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ABSTRACT 
TEE ~:::SU?2:SCTIOX OF JESUS: A ?.A.TIO:K!1 INQUI:ay 
By 
Gary Robert Habermas 
The subject of t~is dissertation is the resurrection of Jesus, 
which is ~erceive~ to be the central doctrine of the Christi~ fait~. 
This subject is treated rationally in regards to the possibility of 
the resurrection being a historical event. 
Research in this topic falls into the realms of three disciplines--
religion, history ~nd philosophy. The entire question is a~ittedly 
~ost related to Christian theology, but there has also been an 
upsurge in the a~ount of interest from contemporary history and 
philosophy as .. ell. Sone of these trends in intellectual thought 
are also investigated. 
This dissertation therefore deals with the problems encountered 
:in a rational approach to the resurrection. .b.s stated above, the 
main purpose is to enieavor to ascertain if this occurrence can be 
de~onstrated to be ~istorical or not. Ec~ever, there are other 
definite i=.plications involved ceyond this immediate purpOSQ, for 
if t!le resurrectio!: actually ha~pened (or if it did n-ot) t!l8re is 
8~rel~T !!2l1cn significance for Christian faith and theology. 
The met~od used is first to investigate some preliminary questions. 
After studyin~ the i=portance of the resurTe~tion in conte2porary 
intellectual thO .... l;-ht (especi'ally in these three disciplines), the 
" 
relation of this eve~t (as a claimed miracle) to science and history 
is examined. Also included is a study of the philosophical problem 
of reason and faith. 
Gary Robert ~abermas 
The ~ain for~at consists of an investigation of three ~ossible 
intellectual app:,"~a.ches to the resurrection. The first possibility 
is that this eve~t did not occ~r literally at all. The second 
possibility is t~at it did occur, but that it cannot be :'e::lonst:;:'ated 
as such. The thiTd possibility is t~at the resurrection did occur 
literally and t!lat it can be demonstrated. It is e:v.tremel;y important 
to note here tl~at the v.-ord !!c.e~cnstrate" is not used as 2. synonym 
for "absolute proof" in this study~ To believe that the l'esurrectior.. 
can be derr.or..stra tea. is thus a reference to probabili ties--tl:at the 
resurrection is the ~ost probable conclusion in light of the fact~al 
evidence. 
The view of one primary scholar from each o~ these three categories 
will be investi;-atec., supple!;1ented by several others ... ;ho ta..'k::e a 
si~ilar position re~arding the occurrence of this event. O~e 
historian (Javid ~uwe), one philosopher (spren Kierkega~rd) and one 
t::eolu5ian C',olfhart Pannenberg) are the p::-i:nary scholars. It is 
not the ove::-all philosophies of t!lese scholars which are st~c.ied, 
but rather their approach to this occurrence. 
Lastly, an evaluation of each of these three possibilities 
i3 given. The object here is to ascertain the approach ";;::ic~~ is 
best supported by the facts. 
The maj or findir..;-s of this study aI-e iiffiC"l.l.l t to sU::'~:2..::-ize 
briefly becaUSe the a::-gu.'l:.ent he::-e is a closely-knit one. ::o-;:-ever, 
it is conclude~'. fi::."st that science ar.d history cannot rul·;:; ou.t the 
::iraculous -::'i thout an investigation. .'i nriori rejectiO!l3 are not 
possible in vie~ of the modern concepts of science and his~ory. In 
Gary Robert ~~cer~as 
i~ order to ascertai~ if miracles such as the resurTectio~ ~ctually 
occurred or not. A~ inductive study of the facts based upo~ the 
proba.bili ty of the .findings is thus the proper procedure and the 
one used here. 
The results show that the literal resurrection of Jesus is in 
all probability a historical fact. Alternate theories are thoroughly 
investigated as part of the three major possibilities outli~ec above. 
It is fou..'"ld that t!:ere are no naturalistic vie ... ;s which adeq,uately 
explai~ the facts. !n addition: there are several stron~ hist~rical 
facts which also :.Joint to this event. Based upon such proor..cilities, 
the resurrection is affirued as a historical event. There r..re also 
certain i~plicatio~s for Christian faith and theo:oGY bec~~se of 
this concli.lsio_l. 
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APP?OACEING TEE QUESTION OF THE 
RESURRECTION OF JESUS 
Chapter I. The Present State of the Question 
The belief in the resurrection of Jesus has raised many questions 
and provoked much thought throughout the history of the Christian 
c~urch. Is such an eveLt pcssible and in what sense, if any? Can 
it still be believed in today or not? This "question of the 
resurrection" has received an increased amount of attention, 
especially in recent years. One quite surprising fact is that the 
discussion surrounding this topic is ne longer relegated just to 
the field of religion alone, as various scholars from other 
disciplines have also shown some interest. 
No one deubts that such inquiry falls primarily into the field 
of theulogy. Therefore we ~ill turn here first i~ order to view 
generally the present state of the question cf Jesus' resurrecticna 
Later we will also deal briefly with the interest in this topic 
shown in two other areas--history and philosophy_ The purpose of 
this chapter is primarily to note some present t~ends related te 
this question, keying on its ~pcrt~ce fer the Christian faith. 
For the purposes of this paper, the resurrect~on will 
initially and briefly be defined in the terms of the Ne~ Testament 
concept. This event thus refers to the Christian belief that 
Jesus ~as actually dead but later was literally raised to life by 
Goi. Jesus was believed to have appeared afterwards to his followers 
in a sniritual body, which was neither an unchanged physical body 
or a spirit. Rather, there ~ere both objective and subjective 
qualities in this spiritual body. The Christi~~ c:ncept of 
res~rection therefore differs from other ideas concerning 
2 
3 
immortality in that Jesus was not reincarnated, neither did he 
simply experience the continuance of his personality beyond the 
grave! nor was his soul absorbed into some type of universal soul. 
T~ the contrary, Jesus was beli~ved to have literally been raised 
from the dead, as he appeared to his followers before his ret~~n 
to heaven. It is this Christian belief in Jesus' resurrection 
which must be investigated here. This definition will continue' 
tc broaden as this work expands. 
Just before we turn to our first section certain cautions are 
in order. Because we are endeavoring to look at both sides of 
the :;:.:."gument and consider views that e:e "pro" &nd "con ii , we must 
take as little as possible fDr granted at the outset. For this 
reason we will refrain in almost all instances from capitalizing 
pronouns fer Jesus, lest we begin to decide the question L~ advance. 
Concerning the l4se of such words as !!this eve!lt" or "this occurrence;; 
when referring to the res~~ectivn, ~e ~: !let me~ to imply that we 
have already decided that it has hap~en~d. Rather, theaa wcr~s 
xefer to what the New Testament claims has happened. Whether it 
actually did or not must yet be determined. Indeed, many theologians 
also refer to the resurrection as an event and still mean that it 
happened in other than a literal way. These words, then, must not 
always refer to something literal and often do not, as we shall 
cza. In these ways the issue will hopefully not be prejudiced 
ahead of time. 
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.8.. Theology and the Resurrection' 
1. The Importance of the Resurrection 
Many theolo~ians today consider the resurrection of Je~us to 
be the central clai= of Christianity, whether they interpret this 
event literally or not. Such was often true of past theolo;i~ns as 
~ell. In other ;.ords, even those who do not affirm the post-mortem 
bodily appearances but so~etimes stress instead the "spiritual 
p:!'e'!:;ence" or "continuing influence" of Jesus often feel that the 
resurrection is still the basis of the Christ~an faith. 
For instance, German redaction critic Y{illi ~\~arxsen believes 
that Jesus' resur=ection plays the most decisive part of t~€ological 
discussion today. This scholar feels that its importance ~as 
precisely stated by the Apostle Paul in the first century ADJ. when 
he wrote "if Christ has not been raised, then our preac~in; is in 
vain and your faith is in vain" (I Cor. 15:14, RSV). For ~arxsen this 
event is therefore linked wit~ the very fait~ of the churc~. An 
l.mcertainty about questions such as those raised above :night cause 
1 
a corresponding uncertainty in cur faith today. 
Another Ger~a~ theo1o;ian, G~nther 30rnka~m, agrees with the 
ulti~ate i~portance of the resurrection, even if it may be i~possible 
to g:-asp exactly what took "lace. He remarks that: 
1 
2 
••• there ,:o:;~ld be no gospel, not one account, no letter in 
the New Testament, no faith, no Church, no worsni~, no prayer 
in Christendo~ to this day without the message of the 
resurrection of Christ ••• 2 
;;i 11i ?·,:arxsen, 'l:'he ?.e surrection of Jesus of !';azareth, tr::::.nsla ted 
b~r }:argaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress ?ress, 1970), p. 12. This 
quote fr0ID I Cor. 15:14 and other Biblical quotes in this work are 
fro~ t'l:1e Revised. Sta:ldard Version of the Bible (!;ew ~orl:; Tb.o:uas 
Nelson and Sons, 1946, 1952). 
G~nther Eornka~, Jesus of ~azareth, t~anslated by Irene and FTaser 
},:cLuskey (KeTr York: rtarpe~ and 3.ow, Publishers, 1960), p. 181. 
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Thus we see t::.e.t for these two critical schola.:-s, theoloGica.l 
discussio~ a~d eve~ theology itself finds its central aspect in the 
resurrection. This of course does not solve the p:-oble~ o~ ~hether 
this event occurreQ or not and in what sense, as this ~ust ~e ;iven 
future conside:-ation. Indeed, both ~tarxsen and Bornk8.!nm do not 
believe ~e can prove it, but only affir~ it by faith.' ~o~sver, 
suc~ state~ents do help serve to demonstrate how important a place 
in the Ch:-istian faith it is given by ~a.ny, and that is the priDary 
o~ject of this cha.pte:-. 
Other sch01a:-s also verify these convictions. For instance, 
Laurence ~:'iller likewise believes that the resurrection of Jesus is 
very heart of "i::sn" '!esta.=::ent theology. Like Ka:-xsen, he finds 
.... 
.,!'!e defi!:itive state~ent of this belief in Paul 4 (I Co:-. 15:12-22). 
7':erri 11 '~'enney nrefe:-s 1;0 use the resurrection as a fra:ne-;:o::-k for 
all of vhristian theology, even dealinG with so:ne of the Qoctrines 
that can be inte;rEte~ under this the~e.5 Charles Anders0n, in a 
section devoted entirely to the importance of the resurrection, also 
speaks of some of the Christia!: doctrines that are ex?lain8~ in the 
New Testa:nent on the basis of this event. Again I Cor. 15:14 is 
3 
4 
5 
~arxsen believes that it is now i~nossible to nrove the :-esurrection 
event (oD.cit., pp. 112-113, 119, i22), but we- can still accept 
the offer of fa.i th in Jesus even if he is dead (Ibid., p~;. 128, 
147). Eornka.w.ffi agrees t!-.:.at the resurrection cannot be den:onstrated. 
or proven to have occurred (on.cit., pp. 180-186; especi~lly 
p? 180, 18L ). But we can still exercise faith .in Jesus apart 
from a!;,y such proof (Ibid., pp. 183, 194). }!ore will be ::;a.i6. about 
the logic of this type of reasoninG la.ter--how it can 8E held by 
so~e ~h2t one can have faith in Jesus whethe:- or not he has risen 
(, • '" 'h • ... '1' d d') ,anc. even 1 ... _.e lS S.,1 ~ ea .• 
Laurence Miller, Jesus Christ Is Alive (Boston: 
1949), p. 9. 
'TT ~ 
',t •• ", • '7ilde Company, 
Uerri~l C. Tenney, The Reality of the Resurrection (Ne~ Yo:-k: liarper 
,;l'- 'Pb"-'h l Q 63) 79 an ..... !tOW, _ U _l:::>_!ers, .I ,pp. -. 
6 
6 
used as a key. 
Closely related views a.re held by other theologians as well. 
The former Anglican Archbishop of Canterbu=y, A.M. Ramsey, believes 
that the resurrection is not only the center of theology, but 
that it is also the starting place for studies revolving around the 
New Test.ment and its meaning. 7 Fer Daniel Fuller the resurrection 
is the basis of redemptiye hi~tory. Events such as the cross 
receive much of their redemptive meaning because they are closely 
associated with the belief in a risen Jesus. 8 C=C~ Dobson asserts 
that even those who oppose all accounts of the resurrection still 
admit its importance as the keystone of Christianity.9 
Every o~ce in awhile a thesis such as the importance of the 
resurrection for the Christian faith iiill receive a new "twist", 
further demo~strating its relevance. This was achieved in recent 
years by ll!arkus :Barth and Verne R. Fletcher, who postulated that 
Jesus' resurrectic~ )las also the basis for Christian This 
event was perceived to have definite implications as a foundation 
for hmnan virt'. .. p. and justice. In spite of its being a li ttle-
recognized theme, the authors believe that it is as relevar.t for us 
6 
7 
I 
8 
9 
Charles Co Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A Continuin-
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 
pp. 157-159. 
A.M. Ramsey,· The Resurrection of Christ (Second edition; London 
and Glascc~~ C~llins: 1965), pp. 9-11. 
Daniel P. Fuller, Easter Faith and 
Eerdman's Publishing Company~ 1965 
Rapids: William 
C.C. Dobson 7 The Em~ty Tomb and the Risen Lord (Second edition 
revised; London and EdinburghJ Marshall, Morgan and Scott, Ltd., 
n.d.), pp. 24-25. 
1 
today in these matters as it is in a strictly theological context. 10 
Even though many of the theologians above differ in other 
aspects of Christian belief, they all perceive that the resurrection 
is the center of theology even today. To be sure, they cone from 
differing backgrounds, b~t they ~re all ~~ agreement ~ith Paul~tb~t 
if' this event was to be cemp1ete1y abrogated, the Christian faith 
woula be in jeopardy. As Marxsen etates, if there is uncertainty 
or obscurity in the matter of belief in the resurrection, then 
Christianity becomes endangered. This demonstrates its importance 
11 
as t~e center of theology today_ 
Before leaving the subject of the importance of Jesus' 
res~rection, it should be mentioned that it is not only an integral 
part of teday's theology. In New Test~ent times it was also the 
doctrine upon which the Christian faith was built. We have already 
discussed Paul's statement to this effect aboye, ~here he states 
"if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in v&in and 
your faith is in vain~~ (I Cor. 15:14; BSV. Cf. verses 12-20). It 
~~~ Paul's opinion that the resurrection of Jesus and the Christia~ 
faith stood or fell together. A stronger statement est~blishing 
the priority and importance of this occurrence for first century 
Christianity could hardly be established. 
Recent theological studies have recognized this importance for 
the early ~hurch~ ~minent Ne~ Test~ent schelar P'~dclf Bult:8n~, 
~hile not personally accepting any sort of literal resurrection of 
10 
11 
Markus Barth and Verne H. Fletcher, Acquittal by Resurrection 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), Foreward, 
pp. V-VIII; cf. p. 3. 
Marxsen, op.cit., p. 12. 
S 
Jesus, still states tha~ for the earliest Christians this event 
served the purpose of proving that God had substantiated the claims 
of Jesus by raising him from the dead. 12 The early Christians alsa 
believed that the resurrection prove~ Jesus' Lordship,13 his 
"'!' • h h' 14 d th t h th S f 15 A ~ess~a ~ ~p an even aeTas e on 0 God. ccording to 
the New Testament the ~esurrection also establishes the Christian 
doctrines of repentance,16 salvation and justification by faith,17 
~nd judgment. lS James McLezan has pointed out that early Christianity 
also witnesses to thebelief that God began neT dealings with man-
kind through the risen Jes~S.19 
Now we must be quick to point out once again that these beliefs 
by no means establish the fact of the resurrection. All we have 
demonstrated is that it is the center Qf Christian theology both in 
New Testament times and today. But this does not make it a proven 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
~udolf BultI:lannp "New Testament and Mythology", in Kerygma. and 
Myth, edited by lians Werner Bartsch, translated by Reginald H. 
Fuller (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), p. 39 
referring to Acts 17:31. 
Uarxsen, on.cit., p. 169, referring to Acts 17:;Of.; Fuller, 
on.cito, pp. 14-15, referring to Rom. 10:9. 
Rudolf Bultmanr., Theology of the New Testament, translated by 
Keudyick Grobel (New York~ Charles Scribner's Sons, n.d.), Part I~ 
p. 27, referrinb to Acts 2:;6 and Rom. 1:4. Cf. also Fuller, 
op.cit., p. 15, referring to Acts 2:22-36. 
Fuller, O!l~ c::i-'.: pp. 15-16!j referring to Rom. 1:4. 
Marxsen, on.cit., p. 169, referring to Acts 16t30f. 
Anderson, on.cit., pp. 158-159, referring to Rom. 4225, 10:9; 
cf. also Barth and Fletcher, op.cit., p. 4 and Tenney, o~.cit.t p.S. 
Marxsen, op.cit., p. 169. 
James McLeman, Resurrection Then and Now (Philadelphia and New 
York: J.B. Lippincott Company, 1967), p. 92; cf. 87 also. 
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fact. ':'he i:lportance of an eV'2nt does not ~ of course? estz.o:.ish 
whether it has actually occurred or not. 
2. The Conte~porary Theological Approach to the Resurx;ction 
Perhaps the pri~ary approach to the theological study of the 
resurrection today from a critical viewpoint is the application of 
the literary methoQs of form criticis:l and the related discipli~e, 
redaction criticis::i to the New Testament texts. 20 Two key ·:·;orks 
dor.e on the resurrection from this standpoint are those by ~Jilli 
-.' 21 .... I" t:r =11 22 ~arxsen an~ rteglna Q _. ~~ ere 
Accordins to ~or~an Perrin, the theological application of 
form critical literary techniques was insinuated in the work of 
Julius :.'el:!.hausen (1544-1918) and an early form of redaction 
criticis~ was first a?plied to theology in the writings of ·::ilhelm 
... . (181:;0 10" .... ) 
·,rec.e .,.1 ...... - ........... 0. After the First ~orld ~ar these stUdies ~ere 
rejuvenater.. Instead of a fe"!: theologians si~ply suggestin,:; the 
for~ critical literary approach to Scripture studies, it became 
the con=.on interest and a major emphasis of such scholars as 
Z.L. Sch:idt (lS91-1?56), ~artin Jibelius (1983-1947) and ~udolf 
20 
21 
22 
It should ~e n~tec that neither foxID or reda~tion criticism is 
actually theolo5j-. ?ather, these are literary methods that have 
been used in diverse endeavors, such as in studying classical 
literature. 1n~7 are +'~exefoTe utilized here as liter~ry 
approaches "hich are presently being applied to the Ne~ Testament. 
These methods are thus referred to as the current theological 
approach to t~s resurrection because they are employe~ by 
theologians and not because these disciplir.es are IDist~~enly 
~eing referred as theology themselv8s. For the relationship 
be't7o"een fO::':::1 and redaction criticis::J., see gorman Perrin's ~at 
is ?edaction::ri ticis:::.?, e:H ted by Dan 0" Via (Philaa.e1phia;--
?ortress ?::'ess, 1971), p. 13 for instance. 
rhe afore:nen"tionec. The Resur~ectio::1 of Jesus of !~azareth. 
~egin~ld ~. Ful~er, The Foroation of the ~esu~rection ~arratives 
(Xe7i Yor!':: The Macoillan Compan:r, 1971). 
10 
Eult~ann (born 1884).2; Eult~ann is probably the one who is best 
known for popularizing for~ criticis~, applying it especially to 
the synoptic gospels anc publishing the results in such ess~ys as 
"mh st d .Z' th <::' t· r. 1" 24 
.. : e u y O.l. e ... ;;.rnop :LC Jospe s • 
Briefly, according to this theory of interpretation, the 
s~"'::;.optic gospels were the products of the fai t!1 of the es.rliest 
first century Christian church. In otter words~ after years of 
orally spreadinz the gospel of Jesus Ctrist (and perhaps also by 
some written records which we no longer have, such as the Quelle 
document), the earliest church decided to write down what it could 
recall of t:h.e life of Jesus. :But since the first Christians were 
not given a complete historical narrative of his life, their 
recollections cou.1d only be of inde'Oe:::dent occurrences.- '::he 
gospels, then, can be broken down into these separate occurrences 
'T."hich in turn correspond to certain forDs. When all of the~e 
occurrer.ces a:::-e d.i vided. up into these fOr:!ls, Bul tr:lann notes the. t Vie 
:!'lave se~ieral classifications such as miracle stories, para:;:;:!..es and 
Since the c~u:::-~~ ~as interested in a cODplete biosrap~y, however, 
these events had to be connected into a day by day acco~t of Jesus' 
life. One can find. a ~ood many of these editorial links th~t tie 
one story to anotber. This is how t!1e likeness to "beads on a string" 
has c~me to be use~ for the fo:::-~ critical approach. A main object 
23 
24 
25 
Perrin, o'O.cit., PI'. 13-15. SODe of 3ultma~~'s conclusions on the 
importa::;.ce of the resurrection in the early chuZ'ch hav~ already 
been noted above. 
Rud.olf Bul tTl.a.n::-.., liThe Study of the Synoptic Gos-oels" i!: Form 
Criticism, tra~slated by Frederick C. G:::-a~t (Ne~ York: Earper 
and Row, Publishers, 1962), pp. 11-76. 
~ultmann, ~., pp. 36-6;. 
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for theologians "ho employ this approach is to ascertain ·::~;.ic!: ~ .... oJ.. wile 
accounts (or parts of accounts) in the gospels are "".ctua.ll~c ::istorical 
stories and which 7.'ere "constructed" by the fai tn of the e2.rly church.26 
~edaction criticisE relies heavily on tte procedures of form 
critici~~ and builds upo~ its pre~ises. In fact, Perrin notes that 
. b f . d" 1" 27 tnese ~ay be seen as eing two stages 0 tne sa~e 1SC11' 1ne. 
Redaction criticism has developed significantly since the work 
done by ~ilhelm ~rede at the end of the nineteenth and be;ir~ing of 
the twentieth centuries. Today more positive attention iz ~iven to 
the gospel authors, as they are seen as having more of an i~tegral 
and original role to play in the choosing of material ani in the 
written portrayal of it. Critics today also feel that a. ?::'i::!ary 
gcs.}. i,; to be able to trace the ::la terial through the vario:.:.s phrases 
of i~:l~cnce, t~rcu~h the va~ious additions by redactors and then 
as closely as possible to the source(s). This ~ill enable them to 
detern:ine, a:!long other things, wher-e the facts originated aIld what 
is at the basis of the reports. The object is, of course~ to 
ascertain the reliability of tte data as ouch as possible, to see 
is historical and what has been added to t!1.e original ~ ~ 28 lac",s. 
Three of the leading redaction critics today, at le2s~ i~ a 
chronological sense, are G~~ther 50rnka=~,29 nans Conzel=a~: and 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
They worked in~ependently on the sy~optic gospels 
Ibid., 1'. 25. 
Ferrin, on.cit., 1'1'. 1-3, 13. 
Ibid., 1'1'. 3, 12-13. 
~ornkamm's belief in the importance of the resurrectio~ for 
Christian theolc~~ has been noted above. 
Some of Marxsen's contributions to the current study of the 
resurrection have also been noted above. 
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of Matthew, Luke and Mark, respectively. In a sense they have 
-1 paved the way for similar stu~ies today.~· 
We have briefly investigated for~ and redaction criti~ism for 
two main reasons. First, its importance as the currently accepted 
literary approach to Eiblical studies should not be underrated. 
We have noted above that some en~ire works and portions of others 
have ~een devoted to studies on the resurrection by scholars who 
favor these two disciplines. 52 Thus farm and redaction criticism 
will provide a basis fer much of what will be said hereafte~. 
Seconds although this writer does not embrace many of the facets 
and conclusions of either form criticism or redaction criticism, 
we will adopt many of its procedures here as the most comwonly 
accepted "rules of the trade". With this ba(;kgrou::ld and. theological 
foundation, it is advantageous to proceed now to two other fields 
of study which have also given recent attention ~o the subject of 
the resurrection. 
E. History, Philosophy and the Resurrection 
We have already stated that one interesting aspect of current 
study on the resurrection of Jesus is that several scholars in other 
fields of study besid.es religion have also become interested in 
31 
32 
Perrin, on.cit., ppo 25-39. 
See, for instance, Marxsen's and R. Fuller's work above, footnotes 
21 and. 22 respectively, which are entirely devoted to the 
resurrection. Portions of many works have also dealt with this 
subject, like those of Bultmann and Bor~~amm cited above, 
footnotes 12 a-~d two, respectively. 
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this question. These men have applied their various . . 2n"er-
disciplinary back;rounds and educations to the problem and have 
u~derstandably co~e to various conclusions. Although these trends 
a.re probably :nost observable in the disciplines of history and 
philosophy, they are no means confined to these two areas. Other 
scholars (and their fields) who have shown as interest in this 
event include C.S. Lewis, the late Cambridge University professor 
of ~n-l;s~ l;·e~~tu~~ 33 .o...J ~ ~ __ .. '" .. c::. __ , J.X.D. Anderson, a lawyer and the University 
34 
f)" !.or.do!l's director of Advanced Legal Studies, Peter L. 3ergers 
f f S - 1 t ':::l t u· . ~ 35 L - C ~ pro essor 0 oc~o ogy a .;1.U gers :uvers~wy, ,ou~s asse.lS, 
. 36 jcurnalist and late colu~nist for ~nited Press Internat~o~&l 
and scientist ~enry ~orris.37 Let us turn now specifically to the 
fields of history and philosophy to observe some of the current 
interest in the question of the resurrection. 
1. 3istor~r and the Resurrection 
It is t:-ue that most ::ode::-n historia.."1s do :-.0: she,;,; an extra-
ordinary acount of interest in the resurrection. Neither ere they 
33 
35 
37 
c.s. Lewis' ~ork ~iracles (~ew York: The Uacmillan C02?ar.y, 1965) 
deals with the resurrectior. on pp. 148-155. 
J.~.J. Anderson has at least two writings dealing with the 
resurrectior.. See Christianity: The ~itness of 3istory (London: 
Tyndale Press, 1969), p~. 84-108 and the boo~let The 3vidence 
for the ?esurrectior:. (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Pres;:;, 1966). 
3er5er's ~or~, A Runor of Ansels (New York: Doubleday?ublishing 
CO!:lpan;y-, 1970) does not deal directly -,-:i th the re surrac"Gion, but 
rather with ths possibility of ~iracles and Supernatural events 
occuri!'l0'. 
Cassels has ~ritten at least two books which deal with the 
question of the resurrection. See This Fellow Jesus (New York: 
?;\rra::lid Public2.tions, 1973) ~ pp. S~-90 and Ch:,istian ?rimer 
(NeT. ~ork: ~ou~leday and Company, Inc., 1967), pp. 23-26. 
One of ~orris! books !!any Infallible ?roofs (San Die~o: Creation-
Life Publishers 7 1974), devotes a chapter to the resurrection, 
pp. 82-97. 
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usually concerned over whether it was a historical event or not. 
Generally the attitude taken in historical works towards this 
occurrence is one either of skepticism3S or one that relates the 
Biblical accounts of the death ~,d resurrection of Jesus only, 
after a short preface which states tithe ~ible claims, ••• ~, or:'ea:rly 
Christians believed that ••• ", or another s~milar e~pression.39 
This general non-interest in the resurrection by historians is 
understandable in view of the fact that many feel that this event 
is an item of faith, even if they believe that it actually occurred. 
Yet there are so~e historians who have investigated this 
event to some extext. It is not our purpose here in this chapter 
to cover all areas of historical inquiry, but rather to briefly 
survey a sample of a few historians who have shown interest in the 
subject of the resurrection. Later the position of historian 
David Hume will be discussed in much more detail, as his viewS 
were extremely influen~ial on the question of miracles. 
Ancient historian Paul Maier has recently published a book 
entitled Fir~t. ~aster.4e This work is concerned to a large 
extent with the first Easter Sunday and the question '~hat did 
ha'O'Oen at d.a.wn on Sunday morning?,,4l His purpose is to try and 
39 
40 
41 
E.G. Wells, The Outline of History, (Two yol~e2; Garde:::J. City: 
Garden City Books, 1949), vol. It pp. 539-540. 
Shepard E. Clough, Nina G. Garsoian and navid L. Ricks, A Eistory 
of the Ancient World (Three volumes; Boston: D.C. ~eath and 
Co:pany, 1967), vol. I, Ancient and Medieval, p. 127. 
Paul L. Maier, First Easter (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1973). 
Ibid., p. 93. The italics are Maier's. 
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42 
ascertain if history can tell us what really happened that day. 
His method is first to investigate the original sources, comparing 
the VRrious accounts of the early church which claim that Jesus 
rose from the dead. Alternate theories are then proposed and 
examined. Lastly, some interesting but seldom mentioned historical 
43 
evidence that bears directly on this issue is studied. 
Maier has also contributed other scholarly articles concerning 
the death and resurrection of Jesus. 44 One, entitled "The: Empty 
Tomb as History", further examines the historical facts surrounding 
t~s event. 45 The conclusion to the article is concerned with 
whether or not the resurrection can be said to be an actual datum 
of history.46 We will return to some of Maier's conclusions later. 
Another ancient historian, Edwin Yamauchi, has also written of 
the resurrection. His investigation is found in the two-part 
article entitled "Easter--Myth, Hallucination or Hi story? ,,47 He 
explores carefully each of the possibilities named in the tit1e--
the resurrection seen as an ancient myth, as an hallucination and 
as actual history. Yamauchi concludes first that the Christian 
concept of Jesus' resurrection could not have been derived from the 
myths in ancient cultures such as those of the Sumerians, Babylonians 
or Egyptians, which appear to espouse a belief in dying and rising 
42 "Can history tell us what actually happened on that crucial 
dawn?" (Ibid., p. 114. The italics are Maier's). 
43 
44 
Ibid., cf. especially pp. 93-122. 
See, for instance, Paul L. Maier, "Who Was Responsible for the 
Trial and Death of Jesus?" Christianity Today, April 12, 1974, 
pp. 8-11. 
45 Paul L. Maier, "The Empty Tomb as History", Christianity Today, 
March 28, 1975, pp. 4-6 
46 Ibid. 
47 Edwin M. Yamauchi, "Easter--Myth, Hallucination or History?", 
Christianity Today, two parts, March 15, 1975, pp. 4-7 and 
March 29, 1975, pp. 12-16. 
u 
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vegetation gods. These latter myths reveal both far too superficial 
resemblances and even very questionable. evidence concerning this. 
belief in a "resUrrection" to have been the basis of belief for 
J ,.. 48 esus rl.Sl.ng. 
Yamauchi's second conclusion is that the hypothesis of 
hallucination is likewise not a strong enough im~etus ·for.belief 
the resurrection of Jesus. None of the needed psy.chological pre-
requisites for visions are found in the New Testament accounts. For 
instance, the disciples were very despondent at the death of Jesus 
and failed to believe even after percei~ing that he had risen, 
whereas hallucinations occur when individuals imagine beforehand 
that a certain thing has, in fact~ happened. Visions are produced 
when people think so ~ositively that they actually visualize what 
they desire and the disciples were certainly not in this frame of 
mind after Jesus' death. The facts simply do not provide support 
for this theory at all. The conditions nee~ed fer hallucinations 
were plainly laCking. 49 
The final conclusion reached by Ya~&uchi is that the resurrection 
of Jesus is a historical event .nd must ~e dealt with as such. It 
simply cannot be termed as an existential occurrence and neither can 
it be forgotten about as a simple myth or delusio~.5C 
We will at this point just quickly mention two other scholars 
in this field who also have dealt with the resurrection in their 
~crks. ~istorian and theologian John Warwick Montgomery has dealt 
48 
50 
llll., ll:arch 15, 1914: pp .. 4-6. 
Ibid., pp. 6-7. We will turn to this theory in greater depth 
later in this paper. 
~.9 p. 7 and Harch 29, pp. 12-16. 
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with this question in several works ~hich are directly concerned 
with historical methodology. 51 Church historian William Wand has 
:::" 
alsc fit the resurrection into an explicit historical framework. J ' 
Rather thall explore the vie~s of these two men at this point, we 
will return to them much more fully in the chapter on histo=y and 
miracles. S~ffice it to say at this time that while historians 
as a whole have not been overly concerned with Jesus' resuxre~tion, 
it has been dealt with by several in this field. Thus it is the 
opinion of these scholars (and others) that this question is a 
historical one, to be decided by historical inquiry. Maier, 5; 
Yamau.chi;54 montgomer),55 and wand5' all agree that the question 
of the occurrence of the resurrection should be decided by the 
historical process of carefully weighing the evidence both for 
and against this event before a decision is made. 
2. Philosophy and the Resurrection 
As with most of the historians, so we also fin~ that most 
contemporary philosophers are not often concerned with the question 
of Jesus' resurrection. But we find that several of these scholars 
51 
52 
5; 
55 
56 
For instance, see John Warwick Montgomery's, .The Shane of the 
Past: An !~troduction to Philoso hical.HistoriogranhY (Ann Arbor: 
Edwards Brothers, Ince: 1962 and Where is History Goin~ . (Grand 
Rapidsz Zondervan Publishing House, 196~). 
William Wand, Christianity, A Historical Religion? (Valley Forge: 
Judson Press, 1972). 
Maier, "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., p. 6. 
Yamauchi, op.cit., March 29, 1974, p. 16. 
Montgomery, Where i8 History Going?, op.cit., pp. 71, 93. 
Wand, op.cit. t pp. 9;-94; cf. also pp. 51-52, 70-710 
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have also dealt with it as a part of their system of thought. As 
with the theologians, these philosophers ofter a variety of approaches 
and answers to this· event. Similar to the preceding short section 
on history, it is not our object in this chapter to treat every 
field of philosophy. To the contrary, the purpose here is simply 
to present a sample 'of a few philosophers who have dealt uith 
the resurrection in their works. Later the positions of David 
Rume and Spren Kierkegaard ~ill be examined in depth. Hume 
especially is recognized even by conservative theologi~s as 
offering a challenge to the belief in a literal resurrection and 
Kierkegaard also develcps a popular philosophical view of this 
event. Eut at present it is our desire only to state the interest 
shown by a few philosophers of various intellectual inclinations. 
Probably the best known philosopher who has .investigated 
this occurrence is john Hick. In his essay "Theology and 
Verificatio!1.,,57 he approaches the ancient topic of the possibility 
of verifying the existence of God. This is done in an interesting 
and novel (if so~e~hat questionable) manner. 
For Eick, one cannot prove God's existence beyond ~~y doubt. 
Eowever, the author believes that one can reason logically to the 
nrobability of Godts existence ~y the use of what he terms 
"eschatologica.l" (or fu.ture) verification. 58 
The Christian faith (and various others as well) teach the 
reality of life after death. For Eick this concept of continued 
57 
58 
John Hick, "Theology and Verification", in Re.ligious Language. 
and the Proble~ of Reli-ious Knowled e, edited by Ronald E. 
Santoni Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968). This 
article first appeared in Theology ~oday, volume 17, 196Q, pp. 12-31. 
Ibid., pp. 367, 376. 
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survi vfI.l is one whi ch wi 11 ultimately be verified after dee. tho In 
other words, the future resurrection of mankind can be verified 
cAp.ari~:ntially by each individual after his own personal dea.th. 
The post-morte~ knowledge one gains would prove that life does 
survive death. 59 
Concerning this odd-scunding apologetic for life. after death, 
Hick attempts to explain how this is possible by the introduction 
f 1 . t t' . 11 . t· 6u o severa ~n eres ~ng ~ us~ra ~ons. He feels that ulti~ately 
the question of i~ortality ma.y be likened to two men walking down 
the road of life. One says that there is life after death at the 
end of the road, the other disagrees. Eut for them it is an 
experiential question. Sooner or later they will each turn the 
last bend in life and die. Then one will have been proven right 
and one wrong. This is eschatological verification of immortality.6l 
Even verification of the existence of God is to be found by 
the same future experience. Rere ~ick appropriates the role .that 
Jesus plays. As we experience the risen Jesus and his reign in the 
Kingdom of God, ~nd finally receive eschatological corroboration 
for this, we then also receive indirect verification of God. Thus 
the individual's own resurrection is the ultimate, experiential 
proof both of life after death and of God's existence. These truths 
are thu.s perceived as realities. Everyone will eventually prove 
the validity of these facts for themselv;es, howev·er, because all 
will achieve this salvation and subsequent state of verificationQ62 
59 ~., p. 375. 
6Q Ibid., pp. 371-375. 
61 ill.2:. , 368-369. pp. 
62 lli~. , 576- 381. pp. 
20 
Unfortunately, Hick;s perception of the ability of one's own 
resurrection to verify such key tenets of theology raises more 
questions than it answers. It is interesting, to say the least, but 
it fails to logically reason out (and even presupposes) too m~ny 
beliefs such as life after death and the ability to verify something 
such as God's existence even if the first was proven to be true. 6; 
Hick realizes that his hypotheses and those of Ian Crombie who also 
accepts eschatological verifica.tion, have both been met 'by 
disapproval from other philosophers and from theologians, but still 
feels that this is the best alternative in establishing the truth 
of theism. 64 Thus, while we must conclude that none of these 
doctrines can really be proven in this way, it does show the 
interest of a certain segment of philosophy in the question of the 
resurrection. 
nut it is ~ct vuly in the writings of Rick (and those who a~ee 
with him) that we find an interest in the subject of the resurrection. 
The recent popularity of process thought has apparently opened up 
a new area of interest in the formulating, among other things, of 
a Christology based on process philosophy. For inst~ce, Schubert 
Ogden's prospects for the de~elopment ~f & ~ew Theism have led him 
to a reinterpretation of the resurrection based on the love of GOd. 65 
Co; • 
... ..,. 
65 
Cf. ~., pp. 375-37' for instance., where Hick admits that it 
would be easy to conceive of after-life experiences that would 
E21 at ·all verify theism, but he does not entertain the objections. 
Ibid., pp. 367-368. 
Schubert M. Ogden, "Toward a New Theism", in Process Philosophy. 
and Christian Thought, edited by Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr. 
and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 
1971), p. 183. Cf. also Ogden's examination of a modern approach 
to the resurrection in his work The Reality of God and Other 
Essays (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1,66)~ pp. 215-220. 
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Another example is Bernard Loomer's attempt to explain the Christian. 
~ "th " 1 d" th t"" t f ~"l h 66 .a~ ,~nc u ~ng e resurrec ~on, ~n erms ~ process p ~ osop y. 
In the work Precess Philosophy and Christian Thought, Peter 
Hamilton proposes a modern Christology with a special emphasis 
upon the resurrection. For Eamilton, process philosophy offers the 
proper framework within which one can more properly view and 
formulate theology. This philosophy is perceived to "e especially 
helpful in dealing with the resurrection. 67 
The key term that H~ilton adopts from process philosophy here 
is "immanence", which refers to the possibility of one reality being 
immanent or indwelt by another. This is illustrated by the way we 
often refer to the experiences of one individual "living on" in 
68 
another's memory. 
When applied to the relationship between God and the world, im-
manence is a reference both to God's indwelling mankind and man-
kind!s indwelling God. As liamilton applies this concept to 
Christology, we may now speak of the chief example of God's 
indwelling mankind as having occurred in the incarnation. Here God 
indwelt Jesuso We can also perceive that the primary example of 
mankind's indwelling God is to be found in the resurrection. Here 
66 
67 
68 
Bernard M. Loomer, "Christian Faith and PrOCesS Philosoph3''' in 
Process Philoso~hy and Christian Thought, Ibid., pp. 91, 95 for 
his treatment of the ~esurrection. 
Peter N. Hamilton, "Some Proposals for a Modern Christology"in 
Process Phi1osonhy and Christian Thought, Ibid., pp. 371, 376, 
379, 381. 
lE.,ti., p. 379. 
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Jesus is said to "live on" in God. 69 By "live on" it is meant 
that it is Jesus' experiences, ideas and actions that were raised 
into God. 'iie a.re therefore to il.."lderstand tha.t his resurrection is 
the most outstanding instance of God's desire and purpose to raise 
into Himself everything else that compliments His own character as 
well. 70 
It is obvious here that the resurrection is not inte~preted 
literally. For Hamilton, the disciples had ~ ~cd-given awareness 
(E£! self-generated, it is emphasized) that Jesus was somehow still 
both alive and present with them. This was the beginning of the 
Easter experience. But they did not ha.ve an actual encounter with 
the risen Lord as portra.yed in th~ N~w Testament gospels. 7l 
Hamilton rea.lizes, however, that t~ere are some serious 
c=iticisms regarding his views. One is that the uniqueness of 
Jesus' resurrection has not been properly maintained. Rather, this 
occurrence is only a model for other such actions of God. 12 
Another criticism (which is admitted by liamilton to be a 
stronger one) is that, according to this interpretation, the "risen" 
Jesus is not really alive although the disciples believed that he 
was because of the aforementioned God-5~ven awareness of this fact. 
69 Ibid., pp. 319-380. 
70 ~., pp. 378, 381. 
71 Ibid., pp. 371, 375, 380. 
72 ng., pp. 377-378. 
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In other words, the New Tes~~ent writers witness to a risen Jesus 
who was really alive and the author agrees with this conviction as 
well. Otherwise there would be no origin for the Easter faith. 
Yet, this thesis does not allow for the type of resurrecti.on that 
would give rise to such a belief. Hamilton admits that this 
criticism is a valid one to a certain extent.1 ; 
The last scholar to be dealt with briefly at this time is 
Swiss philosopher Francis Schaeffer. Formerly an agnostic? 
Schaeffer became convinced through personal research that belief in 
God was rational. 14 Afterwards he became concerned to a large 
extent that rationality must be kept in ~eligious belief and that 
knowledge must precede faith (but certainly not to the exclusion 
of faith).1; 
Exploring this concept of rationality in Christian belief, 
Schaeffer came to espouse the view that Godls revelation occurred 
in history and is thus open to verification. 16 An event "hich is 
reported to have happened can be examined and found to be either 
a valid claim or to be some sort of falsehood. This is the nature 
of historical revelation. For Schaeffer~ the death and resurrection 
13 
14-
15 
16 
Ibid. '. p. 378~ 
Francis Schaeffer, Esca~e from Reason (Downers Grover Inter-
Varsity Press, 1968), see pp~ 84-85 for instance. 
Francis Schaeffer, The God Who is There, (Downers Grove: Inter-
Varsity Press, 1968), pp. 112, 142. 
Schaeffer, The God Who is There, ~., p. 92; see also Schaeffer's 
Escane from Reason, on.cit., p. 17. 
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of Jesus are both verifiable in this way. They are referred to as 
actual historical facts which literally occurred in our space-time 
world. 77 
We have in this chapter investigated both the importanc~ of 
the resurrection of Jesus and the current theological approach to 
it as a religious occurrence. In addition, we have examined the 
views of several scholars from various other fields (especi~lly 
history and ph~losophy) who have also shc~ varying degreeS of 
interest in this event. 
We have found that the resurrection is the central event in 
the Christian faith and thus of eentral importance in theology. 
Therefore the questions raised here concerning its character are 
both valid and consequential ones. 
The contemporary theological approach to the resurrection was 
found to be one that utilizes the literary methodology inherent in 
form and redaction criticism. liopefully through a study of this 
Event, =sking use of these disciplines, we will be able to make a 
judgment as to its credibility. 
We have also seen that there appears to be a surprising interest 
in the resurrection by scholars in ether fields besides religion. 
This especially appears to be the case in history and philosophy. 
The purpose fer cur investigation of several views in these two 
specific fields is threefold. First, it enables us to understand 
that this question is not one that is isolated to the fiel~ of 
77 Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, ~., pp. 79, 90 and Schaeffer's 
The Church Before the Watching World (Downer's Grove: Inter-
Yersity Press, 1971), pp. 98-99. 
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religion and theology alone. Second, it serves to familiarize us 
with some views of the resurrection that are surprisingly close to 
those proposed by some theologians which ~ill be refeTred to 
constantly. Third, this previous discussion prepares the way for 
our later investigation of three scholars (one theologian, one 
historian and one philosopher) who deal with these questions 
concerning the resurrection in much more depth, thus relating all 
three fields together in a "search for the truth" on this issue. 
Chapter II. The Possibility of Miracles To~ay 
The question of whether or not miracles have occur.redin the 
past (or whether they are possible today) is one that has far-
reaching consequences much beyond the field of theology. We will 
turn now to an examination of some major possibilities. 
A. Mira.cle and Myth 
1. A Definition of Miracle 
In searching for a possible definition for "miracle", one 
encounters many approaches and conclusions. However, there are 
sevc~al similarities and poiuts concerning which most appear to be 
in agreement. We must realize, though, that the definition we 
arri ve a. t actually has nothing to do with the prob.lem of whether 
the events that are defined thusly really do occuro For example, 
many scholars who do not believe ttat ~iracles happen at all still 
define them as occurrences which are not caused by nature and which 
~ust be performed by God. They simply believe that no such events 
ever take place. Therefore we see that the definition does not mean 
that a certain type of phenomenon nas happened. 
Eultmann is just suoh a schola~ who believes that our modern 
world is enough to make us reject all miracles. The ancient view 
of the world is obsolete and we no longer rely on its cosmology or 
1 
mythological language. Even so, it is recognized that at least 
1 Bul tmann, "New Testament and Mythology", in Kerygma. a.nd Myth 9 
on.cit., pp. 1-5. 
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the New Testament de~ines miracles as events which occur due to 
the Supernatural intervention of God rather than by the po~er of 
nature. For Eultmann, the purpose of miracles is to express 
spiritual truths that may otherwise be unexplainable. 2 
Bistorian and philosopher David Hume, who also rejects the 
miraculous, relates that: 
A miracle may be accurately define~a tr~~gression of a 
law of nature by a ~articular volition of t~~ Deity. or 
by the inter~osition of some invisible agent. (The italics 
are Hume's.); 
Once again we find that while Rume clearly rejects the miraculous 
(as we shall pe=ceive in more detail later), he defines these 
occurrences as the intervention of God or of another invisible 
agent. Philosopher Richard Swinburne accepts essentially the 
same definition, realizing that in 80 doing he is close to Rume's 
. 4 
v~ew. 
English scholar C.S. Lewis defines miracles as follows: 
I use the word Miracle to mean ~~ interfe=ence with Nature 
by supernatural power. Unless there exists, in addition 
to Nature, something else which we may call the suner-
natural; there can be no mira~les. (The italics ar~ Lewis'.)5 
Like the other definitions, here Lewis also conceives of miracles 
as having a direct affect on nature. Eut the mi~acles are seen as 
2 
3 
4 
5 
~., pp. 34-35, 39~ 
David Rume, Essential Works of David Hume, edited by Ralph Cohen 
(New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1965), p. 128, footnote 3. 
Richard Swinburne, The Concent of Miracle (London: Macmillan and 
st. Martin's Press, 1970), p. ll~ 
Lewis, on~cit., p. 10. 
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being brought less forcefully into the world. Lewis perceives of 
nature as an entity which can receive such extraordinary occurrences 
into its own pattern of events when they are caus~d by Supernatural 
power. Thus they do interfere with the laws of nature, but do not 
6 break them. These miracles are not taken fOT gr~~ted by the author, 
however, but are investigated to ascertain if they actually did 
occur.1 
The last definition of miracles which we will state is that of 
theologian John McNaugher, who agrees with Lewis in asserting that 
these occurrences are out of the normal sequence of events in 
nature. They cannot be explained by natural processes, but are due 
to the agency of God. They are obvious to the senses and designed 
for the purpose of authenticating a message. 8 
In these five definitions of miracles there are obviously 
several similarities (as well as same differences). For instance, 
all five scholars are agreed (to varying extents) that real miracles 
require Supernatural interveution and are not to be explained 
naturallYo9 All five also believe that these occurrences have a 
direct relation to the laws of nature, requiring some sort of 
interference. Some think that miracles h~ve a purpose. Eut all 
1 
8 
9 
~., pp. 47, 60. 
~., pp. 148-169 for instance. 
John McNaugher, Jesus Christ. the Same 
(New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 
In the case of Eultmann we are referring to this scholar's 
Forever 
references to what "miracle" meant in the New Testament, as mentioned 
above. Like Hume he does not believe they occur, but ~ants 
that this was still believed to be the definition of the word in 
first century Christian thought. 
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are not agreed, for instance, as to whether these miracles actually 
occur or not. In other words, it is possible in this case to 
describe what an occurrence ~ould entail if it were io happen, 
~hile not actually believing that there are such events. Nevertheless, 
there is a surprising amount of similarity in these definitions 
for scholars who disagree on this last pOint. 
In this paper, the writer will refer to a miracle as an event 
which interferes with the laws of nature, but does not violate them. 
They cannot be explained by any natural causes (including man's 
power) and thus must be accomplished by some type of Supernat~al 
activity. They are effected for a purpose and may be perceived by 
man's senses. The ~uestion now is to ascertain if there really are 
such events. 
2. A Definition 
A discussion of mi~acles should ideally also include an inquiry 
into the meaning of myth. We will attempt to explore a couple of 
earlier meanings of the word and some modern definition~ of it. We 
would thus endeavor to disoover .hat myth is and what function it 
plays in society. 
Originally,lOmyths were generally defined by scholars as 
fictitious narratives containing very little or no factual content. 
lQ For a very brief introduction to the question of some older 
theories concerning the origins of myth? see Daniel Dodson'S 
introductory essay "What is 'Myth'?" in Thomas Eulfinch's The 
Age of Fable (Greenwich: F~~cett Publications, Inc., 1961), 
pp. VI, IX. For an examination of the origins of myth according 
to many historians of religion, see Burton E. Throckmorton's 
The Kew Testament and l.~vtholo (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1959 , pp. 81-85. 
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They were mainly concerned with stories of gods, goddesses and 
11 questions about the cosmos. Because of such content, myths were 
judged to be simply fiction. The definition was one which implied 
the essential contradiction between myth and history.12 
Later, the word also came to mean a fictitious story revolving 
around a historical personage, circumstance or event, but one which 
was not really factual. 13 Perhaps an e%ample of this type of 
popular myth would be the narrative of how George Washington chopped 
down a cherry tree and chose the subsequent punishment rather than 
tell a lie concerning his actions. 
There is much disagreement as to a suitable definition of myth 
14 todayo This is made even more difficult by the variations in the 
definition utilized by scholars from different disciplines. 15 One 
popular pract~ce is. to define myth as being the opposite of 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Wand, op.cit., p. 40; see also James K. Feibleman's article 
"Myth" in the J);ctionary of Philoso-ohy, edited by Dagobert Runes 
(Totowa: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1967), p~ 203. 
Wand, llli. 
Runes, on.cit., p. 203. 
For instance, see Mircea Eliade! The Quest: History and ii.eani:lg 
in Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969j, 
p. 72f. See alse Throckmorton, o-o.cit., p. 80. 
Victor Turner's article "Myth and Symbol" in the International 
clo edia of the Social Sciences~ edited by ~avid L. Sills 
no city: The Macmillan Co~pa.ny and The Free Press, 1968), 
vol. 10, pp. 576-582. For the definition of "myth!! employed in 
Ii terature, for example, see James F. Knapp, ''Myth in the Power-
house of Change", The Centennial Review, Winter, 1976, P1'o 56-74. 
Cf. Wesley Barnes, The Philoso-ohy and Literature of Existentialism 
(Woodbury: Barron's Educational Series, 1968), pp. 34-40. 
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history, thereby signifying that it is almost completely untrue in 
16 
a factual sense. 
As used by most contemporary theologians and religious scholars, 
myth is not usually taken to be so ur~ealistic. The emphasis is 
clearly placed most often on the f~~ction of the myth a~d on what 
such a concept is supposed to accomplish in socie~y. Thus, 
theologians are more interested in studying the message which the 
myth is meant to convey. 
For nineteenth century theologia.~ David Strauss, n~h is the 
clothing for the expression of religious truths. For this reason, 
one must endeavor to ascertain the societal f~~ction and meaning 
givenLo C:i my ~h, trying to understand the religious message being 
communicated by means of this imagery. The importance of Strauss' 
view of IDJ~b is that before r~s time this concept was either not 
" . ~ 17 
completely recognized or not applied consls~en~~y. 
Rudolf Bul tTIlaJ.lll believes that Hev: Testament lI'.;)rth is essentially 
~~storical, but that its pri~ry purpose is to express existentia: 
... ths abo'''' rna 18 Thus, this scholar also agrees that thi.s vrli ~ u." n. 
19 q~G3tic~ ,,+, the mytl':! S pu.rpose is the key one. Bul tmann freE:;:l.j 
16 
17 
18 
10 
~/ 
See S. H. Hooke, Ivuddle Eastern M'fthology ( Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1966), who lists this view as one w~ich is still employed in 
current treatments of this subject (p. 11). See also Wand, op. cit., 
p. 40. 
See Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans-
lated by W. Montgomery ( New York: The Ma.cmillan Company, 1968), 
pp. 78-79; cf. D~v'id Str:!U88 I '-'fork The Old Faith and the i~ew, 
tra."1s1ated from the sixth edition by Uathilde Blind (New York: 
Heru:J Holt and Company, 1874), pp. 56-59 for instance. 
Bultmmm, llNew Testamer.t a"1d Ylfchology:' in Kerygma and 1'.1yth 
op.cit., especially pp. 1-11. Cf. Schubert Ogden, Christ Without 
:Myth ,New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1961), pp. 39-40. 
TJ:1.rockmortcn, op. cit., p. 23; cf. Jor.n Macq,uarrie, An Existentia::::"ist 
Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 172-17:3. 
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admits that the actual imagery of the myth is not the most important 
part of mythology. Rather, the recovery of its message about 
human existence is the most essential thing. 20 The stress here is 
also on understanding what the myth was intended to accomplish. 
Few scholars have done more research on the idea of myth than 
has Mircea Eliade. For Eliaae, myths are accounts of deeds which 
are always acts of creation, in that they speak of some reality 
coming into existence. Myths are very complex cul~~ral Jactors 
whose main function is to serve as models for the rites and other 
important activities of humans. Taus myths present religious 
explanations for what is believed to have occurred. For this reason, 
a myth is perceived to be an actual reality in that it always 
' .... 
depicts something that has happened, such as the beginning of the 
world or the fact of death. 2l 
Eliade stresses the symbolic character of such myths. They 
are capable of revealing something which is deeper than known 
reality. Such symbols point to various facets of human existence. 
Perhaps the most important aspect of mythical symbolism is that 
truths can be expressed by this mode which can ~e expressed coherently 
in no other way. It is therefore very important to study the 
message of the my~h. Scholars who de not discover this function of 
22 
myth fail in their endeavor to understand this concept. 
20 
", 
...... 
22 
Bu.l t!!!ann~ JlNew Testamer ... t and Mythology" in Ke:!'ygma and Myt'h; 
op.cit., pp. 10-11. 
Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, translated by William ~. Task 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 5-14. 
Mircea Eliade, Me~histonheles and the Andro 
Reli:xious l~;vth and Svmbol, transla.ted by J .!,~o 
Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 201-208. 
in 
11'ew Yorks 
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For S.H. Hooke, myth is ~till viewed as being essentially 
nonhistorical, but it nevertheless is & result of a particular 
circumstance and therefore it does have a purpose. Thus the 
proper approach is not to try to determine how much actual truth it 
contains, but rather to determine what the real function of the 
myth is--what it is supposed to accomplish. As with Eliade~ Hooke 
stresses that the function of a myth 'is to use imagery to express 
tr~ths that otherwise could not be explained. 23 
These definitions of myth have pointed to at least a few 
general conclusions with which many theologians seem to oe in 
agreement, at least to a certain extent. Myths can be identified 
as the use of various types of imagery to portray different aspects 
of life (real or imaginary), including one's beliefs, customs or 
folklore. Mytns are essentially nonhistorical, but they may 
reflect actual occurrences and teach religious or moral truths. 
th d h " t 1 f t" 24 My soave a soc~e a unc 1on. They are often the devices 
by which one can express what otherwise would be inexpressible, 
~hether it concerns cosmology, man's existence, the Divine or one's 
religious and moral beliefs. In other words, myths serve the 
function of allowing various societies tc speak of treasured 
beliefs, mysteries and customs in a way that ordinary language 
2; 
24 
Hooke, op.cit., pp. 11, 16. 
For Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the inte~ingling of 
theology and culture, see his work History and Truth, translated 
by Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston, Northwestern University 
Press, 1965), pp. 177-179 for example. 
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might not ~uite be able to duplicate. This could be either 
because of a lack of proper words or a lack of th~ necessary 
knowledge needed to explain these things. Fo~ instance, mythical 
imagery could easily have been employed to explain certain cosmic 
e7ents such as eclipses. In this way societies could pass on 
verbal or written accounts of their experiences. That this was an 
important function of myth is witnessed by the discoveries through-
out various parts of the world pointing to this usage. 25 
These general conclusions will be the basis for the definition 
of myth that will be used in this paper. Briefly, myth will mainly 
be utilized to refer to the essentially non~istorical use of imagery 
by societies in order to express certain beliefs, customs or events. 
They allow people to speak of realities that might be much harder 
to express apart fro~ the use of this imagery. 
The distinction between miracle and myth is a~ i~portant one. 
It will be the purpose of the remainder of this paper to investigate 
the resurrection of Jesus in light of these definitions. Was this 
occurrence a myth voicing the beliefs of early Christendom, or was 
it a literal event re~uiring Supernatural action? Our investigation 
will thus view the evidence of each possibility in order to ascertain 
where it peints in regard to this question. We agree with Wand in 
the assertion that it is very important to distinguish myth from 
history. The purpose of the myth must be determined and real history 
must not be confused with the myth. 26 Therefore, each has its own 
25 Hooke, on.cit., pp. 19-32. 
26 Wand, op.cit., p. 42. 
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purpose and it will be our task not to let the two become 
indiscriminately mixed. 
E. Twentieth Century Science and Miracles 
1. Introduction 
It is a common practice today to conceive of science and the 
miraculcus as being totally opposed. Bultmann, for instance, rejects 
early Christian cosmology on the grounds that it is opposed to 
modern science. All of our contemporary knowledge is based on 
science and this includes an application of its laws to the study 
of the New Testament. 27 Thus Bultmann speaks of the relationship 
between science and miracles: 
It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and 
to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, 
and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world 
of spirits and miracles.28 
Thus this scholar believes that we live in too modern an age to 
believe in miracles. The world is closed to such occurrences. 29 
The Supernatural simply does not occur and is therefore quickly 
dismissed, often arbitrarily. 30 Others also agree with Bultmann's' 
approach. 31 
27 
28 
29 
;0 
;1 
Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and: Uyth, 
on.cit., pp. 1-10. 
ill.£., p. 5. 
~., pp. 4-5; cf. Montgomery, Where is History Going?, op.cit., 
p. 194, especially footnote number 37. 
Eultmann, ~., p. 38; cf. Macquarrie, op.cit., pp. 185-186. 
Cf. for examnle John A.T. Robinson's Honest to God \ Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 1;-18. 
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This line of reasoning is not very recent, however. For a 
couple of hundred years prior to t!'!e twentieth century ma!:y have 
also held ~hat science ruled mi~acles out. The universe was 
usually seen as being a closed system, meaning aEong other things, 
that it could not be interferred with by the Supernatural. James 
Jauncey deiines it this nay: 
The standpoint of science was that nature was a (closed 
universe'. This meant that everything within the -(.l..'1iverse 
was governed by an ~'1varying sequence of cause and effect. 
The universe was closed to any occurrences which deviated 
f~o::l this pattern •••• Whenever you had a certain co~bination 
of factors operating, the ~esult was always the sa~e and 
could not be different. Miracles, on the other hand, could 
not be fitted into this framework of cause and"effect.52 
This view of ~iracles is actually found very early in critical 
thought. ~e ne~d not wait ~til the eiehteenth and nineteenth 
centuries to find this opinion expressed against the possibility of 
::li~acles. For instance, seventeenth centu~y philosophe~ 38nedict 
Spinoza (1632-1677) also opposed ::;i~aculous events which .. ;e::.'e 
said to b~eak the law~ of nature. 33 
Since the be;i~ing of the t~entieth century, however, science 
has begu:l to chan;e theSe former ;:oz1ce;:.tions about the wo~kines of 
nature. In ~an;s past history there have been many scientific 
revolutions. 34 In the opinion of most, we are living today in the 
32 
33 
James H. Jauncey, Science Returns to God (Grand ~apids: Zo~derY~~ 
Publishing House, 1966), p. 37. Cf. also philosopher Gordon 
Clark's statements about the mechanism of the nineteenth century 
in his essay "Eultmann's Three-Storied Universe" in Christianity 
TodaY9 edited by FTank E. Gaebelein (Westwood: Fleming E. Revell 
Company, 1968), pp. 218-219. 
5enedict Sninoza, The Chief Works of :Benedict De S~inoza, 
t~anslated-by 3.E.~. Elwes (Two volumes; New York: Dover 
?ub1ications, Inc., 1951), vol. I, p. 87. 
See Tho~as S. Kuh~, The structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Volu:!Ie II, Xu::ber 2 of the Inter:1.ational E:1.cyclo-oedia of Unified 
Science, edited by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris 
(Chicago: University of Chicago P~ess, 1971). 
37 
r:rl.dst cf jL..,t such a revc..:...ui:~.on. Jauncy states in his Introd\:::!tion 
err:.i tl.;.-· 1:'~'1e Scien+.i fic Revolution!!: 
':i.l:,' ev .. J.. ..... ·• ~ .~~ are ~iling up that we are in the midst of the 
greatest: ":. ..;.or.. in human living since the Renaissance. 
This is due .~ ... t;'.e tremendous explosion in scientific 
kncwledge which has been occurring within the last few years. 
:C:ven for thoSE:: of u;:; who ::;,ave been close to the frontiers 
vf 3cizn~c ~l cf O~ lives, it is hard to believe what 
is happeni.Tlg. 35 
\'JI1a':~ ".re the :::-esu:;':~s of these changes a...Tld how do they affect 
the possibility of m:.rQ;:J.·:s? Jaunc:; relates that one result of 
... ·h.b ::.'.;is::~l ~:i.fic revol'J:tic·~·~ is that today the idea of a closed 
iIDi verse is rej ecte:i., Sciertific research :has replaced this other 
.;i,~ ... .., y;i th a new iIDdersta....Tlding of nature. 36 Clark also notes that 
"he ldea of causality was dropped by science about one hundred 
y~~rs ago and the belief in a me~~~~stic universe has ~lso come 
::nd.er at.tE:!k, 37 T.h~ resu~ :.ing ne','; view of nature is sonetimes 
.r'eferred ~.0 by sue;: ti-cles :..;.s the ITEinsteinian-relativistic inter-
""J:::'et,G. ti c:-, of : na tU:r'8 'j. 2-d. ...... ! IT ::""'lJ perceived as being essentially 
38 
opposed j:0 lithe YlOrld of NpTItonia-r:. absol'.ltes TT .. Thomas S. Kuhn 
., i ~; .. ) believe:.; +.'''at the t)1.:nr'ies I)f Einstein are incompatible VIi th 
tl18 oJ.d.e..:' ones fOrill1..!lated b:r Ne·w-con. In fact, we can only accept 
tn:.s '::ins-ceinia.'1 s~f:3~en: after recognizing that the theories of 
'1.-
:/ 
36 
37 
38 
39 
10 
• ..L ." / ~n~orrev·~ . 
::;I!li::e::t German -physicist Werner Schaaffs 
describinc these comparatively recent trends 
_ ..... , 37 ">0 ::..::..:2..) pp. - .-IV. 
Cl[;.rk, TTBu1tma..Tln! s Three-St:,ried Universe TT in Gaebe1ein, op.cit., 
:..::p. 21~-219. 
~'''Ollc.-:, Warwick I ... bntgo!TIe~:'Y, The S~ of Christian Theology 
(;-!:.inl"!€3.polis: Bethany ::!ellowship, Inc., 1970), pp. 320:263. 
Kulm, op.cit., pp. 98ff. 
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~u physics and in dealing with the resultant influence on the 
possibility of miracles. Schaaffs informs us that the rejection 
of a closed universe by modern science took place about the turn of 
the ~entury. In fact! the year 1900 is seen as being the turning 
point for modern Physies. 40 Therefore we can no longer scientifically 
hold to the belief in a closed universe as was the case in the 
nineteenth century.41 
Schaaffs refers to the replacing of the closed universe view 
with the present view of physics as "dou'ble negation ll • This is 
because older opinions which were once used to negate all miracles 
42 
are, in turn, negated themselves. The old law of causation has 
been replaced by statistical description and thus the law of 
4-probability. ' To this we will turn directly. But we must first 
remark tr.~t new theories in physics usually build upon older ideas 
and thus appear at least somewhat to be a process of development 
(rather than a case of total displacement). The old views are 
44 thus expanded and corrected by the modern ones. We will now 
take a closer look at some important develcpments in physics that 
have led to these conclusions. 
40 
41 
1,.2 
43 
44 
Werner Scha&ffs, Theology, Ph~sics and Miracles, translated by 
Richard L. Renfield tWashington, D.C.: Canon Press, 1974) 
pp. 26, 31, 37-38. cr. Jauncey, op.cit., p. 37. 
~o, cf. pp. 25-26. 
~., pp. 24-26. 
Ibid., pp. 63-64; cf. pp. 44-45. 
Kuhn, o~.cit., pp. 67, 149; cf. Schaa.ffs, Ibid., p. 64. 
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2. Some Principles of Physics 
We have been speaking of the modern view of physics and its 
negation of the eighteenth and nineteenth century belief in a 
closed universe 'Where no outside intervention was believed to ·De 
possible. It should be ~entioned in all fairness that not all 
scholars in these two centuries accepted this view of cause and 
effect in a mechanistic world~5 although it was very pOPular. 46 
Therefore, before the twentieth century thA world was, for the 
most ~art, conceived to be one of mechanical cause and effect~ 
Any events which did not fit into this pattern, such as miracles, 
were often rejected immediately. It was the "reign of 'unalterable 
la.w'" in which it was imagined '~ha t one could be sure of events 
and in which miracles were simply not possibilities. 47 
With the emergence of the twentieth century exp~rimentation 
in physics it was found that, contrary to the then accepte~ 
scientific belief, there was much u.~certainty in our universe. It 
could not be predicted with complete accuracy ho~ a particular event 
would occur. There were fou.~d variations and differences in 
principles that were once thought to be invariable~ Jt was 
beginning to be appa.rent that the universe could not be expected 
~5 
46 
~7 
For instance, navid Hume firmly rejected cause and effect. See 
o.W. Reiok, Ristor of Protestant Theola ,Volume 2 of A History 
of Christian Thought by J.1. Neve Two volumes; Philadelphiat 
The Muhlenberg Press, 19~6), p. 65 and also J. Bronowski and 
Bruce Mazlish, The ~estern Intellectual Tradition (New York: 
Harper a.nd Row, P'.lblishers, 1962), p. 474. . .. 
Schaaffs, on.cit., pp. 65-64 and Cla.rk, "Bultmann's Three-Storied 
Universe" in Gaebelein, 0pecit., p. 218. 
Jauncey, o~.cit., pp. 37-38. 
40 
to behave anyone certain way all of the time. 48 
Even though we have been ~iscussing the field of physics, it 
should be pointe.d out that this information definitely has had an 
affect on other fields of knowledge as well. This was obvious 
because, if these facts were true, then other studies also had to 
adjust to them. Later, for example, the affect of these discoveries 
on the discipline of history will be shown 0 Schaaffsnotes, for 
instance, that few actually understand that the significance of 
these findings extend far beyond the field of Physics. 49 
Some may object that these principles affect only ~uestions 
which deal with the microcosm and therefore have no bearing on the 
topic of miracles. Schaaffs deals with this very problem, concluding 
that one can work from any of three directions50 to demonstrate 
that occurrences in the microcosm have a great bearing on eventsin 
the macrocosm. These reasons show that chain reactions can be 
caused by deviations in individual atoms which eventually have 
macroscopic results. Thus, minute· and unpredictable changes in 
4s 
50 
~., p. 38; for this principle as it is applied to physics, 
see Schaaffs, o~.cit~, pp. 57-61 end Otto BIUh and Jose~h 
Denison Elder Princi-oles a.nd A't)'olications of Ph sics (!~ew York: 
Interscience Publishers, Inc., 1955 , pp. 760ff. 
Schaaffs, Ibid., p. 61. 
-~ 
Schaaffs mentions three approaches in noting the affect of the 
microcosm on the macrocosm. One way would be to work from the 
microscopic elements to the macroscopic ones, noting the affect 
single atoms can have on whole processes or events. Or one 
might work in the opposite direction, beginning with the macrocosm 
and endeavoring to find the minute particles that affect it. 
Lastly, Schaaffs has experimented with de Broglie's eq~tion 
of the matter-wave demonstrating that it can also be applied 
to the macrocosm, just as it can be applied to the microcosm 
(Ibid., pp. SO-S1). 
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atomic processes cause major events to also become somewhat 
indeterminate and unpredictable. In fact, the uncertain pairing 
of microscopic transactions can either cause a macroscopic event 
to occur or keep it from occurring. Thus the macroscopic event 
itself becomes unpredictable and it is not within the reach of 
science to control it.51 
It is tr~e that microscopic events are more unpredictsble 
than macroscopic ones, but both are often found to be Unexplainable. 52 
For these reasons, ~ microscopic and macroscopic events "can be 
interpreted only as a law of probability.n53 This means that a 
"statement in science is seldom now considered true in itself, but 
5" only wi tL.n a certain lind t of probability •••• II ~ In other words, 
we can no longer consider a scientific statement as being absolute, 
but only probable to one extent or another. Statistical 
probabilities must be given to events according ~o the degree to 
which they can be expected to occur and not viewed as being positively 
certain as might be the case in a closed universe. 
One use of statistics that is perhaps not at first oevious is 
that they "have enabled us to appreciate the extreme casee= ••• ,,55 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Ibid., pp. 52-53, 71, 79-81. 
SChaaffs (pp. 52-53). 
This last point is il:~strated by 
Ibid., pp. 16, 71. 
80;. 
Cf. Bl~ and Elder, o~.cit., pp. 806-607, 
Schaaffs, on. cit., p. 64. 
Jauncey, o~.cit., p. ;8. 
Schaaffs, on.cit., p. 55. 
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because "the rarer an event, the harder it is to determine a 
precise time for its occurrance. One can only assign a probability 
to it. ,,56 Therefore more common events receive a higher probability 
and rarer ones a lower prooability. Unique event~ are given still 
lower chances of occurring. But this is intriguing in the case of 
these Y:<:ry rare events because "even the greatest probability ~..a.nnot 
rule out the possibility that the event will occur tomorrow.,,51 
There is an infinite number of possibilities for such events to 
occur daily and thus they cannot be thought to be impossible. 
Can giving a probability to rare events, as described a~cve, 
have any relevance to the possibility of miracles occurring? 
Schaaffs answers in the affirmative: 
Though a miracle is a rare, or perhaps even unique, event 
or experience, quite out of the ordinary, it can with 
comparative ease, as ~~ example shows, be placed in a 
statistical frame~ork. It has no intrinsic peculiarity 
requiring that it be placed outside that framcftorko Thus, 
a miracle, though a rarity to be sure, is a phenomenon of 
natura,l law, for statistics are the essence of natural la.w.58 
Therefore we see that for this Germa.n physicist miracles are 
nossibleo We will also note here that Montgomery, for one, agrees 
with this ~bove analysis and insists that the only way that an 
account of a miracle can 'be verified is 'by an flu.np:;:"43j'l1dicf?d 
confrontation" with the sourcp.s which claim that su.~h an event 
actually occurred. We need not try to ascertain a priori what is 
able to occur today (as was done in a closed universe), since almost 
anything is possible according to its statistical probability~ In 
56 ~., p. 56. 
£;7 
'" ~. 
58 ~., p. 45. 
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other words, the "question is no longer what ~ happen, but what 
~ happened" because lithe universe since Einstein has opened up to 
the possibility of any event tt (the italics are Montgomery t s).59 
Therefore, we can only determine what has happened by investigating 
the sources in order to ascertain which events probably are and 
which events probably are not a part of history. 
,. Miracles 
Few understand how far-reaching these results in physics are 
and "how far beyond physics their significance extends.,,60 The 
knowledge thus gained surpasses the bound& of physics and affects 
other fields such as theology.6l We have found that the belief in 
a mechanistic, closed universe is no longer valid an~ thus cannot 
be used to ~~le out miracles a priori, as in the past. We can 
only find out if an event has occurred o~ not by invest.igating the 
sources thoroughly. This could lead to either a positive or to a 
negative conclusion. 
A key point we want to stress in this chapter is that these 
fo~er world views can no longer be used, as contemp~rary theology 
62 
often does, against the occ'~r-ence of miracles. We are certainly 
59 
60 
61 
62 
+'h; 
"" •• _9 point that miracles do occur. But they can only 
Uontgomery, Where is History gOing?, o~.cit.t p. 93; cf. 1'p. 13, 
168-169. 
Schaaffs, o~.cit., p. 61. 
Schaaffs directs some of his criticisms against ]ultmann (Ibid., 
pp. 13, 24-25) and other theologians who insist on using these 
outdated world views (~., pp. 8, 15, 31, 60, 64). 
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be disbelieved today on the merits of each. Montgomery drives this 
last point home in the following words, ~sing the resurrection of 
Jesus as an example of a miracle: 
To oppose the resurrection on the ground that miracles do 
not occur is, as we have noted earlier, both philosophically 
and scientifically irresponsible: philosophically, because 
no one below the status of a god could know the univars~ so 
well as to eliminate miracles a priori; and scientific~llYt 
because in the age of Einsteiriianphysics (so different 
from the world of Newtonian absolutes in which liume 
formulated his classic anti-miraculous argume~t) the universe 
has opened up to all possibilities ••• "6; 
This is surely not to affirm that Einstein said that miracles 
would happen but only that ther~ is always the possibility that they 
Concerning the conception of nature with which we have been 
working, we must mention that the results described above do not 
invalidate the idea of essential lawful order in nature. All are 
agreed that such s general order does exist, even though it must 
£1. 
only be described statistically.~ In addition, as McNaugher 
explains, where there is no regularity in nature we cannot speak 
of any departure from itc 65 In other words, if nature were 
disorderly, it would be impossible to know if something had occurred 
that could be described as irregular. 
Thus, along with all recent studies, we also affirm the beiiei 
in the regularity of nature. A true miracle, then (if there is 
such an occurrence), must interfere with this regularity, according 
64 
65 
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op.cit., pp. 262-
26;. 
See Schaaffs, on.citw, pp. 64, 71; cf. alse Swinburne, on.cit., 
pp. 2;-26 .. 
McNaugher, on.cit., p. 92; cr. Swinburne, ~., pp. 26-29. 
to our definition. Therefore, if miracles are to happen, nature 
cannot be the cause of them, but can only be open to their 
66 
occurrence. 
Thus we hold that modern scholarship can no longer deny miracles 
~imply by referring to a closed universe and to our civilization 
as being "too a.dvanced"~ They can only be denied on the grounds of 
historical and philosophical (logical) research. 
It may appear that there is too much reliance here on a 
current scientific world view that may change again in the futuxe 
to yet another understanding of nature. To this there are at least 
two valid responses. 
First and most important, it must be pointed out that an 
investigation into the possibility of miracles does not require 
the contemporary relativistic view of nature in order to arrive at 
valid conclusions. It is true that this modern view of science 
does help considerably both in negating the old closed universe 
hypothesis and in allowing for the possibility that miracles do 
occur. However, it must be asserted that the procedure we will 
deal with later, namely, investigating an event first before ~y 
judgment is given concerning the probability of its occurring, does 
not depend on science. We cannot overstate this enough. If we 
were to rest upon an existing view of nature we would always be in 
danger of having our system upset because of new ideas whc~ this 
need not be the case. Regardless of the contemporary state of 
physics, we hold that an account of a miracle (as defined above) 
66 Note that we are showing the result on nature if miracles were 
to occur. We have not yet established if they actually do or 
not. 
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should be investigated inductively to ascertain if it has 
occurred a~art from any other world view of what can or c~~ot 
happen. Such is a much more logical and scholarly approach than 
beginninG with presuppositions as to what is possible. These 
conclusions could thus be maintained even if physics was not in 
the state in which we find it. 67 Thus the conclusions to be 
reached do not depend solely upon our modern understanding of 
science, but are rather based upon this aforementioned investigation 
68 
of the report~d facts. 
Second, Schaaffs answers this very ~uestion by asserting that 
physics is unlike other disciplines in that it does not regress 
back~a.rdSe "Accurate kn.owledge and the results of earlier research 
are ~~ simply discarded; ratheI:, they serve as building blocks 
for fU1."tb~r advances.,,69 He adds later that "the knowledge 
discovered in the present century will remain valid within the 
framework in which it was obta1ned.,,70 Present concepts in physics 
67 
68 
69 
70 
We w~sh to make it plain, hOY."ever, that our study of contemporary 
physics is an extremely important one and not simply a IInice 
addi tion" to this \,i"ork. Although this study is based on an 
investi~tion of the facts to determine if an event has occurred 
and not upon a current scientific world view, this chapter has 
still provided some insight into the question of what is possible 
in today's world. Understanding the current scientific outlook 
has demonstrated at least that our beliefs must not exclude 
milt~les a ~=iori. Also, it makes us realize that there is a 
scie~tific basis for our historical approach to investigating a 
purpDrted event. 
See Bernhard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences (Chicago: 
M~~dy Press, 1953), pp. 146~149. 
Schaaffs, on.cit., p. 14. The italics are Schaaffso 
Ibid., p. 67. 
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may even be b::-oc:.c..ene'i, but they do not disappear. This is 'Jecause 
kno~ledge in this discipline is not discarded in order to return 
to older ideas. 7l As mentioned, the truths discovered in :physics 
re~ain valid. Therefore, even if we did rest our conclusions on 
the current scientific world view (although we do not, as stated 
above), they would still appear safe. 
~efore procee~ing to the next chapter, it must be ~entioned in 
all fairness that most men of science do not hold that this current 
view of physics gives any preference to miracles. 72 There~ore we 
will conclude this chapter with the assertion of philosopher Gordon 
Clark, who is cautious in his evaluation of the relationship 
between miracles an~ sodern physics. Be feels that while some 
theological conservatives have bone too far in their application 
of scientific pri~ciples to the Supernatural, others have gone too 
far in the opposite cirection by presenting science as beinc 
totally opposec. to anything which is really miraculous. Clark 
believes that we can at least minimally conclude that the cnce-
popular theories of a closec and mechanistic ~niverse can no longer 
be used to invalidate miracles. In addition, neither these older 
theories or conte~porary scientific ones can be used as objections 
against the Supernatural. While we cannot agree with thOSe TIho 
believe that science gives preference to oiracles, neither can we 
agree with those ~ho believe that it fo::-bids them. 73 
71 
72 
73 
T ... ·~ 
.::..::2:.:::... , p. 14. 
Cf. ~rnst Cassirer, ~eter:ninis~ and :ndeter~inis~ in Modern Ph s-
ics, translated by O. Theodor ~enfrey ,tew Haven: Yale University 
Press), p. 193 for instance. 
Clark, "Eultmann's Three-Storied universe", in Gaebelei::-~, 0"0. ci t., 
pp. 218-219. 
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In other words, Clark's conclusion is stated in negative terms. 
Rather than holding that the universe allows for the miraculous, 
Clark simply states that we can no longer appropriate a scientific 
world view that rules out the miraculous. Thus he speaks not abcut 
what is nos sible in nature, as do many of the scholars we have 
dealt with above, but about what we cannot say about it. We cannot 
hold that science gives preferential treatment to miracles, but 
~either can the scientific ~orld view be used to show that they 
-4 
cannot occur. { This, then, is the conclusion we will work with, 
one which directly favors neither opinion. Therefore we are also 
left with the co~clusion which we reached earlier--that 
concerning the probability of certain miracles (SUCh as the 
resurrection of Jesus) must be determined by a thorough investigation 
of the reported facts in order tc ascertain if they actually 
happened. 
Ibid. 
Chapter III. History and Miracles 
As stated above, this study is not based upon the findings of 
modern physics, but rather upon the idea that any accounts which 
claim that a miracle has occurred must be historically investigated 
in order for its veracity tc .be determined. Therefore we will 
look first at the concept of history that will be used in this work 
and then view the method of this investigation. 
A. A Concept of History 
The term nhistory" is used in various ways by diffe:l"'ent 
scholars. There is no uniform definition which is agreed to by all 
SCholars, as numerous approaches ~d interpretations are commonly 
, 
utilized. 4 Therefore it is not our purpose here to give a complete 
or exhaustive t:l"'eatment of the contemporary definitions of history. 
However, it seems that there is at least some general agreement 
concerning the content of history. 
Most historians are agreed that history includes at least 
two major factors--the actual events in particular and also the 
recording of these events. Thus this discipline is mainly concerned 
nith what has happened and how these occurrences have been annotatedo 
It is this conception which will form the core understanding of 
history as it will be usad in this work. Other elements are surely 
involved, as will now be note~. But the inclusion of these two 
1 See Patrick Gardiner's article "The Philosophy of History" in the 
International Encyclo~edia of the Social SCiences, edited by 
David L. Sills, OPe oi t., vol. 6, pp. 428-433 fCJ .. · some of these 
interpretations. 
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major ideas are esse~tial andare thus the foundation of this concept 
as it will be used here. 2 
Now we surely do not mean to affirm that the presence of these 
two elements is all that is involved in a definition of history. 
Rather, these are the ones which seem to reoccur most ofte~. However, 
a few other factors that are part of this discussion should also 
be mentioned-quickly. 
First, there is always a subjective factor involved in the 
writing of history. For instance, the historian must select the 
material which he will (and will not) coveT. The historical event 
is obviously objective. It is the recording of the event that 
introduces subjective factors. For W.R. Walsh, the subjectivity 
of the writer is present, but it is not a real serious roadblock 
to the obtaini~g of objective history. This subjectivity can be 
allowed for its efforts can be overcome.; Wand agrees with Walsh 
in asserting that the best approach to take towards history is one 
~ 
~ ." ~ o caU~1on, as we should try and recognize this subjective bias 
2 
3 
4 
Most historians also recognize-these two factors--the events 
themselves and the records of these events--as being an 
essential part of historyo For such relQted views, see Carl 
L. Becker, The Heavenl Cit of Ei hteenth-Centur Philcso~hers 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969 , pp. 17-18; Bronowski 
and Mazlish, o~.cit., pp. XI-XII; Clough, Garsoian and Ricks, 
op.cit., vol. I, p. 1; ~~eo, op.cit., p. 127; Wand, o~.cit., 
p. 220 
W.R. Walsh, Philosonhy of History (New York: Harper and Srothers, 
Publishers, 1960)~ pp. lOI! 103. 
Wand, o~.cit., pp. 29, 42. 
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and then make the proper allowance for it. 5 
We will also endeavor to allow for t~is subjective factor in 
our investigation of the resurrection. This occurrence has bee~ 
reported as an objective historical event and we must ascertain if 
it is the best explanation for the known facts. 
Second, we find that history cannot reach the point w~ere it 
is totally 'Positive of its findings in all instances. As with 
physics, so there is also a certain amou.~t of dependence on 
6 probability in history as well. 
For instance, Ernest Nagel, who accepts e deterministic vie~ 
of history, admits t~at he does so in spite of the convictions of 
contemporary physicists who almost unanimously hold the opposite 
viewpoint. 7 The conclusions of these scientists have had an affect 
on historians, for the accepted scientific view against a 
deterministic universe has also helped to turn histori~~s against 
a deterministic view of history.8 
Nagel lists five main reasons why historical dete~minism is 
generally rejected by so many historians today. First is the 
argument from the ~bsence of any developmental laws or patterns 
in history. Second is the argument based on the inability to 
explain and predict events in human history. The third argument 
concerns the appearance of the novel in historical occurrences. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Ibid., n. 31. See also Patrick Gardiner's article "The Philosophy 
of Hist~ry" in Sills, editor, o"O.cit., pp. 432-433. 
Wand. on.cit., pp. 51-520 
Ernest Nagel, ItDeterminis.;!l in History" in Dra.y, on.cit., p. 355. 
Ibid. 
-
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Fourth is the argument from the chance events which are also a part 
of history. The fifth argument concerns the conflicting results when 
one attempts to make the concept of a deterministic world compatible 
with the freedoD and moral duty of human beings. 9 
It is because of these and other similar findings that so many 
historians have rejected the deterministic view of history. Nagel 
further states (to reiterate the point), that the findings ~f modern 
physics, which also oppose determinism, have been a key factor 
that has exercised. a direct influence on asimi1ar rejection of this 
t b t h · t· 10 U' t . thO - 1· f cQncep~ y mas ~s or~ans. mon gomery concurs ~n ~s oe 2e 
that contemporary science has made it impossible for historians to 
" accept a closed system of natural causes.·· 
The appearance of these chance and novel events mentioned 
above t together with the aforementioned inability to explain or 
predict many other occurrences, has helped to further the use of 
probabilities in historical stUdies (as well as in scientific 
. t.....) 12 2nves ~gaw20n • Eistorians both recognize and utilize this 
concept of probability. For instance, Montgomery observes that 
historical studies can never reach the one hundred percentile level 
in certainty.l; Ror~ld VanderMolen agrees completely with l~ontgomery's 
9 ~. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Montgomery, ~nere is History Going?, on.cit., p. 71. 
12 See Schaaffs, on.cit., cf. pp. 52-5;, 64 for instance. 
13 Montgomery, Where is History Going?, on.cit., pp. 168-169. 
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assessment and thus accepts the belief that historical scholarship 
is not completely positive of its findings. In fact, historians 
must not fail to allow for this amount of uncertaj.nty.14 For 
this reason Montgomery opts for a critical investigation of the 
sources in question, with the decision about the occurrence of any 
specific event being based upon the probability of the evidence. 
In fact, probability is referred to as the only sufficient guide 
for a historian. 15 Wand also not~s that we cannot be as sure of 
historical investigation as was thought possible in the past. 16 
However, we must make our judgments as to which facts are most 
probable according to the historical evidence. 17 
These elements, then, are to be included in a contemporary 
treatment of history. While it has not been our purpose to deal 
with this subject exhaustively, we have come to some conclusions 
on the concept of history as it will be used in this work. We will 
refer to history as both the occurrence of past events and the 
recording of them. Realizing that there is always a ee~tain ~o~~t 
of the subjective in this recording, allowance must be made for it 
as much as is possible in order for objective data to be obtained. 
Realizing also that in speaking of history we are dealing with 
probabil~ties, it will be our desire to ascertain as nearly as is 
possible which facts best fit the evidence. With these probabilities 
15 
16 
17 
Ronald. VanderMolen, 11 'Where is History Going?' and liistor:i !!al 
Scholarship: A Response" in Fides et liistoria, Pall, 1972 and 
Spring, 1973, Vol. V, Nos. 1-2, p. 110. 
Montgomery, Where is History Going?, o"O.cit., pp. 71-74. 
Wand, o"O.cit., pp. 25-27. 
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and uncertainties there is always room for the possibility of any 
event, however high the probability may be against it. 18 Events 
can therefore not be ruled out (either scientifically or historically) 
before they are researched. The only answer is a thorough 
investigation of the evidence. 
B. Investigating the Historical Events 
1. Historical Research and Investigation 
It is the opi~ion of most historians today that the veracity 
of past events can be discovered (within a certain probability) by 
a careful investigation of the facts. 19 Walsh notes that since 
these events have occurred in the past, they are only accessible 
by a study of the historical evidence. Although the historian 
himself will not be able to participate in the event that has 
already occurred (unless he was originally there), he is able to 
inspect the relevant data such as written documents and various 
other records, structures or archeological finds. Upon such 
confirmation as this the historian must obtain his evidence. This 
is what Walsh feels is the working principle of historical research. 20 
18 
19 
20 
Schaaffs, op.cit., p. 56. 
Wand, 0'0. cit •. , p. 5. 
Walsh, op.cit., p. 18. For a good example of such an investigation 
with regard to ancient historical events, see DelbrUck's methods 
of determining how ancient battles had been fought in the times 
of the Greek and Roman empires. It is fascinating to perceive 
how this scholaI' was able to arrive at historical facts concern-
ing how large the opposing armies were, how they maneuvered and 
other such facets of specific battles in ancient times by 
examining the ancient historical records. For instance, see 
Edward M. Earle, edito~Hakers of Modern strate (Princetonz 
Princeton University Press, 194; , especially pp. 264-268 ~ith 
regard to Delbruck's historical methodo 
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Of course, what the existing data and written sources reveal 
is not usually automatically accepted as being true. It is therefore 
the job of the historian to critically investigate the available 
claims in order to ascertain as closely as possible what has 
happened. This includes the procedure of determining if 7he sources 
best support the claims that are made in them. The proper results 
CeI! 'be ·~bt.ai..."'led even though there exists this need to determine 
which facts best fit the evidence. Then it is the duty of the 
21 historian to formulate the facts based upcn this groundwor~. 
One is therefore to decide upon the evidence at hand--that which 
is shown to be the most probable conclusion. 
3ven clains of miracles must be investigated in this way, since 
they cannot be ~uled out ~ priori, ~s noted above. On this sutject 
i.fontgomerJ-- asserts: 
3ut can the modern man accp.~t a !miracle: such as the 
resv.!':r-ectio!l? .•. For us, u..'1like people of the lJewtonian 
epoch, the universa is no lo~~er a tight, safe, predictable 
playing-field in which we kn·:." all tnE: rules. Since 
Einstein no modern man has had the right to rule out the 
possibility of events because of prior knowledge of 
!natural law! ... The problem of!miracle!, then, must be 
solved in the realffi of historical investigation .•.• 22 
As l:lOntgomery cOIlcludes, sill-.;e we cannot decide in advance what 
can happen, v.'e ~ust determine, by historical research, who.7. :'.-::a1].:; 
23 has happened al:r-eady. 
~He must quickly point out here that miracles are not to be 
believed simply because they are Supernatural. In fact, WA would 
21 
22 
23 
Ibid., pp. 18-19; cf. Daniel Fuller, op.cit., p. 22 for these 
same conclusions. 
T hr '0, • k Of t .. . t d Cl . t' . ... ( T""\~ .,...c:, G 
u o. n i.ar.nc.- Cilon gomery, ras ory an ... lr~S 1.an1. vy .:.JU'.'.'IleJ ~ rove: 
InterVarsi ty Press, 1972), p. 75. Cf. also :i\Iontgome~! s "'!here 
. . .. t 0'? • t 71 1.S tus ory \.j()lng., op~., p. _. 
Ibid., cf. also Where is History Going, pp. 168-169. 
desire to be the more careful before accepti~g a miraole-claim 
as a historical event. But, on the other hand, we must also guard 
against the presupposition that miracles cannot occur at all. There 
is no real basis, eithar scientific or historical, for this 
presupposition. 24 Although many are skeptical about the reality of 
miracles, it may be that a Supernatural explanation fits the facts 
best and is the most probable solution. 25 
On this last point of skepticism Wand has made a very pertinent 
point. His words were specifically directed at the historical 
skepticism of theologian Van Harvey, but Wand points out that the 
same can also be applied to others of this persuasion as well. 
Harvey argued that we cannot accept the New Testament accounts of 
the empty tomb e7en though there is much historical evidence in 
favor of them and no convincing evidence contrary to them. To 
this Wand responds: 
We may well ask Ear~ey how a critical historian can do 
anything else than decide on the evidence before him--unless 
indeed he already holds some secret which will invali~te 
in advance any evidence that csn be brought in favour of 
the phenomenon in que~tion? The plain fact is that in this 
kind of argument the skeptic is not fUnctinning as a historian 
at all. lie starts with the assumption that there could be 
no corporeal resurrection since tha'~ would be against 
nature •••• That is to say, he rejects the evidence because 
he does not like a conclusion that it may be used to support.26 
It appears that Wand's point is well taken here. ~~~t z~:s can 
the r.istorian do except investigate the available evidence a.~d make 
24 Wand, °E·cit., pp .. 30, 101. 
25 Ibid. , pp. 51-52. 
26 Ibid •• 70-7l. 
-' 
pp. 
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a decision based on it? Since this is the way that other historical 
facts must be decided (as we have seen above) it seems that we do 
not have the right to demand different criteria simply because, as 
Wand notes, we do not like or agree with the conclusions. We must 
therefore approach this subject with an open mind, endeavoring to 
ascertain which explanation is the most probable. 27 
Now some may judge that Wand's conclusions are those of the 
theological "fundamentalist" who endeavors to prove every word of 
Scripture as being true. To this it should be remarked that not 
. 28 
only does this Oxford scholar object to such beliefs, he holds 
to the quite "contemporary" theological opinion that while SOiiie 
of the Ne~ Testament is historical and trustworthy, some is also 
simply propaganda which was written without any claims to being 
objectively historical. Thus he cannot accept the view that the 
Bible itself is the guarantee and proof that all of Christianity 
was completely historical. 29 Because of this, Wand believes that 
we should inquire into whatever mythical elements could possibly 
be present in the texts. But, at the same time, we cannct allow 
the portions that evidence indicates are historical to be labelled 
as myth. 30 
W~d's conclusion in these matters is that we must approach 
these ancient documents cautiously. Bias and subjective factcrg 
27 Ibid. , pp. 29-310 
28 ~., 55. p. 
29 Ibid. 9 pp. 17-18. 
30 Ibid. , p. 42. 
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must be allowed for and dealt with accordingly. B~tt in spite of 
all of this, we may find that the Supernatural explanation is more 
historically probable than- the natural one. In this case we must 
be prepared to accept the miraculous conclusion.;l 
2. The Resurrection and Historical Investigation 
According to Wand, the resurrection is the central claim of 
New Testament Christianity and as such it cannut s~mply be ignored.;2 
Neither should we be content to leave the ~uestion simply b,y affirm-
ing that the original disciples believed that Jesus had risen. 
Since it is the center of the Christian faith it should be carefully 
investigated. We must inquire into thi5 belief in order to ascertain 
whether or not it is valid.;; 
other historians also agree to the need for such research. 
Ancient historian Paul Maier also believes that the historical 
evidence for th·2 resurrection must be investigated. Then we can 
better judge whether it can be referred to as an actual part of 
history.;4 Another ancient historian, Edwin Yamauchi, agrees that 
we must investigate this occurrence in order to conclude if it is 
best explained as myth or as history.;5 We have already ~iscussed 
;1 
32 
;; 
34 
35 
Ibid., pp. 29-;1. 
Ibid. 7 pp. 80, 114. 
~., pp. 90-94. 
Maier, First Easter, op.cit., pp. 105-122 and "The Empty Tomb 
as History", 0'0. ci t. t pp. 4-6. 
Yamauchi, o'Occit., March 15, 1974 pp. 4-7 ~;d March 29, 1974, 
pp. 12-16. 
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Xontgo::nery's preference to historically investigate this event as 
36 
'WelL 
Therefore, after dealing with the problem of faith an~ reason 
in the next chapter, we nill tur~ to this investigation. 37 ~he 
New Testament authors certainly clai::tec. thf'.t Jesus rose fro::l the 
dead, meaning literally that he appeared to many of the early 
Christians after having actually died. No one doubts that this is 
what the accounts report. It remains for us to endeavor to 
determine the facticity of these claims. 
We have in this chapter explained the concept of history that 
is to be used in this work. We have also determined that history, 
like science, cannot rule out the possibility of miracles a nriori; 
that is, without investigating the available evidence ana deciding 
upon it. To this end we have briefly described the approaches 
taken by several historians as to historical research and investiga+.ior.. 
Procedures such as these will be used in our own investi;ation of 
the resurrection of Jesus. 
36 
37 
i'Eontgomery, Where is History Going'?, on.cit., pp. 71-73, 93, 
168-169 for instance. 
It is i~portant to note that historical studies have also been 
:::lade about other miracle-claims in e.n~ient history= :,:=10 .F1.nley: 
for insiance, investigates Romer and his claims of miraculous 
intervention into early history, such as with the Troj~~ war. 
Or for another example, various scholars have examined claims 
of tongue-speaking, or glossolalia, in ancient history. For 
Finley's work, see The ~orld of Odysseus (New York: The Viking 
Press, 1954), especially pp. 10-19. For a historical discussion 
of speaking in ton~Jes~ see George Barton Cutten, Snecl:in~ with 
Ton~es Eistcr:'cally and Psychologically Exa:nined (l~e':1' ::.~ven: 
Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 36-47 for instance. For another 
example, see :5'rank Stagg, 3. Glenn Ei!lton and ';'!ayne E. 02 tes, 
Glossolalia: Tonr,:-ue Sneakin~ in Eiblical, Eistorical and Psychological 
Perspective, (1~a.shville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 48-57. 
Cbapter IT. Reason a~d F~itb 
It bas been said that Cbristian history and thought is a history 
of the opposition between faith and reason. This is a reference to 
the continual conflict between these two aspects of the Christian 
life--the spiritual and the rationale l There has always seemed to 
be a variety of views on this subject, often intermingled and over-
lapping. Historian of philosophy Etienne Gilson has dealt with 
several of these opinions in his work Reason and Revelation in the 
Middle Ages. 2 For instance, early church theologian Tertullian 
believed not only that faith was primary, but that all reference 
to human philosophy or other teachings should be excluded.' Passing 
to the twelfth century, we find Saint Bernard voicing a similar 
opinion in favQ~ of faith alone. 4 
A second view was that of Augustine, who held that one's reason 
and understanding do playa part, but a secondary one since faith 
is to precede them. 
we can understand. 5 
Therefore we must exercise faith first before 
". 
Another exponent of this' view was Anselm.o 
Gilson finds that a third important view was voiced by the 
twelfth century Arabian philosopher Averroes. Although his was not 
1 
2 
, 
4 
5 
6 
See Manfred T. B~>auch, "Head and Heart Go to Seminary", Christianity 
Today, June 20, 1975, pp. 11-12. 
Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle A es (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966 • 
ill§; .. , pp. 9-10. 
ng., pp. 12-1,. 
ng., pp. 17-19. 
Ibid. '0 pp. 23-26. 
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a Christian system of thought, it did influence Christianity. For 
Averroes, reason was primary and faith was subordinated to it.7 
The fourth view was that of Thomas Aquinas, who endeavored to 
find harmony between faith ~~d reason. He believed that some 
truths could be known only by revelation while others could be 
attained by reason. 8 
This is just a sample of some of the possibilities when one 
views the ~~story of opinions on the relationship between faith 
~~d reason. Some favor the use of either faith or reason exclusively. 
Some give a place to both, while subordinating one to the other. 
Eithe~ reason is seen as being subordinate to faith or vica versa. 
Others try to find a balance between the two methods. In this work 
a system will be set forth which is both a workable one and one 
that is justified by the facts. 
A. Reason and Faith: Definitions 
In order to lay a groundwork for our discussion on this 
topic, this study will begin with a look at the dictionary 
9 defL~itions of these two terms. The _~eric~~ Dictionary of the 
7 
s 
9 
Ibid., pp. 37-62. See especially pp. 42-43. 
Ibid., see especially pp. 32-83. 
This v~iter realizes that pr~losoDhical conclusions such as these 
c~~ot be based soley on dlctionars definitions. Since dictionaries 
only show how a word is used by most intelligent people, we 
would be epistemologically naive if we were to assume that such 
definitions are capable of settling these philosophical issues. 
Nevertheless, such an approach can be very valuable as a ground 
work for later conclusions and tr~s is how these definitions are 
to be used here. They serve as guidelines for the more 
sophisticated schola.rly yiews which will be presented aftenrards 
to ~~ther corroborate these ~sages. The definitions themselves 
C~~ point to a consensus of opinion as they reveal how these words 
are often defined. HOYlever:_ this will be corroborated by later 
references to scholars who verify these statements. 
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~n~lish Langu~ge defines reason as follows: 
The basis or ~otive for an action, decision, or conviction •••• 
A declaration made to explain or justify an action, decision, 
or conviction •••• The capacity for rational thought, inference 
or discri~ination •••• To ••• think 10gically •••• Tv taL~ or argue 
logically or persuasively •••• To persuade or dissuade (someone) 
with reasons.lO 
According to this definition, reaso~ includes at least t~o 
concepts. First, reason is the ca"Oacity to infer, discri::i:::ate or 
even to thir~ rationally. Second, reason is the explanation or out-
working of this capacity. This second concept include~ (a~ong other 
t~ings) several co~ponent parts. Reason is defined as bein~ the 
basis or motive :or one's decisions or convictions, or a st~tement 
explaining or justifying these decisions or convictions. Reason is 
also the ability to thin..iI: logically or to argue persuasively, 
including persuadin~ (or dissuading) someone one Tray 11 or another. 
If this definition was shown to be a valid one, othe~ conclusions 
could be drawn f~o~ these t~o concepts of reason as well. Fc= 
instance, reaso!:. ';:ould be at the very "':lasis of all of our k::oi71ed.ge, 
for one cannot eV8Y.. bave the ca"Oacity to thir~ apart fro~ reason 
Ib" d f" "." ) '\.:: e ~n~ .. ~on • ".:i thout reason the ex-olana tion or out'.'~or::ir.g of 
this capaci t:.r ":;ould also fail to be accounted for because rational 
thought is defined as being at the basis of all actions, iecisions 
or convictions. In fact, we cannot even formulate these convictions 
or make these decisions (intellectual or otherwise) except by 
utilizing reason. Therefore reason is the begin..~ing of knowledge 
10 
11 
'.'!illiam :lor:;:-is, editor, The American Heri ta.;:;e :!)ictio:a.ary of the 
EnSlish 1angua;e (new York: American Eeri taf,"e ?ublis!:i!:Z Company, 
Inc. and the :-:ouGhton Zifflin Company, 1970), p. 1086. 
~. 
since it becomes obvious that we could not even think in the sense 
which we are accustomed to, except by reason. Considering the 
definition, we would have to think without formulating ~~y convictions, 
making any decisions or coming to any conclusions in order to do 
so apart from a rational process. Finally, any attempt to counter-
act these conclusions or argue otherwise is also reason, again by 
definition. 
However, as we have stated above, dictionary definitions cannot 
in themselves solve philosophical problems such as this one. 
Therefore, after faith is defined, the views of those who argue in 
favor of these definitions will later be investigated. 
The American Eeritage Dictionary of the English Language defines 
faith as: 
A confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness 
of a person, idea, or thing •••• A system of religious beliefs.12 
Faith, then, is trust or belief in a person, thing, idea, value or 
truth. Belief itself is defined as mental ~~ centered in a 
conviction that is thought to be valid. 13 We have· already determined 
in our previous definition that the basis for such actions and 
convictio:~ . 14 ~s reason. In addition, belief generally involves 
thinking of some sort, even if it is only the elemental thought that 
12 
13 
., I. 
~~ 
~., p. 471. 
Cf. ~., p. 121 • 
Ibid., p. 1086. 
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what one is told to believe is "gOOd".15 Both of these prccedures 
of thinking about one's faith, along ~itb the convictions and 
decisions that often accompany them, are grounded in reason, by 
definition. Even the capacity to understand these beliefs is part 
of the cognitive process and has its basis in reason. 16 
There are two general reasons why faith is usually exercised. 
Some believe by intuitive convictiony while others require reasonable 
persuasion and rational argument (indeed, some claim an interest in 
both). But the capacity for both is acquire~ by reason, as defined 
above. This is because the ability even to hold convictions and 
the ability to reason concerning,them is rationa1. 11 
Our study has thus far shown that faith must rely upon reason 
as its basis. However, this discussion has not so far been one of 
finding which of the two is the most important and it should not be 
construed as such. Therefore we will look briefly at this ~uestion 
now. 
Even though reason composes the groundwork t we still hold that 
faith is the most important element of religious belief for two main 
reasons. First, it is not possible to logically and reasonably 
15 
16 
11 
One may object that many have exercised religious faith because 
they were told to do so or for other reasons which require DO 
real contemplation. But we would ho1~ t~t if ~~e ?ez capable 
of understanding his faith he would have been required to have 
thought about it at some time, if only in a naive and simple way. 
This is because faith would even involve affirmation of what 
others have dictated. However simple, it would be an acceptance 
of the existence of God or some SUcn belief. Real faith involves 
at least some thinking as apart of this conviction or it could 
not be B~id to be such. For this reason, if one has never thought 
about his belief in any way it can only be because real faith 
was never exercised in the first place. 
Korris, on.cit., p. 1086. 
lli.£. 
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nrove everything in the Christian faith. Thus faith extends beyond 
the reaches of this reason, which is more limited. Since we can 
only speak of varying degrees of probabilitys as stated above, any 
religious system which places such research at the ape: of achieve-
ment will find that it is very limited in what is presented for 
belief. The realm of faith and hope would be narrowed quite 
Second, although reason can yield true data from a logical 
investigation of the facts, faith is capable of transcending the 
~ational when one puts trust in these facts. Therefore, one 
exercises faith based on the reasonable probabilities. Without 
such belief one could not speak of the Christian faith. God cannot 
be known by reasonable processes (beyond the knowledge that Ee exist~), 
but rather a faith is needed which appropriates and trusts the 
evidence, with deiinite ethical implications for one's life. Without 
this primary importance of faith and these accompanying ethical 
implications, Christianity would not be a faith system. This is 
almost the unanimous witness of Christianity through the centuries, 
and it has a sound basis. While reason and knowledge are very 
18 important, especially as a basis fer belief, faith is more so. 
Reason is thus not the ultimate. This position is also accepted 
in this work. Faith should remain in this pre-eminent position, 
being careful to note that this is a reasonable faith based on 
18 efe the New Testament's primary emphasis on faith in such 
verses as In. 20:29; Eph. 2:8; Heb. 11:1, 6. 
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the facts and not a leap in the dark. More will be said i~ favor 
of this opinion below. 
So we now reach our conclusion pertinent to the results of 
these definitions and the roles they play in the issue between 
faith and reason. We have so far concluded that whilp. reason is 
temporally primary, faith is the most important. Neither should be 
excluded and both should be used in its proper place. These 
definitions, however, will not be regarded as the final word in 
this discussion, nor ~ill it be assumed that they can totally solve 
the issues. Therefore it is advantageous to turn now to those who 
also hold to some of the results arrived at here. 
B. Reason and Faith: Scholarly Views 
A study of definitions has revealed that reason must be the 
basis of all thir~ing processes, including the mental activity of 
faith. While reason is thus temporally first, when speakinb in the 
context of Christian theology, faith is the most important. 
Several conte~porary scholars have come to similar conclusions 
based upon personal studies of the evidence. Secular theologian 
Paul Van Buren believes that faith always requires a thinking 
process. This is because faith usually includes both logical 
contemplation and a consideration of historical sources, and these, 
in turn, involve reasoning. Any type of Christian faith that 
neglects these processes is quite inade~uate.19 
19 Paul M. Van Buren, The Secular I-:Ieaning of the Gospel (New York, 
The !,:acmillan Compa."'l.Y, 1963), pp. 174--175. 
Theologian John R. stott also believes that faith is not 
irrational. It is neither credulity or optimism. 20 Rather, it is 
a trust based upon reason--a rational belief. As such faith does 
not contradict or oppose reason9 but rather it is essentially 
complimented by it. 2l 
For philosopher Francis Schaeffer, rationality, knowledge and 
faith are all related. Rationality is very important, but not to 
the exclusion of the other elements. A balance must be kept between 
each. Nevertheless, we cannot expect faith to be exercisei prior 
to a rational investigation of the evidence, or before a proper 
knowledge and understanding of the truth has first been achieved. 
Th ·-t- d f -th 22 ese cond~ ~ons prece e a1 • 
Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg stresses the need for grounding 
faith on an objective, rational basis. In two essays entitled 
;:Insight and Faith" g,r..d.. ~'Fa.i th ~d Ree..so:l" he sets forth his 
rationale for this belief. Faith cannot stand alone and be its 
own criteria and proof for belief. This is because the subjective 
qualities of one's own faith alone provide no solid re~sons as to 
why it is also good for another individual. The original question 
as to whether the ~ounds of this faith are solid is never answered. 
There is no logical reason to accept it. Therefore a knowledge 
20 
21 
22 
John R.W. stott, Your Mind Matters: The Place of the 1~ind in the 
Christian Life (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1973), 
pp. 33- 36. 
Ibid., pp. 34, 36, 49-52. 
Schaeffer, The God Who is There, op.cit., pp. 112-1139 141-143. 
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based upon reason must precede faith~2; 
As pointed out earlier, Montgo~ery also holds that there must 
be an objective, historical basis for faith. Faith that is not 
based on some such reasonable evidence can give no logical reason 
as to why it should be accepted over other alternatives. Faith 
cannot verify itself and neither can an "experience" demonstrate 
its own validity in and of itself. Therefore we have no reason 
to accept any faith as being valid if there are no grounds upon 
which to base this claim. 24 
We h~ve briefly investigated the views of five scholars on the 
question of the relationship between reas~n and faith. We will turn 
now to the rationale behind these views, as to why reason is held 
to precede faith. The general conviction seems to be, first, that 
faith must 06 based upon knowledge and that, secoud, reason begins 
the entire process and provides the basis for this knowledge. We 
will examine these premises more closely. 
First, faith must be based upon a knowledge 'of certain facts 
which are at le~t believedto be true. In order for one to have a 
23 
24 
These two essays are found in one of Pannenberg's collections 
of other such works entitled Basic uestions in Theolo , 
translated by George R. Kehm Two volumes; Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1972), see vol. II, pp. 28-35, 53-54 for instance. We 
will further elaborate on Pannenberg~s theories on reason and 
faith below. 
See the appendix of History and Christianity, op.cit., pp. 99-101, 
106-108. cr. also Montgomery's debate with "God is dead" 
theologian Thomas Altizer, where Montgomery charges that Altizer's 
irrational faith provides no reason for others to believe him 
because it is based on no objective evidence. This debate is 
recorded in The Altizer-Mont ome. Dialo e (Chicago: Inter-
Varsity Press, 1967. See pp. 26, 59-60, 72, 76 and others where 
this charge is made. As with Pannenberg, so we will return to 
this reasoning below. 
faith-conviction there must ideally be this basis for belief. At 
the very least (in the absence of any intellectual or rational 
investigation), religious faith is trust in the existence of God 
or a reliance upon certain believed tru~hs.25 Therefore, religious 
faith must be grounded on some sort of knowledge, even if it is 
only the belief that God does (or does not, in the case of atheism) 
exist. 26 When we perceive that the Christian faith is thus based 
upon knowledge, we can then view this knowledge as preceding the 
faith. 21 Even some of the end results of faith, such as various 
25 
26 
21 
Even the case of atheism is no exemption here. If one 
designates atheism as a "religious faith!!, then it still must 
Ibe acknonledged that it is also based on the knowledge of 
certain facts which are believed to be true. In this case this 
would be the non-existence of God. 
Cf. Van Burer.., ou.cit~: pp~ 114-175; stott, ·ou.cit., p. 51; 
Schaeffer, The God ~ho is There, ou.cit., pp. 143-145; Pannenberg, 
on. cit., vol. II, pp. 31, 45; ~ontgomery, History and Christianity, 
ou.cit., pp. 106-108. It is extremely important to note here, 
in addition, that the reason or knowledge upon whic1: faith is 
based is not always a very sophisticated one. As asserted in 
footnote number 15 above, faith must be based on some k.Lowledge, 
even if it is an uncomplicated and simple belief in what one is 
told. Eut even in this case acceptance of belief in God (or 
whatever it is that one is told to believe) still involves the 
acceptance of the knowledge that these beliefs a~e true. Any-
thing short of this is not real faith. At no point in this 
work is the assertion ever made that one must be capable of a 
logical investigation of the facts before one can believe. 
Such is clearly not the case. A reasonable faith can be shown 
to be more valuable, but a faith based upon a less sophisticated 
knowledge is not thereby invalid. If the Christian faith can 
be shown to be based on a lcgical investigation of the facts, 
then faith in these facts is valid even if one is not capable 
of demonstrating the evidence for oneself. 
Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 32, footnote and also Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
editor, Revelation as History, tr~~slated by David Granskou 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 139~ 151, note 15. 
Cf. Schaeffer, Ibid. 
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kinds of action or ethical involvement, are due at least partially 
to the attainment of this prior understanding. 28 
Second, reason begins the process and provides the basis for 
this knowledge. We have seen that faith-conviction relies on 
knowledge and that this m~st involve some thinking, if only at the 
rudimentary level. Indeed, Van Euren states that real faith is 
only possible when one thinks29and Stott asserts that one cannot 
have faith at all apart from such cogitation.'O But thi~~ing is 
a rational process which requires the use of reason.,l Therefore, 
b "'"h b . "'"h' d' d the framework f'or 1." t.j2 reason ow eg1.ns w loS process an prov1. es _ 
In addition, faith must have an objective basis. Without such 
e foundation, one would never know if ~he grounds for one's belief 
were solid or not. Apart from a foundation of reasonable knowledge, 
faith is not capable of substantiating itself. Its subjective 
qualities provide no rational basis or crite=ia according to which 
its trustworthiness may be ascertained. For iust~ce; one can~ot 
appeal to one's personal spiritual experiences for the needed 
authority factor. Montgomery notes that an appeal to such private 
experiences is an unconvincing testimony, since it is sometimes 
hard to tell if the heart-felt experiences of another amount to 
26 See stott, 0;'). cit. , p. 57. 
29 Van Buren, on.cit., p. 1740 
;0 Stott, " "'" OPe C1. w. , p. ,7. 
,1 See Scha.effer. The God Who is There, on.cit., pp. 141-143· 
,2 ~.~ pp. 112-11,. 
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anything more than heartburnt 33 At first this appears to be simply 
a humorous illustration, but upon closer examination it is found 
to contain much truth. Row can we even hope to differentiate 
between real experiences or beliefs and false ones if there is no 
factual criteria which gives us at least some idea as to what may 
be most trustworthy? A faith which is grounded upon rational facts 
and which rests upon an objective basis is in a much better position 
to ascertain its trustworthiness than is a faith which is admittedly 
irrational and subjective in its approach. It is true that one 
may prefer the latter, but this does not answer the question of 
how one might ~erify this faith even for oneself$ let alone for 
others. 
It is also true that the rational approach does not always 
lead to a valid faith. But 5t appears that it would be much 
better off in view of this question of verification than would a 
faith which does not (or cannot) utilize any rational method at 
all. Indeed, an ilitel1.igent investor does not often risk funds 
on an enterprise which gives no valid ::-easons to make such an 
investment seem worthwhile. Even hunches and premonitions are 
usually based on some sort of knowledge or reason, even if it is 
"secret information". In a silililar way, faith shou.ld also be 
based upon a rational groundwork. 
Apart from an objectiv2 faith which is based upon a logical 
examination of the facts, there is no way to ascertain if such 
33 Montgomery, History and Christianity, op.cit., p. 101; cf. 
pp. 99, 107. 
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beliefs are valid or r.ot. No amount of wishful thia~ing c~n make 
the facts any ~ore tr~thful. No matter'hor. intense one's faith is, 
one can~ot make this faith any more valid. Faith must therefore 
have an objective basis or else one would not be able to ascertain 
if it is simply spurious. 
Pannenberg also believes that we must reject a subjective 
Christian faith which is based on one!s personal experiences. He 
does so for at least two reasons. First~ such private experiences, 
cannot be obligatory for others because they lack factual, objective 
evidence and therefore are usually only capable, at the most, cf 
.. If 34 conv~nc~ng onese • Second, this subjectivism disregaras the 
fact that the very center of Christianity is based on Divine 
initiative. :,:en everywhere are able to investigate the fou.::dations 
of this religion in or~er to ascertain as closely as possible if 
events such as the resurrection have actually occurred. The 
opport1L~ity to i~vesti6~te the claims of Christianity is open to 
anyone who wants to study them and is r.ot relegated to the perusal 
of a select few. 35 Therefore, the Christian faith is Dost properly 
.,.1, 
::r~ 
35 
It might be objected that p;erhaps one does not care to ::lake his 
faith obligatory for others, thus keeping it simply on the 
subjectiv.e level. But here we must remember, first, t::1at 
Christ,iani ty claims to be a propagating faith interes-:ec. in 
bringing others to accept this same grace of God that it has 
received. It therefore qoes not thrive on one's keeping faith 
to oneself. Second, we have reasoned here that Christianity is 
most properly based on one's exercising faith as a result of 
facts which are believed to be true and not upon irrational 
explanations or private experiences apart from these fac~s. 
Thus this aforementioned objection falls prey :~th to the idc~ 
that the Christian faith is to be propagated and to the conviction 
that faith is based upon objective facts as opposed to subjective 
feelings. For so~e of these ideas see Pannenberg's 3asic 
Questions in TheolOgy, o~.cit., vol. II, espec~ally pp. 5)-54; 
cf. pp. 28, 30-32. 
Pannenoer3, nevelation as History, op.ci~., p~. 135-139. 
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objective, open to a rational confrontation with the facts and not 
subjective or irrational. 36 
The same conclusion that was reached with regard to trying to 
subst~~tiate Christianity by one's personal, subjective experience 
also applies to those who endeavor to point to the proclaimed 
message as the basis for the faith. ihis approach also fails in 
that the obvious question concerns whether there is a real reason 
to accept it or not. If the reason is unconvincing, it would seem 
that we would lack a sound basis for accepting it. Further, the 
message apart from any rational coercion cannot show why it shoul~ 
be accepted over another alternative, or even over a contrary view. 
In other words, the message is not self-authenticating but must 
also provide objective reasons to back up its claim to truth=37 
By "objective reason" we are referring to the need for faith 
to investigate the historical (or other) evidence and make its 
decision upon which facts best fit the case. For Schaeffer, faith 
is bas€d upon just such an examinatioh of the events v.hich Christianity 
claims have already occurred in history, such as the resurrection. 
One cannot be asked to exe~cise faith in the Christian message until 
the evidence has been investigated. 38 Montgomery agrees that faith 
begins in an investigation of the objective, historicale7ents and 
37 
;8 
Ibid., especially p. 138. See also Basic Questions in Theology, 
op.cit., vol. II, pp. 30, 53-54. 
See Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology, Ibid., vol. II, 
pp. 33- 34. 
Schaeffer, The God Who is There, op.cit., p~ 141~ cf. p. 92. 
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rests in the probability of the findings. 39 But we must re~ember 
that faith is based on the events and not vice versa. 40 In other 
words, faith is not formulated apart from the facts, hoping that 
there is some evidence to support this venture. Rather, one believes 
beca~se the facts appear reasonable. Pannenberg also stresses 
this last point, asserting that an individual does not bring en 
already existing faith to the events, but exercises this faith-only 
41 
after ~~ open-minded look at the events. 
As for the question of importance, we fo~d earlier that reason 
was temporally primary while faith was -1re important in a 
theological context. We found this to be t~~e for two main reasons. 
First, the whole of Christian teachings and belief cannot be explained 
com~letely in terms of reason. Second, when we speak in a 
i 
theological context belief takes on a central importance, as it 
transcends reason. Faith must personally appropriate the factS i which 
involves ethical implications for one's life. This is chiefly 
because we are dealing with the existence and teachiug of God (the 
Greek Theos, root word of theology), a doctrine which cannot be 
dealt with adequately in the realm of reason alone. The importance 
of faith is primary here, as witnessed by centuries of Christian 
thought. 
39 
40 
41 
Montgomery, Eistory and Christianity, o~.cit.g pp. 75-76, 79-80, 
, n7_ ,ns:\_ 
--, ---. 
Ibid., p. l07s 
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., p. 157.-
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Does contemporary thought offer similar reasons for giving 
faith the place of primary importance while placing' reason first 
temporally? We must answer here in the affirmative. It is especially 
noteworthy that the same scholars who we have been dealing with in 
our previous dis~ussion, those who hold that reason and knowledge 
are the foundation for belief, also place faith in the place of 
prime importance in the end~ E~~n the same two reasons used above 
(or very similar 'ones) are employed. First, Pannenberg notes that 
the doctrines of Christianity can never be explained completely in 
terms of reason. There will always be a remainder. 42 Second, 
Pannenberg further relates that no one can come to know God strictly 
by his own reason. A good ex~ple h~re is t~e Ch~isti~~ te~~hings 
concerning salvation. Even though reason provides the original 
basis, knowledge is still not capable of securing salvation because 
it depends finally upon the appropriation of faith and reliance in 
Gcd and personal surrender to Him. 4; Thus faith is based upon 
l 
rational probabilities, but the final express~on of it transcends 
the rational. 
Montgome~y also comes to similar conclusions. Faith is based 
upon the probabilities which emerge from an investigation of the 
objective facts and the final step of salvation is an appropriation 
of this fact by means of faith. As such, faith and commitment to 
42 Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, o~.cit., vol. II, p. 48. 
Ibid., p. 57 and Revelation as History, op.cit., pp. 137-139. 
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God through Jesus Christ is the final step of s~lvation, as it 
accomplishes something which reason could never do. 44 
Wand adds an interesting point here. While faith is dependent 
upon reason and builds upon its more conclusive basis, faith is 
still more important in that it is more intimate and personal than 
knowledge. Thus it makes use of the framework of reason and then 
goes beyond the rational. 45 
It may become apparent at this point that reason and faith, when 
properly understood, actually compliment each other. Both have 
their own roles to play and each are very important. 46 These roles, 
as we have shown above, consist of faith operating on the basis of 
reeson. 47 However, the two are not in competition with each other, 
but rather cooperate together. In this way they are found to be 
quite compatible. 48 The result is that head and heart should 
ideally work with, and not against each other. 49 
The conclusion which we have reached in this chapter lis that 
faith can only be built upon reason, meaning that reason is temporally 
first in this process. This has been found to be the case both 
~ 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
Montgomery, liistory and Christianity, o~.cit., pp. 79-80, 107. 
Wand, o~.cit., p. ,4. 
Ibid. 
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology7 on~cit.: vol. II, 
pp. 36-,7. 
Ibid., pp. 34-35, 47. 
Brauch, on. cit., p. 12. 
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from ~~ investigation of definitions ~~d from a logical examination 
o? the evidence. From the first study we fo~~d that we CCL~ot even 
think in the way we are accustomed to, let alone exercise faith, apart 
from a rational process. For instance, real faith involves 
convictions and mental action. These can only be held by some 
variety of thinking and they also require reason, however naive. 
One can exercise valid faith, however, even if one is not able to 
personally investigate the facts, as mentioned above. From the 
latter study we have not only verified this, but we have concluded 
in addition that a subjective, irrational faith can provide no 
logical grounds as to why it should be accepted. If there is no 
rationale for this faith, there can be no objective criteria on 
which its claim to truth cCL~ be based. Therefore one cannot ascertain 
if the message based on such a faith should be accepted or not. 
Without any criteria or objective data on which to ,judge its contents, 
there is no logical way to distinguish one faith-message from a 
rival one. In fact, one is hard pressed for any evidence on which 
one's religious experience may be distL~guished from any other human 
emotion, unless it is grounded in logical reason and investigation. 
Even an intense faith apart from such CL~ objective basis cannot make 
faith ~~v more valid. Therefore, we hola that for faith to be 
intelligible it must be based on a rational knowledge. 
We must be careful to point out once again that a rational 
approach to faith may not solve every last problem, but it does 
provide the best grounds on which to base faith, as shovm above. 
Without this approach there would be no real way that one could 
verify these conclusions with any confidence. We thus encounter 
historical probabilities once again, as it appears that arguing 
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from objective, Listorical data and logical evidence seems to 
provide the best way of arriving at the most probable results. So 
while the rational approac~ is not infallible, it does provide 
the best means of gaining a testable and verifiable foundation for 
faith. If we abandon the rational, we ~ust also abandon our hopes 
of gaining such objective and ve~ifiable results. 50 
An irrational or strictly subjective faith is not capable of 
providing such answers. It cannot verify itself or demonstrate its 
own validity. Neither can it answer the question of whether its 
grounds for faith are solid or not. Because of this lack of 
evidence it cannot show why it should be accepted over other 
possibilities. Such a faith ca~~ot provide a logical reason as to 
why it should be accepted, since there are no testable grounds on 
which to base this claim. Neither can such belief make faith any 
more truthful a There is no logical reason to accept this faith. 
Although reason is temporally first, faith was found to be the 
most important as an end result. This is because, first, all of 
Christian belief cannot be accounted for rationally. Second, in 
the context of theology, faith can do what reason cannot quite 
accomplish in dealing with the existence and teachings of God. 
Although based upon reason, faith transcends the rational in 
providing a means by which one can trust in the reasonable findings 
of one's aforementioned investigation, applying the results to one's 
life. 
50 Schaeffer, The God Who is There, op.cit., p. 113 and Pannenb~rg, 
Basic Questions in Theology, op.cit., vol. II, p. 28. 
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Lastly, we discussed the need to bri~g reason and faith 
together. We must present them henceforth as being entirely 
compatible and not in competition with each other, recognizing 
that each has a role to play. Reason forms the basis 'and is 
temporally first while faith is more essential and im~ortant. 
In the historical and logical investigation which will now 
follow, we will endeavor to combine the essentials of our last 
three chapterso The scientific world view can no longer be used 
to rule out the miraculous. Rather we must speak in terms of 
probabilities and investigate each miracle-claim. Here history also 
plays a part. utilizing the cvnc~pt of historical investigation 
outlined aoove, we will examine the possibilities of belief and 
nonbelief in the resurrection of Jesus. Again we must decide upon 
historical probability and accept as factual th&t explanation which 
best fits the facts. The philosophical discussion just concluded 
will also be utilized here. We must maintain throughout this 
-1 
relationship between reason and faith.' 
It is advantageous to turn now to our historical and logical 
investigation of three key possibilities (and several related ones) 
concerning pe1ief and nonbe1ief in the resurrection of Jesus •. The 
51 Notice that in all three instances we have concluded that 
probabilities playa decisive part. Science has demonstrated 
the need to explain issues statistically, thus relying on 
probabilities. As we have shown above, history has also ~dopted 
this procedure as the best method of discerning facts about the 
past. Even in the philosouhical treatment of reason and !aith 
we spoke of the importance of faith making its decision on the 
probability of the rational investigation. Thus faith acts 
upon the most probable solution as well. ·,'ie have here a striking 
confirmation of this belief. 
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findings in the fields of physics, history and philosophy will 
be combined in an effort to ascertain ~hich possibility best fits 
the facts. 
PART 2 
POSSI~LE SOLUTIONS TO TEE QUESTION 
OF THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS 
Chapter V. Possibility Number One: That the Resurrection Did Not Occur 
A. David iume: An Introduction 
The first possibility to be dealt with here is that the 
resurrection did not literally occur. We will begin by investigating 
the views of one very important scholar who held this opinion, 
turning later to several other related views. l The scholar we will 
use as a representative exam:le is historian and philosopher David 
E~e (1711-1776)c 
This choice of Eume as the primary scholar to be dealt with 
here is one based on several closely-related reasons. It is quite 
doubtful that an author could be chosen who has had more influence 
on this question of miracles. Rumets essay "Of Miracles" has been 
so influential that one can hardly even deal with this question at 
all without' discussing his 2 ~o:rk. The importance of this short 
~iting has been reflected by its enormous affect upon contemporary 
theology and philosophy.; Even conservative theologian Wilbur m. 
Smith admits that this essay contains the strongest argument ever 
1 
2 
; 
In each of the three possible approaches to the resurrection 
which are covered in this work, we will likewise concentrate on 
one major scholar who we think is a representative example of 
that view. In the introductions to each chapter we will also 
outline the reasons for such choices. However, we will not be 
confined to just these three single opinions but in all three 
instances we will also entertain other similar views in the 
next chapter. 
See, for example, McNaugher's treatment of miracles, which also 
deals with Eume's essay, on.cit., pp. 91-118. 
~ontgomery, The Suicide 'of Christian Theology, on.cit., p. ;8. 
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·1. 
presented against the belief in miracles ...... Therefore Hume is an 
excellent example of one yho rejects belief in any miracle such as 
the resurrection. The popularity and high repute of hig essay among 
other scholars who hold similar views further reflects the trust-
worthiness of this choice. 5 
In order to more correctly understand Hume's contribution to 
the question of miracles, it is important to look briefly at some 
of the intellectual trends of the time in which he lived. According 
to Heick, English deism is a movement which may arbitrarily be said 
to have covered the century and a half from Herbert of Cherbury in 
1624 to Rume in 1776. Deistic trends were int~insically in agree-
ment with similar proclivities in French and German thought. 6 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England we 
find thepppularity of various types of deism that sometimes allowed 
for varying amounts of Divine revelation. However, these brands of 
~eism were generally not of the variety which is often referred to 
today as "the clockmaker's theory", whereby God was said to have 
made the world and later abandoned it to its own existence without 
any guidance whatsoever. This is a later definition of the word, 
5 
6 
Wilbur M. Smith, The Su'Oernaturalness of Christ .. (Boston: W.A. 
Wilde Company, 1954), p. 142. 
Later we ~ill deal more fully with Hume's influence on theology, 
specifically viewing other scholars who also reject all miraculous 
events and who believe that Hume's essay is the apex of critical 
thought on t~is subject. 
Eeick, o'O.cit., p. 52. Heick does note, however, that Bume 
differed from deism at several points, such as the reliance 
upon reason and the desire to prove the existence of God. By 
turning from such notions, Hume contributed to the demise of 
deism by taking this stance in favor of empiricism (~., 
pp. 65-66). 
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formulated when it became necessary to differentiate between 
ath~ism, theism and pantheism. In eighteenth century England, 
therefore, the word was not often used as a conscious attempt to 
differentiate between deism and theism, as it is today. Rather, 
the word was used to describe scholars who were opposed to atheism. 7 
In defending religion, the deists of this period depended upon 
reason to justify faith. In fact, reasor. was usually perceived to 
be the most important part of one's belief. Traditional Christian 
dogmas were attacked as ~ct confDrming to the application of this 
reason. Some of the emerging views were quite radical for these 
times. For instance, the results included doubts of traditional 
revelation and authority, and an opposition to Supernatural miracles 
and wonders. There was a growing conviction that the search for a 
natural religion was valid and that a "common ground" should be 
fo~d ~mong other religions, sinoe all were believed to be ways to 
8 God. Attempts at formulating such a natural approach to faith 
based upon the different religions were developed in works such as 
Herbert of Cherbury's "Common Notions Concerning Religiontt • 9 
7 
8 
9 
One major development of a large portion of English deism was 
Ibid., pp. 51-52; cf. also Vergilius Ferm~s article "Deism" in 
Runes, o~.cit., p. 75, 
This e~say can be found in Owen C. Thomas, editor, Attitudes 
Toward Other Religions (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), 
pp. ;2-46. Of course, not all scholars of this period held to 
all of these more radical beliefs. For instance, see John Locke'S 
The Reasonableness of Christianit , edited by I.T. Ramsey (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1958. Cf. here also Ferm, "Deism", 
in Runes. Ibid. 
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the emerging emphasis on empiricism, culminating in Hume. Experience 
was believed to be the criterion for obtaining knowledge. Even a 
very brief survey of some of these trends reveals this emphasis. 
An early empiricist, Francis Bacon, based his experiments and other 
observations upon the experience arrived at by the senses. This 
experience was gained by an application of the inductive method of 
ascertaining truth. Thomas Hobbes also sought to base all knowledge 
upon the criteria of sense experience. For Jchn Locke, men acquire 
ideas by experience. In fact, even Divine revelation is perceived 
b d " 10 Y reason an exper~ence. 
Hume also follo?!'e,d the emphasis on experience. He believed 
11 that this experience was the foundation for all knowledge. 
Although this method is not infallible, postulates were "to be 
judged according to the probability of the experience. As we shall 
see b 1 th " f th t .co '." 1" "t" 1 12 e ow, ~s orms e cen er 0 ... !!::..:: ;0_em~c aga~ns m~rac es. 
Eume's work is by no means limited to this field of philosophy. 
He is well known in this area, but in the middle of his scholarly 
career he turned away from such studies to other interests like 
history and ethics. 13 In fact, his best known work is very probably 
14 his multi-volumed masterpiece entitled The History of England. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Heick, -. O"O.Cl-l.., pp. 53-58, 65. 
Ibid., pp. 64-66. 
See Hume's position in his work edited by Cohen, o"O.cit., pp. 124-125. 
Becker, ou.cit., pp. 38-39; cf. pp. 33-35. 
David Hume, The Histoxy of Enflana (Six volumes; London: Gilbert 
and Revington, Printers, 1848 • 
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It was poorly received by the public in the initial stages, but 
soon bec~e a well-recognized and very popular work. It was 
considered a classic for many years. 15 
Earlier several reasons were observed for choosing David 
Hume as a representative example of one who holds that the 
resurrection, as a miracle, could not occur. Also just completed 
was a brief look at the background of the period in which he lived. 
It is desirable now to turn our attention to his extremely 
influential essay, "Of Miracles". 
B. David Hume's Argument and a Critique 
In his essay "Of Miracles~:, David Eume argues from what he is 
convinced is m~nkind's experience against all real miraculous events. 
At the outset, miracles are defined as events which violate nature's 
laws. Eume postulates further that such events, if proven to have 
occurred, must be caused by some Supernatural power or other such 
16 
agency. 
In u~deT to determine if such events have actually happened, 
one must test the available data empirically. This consists of 
viewing the experiential evidence for the miracle-claim on the one 
15 E.W.F. Tomlin, The Western Philoso~hers (New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1967), pp. 194-195. . 
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Bume, op.cit., 
p. 128. See the discussion of Hume's definition of miracle above. 
We will also return to this topic in the critique below. It is 
important to note here that this is not an obscure essay by Hume. 
This well known essay on miracles is Section X of his roark An 
Enouiry Conce~ning Ellman Understanding. See Ibid., pp. 123-142. 
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hand and the experience of the reliability of the laws of nature 
on the other. Then one can ascertain which is more ,strongly 
attested. This test is therefore one based, once again, on the 
testimony of exnerience. The experience of miracles is pitted 
against the experience supporting the uniformity of nature. Here 
Rume concludes that it is more probable that the experience favoring 
the laws of nature is more reliable and the miracle is therefore 
rejected. Since each case of miracle comes against similar 
experiential data 9 these occurrences are rejected as a whole. 17 
An important note here, however, is that Hume realized that his 
18 
argument had not disproved the existence of God.-
Thus we perceive that for this scholar, the e'xperience of 
miracles is to be rejected in favor of the experience of the l~~s 
of nature. In addition to the reasoning given above, Hume also 
makes use of four supportive points. First, there are no historical 
accounts of miracles which are attested by enough reputable men so 
as to make the event probable. Second, people are inclined to want 
to speak of extraordinary experiences, even to the point of 
fabricating the miraculous in order to spread religious truths. 
Third, miracles are cited as having occurred mainly in areas of 
ignorance or even barbarism. Fourth, the miraculous events in one 
religion destroy the probability that those of another faith are 
also true and vica versa. Therefore, accounts of such Supernatural 
events in different religions nullify each othero Thus, all are 
17 
18 
Ibid., pp. 125-129. See Edwin A. Burtt, !zpes of Religious 
Philosonhj[ (Revised edition; New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1939), pp. 222-2160 cr. Swinburne, op.cit., pp. 13-14. 
Burtt, Ibid., n. 258. 
- -
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eliminated by the others. 19 
Now at the outset we must agree that this appears to be quite 
a reliable system in which to test relevant data. Hume seems to 
have found a valuable method and one can easily see how it has 
appealed to scholars. But in order to ascertain if these first 
impressions are correct ones, let us proceed to the text itself. 
It is the conviction of this writer that there are at least four 
major problems with Rume's approach to miracles--four chief criticisms 
which endanger the very heart of his polemic.· 
The first major criticism of Hume's essay is that he incorrectly 
defines both the essence of a miracle and the nature of the evidence 
for and against it. He states: 
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a 
fim. and unalterable experience has established these laiis, 
the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the 
fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can 
possibly be imagined.20 
As in the actual definition of miracles ·stated by Rume above, 
we again observe that these events are perceived to contradict and 
violate nature's laws. They are said to do so because the totality 
of experience relates that these laws cannot be interferred with or 
broken. This experience is "firm and unalterable". Later H~e 
describes it as liuniforI:l experience 1.1. 21 
19 
20 
21 
Hume "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, on.cit., 
pp. 129-134; cf. Swinburne, on.cit., pp. 15-18. 
Hume, ~., p. 128. 
89 
Immediately we can perceive a logical error in ~easoning he~e. 
~ume fails to begin the investigation with an impartial look at 
the :acts. Rather, his very definition rules miracles out because 
of an arbitrary and unproven assumption and it is therefor'2 not a 
valid one. ~is definition is basec upon the idea that the totality 
of experience rests abainst the mi~acle, when such is far fro~ proven. 
There definitely are ~iracle-clai~s that are experientially based, 
but these are b~usted aside by the assu~ed superiority of otbe~ 
varieties of ex?erience. But 3u=e cannot know if the clai~s made by 
supernaturalists are able to invalidate the claims.5ade against 
miracles apart from an investigation of the facts. 
An exa~ple of this could readily De providec. Burne is definitely 
thinking at least so~ewhat in terms of the miracles of Jesus. 22 
But rather than speaking specifically concerning the chief Eiracle-
claim of the Christian faith, which is the resurrection of Jesus, 
he speaks only senerally of the resurrection of any dead indiviQual 
and t!:en promptly infor:ns his reariers t:!1at such an occurre~lc.e has 
never happene~ ~hen he has not presented any examination of the 
facts. Ee cas no evidence that this has never occurred. :::~e further 
concludes fro~ this (without any new evidence) that in a similar 
way all experience opposes' every miracle. 23 Therefore we have 
here a good example of circular reasoning. Dead men are assUEed 
never to rise, and because all experience is arbitrarily perceived 
to stand against such an event, all expe~ience also must oppose 
other ~iracles as well. The evidence for ~iracles is simply ruled 
out. 
22 
23 
But this can only logically be done after an investisation 
Ibid., p. 124. 
Ibid., p. 125. 
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of the evidence. Thus Hume assumes that which he must demonstrate. 
Oxford scholar C~S. Lewis also recognizes this weakness and 
develops it into a trenchant criticism of Hume's position. Lewis 
relates: 
Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is 
absolutely 'uniform experience' against miracles, if in 
other words they have never happened, why then they never 
have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them 
to be uniform only if we ~~ow that all reports of them 
are false. And we can know all the reports to be false 
only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. 
In fact, we are arguing in a circle.24 
Lewis has clearly perceived the problem here. Hume can o~ly 
claim that all experience supports his view if he has first 
ascertained that all other experience is false. But since he 
has not investigated the other evidence, he can only state that 
it is false by assuming that miracles cannot occur. Thus he reasons 
circularly. 
It goes without saying that one cannot disallow miracles simply 
by defining them so that they cannot happen. Circular definitions 
are clearly unsatisfactory.25 But, as we have seen, Hume defines 
miracles to be impossible in light of the experience which testifies 
to the existence of laws in nature. This is done without ~~ real 
investigation to determine if the experience on behalf of miracles 
can establish their validity. He must somehow know this latter 
experience to be false and he can only know that it is so by assuming 
that miracl€s cannot occur in the first place, as Lewis explains. 
24 
25 
Lewis, on.cit., p. 105. 
w. Edgar Moore, Creative and Critical Thinkin 
Mifflin Company, 1967 , p. 188 for inst~~ce. 
(Boston: Houghton 
91 
It may be that one agrees with Hume's conclusions that nature 
does ~le out miracles. But the point here is that one cannot 
define this to be the case or arrange the "facts" in such an order 
that this assumption is supported. It is a matter of philosophical 
and historical debate. 26 
A'further issue here is the place that should be given to 
experience for the laws of nature. We mentioned above in chapter 
two that we also agree with Rume in asserting that nature behaves 
by certain laws. We could not speak of miracles as being abnormalities 
27 apart fro~ recognizing e normal pattern. But Hume asserts that 
the existence of these laws is sufficient to disprove all experience 
f · 1 28 o m1rac es. At this point there are many scholars who would 
disagree. 29 Just because there are laws in nature, this does not 
mean that occasional abnormalities cannot occur. Such laws regulate 
the inner workings of nature ~nd describe what will happen if the 
system is left to itself. But these laws do not dictate the 
possible results of Supernatural interference from the outside. 
Now we have not as yet established if such Supernatural influence 
is possible. Eut the point here is that Hume is simply begging 
the question when he assumes that the experience for the laws of 
nature is $uperior to experience (if established) for the miraculous. 30 
26 
27 
28 
29 
,0 
Cf. Swinburne, on.cit., p. 15 and Ramm~ onocit.; pp. 126-128. 
See McNaugher, on~cit., p. 92. 
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Eume, on.cit., 
see pp. 127-129, 133, 139. 
Cf. Lewis, on.cit., p. 60, McNaugher, on. cit., pp. 99-10; and 
Ramm, on.cit., p. 128, for instance. 
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, o'O.cit., 
see the obvious examples of this attitude on pp. 127-128, 139. 
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This is so in that the very experience which he dismisses as non-
existent or as inferior, if established to be probable, would 
overrule the supposedly stronger experience for the laws of nature. 
This is because miracles involve the Supernatural intervention 
into nature, and if such intervention was shown to be probable 
via a miracle, it would show that the laws of nature could be 
temporarily suspended. Thus, valid e~perience for a miracle would 
actually be superior to experience for the la~s of nature. Yet 
Rume fails to sufficiently investigate this experience for the 
miraculouso Therefore Hume cannot use the laws of nature as an 
absolute rule which cannot ever be broken.;l 
C.S. Lewis also accepts this la~t criticism of Hume as a valid 
one. He points out: 
Probabilities of the kind that Bume is concerned with hold 
inside the framework of an assumed Uniformity of Nature. 
When the question of miracles is raised we are asking about 
the validity or perfection of the frame itself. No study 
of probabilities in~id~ a giveu frame can ever tell us how 
probable it is that the frame itself can be violated. 32 
In other words, Lewis charges Hume with only answering questions 
which fall into the framework of his assumed view of a completely 
uniform nature, when in reality we should be asking whether the 
frame itself can be violated. Thus Hume is concerned with things 
;1 
;2 
See Lewis' essay "The Laws of Nature", contained in a collection 
of some of his other works of this type entitled God in the 
~, edited by Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Willi~ B. Eerdman's 
Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 76-79, especially po 77. 
Lewis, ~iracles, on.cit., p. 106. 
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which might or might not occur within a limited system when he 
should rather be concerned with the system outside of this restricted 
area. Is it possible that this little system of nature, as tr~st-
worthy as it might be in and of itself, could be interrupted from 
the outside (as with a miracle)? Burtt levels a similar criticism 
at liume. 33 
It is now easier to understand why experience in favor of 
miracles, if found to be probable, is so important here. If such 
was found to ~e the case, it would demonstrate that the laws of 
nature could be temporarily suspended~ thus making the empirical 
claims in favor of the miracle dominant over the empirical claims 
for nature's laws. But by refusing to investigate such ~iracle-
claims, flume thereby rejects evidence that could easily disrupt his 
assumptions and show a miracle to be probable. 
Therefore we see that Eume is guilty both of formulating a 
circular definition and of begging the question with regard to the 
importance of experience concerning the laws of nature. But these 
two errors are in turn used improperly as the heart of his polemic. 
Eume further states about miracles: 
33 
There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against 
every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not 
merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts 
to a proof, there is here a direct and full uroof, from the 
nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle ••• 
(Italics are Bume:s).34 
See Burtt, ou.cit., p. 213, footnote 5 where it is also asserted 
that Hume fails to entertain 'this view which allows God to 
interfere with nature's pa~tern from outside the system. 
Eume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David liume, ou.cit., 
p. 128. 
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Here we see three more obvious errors of logic. First, Eume 
persists in formulating a circular definition of miracles, assuming 
that they cannot occur from the very outset. As we have said above, 
he can only know that there is uniform experience against ~ll miracles 
if he has investigated all of the serious claims. Since he has 
not done so, he can only know that all experience opposes miracles 
by ruling that they cannot happen in the first place. This is 
clearly circular and has already been adequately shown to be an 
incorrect procedure. In ~ddition, he still is working only within 
the framework of the laws of nature and thus does not take account 
of possible interferences from the outside. This, likewise, has 
been shown to be incorrect. 
Second, we perceive an additional misuse of experience. 
Experience is now uniformly allied against all miraculous events. 
As we mentioned above, the reason all experience is assumed to 
agree with Rume's first prohibition against miracles is that these 
eVents h~ve already bee~ determined not to take place, by definition. 
Therefore, all reliable experience will indeed coincide with this 
since the opposite is defined as an impossibilityo But it is clearly 
not possible to assume an important statemen~ like this. It is not 
logically correct to argue circularly in order to answer supernaturalists 
who cite experience for miracles simp~y by defining all experience 
so that it opposes or even eliminates miracles. But this is exactly 
what Eume does, as experience is explicitly defined so that if it 
does not provide evidence a.gainst ".CIt events, then the said 
occurrence "would not merit that a.ppellation~tl35 This is a new 
35 Ibid. 
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prohibitive placed against miracles by experience. In other words p 
unless all experience stands against an event, it cannot be 
referred tO$ a miracle. In order for a miracle to be claimed as 
such, its existence must immediately be opposed by all experience. 
This is done without proof or investigation of the miracles. Is 
this a proper approach? Thus a second circular definition and 
subsequent begging of the question is introduced and the problem is 
further compounded. First, experience of nature and second, the 
uniformity of experience are both placed egainst miracles in such 
a way (without any evidence) that these events are said to be 
impossible. The burden of the second (uniformity of experience) 
rests on the solidity of the first (experience of nature), uhich 
solidity has all but been proven. The moment an event becomes 
designated as a miracle, it is snuffed out of existence arbitrarily. 
Third, and in spite of all of this lack of proper evidence, 
3:ume insists on stating that this constitu.tes a proof--"a direct 
and full nroof" against any brand vf ... irac\llous event.;6 The 
argument thus moves from a first circular definition and begging of 
the question to a second of the same and on to th.e concluding 
"proof" • 
But this "proof" turns out to be nothing more than an assumed 
conclusion. It is a good example of an inse dixit or an unsupported 
assertion.;? But if one premise of a syllogism breaks down, the 
;6 Ibi~. The italics are Hume's. 
37 See ~cNaugher, on.cit., p. 101 for a similar charge against Eume. 
96 
whole is invalidated. 38 One can demonstrate anything if definitions 
are allowed to be all-inclusive ~~d cor-tain the conclusion ~hich is 
to be proven as a. given. Therefore we perceive that Hume's "proof" 
fails. It indeed relies on the previously given definition of a 
miracle. It is a solid example of circular rcasoning. 39 
It is easier now to see why many scholars have objected to 
various aspects of :S:ume's approach to miracles. He asumes here that 
which he wishes to prove, but which he has not . t· t d 40 l.nves l.gs. e • In 
spite of claiming to deal with the miracles of the ·Christian faith,4l 
he refuses to deal with any specific New Testament miracles, but 
simply rules them out as being impossib1e. 42 In fact, one scholar 
notes that Hume felt so strongly about the impossibility of miracles 
which are part of the basis of faith for religious systems that 
claims to the contrary did not even have to be examined specifically.43 
This so~ds like anything but an honest attewpt to arrive at the 
proper facts concerning opinions which disagree with one's own! It 
is indeed an intellectually secure person who can know that these 
events can never occur without any investigation whatsoever. But 
. judging from the work in question, this appears'to be the attitude 
of this scholar. 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Moore, o~.cit., pp. 13-20. 
Montgomery agrees that Hume's a ~riori and circular argument 
obligates no one to accept such a view of experience (Suicide 
of Christian Theology, op.cit., p. 38). 
Smith, o~.cit., p. 147; McNaugher, op.cit., pp. 101-103. 
Eume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, on.cit., 
p. 124. 
Smith, o~.cit., p. 146. 
Burtt, o~.cit., p. 215. 
97 
Again, C.S. Lewis points to yet another example of circular 
reasoning in this essay on miracles. For ~ume the two questions 
"Do miracles occur ll and "Is the course of nature absolutely uniform?" 
are one and the same, simply asked differently. But "by sleight of 
hand i ; liume answers "Yes" to the second question and then uses if for 
answering "No" to the first question. The real issue which he 
endeavors to answer is never really dealt with at all. We still 
do not know if nature's patterns can be interrupted or not and thus 
we do not really know if miracles occur. Therefore Rume "gets the 
answer to one form of the question by assuming the answer to another 
form of the same question.,,44- Again we find an ex~p1e of circular 
reasoning. 
We have fo~~d, first of all, that flume commits a series of 
logical errors. In particular, these usually consist of arguing 
circularly .(especial1y with regard to a definition of miracles) a.nd 
by begging the question in using unproven and unsupported assumptions 
(especially in reference to the believed absolute authority of the 
laws of nature and the negligible value of any experience of miracles). 
These arguments alone are enough to invalidate Eume's entire thesis 
against miracles. We could also "prove" that miraculous events ~ 
occur by definition and by accepting all experience for miracles, 
while rejecting all experience for the laws of nature. Then we 
could conclude that all other experience must agree with this. To 
do so would of course prove nothing. But it could be made as 
Lewi~, Miracles, on.cit., p. 106. 
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logically valid as flume's argument. However, there are yet three 
other points of attack that we must make with regards to flume's 
work on miracles. 
The second major criticism of Hume's essay concerns his use of 
the four supportive points which appear to expand his beliefs against 
miracles. 45 It is our contention that he then ignores a series of 
miracles which he even admits fulfills these four "conditions", 
leaving the way open to the possibility that other miracles also 
fulfill them. The case in question concerns a series of reputed 
miracles performei among the Jansenists in seventeenth-century 
France. Hume's own investigation of these occurrences prove very 
interesting indeed, in light of his four supportive points. 
Pertaining to the first point, Hume admits that these miracles 
were "proved upon the spot:- before judges of unquestioned integrity, 
attested by witnesses of credit and distinction ••• 1f and lists 
several very reputable persons who were reported either to have 
witnessed them personally or who investigated the cases later. These 
include such persons as a wel~-known and respected lieuter~t of 
police, a number of physicians, a duke, a well-respected cardinal, 
120 witnesses who were quite influential in Paris and even a list 
--------------------
45 Hume asserts that these four supportive points, which are 
summarized above, prove all miracles to be untr~stworthy. We 
will briefly restate these four here. First, no historical 
accounts of miracles are attested by enough reputable witnesses. 
Second, p~ople deli~~t in telling miraculous stories, even lying 
in order to spread these teachings. Third, miracles are found 
mostly among people of backward nations. Fourthly, accounts of 
miracles in one religion nullify the accounts of those in other 
belief systems. See Hume's essay "Of Miracles" in Essential 
Works of David ~ume, op.cit., pp. 129-1)4. 
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of several famous scholars (including Pascal and Racine).46 Surely 
these can be counted as a satisfactory number of reputable witnesses. 
As for the second point, Hume also admits that these reported 
miracles were investigated by the Jes~its and other groups who 
were enemies of these teachings. This group included the previously 
mentioned lieutenant of police, whose job it was to expose or 
suppress the reported miracles. His attempt was unsuccessful. The 
Molinist party also tried to discredit these occurrences and ended 
up attributing the miracles to the d~vi1, thus admitting that they 
occurred. In another instance, the acting queen o'f France also 
wished to expose these miracles. She sent her personal physician 
to investigate them, only to have him return as a Jansenist convert. 
In fact, none of the antagonists who were sent to investigate this 
situation were apparently able to uncover any falsehoods at a1l. 47 
We are not making any judgments as to what mayor may not have 
48 happened here. But it is plain to see that these many enemies 
of these reports were not lying to make the miracles appear plausible. 
Nor were they trying to delight in the spreading of these reports. 
for it was their own desire to expose these facts. Indeed, they 
had a private interest in disproving them. Even Hume admits to 
46 
47 
48 
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Rume, op.cit., 
pp. 135-137, especially footnote number two. 
~. 
Our purpose here is by no means to determine if these Jansenist 
miracles actually occurred or not. Rather, we p~pose to 
determine exactly what Hume's own reaction is when a miracle 
admittedly fulfills his four conditions. This we will perceive 
later. 
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the fact that many of the witnesses were reliable. 49 Thexefore 
we can assert that these witnesses have not upheld the second point. 
Concerning the third supportive point, neither can we hold that 
these events occurred among ignorant and backward peoples. Not 
only did they occur in one of the more advanced countries of the 
world not long before Eume's own time, but Hume explicit~y states 
that all of this happened "in a learned age". Once again he admits 
that the conditions stated in one of his pOints do not pertain to 
t " "1 C:;O nese m~rac_es.-
Hume's fourth supportive 'point also fails as an ade~uate 
explanation here. Even if the miracles purported to have occurred 
in some religions were able to "cancel" those in other faiths (which 
is a dubious assertion), the logical procedure would be fi~st to 
investigate instances of these reports. If there were some instances 
which appear to be better documented than others, as in the case cited 
here, it would not be logical to abrogate the.se because of the 
existence of "lesser" miracles which are also reported in other 
religions. It would be more reasona.ble to uphold the events which 
best fit the facts, as outlined above. Here it is.curious to note 
that flume adopts a similar procedure. lie investigates what he 
feels are two such tllesser" mira.cles before discussing the Jansenist 
reports. The first two are clearly found to be falsehoods. 51 
51 
Hume, "Of ?Eiracles" in Essential Works of David flume, on.cit., 
pp. 135-137. 
~., p. 1;6. 
~., pp. 134-135. 
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Later he recognizes that the Jansenist reports fit the facts 
better. But he apparently does not endeavor to rule out the latter 
52 accou.~ts by usL.g the former two, and logically so. 
Hume's fourth point would only be plausible if one assumed 
that all accounts of miracles were true, thereby causing some to 
believe that there was a possible conflict of ideologies. But 
since all are clearly not factual, we are left most logically ylith 
the need to investigate each case on its 0~n merits. Thus we c~~~ot 
rule out ~~ event w~ch is well-attested simply because other 
accounts of miracles also exist, for we ca..TL~ot know but that the 
latter ones are the falsehoods and the former one factual. Tp~s 
can or~y be determined oy an investigation of the miracle-claims. 
Therefore the last point is also fou.~d not to be applicable here as 
a critique of these miracles. 
For these reasons we can perceive that Hume's four supportive 
points do not succeed as a valid critique of the miracles in the 
case of the Jansenist re:ports. [Jor have they disproved the 
testimonies. In other ":lords, these four !:prerequisites ll for !tiracles 
have all been fulfilled. In fact, Hume seems willL~g to admit 
his assertion. The follo~-llg statement could be construed as ~~s 
acknmvledgment that the first three in particular meet the 
requirements. Spea~ing of the Jansenist claims he states: 
52 
53 
But uhat is more extraordina~J; ~~ of the miracles were 
~~ediately proved upon the spot~ before judges of 
unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit 
~~d distinction, in a learned age, a..~d on the most eminent 
theatre that is noV! in the world.53 
Ibid.: p. 137. However, Hurne seems to believe that just because 
the fourth point does not hold in this instance because of the 
su?erior testirr0r~ of the authorities involved (Ibid.), it still 
may appl~ in other insta..~ces (Ibid., pp. 137-138~ 
Bume, ~., pp. 135-136. 
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Here Hume informs us that there were reputable witnesses of these 
occurrences (point one), men of sufficient integrity and unquestioned 
character so as to militate against the charges both of lying (or 
forgery) and of the unscrupulous speading of tales in oi-tler to 
"tickle the ears" of men (point two). In addition, these reports 
were proclaimed to have happened in an intellectual age in one of 
the most advanced countries of the world (point three). We have 
already shown above that the fourth point also cannot be used here 
because we cannot rule out a well-attested event a uriori simply 
because of the testimony of other similar events which often do 
not fit any of the facts at all. We can only judge on the evidence 
at hando Neither does Rume specifically assert that the fourth 
point applies here. 
We have now established that Rume felt that the Janse~ist 
miracles were well-attested cases. The human testimony in favor 
of these occurrences is impressive, especially in view of the fact 
that it concerns claims of Supernatural events. 54 Therefore it 
would be very valuable to see how Eume responded to the question 
of whether these were valid claims to the mirculous or not. To 
this suggestion E~e responded concerning these events: 
55 
Where shall we find suoh a number of ciroumstances, agreeing 
to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose 
such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or 
miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And 
this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone 
be regarded as a sufficient refutation.55 
We must state here once again that we are not ourselves ooncerned 
as to whether these Jansenist claims are valid or not. 
Hume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, o'O.cit., 
p. 137. 
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It appears that Humets dismissal of the miraculous'is here a very 
arbitrary one. Even when all of the information adds up ~n support 
of a fact, it cannot be maintained to be true if it is Supernatural 
in origin. Even if it is one of the most corroborated facts in 
terms of human testimony and experience, Hume says we must reject 
it simply because miracles are impossible. A more blatant case of 
circular reasoning may be difficult to produce. When evidence is 
found for a miracle, it is held not to apply simply because such 
events do not occur when this may be the very evidence capable of 
demonstrating that they do occur. One would just naturally assume 
that Hume was really interested in exploring the possibility of 
miracles in an essay of this scope. Rather, we find that his 
belief is that miracles do not occur and that no examination of 
experience for them can establish that they even probably do. 56 
Thus we hold that Hume first assumes that miracles could never 
occur and then disregards the evidence on behalf of them. 57 
Even if one could show that Eume did have an adequate reason 
to distrust these reported Jansenist miracles, the former charge 
56 
57 
Ibid., p. 139 for instance. 
Philosopher Swinburne arrives at similar conclusions about this 
exact passage in Hume's work. He also realizes that flume dismisses 
the Jansenist miracles not because the evidence is not adequate, 
but because such evidence is seen to be irrelevant (on.cit., 
p. 16). We might wonder just how H~e is able to disregard such 
an admittedly adequate amount of experience for these events when 
such examination and research is the foundation of history. The 
acceptance of past events as having actually occurred is based 
upon the existence of an adequate amount of historical evidence~ 
But even though Eume realizes that such as been produced he still 
rejects the miracle, as Swinburne alse notes. Such a double 
standard of rejecting miracles when they are evidenced oy the , 
same (or an even greater) amount of experience which is viewed 
as being adequate in other instances of establishing historical 
fact certainly seems unscholarly. It is such circular reasoning 
that invalidates his argument. 
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that he arbitrarily dismisses possible evidence in favor of miracles 
for faulty reasons can still be maintained for two reasons. First, 
he makes a similar statement earlier in the essay which is not 
related to the Jansenist issue. After his cir~ular defini+.ion of 
miracles which is dealt with above, he remarks thata 
••• no testimony is sufficient to establish "a miracle, unless 
the testimony be of such a kind~ that its falsehood would be 
more miraculous, than the facts, which it endeavors to 
establish •••• always reject the greater miracle. 58 
Again we perceive that Bume is convinced that no amount of testimony 
can establish a miracle. Even when his criteria (the presence of 
sufficient experience of the event) has been satisfied he holds that 
miracles are impossible. Therefore, as explained in the first major 
objection to Bume's essay given above, Eume is also guilty of 
employing unsupported assumptions. Miracles are rejected just 
because they are Supernatural even when they are found to have adequate 
experience supporting their reality. 
Second, even if Eume continued to rely on other conclusions 
(SUCh as the miracles in other religions) to oppose the miraculous 
in the instance of the J~~senist reports, he disregards the fact that 
the available evidence might be sufficient to establish this 
experience as miraculous even if no other miracles had over occurred. 
In other words, the evidence that is dismissed might be enougxLtc 
demonstrate the reality of these events as the supreme ex~ple of 
the Supernatural ~hether other such claims were valid or not. If 
an event has occurred it is made no less realistic because there 
58 Bume, nOf !I~iraclesn in Essential Works of David Bume, 0'0. cit., 
pp. 128-129. 
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are other claims to similar occurrences in existence. 
Therefore we find that this second major c~iticism of liume1s 
essay is also valid. His four supportive points are hi,ghly 
objectionable in the first place, mainly because a large portion 
of our currently accepted history would be subject to much doubt if 
these were viewed as the norm by which facts are to be judged as 
being correct. For~instancet ho~ much of our accepted world history 
is made up of events which were not attested by a goodly number of 
unquestionably intelligent and educated men who in themselves are 
sufficient to guard against all kinds of error and delusion? One 
might indeed question large amounts of history because of a lack 
of conformity tc this rule. Or how much of our history is prejudiced 
by the fact that the person reporting stood to gain much by the 
acceptance of these events, such as Julius Caesar's reports of his 
victories over the barbarians? And surely many other events took 
place among ignorant or backward nations? Since flume includes the 
Greek and Roman civili~ations as falling into this category (because 
miracles were reported by them),59 are we to doubt the history of 
these entire perio~s, to say nothing of ancient Babylon, for instance? 
One begins to note the many problems involved in such an application 
of these four criteria to history. Yet this history is accepted as 
being quite reputable and trustworthy. As Richard Whately once so 
aptly noted, the same method which Rume employed to dismiss the 
miracles from t~e life of Jesus would also remove the unique elements 
from the life of Napoleon. Such reconstructing of history is correctly 
59 1£i£., pp. 132, 134. 
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seen as being self-condemning and very problematical. oO .. 
But as we have also found, nume fails to do justice to miraculous 
events even when they have attained a high level of credibility 
because of the wei~~t of the experiential testimony in their favor. 
Such evidence would most likely be sufficient to corroborate other 
historical events. Therefore it appears that we would be impelled 
to grant probability to certain miracles if they best account for 
the available evidence. And if 3~e errs in his evaluation in 
cases such as the above, it is also reasonable to hold that other 
well-docU2ented ~iracles can be held to be probable events if they 
are found to be the best explanations fer what 
r., 
OJ. 
occurred.. 
The third major criticism of Hume's essay revolves arou.~d the 
fact that this Entire work depends "'.!pon an assumed unifor:li t;y i" 
nature. ~ume rejects miracles because of man's experience 0: this 
uniformity. 3ut i~ order to do this one must hold to the validity 
of cause and ef':'ect by assuming that the course of nature ~.·!ill 
continue (and that it always has continued) exactly as it is no~ 
perceived. ~owever, the fact is that we know only a small part of 
nature and cannot be sure that what we do ~now will continue to be 
the same in the future (or that it has continued this way throughout 
the past). 
60 
61 
~~ontgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op.cit., pp. 43-44, 
note 13. 
If such miracles can be shonn to exist, of course. ',';e are still 
not making any judgment about the facticity of the Jansenist 
miracles, or saying that they are probable. This is because we 
have relied on F.une's presentation of the evidence and therefore 
have not investigated the evidence for ourselves. As ~entioned 
above, the main object here was to perceive how 3ume viewed 
occurrences ;7hicn he 'thouP.:'ht were well-documented. This was 
accomplishe~ here. 
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~at makes this argument all the more persuasive is that Eume 
himself recogni~ed the fact that we cannot accept cause and effect 
as being valid. 62 This is especially evident in his little work 
.An Abstract of a. Treatise of Ruman Nature,63 where Humeexplains 
why we c~~ot reasonably accept this notion. It is customary to 
expect an effect to follow a cause, but there are no reasonable or 
logical grounds for it. 64 
Since cause and effect are no longer held to be valid, 65 there 
is really no logical reason for believing that the uniformity of 
the laws of nature can rule out the miraculous. Neither can we assert 
that the state of nature has ruled out miracles in the past, because 
the uniformity needed for such as assertion also cannot be demonstrated. 
In other words, liume's contention that the experience of mankind 
does not know of any valid cases of miracles because of the uniformity 
of nature is not only invalid, but it contradicts his own statements 
to the contrary. 
This is actually a very powerful argument against 3ume's entire 
essay, which relies on man's supposed experience of the uniformity 
62 
63 
64 
65 
For Hume's rejection of cause and effect g see, for instance, his 
work entitled A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L.A. Selby-
~igge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), Book I, Part III, 
Section II, pp. 73-78, especially p. 76. Cf. also Heick, o~.cit., 
p. 65. 
David liume, An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature (Cambridge: 
The University Press, 1938). For a perceptive discussion 
concerning the author of this work, see the Introduction by J.M. 
Keynes and Po Spaffa, pp. V-XXXI; cf. Bronowski and mazlish, 
o~. ci t., p. 47'+, footnote number three •. 
Hume, Ibid., especially p. 16. Cf. Bronowski and Mazlish~ ~., 
pp. 474-475. 
Cf. Bronowski and Mazlish, Ibid. See chapter two above. 
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of the laws of nature. 66 This experience, based upon the reliableness 
of nature's laws, is the very center of his pole~ic .against miracles, 
as shown above. 67 It is so central that it is held that no miracle 
could have occurred, simply because of this· uniformity. Rume holds 
that even if one could find- a probability or proof for a miracle, 
it 'Would then run up against the "proof" of this uniform conception 
68 
of nature, meaning that it could never occur anyway. 
But now we find that this method can no longer be used as a 
basis for this rejection of miracles. There is not only a lack of 
proof that nature must act in this way, but we have even found that 
we can-~ot speak of this type of causality in nature because it is 
no longer a valid concept (see especially chapter two above). This 
means that the entire basis of Hume's system as it now stands must 
be abandoned. If such a probability for a miracle were found to 
exist, as postulated above, there is therefore no "proof" from 
nature left to oppose it. This would also apply to inst~~ces of 
. 
miracle-claims in past history, if they.were shown to be prcbable, 
because these new concepts of nature would have applied then, as 
well. Once again we perceive that miracles cannot be opposed by 
a uniform, causal view of nature. Eume's objection to mi=ac1es 
is therefore quite defective. 
66 
67 
68 
c.s. Lewis agrees in this critique of Rume. He states in a 
Eume, "Of Miracles" in Essential Works of David Hume, op.cit., 
p. 128. 
Ibid. 
~., p. 139. 
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similar vein of thought: 
The whole idea of Probability (as Rume understands it) 
depends on the principle of the Uniformity of Nature •••• We 
observe many regularities in Nature. But of course all the 
observations that men have made or ~ill make ~hile the race 
lasts cover only a minute fraction of the events that actually 
go on. Our observations would therefore be of no use unless 
we felt sure that Nature when we are not watching her behaves 
in the same way as when we are: in other words, unless we 
believed in the uniformity of Nature. Experience therefore 
cannot prove uniformity, because uniformity has to be assumed 
before experience proves anything •••• The odd thing is that 
no man knew this better than Rume. His Essay on Miracles 
is quite inconsistent with the more radical, and honourable, 
scepticism of his main work (Italics are Lewis').69 
Here Lewis also recognizes that Hume's entire argument depends 
on the uniformity of nature. But there is no way we can know, much 
less prove, this belief. We observe nature by our senses and 
incorporate it into our experience. '0 •• + ~" "f' +l->o J,J"""w 0 __ v_ v __ exp=~ience of 
mankind is but a small part of the whole. In order to say that nature 
acts completely uniformly with ~ interruptions (as Hume asserts) 
would be to know all of nature. This is once again circular reasoning 
because, ~s Lewis points out, one must assume uniformity in all of 
nature in order to say that we experience the same when we do not 
know the whole of it. We must simply believe it is the sane~ In 
other words, one must already have assumed that nature· is completely 
uniform Qud acting i~ a causal way when the evidence indicates 
otherwise. Lewis also notes that Rume accepted similar arguments 
against the caus~lity of nature in his other works. 
Our two former conclusions must therefore stand in light of this 
knowledge. First, Eume's basis for rejecting miracles is not valid. 
69 Lewis, Miracles, o~.cit., pp. 105-106. 
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One cannot reject a miraculous event if it best fits the evidence 
simply because of an assumed uniformity in nature, especially when 
such uniformity has been shovm not to exist. Cause and effect would 
have to be in operation before Hume's argQ~ents could even begin to 
be asserted. But even H~~e himself rejects this view of nature. 
Thus nothing is left but to abandon the very basis of his reasoning. 
Second, this means that the question now concerns which facts best 
fit the evidence, turning ~s once again to an investigation of these 
f' . ~ ac'ts. If a miracle in past history is found to offer the best 
eA~lanation of the evida~ce, it can no longer be op?osed because of 
the belief that these things simply do not happen or because nature 
opposes such an event. 
Our fourth major criticism of H~~e's essay arises from the 
second and third criti~isms. A positive aspect of Burne's phi10sopr~ 
is that he relies heavily upon probabilities, which has been sho~T. 
above to be the conviction of modern thought. In addition, Hurne 
rejected many of the then-popular theories concerning cause and 
effec~ and the accompanying implications based upon a closed un::'verse. 
In an age when it was popular to accept a mechanistic view of the 
70 lL."1iverse, Hume insisted that it remain open. In this sense, at 
least, his thougnts may be viewed as a fore~w"1ner of SOffie of the 
modern theories which also postulate an open universe. 
However, a problem arises when we try to reconcile Hume's 
belief in ~"1 open universe with his previous rejection of miracles. 
70 Hume's rejection of cause and effect has been noted above. For his 
emphasis on probability, see, for instance, his ~ork Essays, 
Literar::r, Moral and Political (London: Ward, Lock and Bowden, 
Limited, n. d. ), pp. 341-343 a.."1d also the essa;y nOf Miracles!! in 
Essential Works of David Hume, op.cit., pp. 125-129. 
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Rather than allowing the evidence to speak for itself (since 
evidence for miracles cannot be ruled out a priori or by animpr9per 
~iew of nature), as might be expected when one holds the above 
positions with regard to nature, Hume transgresses his own position 
to rule out miracles. He does not allow the miraculous even when 
the evidence is sufficient to point to a probability (criticism two) 
and then he dismisses the miraculous as a whole by accepting a view 
of nature which he himself has already dismissed (criticism three). 
Therefcre a fourth major criticism is arrived at here. While 
he accepts quite a modern view of the universe in many senses, he 
becomes a pre-modern in his treatment of miracles. In other words, 
he i~ not self-consistent in his philosophy. His treatment of 
miracles shows signs of a pre-modern critical consciousness, fcr he 
proposes to accept an open universe but rejects miracles because 
of a closed view of nature,7l and he proposes to base his ~ork on 
probabilities, but arbitrarily rules out a probable miracle. Thus 
he is internally inconsistent as well as reverting to this pre-modern 
consciousness. 
We therefore hold that all four of these major criticisms of 
Hume are valid. lie is first guilty of committing a series of 
71 Montgomery also feels that Hume's argument against miracles is 
based on a closed view of the universe. See Montgomery's Suicide 
of Christian Theology, on.cit., pp. 262-263, 351, note 15. Once 
again, we also believe that. there are laws in nature, as pointed 
out above. To speak of miracles as out of the ordinary there 
must be an ordinary course of nature. The question is not if 
these laws exist, but if they can be temporarily suspended. 
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logical blunders~ lie argues circularly72 several times~ usually 
with regard to his ~efinition of miracles and often begs the question 
by using unsupported assumptions, such ~3 the negligible value of 
BrLy experience of miracles. He also fails here in refusing to 
investigate any of these events when this very inves.tigation could 
reveal a valid miracle. Second, Rume fails to accept miraculous 
events even when they are found to be well-attested by human 
experience. He still rejects them for arbitrary reascns even after 
he admits the high credibility of this attestation. Third, Hume 
rejects miracles because of a view of nature that not only was false, 
but that he even rejected himself. Yet the belief in this unifo~ity 
of nature is the center of his polemic against miracles. Therefore 
the very apex of his polemic against miracles must be rejected. 
Fourth, while Eume is modern in many of his conceptions of nature 
(opting for the use of probabilities and rejecting cause and effect 
and the subsequent uniform 'iiti:w of nature), he reverts 'to a pre-
modern stage in his attempt to prove that no actual miracles have 
ever occurred. In arguing against miracles he gives little weight 
to miraculous probabilities and employs an incorrect view of nature 
which he even rejected. Thus he is both pre-modern and self-
inconsistent here. 
It is obvious that these criticisms invalidate Eume's treatment 
of miracles. These errors and improper conclusions in E~e's work 
were not as readily detected in the ~ighteenth century be~~~~~ 
72 Even William Hordern, a scholar sympathetic to certaill tr~nds in 
contemporary, critical theology, states that Hume argues circularly 
in this essay. See his work A Layman's Guide to Protestant 
Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 37. 
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Enlightenment intellect continued to prevail in scholarly circles. 
As will become even more apparent in chapter six, the desire was 
usually to reject miracles in the first place and Hume's essay 
provided the needed authority for such a venture. 
It thus goes without saying that Hume's polemic against miracles, 
while appearing to be a strong argument at the outset, fails when 
closely investigated. This system cannot therefore be used at all 
to invalidate or rule out miracle-claims. A more proper approach 
may have been to define miracles without any inherent state~ent as 
to the possibility of their occurringo Then it would"have been 
possible to investigate the ayailable experience in order to 
determine the extent of its agreement. We are thus confronted 
once again with the need to investigate the evidence to better 
ascertain what has occurred. Such a historical investigation of the 
documents making such miracle-claims is therefore needed, as 
concluded in chapter four above. In the specific case of the 
resurrection of Jesus, empirical claims have been made which report 
experiential evidence for the appearances of the risen Lord. These 
are the accounts which must be examined in order to ascertain if 
this event is the best explanation for the facts. 
Chapter VI. Possibility Number One: Other Similar Views 
It is hard to estimate exactly the influence that Bume's essay 
ItOf Miracles" has had upon the intellectual world since its appear-
ance in 1748. However, we may most assuredly determine that its 
affect upon theoloGY ~as been extremely great. Many scholars have 
viewed it as the determining argument against the existence of any 
miraculous event. This is true both of the older nineteenth century 
liberal theologians and of the more conte~porary twentieth century 
theologians. Some refer directly to flume as the source for this 
rejection of miracles while others make anonymous references to 
their dismissal of the miracu*ous as being due to the belief that 
our experience of nature completely opposes any such violation of 
its laws. It is important to look briefly at both this direct and 
indirect evidence for Eume's influence. 
We are informed by John Hermann Randall, Jr. that since the 
appearance of Eune's essay, religious liberals have rejected any 
, 
belief in miracles. Nineteenth century liberalism~ as a whole 
became convinced by this work that there could be no interference 
1 Briefly, we will refer to religious liberalism in this ~ork as 
the predomina..~t trend of theological thought in the nineteenth 
century (cf. Daniel Fuller, op.cit., chapter three). ~ore 
specifically we might date this movement's prominence from the 
publishing of Schleiermacher's work On Religion: Speeches to its 
Cultured Des~isers in 1799 to Karl Barth's The Epistle to the Romans 
which appeared in 1918. Cf. here this work by Schleiermacher, 
translated by John Oman (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 
1958). See the Introduction by Rudolf otto, especially pp. IX, 
XII. Cf. also Burtt, op.cit., p. 284 and William Hordern, Intro-
duction, Volume I of New Directions in Theology Today, edited by 
William Hordern (Seven volumes; Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1966), p. 15. 
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~ith nature from any miraculous events. 2 Montgomery agrees with 
this assertion that nineteenth century liberal theology followed 
Hume's rejection of miracles.' 
An excellent example of this rejection is seen in the works 
of German theologian David strauss, one of the most vigorous critics 
of the New Testament who ever lived. In his two-volumed work A New 
Life of Jesus (first tra~slated into English in 1865; shortly after 
the German edition), Strauss specifically asserted that Hume's 
essay was so conclusive in disproving miracles that the question 
had now been settled. 4 Miracles simply could not be allowed to 
contradict nature. 5 
strauss' stance on this question, one which follows Rume's 
critique, is a typical one taken by nineteenth century liberalism. 
Friedrich Schleiermacher was also of the opinion that a real miracle 
would involve the suspension of the laws of nature. Such miracles 
occur ~ost often where there is little knowledge of these laws. We 
should abandon such miracles as being superfluous, for they are not 
able to bring us closer to a recognition of Christ. Eesides, science 
and religion agree here that there are no absolute instances of such 
2 
4 
5 
John Herman Randall, .Jr. ~ The Making of the Modern Mind. (Revised 
edition; Eoston: Houghton Mifflin Comp~~y, 1940), pp. 553-554. 
Concerning Randall's statement that liberalism rejected miracles 
because of the influence of Rume's essay, it appears that Randall 
is also spe~~ing of liberalism as a predominately nineteenth 
century movement (Ibid.). 
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op.cit., pp. 27-28. 
David Friedrich Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, no translator given 
(Second edition; two volum~~; London: Williams and Norgate, 1879), 
vol. I, p. 199. 
Ibid., pp •. 199-201. 
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an event. A more perfect view of God, one requiring man!s absolute 
dependence, needs no such miracles to support its cause. 6 For this 
reason, Schleiermacher preferred to see all events as being miraculous, 
including the most common and natural ones. In fact, events such 
as those which were supposed to have broken the laws of nature by 
Supernatural intervention are really not miracles at all. 7 
Other inst~~ces such as these are common in liberal theology. 
Eruno Baur followed Strauss in strongly insisting that we can admit 
of no events which deny the laws of nature. Rathe~ nature's laws 
are upheld by religion and not insulted by o~currences such as 
. 1 8 ml.rac es. Ernst Renan postulated that Jesus wa~ not aware that 
there were any laws in nature at all. Because of this lack of 
knowledge about the lawful pattern of nature, Jesus believed that 
miracles were very common occurrences and uothing ~bout ~hichone 
should be surprised. 9 Adolf Harnack also held that ancient peoples 
had no concept of the strict.ures of the laws of nature. But today 
we realize that no events can occur which interrupt nature. As a 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, edited b~ H.R. 
Mackintcsh and J.S. stewart (Two volumes; New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishe=s, 1963), vol. I, pp. 71, 178-184; vol. II, pp. 448-449. 
Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Desnisers, 
ou.cit., pp. 88-89, 113-114, explanation number 16. 
Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated 
from the 1906 German edition,.on.cit., p. 154. 
Ernst Renan, Life of Jesus, volume one of The History of the Origins 
of Christianity, no translator given (London: Mathieson and 
Company, n.d.),·pp. 147-155, especially p. 148. 
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result, miracles do not happen and we cannot believe in the accounts 
of them. lO 
This rejection of the miraculous, revealing a dependence upon 
Hume's thesis, is not relegatedonly to nineteenth century theology, 
11 however. As shown above, contemporary twentieth century critical 
theology has pursued a similar pattern of thought. It usually 
espouses either the belief that miracles cannot (and should not) 
be validated, or, often relying directly on Hume's arguments, that 
all miracles should simply be dismissed as impossibleo12 
For instance, Paul Tillich holds that miracles cannot interfere 
with the laws of nature. Any theology attempting to make them do 
such is distorting the Biblical view of God. 13 Bultmann believes 
that our modern conception of nature ha~ rendered miracle~ impossible. 
The natural laws are such that they make the world a reality that 
is closed to the miraculous. We are thus too advanced to helieve 
t · t f h . ~ , . 14 in the New Tes a~ent accoun s 0 suc Superna~u~a~ worK~ngs. 
John A.T. Robinson likewise believes that miracles such as Jesus' 
incarnation can only be described as myths because in our scientific 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Adolf Harnack, What is Christianitv~, translated by Thomas Bailey 
Saunders (Third and revised edition? London: Williams and Norgate, 
1912), pp. 25-31. 
Randall asserts that from Hume's time until today few learned men 
have ~uestioned his conclusions against miracles (on.cit., p.293). 
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, on.·ci t., pp. 37-
38; cf. p. 28. 
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Three volumes; Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1971), vol. I, pp. 115-117. Cf. 
Alexander J. ~cKelway, The s~stematic Theolo of Paul Tillich 
(New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1964 , pp. 81-83. 
Bul tmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and I.!yth, 
op.cit., pp. 4-5. 
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age we realize that natural processes cannot be interrupted by 
Supernatural intervention. The entire New Testament cosmology 
must be ruled out for these reasons. 15 We have briefly explored 
some major theories proposed by those who follow Bume in ar'guing 
against the occurrence of all miraculous events. Many scholars 
utilized these and similar views which opposed all miracles in 
deducing from them specific hypotheses against the belief in a 
literal resurrection of Jesus. 
To be sure, the milieu of the eighteenth century, in which 
~ume formulated his anti-miraculous argument, was different from 
the milieu of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which 
these religious liberals applied Hume's views. In the nineteenth 
century there were the philosophical systems of Immanuel Kant, 
stressing morality and Friedrich Heeel, who emphasized a theology 
16 
of reason and development. In the later half of the nineteenth 
and on into the twentieth centuries, Darwinism extended its 
influence. Historical events such as the Frencn Revolution and the 
two World Wars also added to this climate of change. The secularity 
of the twentieth century affected still more world views. In spite 
of these differences, however, on t.he question of miracles these 
liberal theologians ever since the eighteenth" century continued to 
follow Rume, believing that such events were impossible. 
15 
16 
John A.T. Robinson, Honest to God (Philadelphia: The ~estminster 
Press, 1963), pp. 11-18, 64-68. 
Heick, on.c;t=. pp~ 92-102, 119-127; especially p. 92. 
l~ 
A. Heinrich Paulus 
Very possibly the most noteworthy scholar who endeavored to 
apply Immanuel Kant's thought to Ne~ Testament studies was Heinrich 
Paulus. 11 This German theologian also rejected miracles fo= reasons 
which were quite similar to those listed above. The Biblical 
witnesses are believed to have had a deficient knowledge of the 
laws of nature, especially in not knowing of nature's secondary 
causes. Therefore they wrongly believed that Supernatural events 
actually occurred. However, when we discover the true workings of 
nature, we are said to find that the events which were once considered 
-
to be mi=aculous can no longer be consideIed as such. This is 
becau3e these occurrences are found to proceed according to natural 
law. Thus ?aulus proceeded to employ naturalistic explanations fOI 
the New Testament accounts of miracles. 18 
The resurrection of Jesus was also given such a natural 
explanation. For ?aulus 9 Christ did not die on the cross. lie was 
taken down before death overcame him and later resuscitated gradually 
in the grave. The spear wound in the side had not immediately 
killed him, but had merely served as a blood-letting devioe and 
encouraged his recovery. Later an earthquake was additionally 
helpful in rolling away the very large stone from the front· of the 
grave, thus enabling Jesus'escape. He obtained the apparel of a 
gardener and then proceeded to arrange for a ~eeting with his 
11 ]aniel Fuller, op.cit., p. 38; cf. Schweitzer, on.cit., pp. 51, 53. 
18 Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 49, 5l-53~ 
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disciples. After several visits with them, he realized that he 
was dying. He then held one last meeting on the Mount of Olives. 
As he moved away from them, he was obscured from their sight by 
a cloud and was not seen by them again. Jesus died, but in a 
place unknown. to the twelve, who referred to this event as an 
"ascension". 19 
According to this conjecture, usually referr~d to as the 
::swoon theory" of the resurrection, Paulus plainly conceived. of 
this event as one operating by natural processes. There W~5 ~o 
supernatural intervention involved. Thus Jesus was not believed 
to have risen from the dead. 
The s~oou theory did not originate with Paulus, but was quite 
popular with several other scholars throughout the first half of 
the nineteenth century. It was an especially common interpretation 
of the resurrection found. in the so-called fictitious accounts of 
the life of Jesuswnich appeared during this same period of time. 20 
These works were imaginative portrayals of the .life of Jesus, often 
very similar to novels. The use of fiction was quite apparent, as 
the author weaved various plots and counter-plots into an attempt 
to portray Jesus' life in a certain light. The non-historical 
ingenuity of the writer was usually quite noti~eable. As a result, 
21 these works were seen as having little credibility or esteem. 
19 
20 
21 
Ibid., pp. 53-55. 
For some of those who held this view, see ~., pp. ~6-47, 64, 
161-166; cf. pp. 43, 60. 
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Paulus' work differed in that it was not one of the above imaginative 
lives. His work was both more logical and more respectable than 
the fictitious lives and thus he was a more reputable exponent of 
this theory.22 
Strangely enough, various liberal theologians were some of 
the most ardent cr~tics of the swoon theory. By far the most 
famous critique was given by David Strauss hims~lf. He pointed 
out that in order for this theory to be true, Jesus would have come 
forth from the grave half dead, one who was quite visibly ill and 
weak, badly in need of medical help and care, later even succumbing 
to death because of these wounds. But Strauss persuasively argues 
that it would be impossible for such an individual to have convinced 
the disciples that he was the Conqueror of death, the Victor over 
the grave or the Prince of life. If Jesus did not die on the cross, 
he could only have convinced his followers that he was someone to 
be ;itied and cared for by them. They would have immediately 
perceived the facts as they were in reality. At any rate, Jesus' 
condition could not have changed the disciples' sorrow into happiness. 
Nor would it have convinced them to worship Jesus as the Messiah. 23 
Strauss' criticism is a very pointed and accurate one. As we noted 
above, Paulus did indeed conceive of Jesus as a victim of blood-
letting, one whose appearance was changed due to tremendous suffering 
?~ 
and who still felt weak and sickly, finally dying of the wounds.-· 
And this is just how a survivor of a crucifixion would appear. But 
22 
23 
24 
Cf. Ibid., pp. 48-50. 
Strauss, on.cit., vol. I, p. 412. 
Schweitzer, on.cit., p. 54. 
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could such a limping, bleeding, stoop-shouldered individual convince 
even his loved ones that he had conquered de~th forever? The 
answer is obviously a negative one. 
Most theologians have therefore agreed that strauss' critique 
2~ has settled the issue for good. ~ Indeed, Schweitzer even judged 
that Strauss' reasoning was the absolute death stroke to the swoon 
26 theory. Renan was al&~ careful to point out the assurance we 
have of Jesus' death on the cross.27 
The Ne~ Testament records claim that Jesus was nailed to the 
cross (Luke 24:39-40; John 20:25-27). If this could be shown to 
be valid, Strauss' view would be strenghtened all the more. 26 And 
we do find, in fact, that strauss' critique has received striking 
archaeological confirmation in recent years. Paul Maier reports the 
following~ 
25 
26 
27 
28 
••• in the summer of 1968, archaeologist V. Tzaferis excavated 
some stone ossuaries in East Jerusalem dating from the first 
centuIJ" A.D. These were chests in which bones of the de~d 
were reburied after the flesh had decomposed following 
original burial in a cave. One of the ossuaries, inscribed 
with the name Yohanan Ben Ha'galgol, contained the bones of 
a man who had obviously been crucified, the first such 
victim ever discovered. A large, rusty iron spike, seve~ 
inches long, had been driven through both heel bones after 
Cf., for instance, McNaugher, op.cit., p. 148; Smith, on.cit., 
p. 208; Miller, on.cit., pp. 37-38. 
Schweitzer f on.cit., p. 56. 
Renan, op.cit., pp. 244-245. 
Anyone who has had the misfortune of even stepping on ~ nail 
knows the discomfort and pain so cause~, including the forced 
limp! This writer has done so several times. Once only a small 
nail was enough to incapacitate him for three days, making it 
impossible to recover completely until the four±hand fifth day. 
Imagine the results of crucifixion with a spike bearing one's 
weight fer several hours! We could not a~oid Strauss' illustration 
of the condition in which a wounded crucifixion victi~ would 
emerge from the grave. Considering the feet only (even if we 
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first penetrating an acacia wood wedge or plaque that held 
the ankles firmly to the cross. The nail must have encountered 
a knot on being driven into the cross, for the poi~t of the 
spike had been bent directly backward. Slivers still clinging 
to it show that the cross was made of olive wood •••• In 
addition to the iron spike, evidence of crucifixion included 
a deep scratch on the right radius bone, showing that a 
nail had penetrated between the two bones of his lower fore-
arm just above the wrist, which abraded the: as the victim 
writhed in agony •••• Yohanan, at any rate, had his lower 
arms pierced with nails ••• 29 
This is indeed important evidence bearing on this question. 
Maier further corroborates this evidence with three photographs 
which plainly show the affected bones of thisvicti::n. One displays 
a hind vie" of the heel bones as they were found, pierced by a 
large iron spike. The end of the spike is curved upwards. A second 
photograph reveals the portion of the right arm where the radius 
bene was sca~ed by another . ., na.~.l.. m .... _ ,,-ut:: third photograph displays a 
side view of the left heel bone after the spike had been removed, 
clearly showing the very large hole thu::. creatad 'OJ the W'O'!.l!ld.;30 
strauss' critique of the swoon theory therefore appears to be 
even stronger. There is no reason to doubt the New Testament 
accounts of the nail wounds inflicted upon Jesus, especially in 
light of this archaeological evidence. 
It is possible to adduce other considerations against the 
swoon theory as well. For inst~nce, secondly, there is stro~gevidence 
29 
30 
were to momentarily disregard the other wounds), it would not 
be possible to walk so soon afterwards. Detection of such a 
wounded victL~ would indeed be both inescapable and inevitable. 
He would not pass for someone who was resurrected, at any rate. 
This ~ortion is quoted from Maier's The First Easter, ou.cit., 
pp. 78, 80. Page 79 contains three photographs of the above-
mentioned crucified victim's bones which were affected by the 
pierCing of the nails. 
ill,£., p. 79. 
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to demonstrate that Jesus was dead prior to the burial. We are 
told in John 19:31-35 that the legs of the other two crucified men 
were broken in order to hasten their deaths. 3l But since Jesus 
was found to be already dead, his legs were not broken. Rather 
a Roman soldier pierced his chest with a spear in order to make 
sure that he was not simply feigning it. This portion has both 
long and often been recognized as a proof that Jesus was dead by 
many scholars of d~ffering theological positions. The general 
tendency by those who prefer this approach is to perceive this 
spear wound and the subsequent appearance of blood and water as 
signifying one of two medical explanations. It is thought either 
that the spear punctured the heart via the pericardium (a thin sac 
surrounding the heart, which contains a watery liquid) or that the 
heart had ruptured (in which Ca5~ th~ pe~icardium would be filled 
with blood and fluid). In either case the presence of botn blood 
and water is medically explained and Jesus would have been dead.,2 
The question here concerns whether this account in John is a 
reliable test~mony as to crucifixion procedure. 
Again we find some corroboration of these facts in the 
archaeological evidence al~eady supplied by Maier. The bones of 
the crucified victim bring evidence to bear that this account of 
the spear wound and breaking of the legs is also based on historical 
31 
,2 
For the most likely reasoning behind the breaking of these men's 
legs in order to speed up their deaths, see Jim Bishop's analysis 
in The Day Christ Died (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
1965), cf. p. 280 with pp. 289-290. 
For a few of those who hold one of these views, see Renan, op.cit. 9 
p. 244-245; McNaugner, op.cit., p. 148; Miller, op.cit., pp. 38-39; 
Charles C. ~nderson, on.cit., p. 168; Maier, on.cit., p. 112. 
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information (as claimed in John 19:35). Maier relates that: 
Even the detail of the two criminals having their legs 
broken at the close of Good Friday to induce death--the 
crurifragrium has an exact parallel here: Yohanan's right 
tibia and the left tibia and fibula were all broken in 
their lowest third segment at the same level, indicating 
a common crushing blow, probably from a mallet or sledge 
(Italics are Maier's),33 
Now it is true that this evidence does not.mention a spear 
wound. Eut once the custom of breaking the legs of the criminals 
has been est~_blish-=d., it is a short step to this next point. After 
all, the object of each was to insure the victim's death. If one 
was found to be already dead, the logical thing to do would be to 
make sure. The spear, being a natural part of the Rom~~ military 
repertoire, would be the most likely weapon. And where could one 
more likely kill a person with a spear than by piercing his heart? 
The Ro,mans were responsible for !!!8...1dng sure that the victiI:J. was 
dead, as he had been sentenced by a Roman official, and they were 
very efficient in such tasks. 34 
In addition, since at least this first portion of this gospel 
statement has been verified, there is no suffici.ent reason to assert 
that the interrelated item of the spear wound was not also historical. 
The two belong together, because if Jesus had not been pierced, he 
would most likely have had his ankles smashed as well. Eoth meant 
that he diad. The best conclusion is that both are fact. 
A third great difficulty for this theory is that Jesus would 
have to have been an impostor of one sort or another. He would 
33 Maier, The First Easter, on.cit., p. SO. 
34 For this last point, see Charles C. Anderson, op.cit., p. l6s. 
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haVA been guilty of proclaiming his resurrection when such would 
clearly not LtiVe been the CaSe. He, of all people, ~ould certainly 
kn .... +' ... 35 ow ... .ne .1.ac ... s. To honestly ignore them would be to make himself 
worse than an imposter, as it would then most likely entail some 
sort of mental insa.TJ.i ty. Yet, the world almost unanimously views 
Jesus at least as a great moral teacher, in all probability 
incapable of such a gra..TJ.d example of deceiving others. Irnatever 
else might be postualated, he cannot be found to be such an impostor. 
Thus the swoon theory fa~ls as an adequate expla..TJ.ation of the 
facts. Other points could also be made against it. 36 But suffice 
it to say that there is very little doubt among scholars today that 
" 37 Jesus was actually deaa. First, as pointed out by Strauss, he 
could not have convinced his disciples that he had conquered death 
and was victor over the grave in ~is physical ccnditicn. 
would have }rnOi'm immediately that :!1e needed medical help, not that 
he was ia~ortal. Second, the facts point strongly to ~is actual 
physical death on the cross, which occurred no later than the time 
of the spear ",'loli..TJ.d (and act uall:r before this time). Third, Jesus 
was certainly not an impostor of this sort. 
It is therefore no wonder that the swoon theory appeared short-
lived in its popularity. By 1908 Scottish theologian James Orr 
1 d k "'"h . " l" ... hi· 1 38 cou~ remar- v a~ no one ne~a v s Vlew a..TJ.Y anger. Similarly, 
35 
36 
37 
Cf. Iviiller, op.cit., p. 38. 
'Nhat of Jesus! embalmed body? Could he move the stone in front 
of the tomb? How and where did he actually die? Q~estions such 
as these are most difficult for this theory. Cf. Charles C. 
Anderson, op.cit., p. 168. 
?.fcNaugher, op.cit., p. 149. 
James Orr, The Resurrection of Jesus (Grcilld Rapids: Zondervfu! 
Publishing House, 1908 edition reprinted in 1965), p. 92. 
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today this view is also rejected as being outdated and insufficient 
to account for the facts at hand. 39 Frank Morison could even 
assert that the swoon theory is today best regarded as a theological 
curiousity of the past. 40 
B. David Strauss 
As noted above9 strauss ~as one of nineteenth century 
liberalism's most ardent New Testament critics. His Life of Jesus 
appeared in 1835 and occasioned a great theological furor. One 
result of this work was the immediate signaling of a raging battle con-
41 
cerning t~ nature of myth in the New Testament accounts. A 
second result was strauss' dismissal from his teaching post at 
Tnbingen because of the radical nature of his work. Large amounts 
of criticism directed towards his theories were to follow, as much 
printed material opposed his effortso One book even humorously 
d th 1 ° d D °d st hJ.°~selft.42 emy 0 ogl.ze avl. rauss ~ 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, Volume IV, Part One 
of Church DOgmatics, edited by G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance 
(13 volumes; Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1961), pp. 340-341. 
Frank liiorison, Who l~ioved the stone'? (London: Faber and. Fa"ber 
Limited, 1962), p. 96. It is true that this theory reappears 
from time to time, almost always establishing many of the older 
presupposi tions and often, 'once again, in the form of a novel. 
One such modern attempt is Hugh Schonfield·f·s The Passover Plot {Ne* York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1967). That such attempts to 
revive this theory are generally met with scholarly disdain 
(see, for instance, Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theolo~, 
o~.cit., p. 39 and especially note number 44 on p. 46 and J.N.D. 
Anderson, oPccit., pp. 63-65; cf. pp. 93-94) is easily conceivable 
since this theory still has to adequately answer the objections 
raised here and other similar problems. 
Schweitzer, on.cit., pp. 71-72, 96-120. Cf. Charles C. Anderson, 
Cri tical QU&sts of Jesus (Grand. Rapids; Williar:: :::. Eerrl!!lp~n' s 
~~blishing Company, 1969), po 18. 
Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 70-72, 96-97, 111. 
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One element of the l~ew Testament which was clearly ·rejected 
by Strauss was the accounts of miracles. Ever since David Hume's 
essay on miracles, these occurrences could no longer be thought to 
be possible. lriracles cannot break the laws of nature. ::::xplanations 
other than the Biblical ones must be found. 4, 
Concerning the resurrection of Jesus, Strauss is most explicit. 
Jesus was definitely dead and thus the swoon theory is inapplicable 
44 here. Rather, Strauss preferred and popularized the subjective 
vision theory of the resurrection. According to this·view hlary 
Magdalene was probably the first to perceive psychological visions 
of the risen Christ. Next the apostles also had subjective visions 
convincing them that Jesus was indeed alive. 45 
However, strauss explains, the disciples were not in the proper 
frame of mind to be open to visions immediately after the death of 
Jesus or for even days afterwards. They were too despondent to have 
any hope at all so soon. Therefore both a change of locality is 
needed (away from Jer.lsalem) and a period of "recovery" before the 
visions could begin. Strauss thus transfers the disciples' first 
apparitions to Galilee in the north. The time which passed before 
the first "appearance" is also expanded to a much longer period than 
is stated in the New Testament narratives. 46 
44 
46 
Strauss, o~.cit.~ vol. I, pp. 199-201; vol. II, pp. 149-280. 
Cf. Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 82-83. 
strauss, Ibid., vol. I, pp. 408-412. 
~., vel. I, pp. 421-429; cf. also Strauss' work The Old Faith 
and the New, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 81-82. 
I' 
Strauss, The New !.ife of Jesus i Ibid.!' vol. I, pp. 430-437 and 
The Old Faith and the New, ~ •. 
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The result was ih:ernal visions which occurred because of the 
f f t · . ". d h ·t t 47 presence 0 erven ~mag~nat~on an rouc. exc~ em en • :Because of 
this deception on the pa~t of the disciples when they mistook their 
subjective experiences for objective reality, St~auss esse~ts that 
the resurrection itself has therefore become a ;orld-wide illusion. 48 
This theory which strauss developed gained popularity in ~he 
nineteenth century. Scholars such as ?enan and Ghillany, ~ong others, 
prefe~red it as t~e most probable explanation fo~ the appearances of 
Jesus. 49 Its popularity has di!!l.inished in the twe~tieth century.50 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Strauss, The Few Life of Jesus, Ibid., vol. I, p. 440. 
Strauss, The Old Faith and the New', 0'0. cit., vol. I, p. S 3. 
Renan, on.cit., pp. 249, 309-310; Schweitzer, on.cit., pp.170, 187. 
Renan's work has already been cited above. Ghillany, writing an 
imaginative life of Jesus under the pseudonym of Richard von der Alm, 
also preferred this view. Other'liberals accepted this theory as well. 
Comparatively few schola~s hold the vision theo~y today. hlo~e 
com=on are views which are based upon so~e personal experience 
of the disciples which convinced them that Jesus was so~ehow still 
alive. The exact details vary from one view to the next. Charles 
Anderson (The ~istorical Jesus: The Continuin~ uest, onocit., 
pp. 169-171 and Paul ~~aie~ ,First 3aster, on.cit., p. 107) 
rightly include such views in the same category ~ith t~e vision 
theory because, even though hallucinations are rejected here, a 
subjective eAperience of one sort or another is generally perceived 
to be based upon some form of pre-existent faith on the part of 
the disciples. :hus it is still a case of these believers becoming 
convinced of the resu.!.'.r"ection because of their own projected 
faith issuing forth into a belief in objective ~eality. P~obably 
the best-kno;~ theo~y of this type is Paul Tillich' s "rcsti t'J.tion 
theory". For Tillich, the resurrection is not be be"conceiv-ed 
of in terms of the Teappea~ance of eithe~ a person or a spirit. 
In fact it is not any ty~e of literal appearance of any kind. 
Rather, the cisciples experienced the spiritual presence of jesus. 
Like Strauss, Tillich feels that it was actually an ecstatic 
experience which convinced the~ ~hat Jesus was the New ~eing. It 
is possible for belieye~s to~ay to have this same expe~ience 
(Tillich, on.cit., vol. II~ pp. 156-158. For a simila~ interpretation 
of Tillich's view, see ~cKelway, on.cit., pp. 170-171, 181-182). 
Theories suc~ as Tillich's will also be included in this treatment 
of visions (as Charles Ande~son and Paul ~aier also do). Most 
of the proble~s involved in postulating a pre-existent faith and 
in the subse~uent application of subjective criteria to objective 
co~viction also apply here and ~ende~ such an expe~ience ~uite 
izpossible, as will be shown below. 
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However, several of the nineteenth century liberals opposed 
this view as well. Schleiermacher asserted that any version of the 
vision theory was entirely unacceptable because its suppositions do 
not fit the facts. 51 Another rejection of this theory was given by 
Paulus, whose own views we have discussed above. He likewise felt 
that visions were not possible in view of the available facts, for 
there was sufficient evidence to prove that Jesus was actually alive 
end present with the apost1es. 52 Therefore he preferred the swoon 
theory. This rejection of visions by Paulus is a very iuteresting 
one, because we have already pointed out that Strauss had likewise 
ruled out Paulus' theory. Thus we see that each attempted to negate 
the theory of the other. 
The most noteworthy nineteenth century criticism of Strauss' 
vision theory came from another liberal theologian, Theodor Keim. 
Schweitzer notes that Keim's study of Jesus' life, which was published 
in three volumes from 1867-1672, was the most important critical 
work on this subject that had appeared in many years. 53 In it he 
presented a substantial criti~ue of all hypotheses which made subjective 
visions and inner experiences the basis for the disciples' belief in 
objective, outward appearances of Je6us~ 
Keim rejected the vision theory for several key reasons. First, 
the over-abundance of self-generated emotion and excitement which 
Strauss felt had to be present 54 to produce these visions is not 
51 
52 
53 
54 
5chleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ou.cit., vol. II, p •. 420. 
Schweitzer, on.cll., pp. 54-55. 
Ibid., pp. 193, 211. 
See, for instance, Strauss' The New Life of Jesus, on.cit., vol. I, 
p. 440. 
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found in the early church. Other inward experiences and visions 
found in the early texts are likewise not characterized by this 
extreme excitement. Second, visions in the New Testament are 
numerous. But these are never confused with the resurrection 
appearances, so as to ad1llit the difference between them. Thj.rd, 
the appear~~ces of Jesus are characterized by calmness and reticence. 
Those involve~ are usually reserved and not at first ready to accept 
Jesus with joy and exuberance. Fourth, religious visions tend to 
multiply ~~d grow more numerous. But the appearances of Jesus come 
to a sudden cessation. For these and similar reasons, this theory 
is rejected as not adequately explaining how the appearances of 
Jesus could possibly have been subjective visions. 55 So~e of Keim's 
55 W.J. Sparrow-Simpson, The Resurrection and the Christ~an Faith 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan PublishL~g House, 1911 edition reprinted 
in 1965), pp. 113-115. The theory popularized by Keim is commonly 
referred. to as the "telegram theory". According to this hypothesis, 
Jesus rose spiritually from the dead (not bodily) and :returned 
to God. Afterwards he com~unicated the knowledge of his spiritual 
existence to the apostles"by means of "telegrams" or messages 
from heaven. The appearances of Jesus recorded in the Hew Testament 
were therefore not subjective visions or hallucinations but 
oOJec~~ve impressions sent by both Jesus and God. Keim admits 
that this commtL~ication to the disciples of the truth that Jesus 
had risen required Divine intervention (ill£., pp. 117, 119; 
McNaugher, oD.cit~, pp. 155-156). But such a theory falls prey 
to at least four major criticisms. First, is this view any less 
a miracle than the view Tecorded in the New Testament? The 
miraculous is admittedly involved here as well and ~e still have 
the teaching that Jesus actuall~ rose and is alive (although in 
spiritual form). Secoud, would God and the: risen Jesus seu~ 
messages and reveal appearances which would deceive the disciples 
into th~nking that Jesus was physically there with then? Such 
deception has moral (or amoral!, implications and fails to explain 
why Jes~s did not actually appear instead of sending the impression 
that he had actually done so. Third, these impressions would not 
be objective enough to make them think that Jesus had actually 
risen bodily. Fourth, it fails to explain the empty tonb. (For 
these and similar criticisms, see Tillich, on.cit., vol. II, p. 156; 
McNaugher," Ibid..; Lewis, Miracles, on. cit., pp. 152-153; Smith, 
o~.cit., pp:-2I9-220; Tenney, on.cit., pp. 189-192.) 
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points are well-taken and are still employed today as negative 
evidence that opposes this theory, as we will perceive presently. 
At any rate, many scholars believe that Xeim dealt the death-blow 
to strauss' theory of visions, just as strauss had earlier done the 
same to Paulus' hypothesis. 56 
Today there are at least four major reasons why the subjective 
vision theory is rejected. First, the apostles were not in the 
proper frame of mind to presuppose visions. There is a needed 
psychological precondition for such halluCinations, this being the 
ex~ectation of the event in question and a strong belief that it will 
happen. Otherwise there would be no impetus for the mind to produce 
such subjective projections. 57 But the disciples were not in such 
a state of mind. They were very despondent and did not have such 
faith and expectation that Jesus would rise. Pannenberg expresses 
this point as follows: 
51 
To maintain, first, that the appearances were produced by 
the enthusiastically excited imagination of the disciples 
does not hold, at least for the first and most fundamentsl 
appearances. The Easter appearances are not to be explained 
from the Easter faith of the disciples; rather, conversely, 
the Easter faith of the disciples is to be explained from 
the appearances. All the attempted constructions as to how 
the faith of the disciples could have survived the crisis 
of Jesus' death remain problematic precisely in psychological 
terms, even when one takes into account the firm expectation 
of the imminent end of the world with which Jesus presumably 
died and in which his disciples lived. It cannot be disputed 
that, in spite of all this, Jesus' death exposed the faith 
of the disciples to the most severe stress. One could hardly 
Sparrow-Simpson, ~., pp. 113-115; Orr, on.cit., p. 219; 
McNaugher 9 Ibid., p. 155. 
McNaugher, Ibid., p. 152. See especially George E. Ladd, I Believe 
in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William E. Eerdman's 
Publishing Company, 1915), p. 138. 
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expect the production of confirmatory experiences from the 
faith of the disciples that stood under such a burden. 
Certainly such psycholcgic~l considerations by themselves 
are as little suited to support any conclusions as to support 
the criticism of the New Testament traditions.58 
As Pannenberg clearly states here, it is psychologically 
problematical to endeavor to explain how the disciples' faith could 
have withstood the stress placed upon it by the death of Jesus. We 
could not expect the collectively forlorn faith of these ~e~ to 
respond positively by producing visions which, by their nature, require 
enthusiasm, excitement and especially belief. Therefore ue find 
that the annearances of Jesus gave rise to the post-Easter faith and 
were not produced by an already-existing faith. 59 
This position is well-attested by various others as well. Eminent 
Scripture scholar Raymond E. Brown notes that most theologians also 
agree that faith in the resurrection of Jesus arose because of the 
appearances rather than the appearances being caused by a pre-existing 
faith. 60 An examination of the facts will show that this is the 
case, thus making visions an impossibility. 
The disciples were si~ply too despondent to have produced such 
hallucinations, especially in so short of a t~ .. EV2~ Marxsen 
realizes that the disciples' faith was a result of extcrnal experiences 
61 
and not inward impulses, thus making the vision theory untenable. 
William Barclay agrees that the disciples could not contemplate 
56 
59 
60 
61 
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, translated by Lewis L. 
Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1968), p. 96. 
Ibid. 
Raymond E. Brown, The Vir °nal Concention ,and Eodil 
of Jesus (New York: Paulist Press, 1913 , p. 84. 
Marxsen, op_cit., p. 116. 
rtesurreotion 
themselves into a situation where visions would be possible so soon. 
Therefore this theory itself is perceived to be unreasonable. 62 
Ramsey likewise asserts that any theory which proclaims that the 
resurrection appearances arose because of a prior belief of the 
disciples, as this theory does, can be dismissed because of the 
problems involved. 63 
It is not overly difficult to comprehend this criticism raised 
against strauss' subjective vision theory. The disciples had expected 
Jesus to redeem Israel and bring in the heavenly Kingdom of God 
(see Luke 24:21). They had followed him for a few years, expecting 
this result. Eut now his death was unexpected and caused must 
despondency. Such a reaction is a natural psychological response 
when so much was at stake and believed to be dependent upon Jesus' 
remaining alive. Their long-awaited hopes and dreams were dashed 
to pieces. To expect an ecstatic, enthusiastic faith-affi~ation 
capable of producing inward visions from these men is therefore 
not very possible. 
An interesting concession here was made by Strauss, who also 
realized that, as the facts stand, visions would not have occurredo 
The disciples could not have escaped such despondency in such a 
short period of time. Thus, unless one rearranged the available 
data, the theory would fall. 64 
62 
63 
64 
William Earclay, The Mind of Jesus (New York: liarper and Row, 
Publishers, 1961), pp. 304-305. 
Ramsey, on.cit., p. 41. 
Strauss, The New Life of Jesus, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 430-431. 
Cf$ also Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., pp. 111-112. 
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Therefore we find that the disciples were too despondent to 
have been subject to such excited visions entailing a believing 
frame of mind. As Marxsen concludes, we must reject the vision 
theory because it does not agree with the textual facts. 65 McNaugher 
reminds us that such hallucinations have psychological rules and 
these had not been fulfilled. 66 
In addition, we find that the disciples did not expect Jesus 
to rise from the dead. 61 Ramsey notes that they were not able to 
anticipate this event at all because of their aforementioned doubt 
d · old t 68 an oew~ ermen. 
In fact, the disciples did not believe immediately even aftgr 
the appearances, but doubted the i;vidence. 69 Orr believes that 
this doubt on the part of the ~isciples is the most historical 
portion of the resurrection records. 10 Reginald Fuller finds this 
doubt to be a part of the earliest tradition and a very natural inclination 
for these early witnesses. 71 Both Marxse~12 a~d Ramsey73 note the 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Marxsen, ou.cit., p. 116. 
McNaugher, op.cit., p. 152. 
The narratives sufficiently establish this point. See Yuke 24;12; 21; 
In. 20:9, 19; cf. the Markan appendix, 16:10. Cf. also Brown, 
o~.cit., p. 106, footnote number 176. 
Ramsey, o~.cit., p. 41. 
The witness to this is even greater than that of the previous 
point. See Matt. 28:11; Luke 24:11, 22-24, 27; In. 20;25; 21:4; 
Cf. the Markan appendix, Mk. 16:11, 1;, 14. Cf. also Erown, op.cit., 
p. 106, footnote number 176. 
Orr, op.cit., p. 225. 
Reginald Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 81-82; cf. pp. 100-101. 
Ramsey, ou.cit., p. 41. 
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affect of this doubt on the disciples. It is important to realize 
here that if the vision theory were true, such persistent doubt 
could not exist, because the supposed presence of the pre-existent 
faith would me~~ that the appearances would have already been regarded 
as genuine. In other words, if the disciples' faith in a risen Jesus 
had produced visions, this same faith would automatically accept 
the resulting visions as true. But we find that such was not the 
case. The doubt was both genuine and persistent. 
Thus we see that, first, the disciples were not L~ the proper 
frame of mind for visions to occur. They were too despondent to 
have had hallucinations in so short a time. 74 In addition, they 
not expect Jesus to rise ~~d did not readily believe the 
appearances even after they occurred. 
The second main reason that the vision theo~, is rejected is 
because of the problems involyed concerning the number of people who 
claimed to ~2ve seen Jesus after his death and the different places 
and times in which these appearances were believed to have taken place. 
It is true that visions can be experienced by more thfu~ one person 
t . 75 at a lme. But we haVe been speaking of a theory which proposes 
74 
75 
Even C-ordon Kaufman, one of the compara"lvely few scholars who 
still hold the yision theory today, realizes that a prior belief 
must exist before visions can be produced. However, he fails 
to show what positive factors there were that would be sufficient 
to give rise to this optimistic faith, a faith which would 
absolutely have to be present before the events themselves. This 
is quite damaging to his viewpoint, especially in view' of the 
fact, t!:2:t he admits that the disciples were quite disillusioned 
at Jesus' death and were therefore subject to despair. He realizes 
that their hope had disappeared. But we may wonder what 
spontaneous factors caused such a reversal of thought and made 
the disciples believe that Jesus was alive before they received 
any confirmation of the fact. See these adm~ssicns in Kaufman!s 
Systematic Theology: A Historic:tst Perspective (New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1968), especially pp. 415, 422. 
Ibid., p. 421; footnote 20; Orr, op.cit., p. 219. 
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subjective hallucinations--visions with no real objective stimulus. 
Therefore if one of the disciples (or others who claimed to have 
experienced the resurrection appearances) actually did hallucinate, 
it would not by any means be automatic that others would also 
experience the same vision. Rather, each would also have to go 
through the process of developing a prior faithmd of being 
psychologi~ally ready for such an experience. This is because 
hallucinations are essentially private events and are experienced 
by more th~~ one person only when these above conditions "are present 
for ~ indivdual. 76 But, as Pannenberg notes, the narratives 
record se7eral different appearances which occur under many different 
circumstances and time~ and even include different participants. 
This invalidates this theory which relies upon a mental reaction 
which spread from one individual to the next. The various conditions 
simply do not support such a view. 77 
The above objections are persuasive especially when one remembers 
that in order for this theory to be valid, each individual would 
have to have responded to personal stimuli at each of these various 
times and places. The different personalities involved would mean 
that many would not be in the proper state of mind, especially when 
all the records indicate that exactly the opposite reaction prevailed, 
as shown above. 
76 
77 
Edwin G. Boring, Herbert S. Langfield and Harry P. Weld, editors, 
Foundations of Fs cholo (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 
1956 , p. 216; Yamauchi, op.cit •• March 15, 1974, p. 6; McNaugher, 
op.cit., p. 153; Smith, oD.cit., p. 217. 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, op.cit., pp. 96-97. 
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Surely some of tr.e participants would not have experienced 
these appearances at all if they were due to visions, for they would 
not all be in the correct state of mind. But such was not the 
case. Even New Testament critics are agreed that all the disciples 
genuinely believed that Jesus had appeared to them after his death. 
In other words, whatever may have been the cause of the appearances, 
the disciples believed that Jesus had been raised from the dead. 78 
In fact, Johannes Weiss pointed out that the early procl~ation of 
the resurrection would not have been possible at all had the disciples 
experienced even the simplest doubt in an objective resurrection. 79 
This undoubting belief would hardly be the consequence if ve were 
to rely on visions tc s~ch large numbers of people as are recorded 
in the narratives. As ~e~tioned ~bove~ all would not be prepared 
for such visions. 
AIl i:;: ... ste.nce where this would be true occurs in the oldest 
resurrection narrative. ~ere Paul relates that on one occasion 
Jesus appeared to over 500 people at once (I Cor. 15:6). That Paul 
cites this as a proof of Jesus' resurrect~~n is evident from his 
further explanation that most of these 500 witnesses were still 
alive at the ti~e of his writing (and thus available to testify of 
the reality of this, event). 80 As Brown asserts 1 it is hardly possible 
78 
79 
80 
Bul tmann, "New Testament and t':ythology" in Kerygma and llyth, Ope ci t. , 
p. 42. See Orr 9 o~.cit., p. 115, with regards to this admission 
by critic Kirsopp Lake. 
Johannes Weiss, Earliest Christianit : A Histor of the Period 
A.D. 30-150, edited by Frederick C. Grant Two volumes; Magnolia: 
Peter Smith, Publishers, 1959), vol. I, p. 28. 
Bultmann, KerYgma and Myth, o~.cit., p. 39; cr. Reginald Fuller, 
o~.cit., p. 29. See also Archibald T. Robertson, Word Pictures in 
tneNew Testament (Six volumes; Nashville: Broadman Press, 1931), 
vol. IV, po 188. 
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to imagine a synchronized but personal experience which wo~ld 
convince each that Jesus had objectively risen. 81 A collective 
hallucination in which all saw visions would be to ignore the above-
mentioned evidence to the contrary. 
Another instance wherG the vision theory appears especially 
improbable is L~~els recording-of the walk to Emmaus (Luke 24s13-33)o 
This narrative, co~plete with proper names (such as C1eopas, Emmaus 
and Jerusalem), convinced Martin Dibelius that the pure form of the 
82 
event had been preserved at this point. This incident has received 
much respect from critics who have rejected other aspects of the 
resurrection accounts. 83 Here we find that the shifting scenes, 
continual conversation and the time element involved all militate 
strongly against the reality of visions. 84 Paul's list of appearances 
in I Cor. 15:1-8 is also quite problematical for this viewpoint as 
we11. 85 
It would be advantageous here to recall two of Keim's criticisms 
ma~last century which were discussed above. First, the New Testament 
writers distinguish between the resurrection appearances of Jesus 
and visions which occur a~ la~er times (such as II Cor. 12:2-4; Acts 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
Brown, on.cit., p. 91. 
See Ramsey, on.cit., pp. 61-62. 
Orr, on.cit., p. 176. Cf. Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 107. 
This conclusion was verjfied for the writer by a discussion with 
a psychology professor on Dec. 18, 1969, who spoke of the various 
impossibilities of relying on visions in this instance. 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, on.cit., p. 97. 
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7:55-56; 18:9; 23:11; 27:23).86 This would not be the case ff the 
resurrection appearances were of the sa~e variety as the later 
visions, as all would be viewed as being of the'· :same type. This is 
an acute point because it d~monstrates that the resurrection experiences 
were regarded as being unique and were therefore not of a subjective 
visional character. 87 Second, if tnese appearacnes of the risen Jesus 
had not been perceived to be unique, then one would not expect them 
to have ceased so suddenly. Rather, they would tend to have been 
related to the later visions. That they did stop indicates that the 
early church did not want them to be confused with spiritual visions. 88 
Therefore we perceive once again the second chief criticism of 
the vision theory. l'l!any factors have contributed to this pr~babili ty 
that the number of visions, the number of people who saw them and 
the way in which these occurred simply do not correspond to the required 
data for the disciples to have experienced such manifestations. 
The third major criticism of this theory is that real subjective 
hallucinations are comparatively rare, as proper causes are usually 
lacking. They are, by definition, experiences in which something is 
perceived to be present, but for which there is ~ objective reality. 
Thus they differ from illusions, where a reality is mistakely 
identified. 89 Thus it can be ascertained that such occurrences are 
86 
87 
88 
89 
Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., p. 114. 
See Reginald ?uller, on.cit., pp. 32, 170. 
Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., p. 114. 
See, for instance, William James, The Princinles of Psychology 
(Two volumes; Dover Publications, Inc., 1950), vol. II, pp. 114-
115. Cf. also Yamauchi, on.cit., March 15, 1974, p. 6 and 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, op.cit., p. 95. 
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generally rare. The perception of something that not only is not 
present but for which there is no objective reality at all therefore 
requires an explanation. Usually such halluci~ations are caused 
by mental illness of some kin.d, dru.gs or extreme methods of bodily 
deprivation. 90 To suppose that all of the witnesses of the resurrection 
appearances were in such a state of mind th~s becomes nonfactual. 
We can now bette:understand how an extreme pre-conditioned ho.pe and 
expectation must exist, combined with· other factors. Such conditions 
as the a"ooveclearly did not exist in order for all of the disciples 
to imagine something that was only "thin air tl • 9l Therefore Pannenberg 
rightly concludes that to describe the resurrection appeara~Ces as 
hailucinations or subjective visions is completely unsatisfactory.9 2 
The fourth major reason why the vision theory is rejected today 
(and the last which we will deal with specifically) is that cautions 
were actually t~~en in order to demonstrate that the appe~rances 
"ere hallucinations. We have already mentioned the theme of 
doubt in the gospels and the consequential conviction of contemporary 
scholars that the disciples were convinced that Jesus was act~lly 
alive only after the appearances and not before. 93 We have likewise 
90 
91 
92 
93 
Yamauchi, Ibid.; Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 94-95, footnote nUmber 93. 
- -
Kaufman admits that the objection that the vision theory is too 
subjective to account for such objective appearances of Jesus is 
a stror.gane. He also notes that his work had. thus far (on.cit., 
pp. 426-427) not sufficiently handled this problema 
Pannenberg, ~., pp. 95-970 
Marxsen, on.cit., p. 67; Reginald Fuller, op.cit., pp. 81-82; cf. 
pp. 100-101; Brown, on.cit., pp. 84, 106, footnote 176. 
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. spoken of the conviction of the New Testament authors that the 
appearances of the risen Jesus were different from later visions. 
Reginald Fulle~ especially notes here that Paul did not confuse 
these appearances with the subjective visions which were experienced 
later. 94 
In addition, we find that other steps were also taken to 
disprove visions as the origin of the appearances. We find these 
"safeguards" in ~ the ea.rliel" and the later narratives ".7hich deal 
with this subject. The emphasis in Xatthe~, Luke-Acts and John on 
Jesus' resurTected body being both spiritual and material is well-
Qr:: 
known. 7J We find an emphasis on being able to see and handle the 
body of Jesus. In Luke especially it is related that it occurred 
to the disciples that they were seeing just such a spiritual 
hallucination--a bodiless apparition. 96 Although these gospels 
were written later than Paul's description of the resurrection 
appearances, it is recognized by many scholars that the description of 
Jesus' body in the gospels may have been derived, at least in part, 
from the same source as Paul's conception of a "spiritual body"o 
In other words, it is often recognized that both Paul and the gospels 
94 
95 
96 
Reginald Fuller, ~., pp. 32, 170. Cf. ~Larxsen, Ibid., pp. 100-102. 
See, for example, Orr, op.cit., p. 197. 
Ibid., pp. 71-154. 
See a~so Reginald Fuller, 
Luke 24:;6-4; relates this scene. The disciples though that they 
were viewing a bodiless apparition or spirit (Greek uneuma; cf. 
Matt. 14:26, 27). Jesus had to convince them otherwise by present-
ing his body for observation. We are told that they only believed 
that they were not see:ing "ghosts" when it was thus proven to 
the:_ See Robertsonj op.cit., ~ol. II, p. 296. Other verses 
where it is either stated or implied that Jesus' body was handled 
include Matt. 28:9; John 20:17, 26-28; of. Acts 1:;. 
speak of a resurrected body composed of both spiritual and mr ~.r'ial 
qualities (with varying emphases) and that these concepts r.ere in 
turn based on the reports of the original eyewitnesses. 97 
What is often not realized is that Paul's list of appearances 
in I Cor. 15:1-8 also contains a polemic against theories such as 
-that of subjective visions. As Brown properly notes, Paul's reference 
to 500 people having seen Jesus at one t1me means that Paul conceived 
of the appearances as being other than p~~ely internal experiences. 
Thus hallucinations were not possible in view of his testimony.98 
This is especially true when we remember tha.t Paul adds that most 
of these witnesses ~ere still alive and thus could be questioned. 
Therefore, this testimony in I Cor. 15:6 is regarded by Paul himself 
as proof against subjective visions. 99 
Thus we see that there were precautions taken in both Paul'e 
account and in the gospels to guard against the view that the 
appearances were due to subjective visions and therefore not genuine. 
This motif is more developed in the gospels, where we are told that 
Jesus' body was touched on various occasions, demonstrating its 
l Ot 100 rea 1 y. But we have seen how Paul also includes a proof against 
97 
98 
99 
100 
Cf. Robert }'·i. Grant ~ lliracle and l~a tural Law (Amsterda.I!l.: North-
Holland Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 229-230; Brown, on.cit., 
pp. 85-89; Charles Anderson, on.cit., pp. 161, 163-166; Smith, 
op.cit., pp. 194-195. Concerning Paul's list being based upon 
eyewitness testimony, see BTOW'n! ~., p. 92 and Reginald Fuller, 
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Cf. Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythologyll in Kerysa and Myth, 
op.cit., p. 59 and Reginald Fuller, op.cit., p. 29. 
This is also reported by Ignatius in section three of his Epistle 
to the Smj7neanSe See J.B. Lightfoot, editor and translator, ~ 
Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1971), p. 83; 
cf. p. 85. 
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101 
such a theory as well. That this is the case in the New Testament 
is only natural ~hen we consider man's psychological impulse to 
investigate both strange occurrences and the testimony of others who 
102 
claim to have experienced such. 
Therefore we perceive that the vision theory cannot account for' 
the resurrection appearances of Jesus. Several major points militate 
against such a view. The disciples were not in the correct psychological 
frame of mind. There is also a problem concerning the number who 
claimed to have seen Jesus and the time and place factors involved. 
In addition, real hallucinations and vision's are rare and do not fit 
the facts. Lastly, the early sources explain that various cautions 
were taken to prove that visicns were no·~ applicable in these instances. 
Many minor points could also be mentioned against this theory.l03 
Most of these objections can also be applied to theories relying upon 
other subjective experiences of the apostles as well. l04 
101 
102 
103 
104 
See Sparrow-Simpson, on.cit., p. 110. 
Orr, on.cit., p. 180. 
Fer instance, if the vision theory were true, the empty tomb 
would be left unexplained. And what happened to Jesus' body? 
In addition, this writer has complied a list of 34 total reasons 
why this theory is inadequate. 
Theories like those of Tillich (op.cito, vol. II, pp. 156-158) 
and Van Euren (on.cit., pp. 132-133) which rely on some unexplained 
subjective experience of the disciples face practically all of 
the same difficulties. For instance, the disciples' despondency 
and doubt must still be changed to faith before the experience 
itself in order for these to occur in the first place, which 
encounters the Qifficu1ties raised above. There is likewise the 
same proble~ of how many would have been convinced in this manner, 
as well as with the various time and place factors. Even more 
acute, is the disciples' mistaking such subjective experiences 
for objective ones and how they became convinced that Jesus had 
literally risen from the dead. The disciples knew the difference 
between the resurrection appearances and later experiences, as 
We thus conclude that the visional 'theory simply does not fit 
the narratives. For hallucinations to have occurred, all of the 
facts must be changed around. There are psychological laws which 
these hallucinations must abide by and these were not present. 105 
No ~Btter how inviting a theory may appear, if it fails to account 
for the evidence, it must be rejected. 106 
Today the vision theory is held by comparatively few scholars. 
Brown notes that this nineteenth century view is not flven respectable 
10'" 
any longer. ( Based upon the fear and dejection of the disciples, 
Eornkamm asserts that we cannot resort to any explanation which 
depends lOS upon the inner, subjective experience of these men. 
McLeman agrees that the nineteenth century vision theorists such as 
strauss and Renan presented views which were quite extravagant in 
their claims. 109 Even Schonfield rejects this theory as not fitting 
the evidence. Vnatever~~eorymay be proposed, it cannot validly 
b "-hO 110 e w loS one. 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
explained above. We also find psychological causes lacking 
here. ~at would give rise to such experiences? As with visions, 
there is also the objection that cautions were deliberately 
taken in the narratives to pro~e that the experiences were 
objective and ~ot subjectiveo These are a few of the key object-
ions to these subjective theories. As we have observed, they 
are practically the same as those listed above. See IEcKelway 
(ou.cit., pp. 170-17lf lel-1S,), Charles Anderson (ou.cit., 
pp. 169-173) and Maier (The First Easter, on.cit., pp. 112-11,) 
for similar criticisms and other objections to this theory. 
Orr, ou.cit., pp. 27, 222. 
Brown, on.cit., p. 75, footnote number 127. 
Raymond E. Brol'm, liThe Resurrection and Biblical 
Commonweal, l~ovember 24, 1967, pp. 233, 235. 
Bornkamm, on.cit., pp. 184-185. 
l~cLeman, on. ci t., pp. 212-21;. 
Schonfie1d, on.cit., p. 152. 
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C. otto Pfleiderer 
In the last portion of the nineteenth century a movement 
appeared from within the ranks of Protestant liberalism. It became 
designated as the Eistory of Religions school of thought. It opposed 
several of liberalism's suppositions, such as trying to find a 
"Jesus of histor-.f". In fact, it was believed that very little 
III historical information could be gather~d about the life of Jesus. 
This was mainly due to the legendary growth which was said to have 
built up around the life of Christ. These legends were believed 
to have accumulated in stages until the embellished material became 
·t d t '1 d 112 qUl. e e al. e • 
The History of Religions school sou~~t to study Christianity in 
terms of the other religions. The Chzistian faith came to be seen 
as being syncretistic and therefore it was not unique in the sense 
that it did borrow from the other faiths. It was n~ postulated by 
these scholars that Christianity borrowed quite freely from Judaism 
and from other systems of belief such as the Eabylonian, E~~tian 
d P · 1" 11; an erSl.an re l.~ons~ It was postulated that Christia~ity was 
especially influenced by the Old Testament and by the teachings of 
these other faiths. ]':yths were believed to be extremely p=-evalent 
at this time and were perceived to be spreading from one reGion and 
religion to another. Each then accepted ideas from the other that 
III 
112 
11; 
~narles C. Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus (Grand Rapids: 
William E. Eerdman:s Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 55-57. 
McNaugher, on.cit., p~ 157. 
Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus, op.cit., pp. 55-56; Orr, 
op.cit., p. 2;5~ 
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were advantageousto its own purposes. As a result, these scholars 
constantly compared almost every individual category of the Christian 
fa oth tool o~ hO h t f th 1° ° 114 1. 0 Sl.ml. ar l.a.eas w l.C were a. par 0 0 er re l.gl.ons. 
One scholar who had many beliefs in common with this emerging 
school of thought was German theologian otto Pfleiderer. For 
instance, he also postulated that there were many affinities between 
Christianity and other ancient religions. The influence from 
JUdaism was also noteworthy. Myths were said to be present in all 
of these faiths and there were similarities, especially in the 
transmission of events re~uiring Supernatural intervention. Especially 
noticeable is Pfleiderer's tendency to compare different aspects of 
the Christian faith with similar ideas and occurrences in these 
other religions. Parallels are found, for instance, in Jes~s' 
relationship t.o Satan, in the miracles of Jesus~ and in the accounts 
of the resurrection. II5 
Pfleiderer also believed tha.t very little cOi;..ld be known about 
the beginnings of the Christian faith. He likewise based this 
conclusion upon the thesis that legends grew profusely around the 
life of Jesus in the early church. It is now too difficult to 
know for sure which reported events actually occurred and which 
d Od . 116 l. no"t. 
114 
115 
116 
Ancierson f Ibid~, p. 56;· Orr; Ibid., p. 238; McNaugher, Ope cit., 
p. 157. 
Cf. for instance, Pfleiderer's work The Earl Christian Conce~tion 
of Christ (London: Williams and Norgate, 1905 , see pp. 63-83 
for his account of some of the similarities between Jesus' 
miracles and those found in other ancient religions. 
Otto Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, translated by W. 
I --..,.. . 
Montgomery \FOUI volumes; Clifton: Reference Book Publishers, 
1965), see vol. I, pp. 1, ;, 23-25 for instance. 
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The History of Religions school rejected any belief in the 
resurrection of Jesus. Rather, they popularized the view that the 
narratives of this occurrence were later additions to the bospel, 
ones which grew mainly from the influence of stories of other such 
events found in other religions. At any rate, the resurrection was 
considered to be a legend which was added to the story ~f Jesus' ~ife.111 
Pfleiderer follows this pattern and also views the resurrection 
of Jesus as myth that did not occur literally. But he does so for 
two main reasons. First, the resurrection is believed to be legend 
added to the story· of Jesus' life by his earliest followers~ It 
nas not a real occurrence at all, for Jesus never actually rose 
from the dead. Rather, the narratives were added by the disciples, 
who were convinced that Jesus must be alive. The legends continued 
to grow until they were detailed accounts of a victory over death. 
In addition, stories of resurrected gods in other religions served 
as a basis for the rise of the Christian legends about Jesus. These 
more ancient myths provided the impetus for the formulation of the 
New Testament accounts of Jesus rising from the dead. ll8 
Seco~d, Pfleiderer believes that this theory based upon the 
formation of legends must also be supplemented by the subjective 
vision theory of the resurrection. 119 Visions apparently account 
111 
118 
119 
Orr, ~!!., pp. 235-261; McNaugher, op.cit., p. l57. 
Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 5-6, 
24-25; vol. II, pp. 186, 311-312; vol. IV, p. 16. See also The 
Early Christian Conception of Christ, op.cit., pp. 84-133. 
Friedrich Ghillany was another nineteenth century scholar who 
likewise combined visions with legends which were influenced by 
myths from other ancient religions (Schweitzer, op.cit., pp. 161, 
110). 
1.49 
for the source of the conviction that Jesus was alive, while the 
subsequent legends explain the present form of the narratives. 120 
We have already dismissed the vision theory above, and we will 
turn presently to the possibility that the narratives are due to 
legends. TIe will henceforth refer to this hypothesis as the 
mythical or legendary theory of the resurrection. 
Even in the twentieth c~ntury the mythical ·or legendary theory 
of-the resurrection can be found. 12l Probably the best-known 
theologian today who advocates a somewhat related form of this theory 
is Rudolf 3ultmanrl. 122 He freely recognizes his indebtness to the 
History of Religicns school of thought, especially in his understanding 
of the meaning of myth. For Eultma~~, New Testament mythology is 
made up of elements quite similar to concepts found in both Jewish 
apocalypticism and the redemption myths of gnosticism.123 All have 
several features in common. As a result, we find that many of the 
gospel miracles, for instance, are close to those in the Hellenistic 
120 
121 
122 
123 
Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Concention of Christ, on.cit., 
p. 157-158; Primitive Christianity, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 10-14; 
vol. II, pp. 115-116, 125. 
For instance, Rooke favors the uartial use of this view. 
his work used above (on.cit., PP. 173-179). See 
Eultmann does not actually offer much rationalization for the 
resurrection. Neither does he appear very interested in developing 
theories as to why it did net occur. Therefore it is hard to 
"label" him at this point. However, he does believe that this 
occurrence is a myth, in some ways similar to other ancient myths, 
as will be perceived below. Because his treatment is nevertheless 
quite similar in several ways to these we have been discussing, 
we will include him here. The critique of this theory also applys 
to his views about this event. 
Eul tmann, "New Testament and Mythology" in Keryp.!ls a~d !~yth9 
on.cit., p. 10, footnote number two, and pp. 15-16. 
150 
narratives. 3ult~ann draws parallels between some of these guBpel 
miracles and those of other ancient peoples in a way much reminiscent 
of Pfleiderer's attempt spoken of above. 124 
Also similar to Pfleiderer is Bu1tmann's twofold treatment of 
the resurrection. First, there is a stress on the presence of 
legendary material in the New Testament accounts. For instance, this 
event is viewed as being a myth which was constructed by imagination 
and 1egend~125 Eut second: while in his discussion of the resurrection 
Bu1tmann la~d much more emphasis on the part played by this legendary 
growth, it is noteworthy that he also felt that the vision theory 
126 
was also a very possible explanaticn, at least in part. While 
the narratives of Jesus' rising from the dead do have significance 
when we view them as being pointers to the ~~iqueness of Jesus' death, 
the resurrection is nonetheless a myth devoid of historical reality 
127 
and thus net an actual historical event. 
For Eultmar_~, the New Test~ent church combined and mingled Greek 
128 
and Jewish (Old Testament) mythology. It is no surprise, therefore, 
124 
125 
126 
127 
, .,,' .L.~O 
:Sultmann, "The Study of the Synoptic Gospels'in Fo~ Criticism, 
on.cit., pp. 36-39. 
See, for instance, Ibid., pp. 66, 72. 
Bu1 tmann, "l;ew Testament and Mythology" in KerYgma and. I,:yth, 
on. cit., p. 42. 
~., pp. 34, 38, 42. 
~., pp. 15-16; see also Bultmann's History and Eschatology 
,New York: Harper and.Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 7~ 
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that this scholar postulated that the resurrection also had 
similarities to beliefs in other religions and systems of thought. 
The affect of such beliefs upon this Christian doctrine of a risen 
Jesus might partially be realized, for instance, in Paul's speaking 
of the resurrection in gnostic terms. 129 The gnostic influence 
on such narratives is also found in oth~r portion~ of the New Testament. 150 
Bultmann holds that Jewish sources also influenced the faith that 
the early church had in Jesus' resurrection~ Old Testament verses 
were reinterpreted as predictions of this event. In fact, one of 
the early proofs of th::",; Gccurrence was what the Christians felt was 
just such Jewish Scriptural support. 13l ,We therefore find that 
certain aspects of the New Testament's teaching about the resurrection 
were influenced by other ancient faith systems. As a result of 
these and other legendary features involved in the Christian faith~ 
little can actually be known about the historical Jesus with any 
degree of 'certainty. 132 
Earlier we saw how ni~eteenth century liberal theology as a 
whole followed Hume in its rejection of miracles. 135 "We shou.ld also 
note that Pfleiderer was no exception here. lie likewise ~ccepted the 
129 
150 
151 
132 
135 
Bul tman.'"l, "New Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and 1I1yth, Ibid., 
p. 40 and Theology of the New Testament9 op.cit~, vol. I, p. 345; 
vol. II, p. 155. 
Cf. the references in footnote 129 with History and Eschatology, 
op.cit., pp. 54-55. 
Eultmann, Theology of the New Testament, op.cit., vol. I, pp. 31, 82. 
Bul tmann, "The Study of 'the Synoptic Gospels" in Form Criticism, 
o~.cit., pp. 60-61. 
Randall, o~$cit., pp. 555-554; cf. p. 293. 
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view that science had discovered the laws of nature which were so 
1-
regular that they could not be violated. j4 Even in the twentieth 
century this view was accepted by Bu1 tmann (as shovm above), who 
rejected the miraculous both because it was perceived to contradict 
the laws of nature and because we live in too modern of an age to 
accept such: occurrences as fact. 135 
It is apparent that there are several similarities between 
BultmapJ1 and Pfleiderer on the concept of mythology, especially 
with regard to the treatment of the resurrection. Therefore Bultmann's 
position vall also-be included in the discussion ~~d critique in 
this section. 
We "'"ill turn now to an examination of Vlhat we will term the 
1 · ........ 1 t ~ + • f J 136 
_egenaary or mjvD1Ca heory o~ the resurreCulon 0 esus. lmcient 
mythology relates various tales concerning tlvegetation zods". In 
their earlier forms these stories, in other words, celebrated the 
ye8.:::.'ly death of vegetation duriI"..g the fall season and the birth of 
t£G vegetation in the spring season. These oj~hs originally dealt: 
only with an expression of ma..'1 t s observances of t:bis yearly cycle of 
vegetation. Later they were tra~sformed into narratives expressing 
137 
religious beliefs about the gods. 
134 
135 
136 
137 
Otto Pfleiderer, Philosophy and ~evelopment of Religion (Two 
voltunes; Edinburgh: William Blackwood a~d Sons, 1394), vol. I, 
pp. 5-6. 
Bultman.~, IlNew Testa':lent and :,.trthology" in Kerj"gIDa and Myth, 
op.cit., pp. 4-5. 
We note here once again that sir.:ce the vision theory has been 
perceived above to be an inadequate explanation to account for the 
resurrection, we l'.'i11 not reopen the subject here even though 
both Pfleiderer and Bultmann se~il to also prefer this theory 
along with the mythical or legendary theory. 
Pfleiderer, Early Christian Conception of Cr~ist, op.cit., pp. 91-93. 
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Various ve~sions of such-myths circulated around the ancient 
world. The details vary from culture to culture, but they do appear 
to have the mos~ p~ominent features more-or-less in co~on, as they 
revolve mainly around the death of a vegetation gOQ. The god is in 
love with a goddess but becomes separated from his lover, often by 
death. ~he usually mourns for him and sometimes receives him back 
into the land of the living. 138 The Summerian form of this ~y~~ 
concerns the god Dumuzi and the goddess Inanna. 139 The Babylonian 
140 
version is about Tammuz and Ishtar. The Egyptian rendering 
speaks of Osiris and Isis. 14l Other cultures depict thei~ gods and 
goddesses directly patterned upon these major ve~sions. For instance, 
Phoenician mythology presen~s Adonis and Astar~and Phrygian mythology 
concerns Attis and Cybele, both of which are the equivaJ.8nt of the 
142 Babylonian Tammuz and Istar.- The Greek equivalent to the Egyptian 
d 0 - - - D- 143 go s~r~s ~s ~onysus. 
It is generally asserted by those who hold the legend theory 
that these myths concerning the vegetation gods not only permeated 
Christian circles, but that they formed the basis for the Christian 
belief in the resur~ection of Jesus. The foundation thus laid by 
the influence of these ancient myths then is believed to have provided 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
Cf. Orr, ou.cit., p. 231. 
Hooke, ou.cit.: pp. 20-23. 
Ibid. , pp. 39-41. 
Ibid., pp. 61-10. 
Pfleiderer, Early Christian Conceution of Christ, on.cit., pp. 94-
95; Orr, on.cit., p. 231; Yamauchi, on.cit., ~arch 15, 1914, p. 4. 
Pfleiderer, Ibid., p. 97. 
154 
the framework for later legendary accumulations, which continued 
144 to grow. 
There are at least four major reasons land several addition 
minor ones) as tO,why the legend theory of the resurrectio~ attracts 
the attention of comparatively few scholars today. First, there is 
ample proof from contemporary theological studies that Jesus' 
resurrection lies at the very roots of New Testament belief. In 
other words, it is not simply a flattering tale added to the origins 
of Christianity years after the death of Jesus. 
It is agreed by all that Paul's account of the resurrection in 
I Cor. 15:3-8 is the earliest witness to this occurrence. It is also 
a.lmost entirely t:...'1animous that Paul is not passing on material which 
he has formulated himself, but rather is citing a much earlier 
d ' t' 145 tra :l :lone In other words, the earliest account of the resurrection 
appearances was for3ulated before Paul actually wrote this book and 
thus it is earlier than the composition of the book in which it 
146 
appears. 
The key question is how near this ancient formulation of these 
appearances is to the actual events. Pannenberg believes that the 
147 creed is Quite close to the original appearances of Jesus. . Most 
others agree r;ith him for several reasons. First, Paul's words "I 
144 
145 
146 
147 
Orr, on.cit., p. 235 and Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, 
vol. I, pp. 5, 23-25 for instance. 
Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 10; ~arxsen, on.cit., p. SO.Even 
Bultmann recognizes this (Theology of the New Testament, on.cit., 
vol. I, p. 45). 
See, for exa::ple, lrarxsen, Ibid., pp. 52, 80; cf. p. 86; Brown 
The Virginal Concention and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op.cit., 
p. 81; Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 10-14, 28. 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, op.cit., p. 900 
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delivered" and "I received" are technical jargon referring to the 
Jewish custom of the transmission of ancient data. 148 Second, there 
are words in this po~tion which are non-Pauline, pointing to an 
earlier formulation by others. 149 Third, at least Jeremias believes 
that the origin of these words is Aramaic and net Greek, thus dating 
back to the earliest sources. 150 
For these a~~ other similar reasons, it is the belief of most 
theologians today that this formulation reported by Paul is about 
as close to the ori6:na1 appearances as is possible for such a 
formalized creed. This is because a little time would be required 
for this process of formalization into a list of appearances. We 
do not know if Paul preserved the list exactly in its original form 
or if he added to it or modified it, but the core material concerning 
the appearances of Jesus dates to just a short time after Jesus' 
151 death. 
In all likelihood, Paul received this information about Jesus' 
resurrection from Peter and James when he visited Jerusalem after 
his con7ersion (Gal. 1:18_19).152 This is especially likely when 
~e reIDember that there are single appearances of Jesus to both Peter 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
Brown, The Virginal Conce~tion and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, 
op.cit., p. 81; Reginald Fuller, £n.cit., p. 10; Pannenberg, 
Jesus--GoQ. and I.:an, op.cit., p. 90; Ladd, op.cit., ppo 104-105. 
Reginald Fuller, I!&£c. Fuller lists some of 'these phrases which 
are foreign to Faul's speech patterns in footnote number one, 
chapter two, p. 199. 
For an evaluation of this conclusion see Erown, The VirFinal 
Conception and Eodily Resurrection of Jesus, p. 81, footnote 
number 140 and Reginald Fuller, ~., pp. 10-11. 
Reginald Fuller, OE.cit., p. 10; Ladd, op.cit., p. 105. 
Ibid., pp. 14, 28; Erown, The Virginal Conception and Eodily 
Resurrection of Jesus, op.cit., p. 92; Pan.~enberg, Jesus--God 
and Man, OPe cit., p. 90; Ladd, o~. ci t., p. 105. 
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and James in this early traditional formulation (I Cor. 15:5, 7). 
Therefore, Reginald Fuller states that the very latest that this 
list could have been formulated would be five years after the 
original appearances, or about 35 A.~. when Paul made this visit 
to Jerusalem. 153 Pannenberg dates this visit and the subse~uent 
receiving of this information as occurring six to eight years after 
154 these events. Eut Fuller rightly notes that this is the latest 
that the tradition could have been formulated (so that Paul could 
have received it at that time). It very well could have c~rstallized 
much earlier. 
Therefore, ~e find that the disciples taught the resurrection 
of Jesus from the very beginning. There was no period of inactivity 
when this was not their central theme for preaching. 155 The early 
formulation cited by Pa~l demonstrates that the proclamation of the 
resurrection rests upon the testimollY of the original eyewitnesses 
and not upon a legendary process. Therefore this carefully-worded 
tradition in I Cor. 15:3-8 reveals explicitly that the appearances 
of Christ were experienced by groups of early Christians an~ not 
invented as a part of later legendary development. This early date 
caused Pannenberg to conclude that: 
153 
154 
155 
156 
Under suc~ circumstances it is an idle venture to oake 
parallels in the history of religions responsible for the 
emergence of the primitive Christian message about Jesus' 
resurrection (Italics are Pa~~enberg's).156 
Reginald Fuller, on.cit., pp~ 48-49, 70. 
Pannen"berg, Jesus--God and Xan, op.cit., p. 90. 
Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 48; Morison, on.cit., p. 107. 
:Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, Ope ci t., p. 91. 
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Thus we see, first of all, that myths in ancient religions in all 
probability ca~not be made to acco~~t for the rise of the belief in 
Jesus' resurrectio~ fro~ the dead because t~e ~ew Testament accounts 
are simply too close to the events themselves to be lese~ds, as we 
have seen here. 157 
The second reason that the legend or myth theory is rejected 
is in some ways similar to the first. In addition to the very early 
date given to the earliest tradition F.hich reports the appearances 
of the resurrected Jesus, we are also informed that we have the 
testimony of e3ewitnesses to this fact. Above we discussed the 
probability that two of the original persons to wbom Jesus appeared, 
Peter and Jam~s, were the ones who hgd passed this information to 
Paul. But there is additional New Testament evidence that must now 
be discussed which de~onstrates that the original eyewitnesses agreed 
with Paul in teaching that Jesus both rose from the dead andthat 
he 8?peared to them. To show that such eyewitnesses also believed 
and taug~t that t~is event occurred after Jesus' death and that they 
witnessed the appearances would of course be an extre~ely strong 
point against the le~end theory. We will deal more with this below, 
showing why this point is so acute. 
In I Cor. 15 we have not only the earliest testiffiony concerning 
Jesus' resurrection appearances to the apostles and to others (vs.1-8), 
but we also have ?aul!s state~ent that these same apostles also 
preached these sa~e facts. Paul thereby asserts that the lliessage 
Tihich he was preaching about the resurrection appearances was the 
same as that to which the other apostles were also testifying (I Cor. 
15:11).158 Later he ~entions three ti~es that these ori5inal 
157 Orr, o~.cit., p. 246. 
158 J.N.D. Anderson, op.cit., pp. 90-91. 
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eyewitnesses to t~e appearances were also preaching of their 
experiences with the risen Jesus (I Cor. 15:14, 15). Even the 
critics admit that Paul is here witnessing to the content of the 
early disciples' ~essage--that ~ Paul and these other eyewitnesses 
were proclaiming a risen Lord who had appeared to the~.159 In other 
words, those who had seen the risen Lord were now relating this to 
others. And they did so immediately after the events occurred. Paul 
additionally ex?lains that the 500 who had also beheld an appearance 
of the Lord, while they perhaps were not themselves actively preaching 
about their ex?erience, were still available for questioning, as most 
of them were still living (I Cor. 15:6). Therefore we see that a 
number of eyewitnesses were either preaching or were available for 
questioning concerping their experiencing of various appearances of 
the risen Jesus. This testimony did not take place only years later, 
but immediately after the original manifestations. 
We also recejve confirmation of Paul's testimony in the gospels 
and the book of Acts. Although some critica~ scholars do not believe 
that any eyewitnesses were the authors of any of the four gospels, 
most believe that at the very least some can be traced to eyewitness 
testimony. Therefore we can at least say that, in all probability, 
hlark recei~ea much ~aterial from the apostle Peter, Matthew from 
the apostle Matthew, Luke-Acts from various eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1-4) 
and John from the apostle JOhn. 160 These, then, also point to 
159 
160 
Reginald ~~ller, on.cit., pp. 29-30; Marxsen, on.cit., p. 61. 
It is not r.ithin the scope of this paper to thoroughly exa~ine 
the question of the authorship of the four gospels. -3ut suffice 
it to say t~at ~ost critical scholars recognize at least some 
eyewitness testi~ony behind these four Dooks. Matthew is often 
taken to be the author of the Q document ~~d thus is an eyewitness 
159 
eyewitness testi~or.y concerning the resurrection appearances of Jesus. 
The iIDportan~e of eyewitness testimony such as this is hard 
to over-estimate. ':Ie have .seen ho;;" virtually all agree tnat ihe 
earliest church, including those who were the original observers, 
proclaimed Jesus' resurrection from the dead. 161 That these first 
witnesses did not simply fraudulently invent the narratives, fully 
believing that Jesus was still dead, is evident and admitted' by all. 
Men do not risk their lives and even ~ie162 for what they know to be 
161 
162 
testimcr:y fc::- o!!e of the major sources of the first gospel. The 
author of the second gospel is usually asse~ted to be John Mark, 
who is believed to have recorded the testimony of Peter, another 
eyewitness an~ apostle. Xost scholars believe that Luke is the 
author of the third gospel and the book. of Acts, with many 
recognizing that Luke claims to have collected his information 
from eyewitnesses (L~~e 1:1-4). Part of the reason for the new 
resurgence of interest in the authority of the fourth gospel is 
that it is often recognized that this book is very close to the 
eyewitness testi~ony of the apostle John. For these an~ similar 
conclusions, see Archibald M. Hunter, Introducing the I'e .. 
Testament (Seccn~ editio!!; Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
1957), pp. 41-43, 49-50, 55-56, 61-63; Ladd, ou.cit., pp~ 74-78; 
Robert Ii:. Grant, An Historical Introduction to the !~ew Testament 
(London: Collins, 1963), pp. 119, 127-129, 134-135, 160; George 
A. Buttrick, editor, The Interurete::-'s Bible (Twelve volumes; 
!~ew York and Kashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951-1956) 
vol. 7, p. 242 and ~ol. 8, pp. 9-10, 440-441; Raymond ~. 3rown, 
New Testament Essays (Milwa~~eet The Bruce Publishing Company" 
1965), pp. 129-131; William Hamilton, The Modern Reader:s Guide 
to Joh.'1 (~(ew York: Association Press, 1959), pp. 13-15; Daniel 
Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 188-194. 
See Fuller, Ibid., p. 48. 
For the traditions concerning the martyr's deaths suffered by 
all of the twelve apostles (except John) and other early prominent 
Christians like Mark and Luke, see Marie Gentert King, editor, 
Foxe's Book of 11art rs (Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Company, 
1968 , pp. 11-13 for instance. cr. also the witness of Eusebius' 
Ecclesiastical Eistory, translated by Christian Frederick Cruse 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1969), pp. 58, 75-80. 
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only a fabricated falsehood. Also, as J.N.D. Anderson poi~ts out, 
the quality of the ethical teaching of th€ early disciples and the 
fact that none ever recanted under the threat of losing their lives 
further repudiates any theory based upon such fraud. In addition, 
the psychological transformation of the disciples is left unaccounted 
for if they invented the stories. 163 Thus they actually believed 
that Jesus had risen from the dead. 164 
But under these conditions the legend theorJ is impossible. 
This is obvious not only because those who witnessed the appearances 
proclaimed the exact opposite. Of course, proclaiming something does 
not neoessarily make it true. But since we have ruled out any chances 
of a fabricated story or lie on the part of the disciples,165 there 
163 
164 
165 
J.N.D. Anderson, o~.cit., p. 90. 
Even Eultmann admits this, as we saw above ("New Testar:lent and 
•• t."' ". K d ,~ th . t 42' m' • tLy u!lO_og-'y ::.n erygma an !:.?, , 0'0. cJ. • ~ p. ). l:_'le:-e:loS a 
difference between saying that the resUI'rection was a legend v~ 
myth and that it was fraud. The former, which is the theory we 
are discussing here, advocates that the disciples and other early 
Christians fo~ulated the stories because they really believed 
Jesus was alive (such as the view of Pfleiderer and bultmann). 
The second theory advocates that the discinles sim'Ol:-,~ invented 
the story in spite of believing that Jesus-was d4aa.' Some still 
hold the former theory (legends or myths). But it is obvious 
why the latter (fraud) is rejected. The psychological 
improbabilities of someone dying only for a known fraud, as well 
as the other reasons against this theory as listed above, therefore 
make it impossible. . 
This theory, usua.lly referred to as the "fraud theory", is not 
held today among theologians to the knowledge of this ~ritere 
This is because of the reasons given above. This also includes 
theories of the disciples stealing the dead body of Christ r for 
this would once again involve their lying about the appearances 
when they would have known that Jesus nas not a.liv~. ~~en do 
not die for a known lie. For these and the other objections 
already given, this expansion of the fraud theory is also unanimously 
rejected. 
161 
has to be a reason why these men would come to believe that Jesus 
had risen from the dead. The other leading theories (the swoon and 
the vision theories) have also failed as adequate solutions, as ShO~l 
above. Therefore these cannot be used as the impetus for this faith. 
So the legend theory also fails because some event had to have happened 
at the ~.rery besinning to convict the disciples that a resurrection 
had actually occurred. There could have been no gradual b~ild-up of 
legends because these events ~ere reported from the very first to be 
true. Neither do other naturalistic theories help to e"xplain this 
conviction and unquestioning belief on the part of the earliest 
witnesses. 
To proclaim that other ancient myths are the basis fer these 
appearances merely begs the question. To proclaim that Jesus rose 
because ancient mythology relates such a scheme for the so-called 
"vegetation gods" does not solve the problem of the origin of faith 
which convinced the disciples that this event had actually occurred. 
It also fails to account for the need of the disciples to fabricate 
appearances of the risen Jesus as narrated in the early fo~ulations. 
They would obviously know that Jesus had not risen"unless they were 
otherwise deceived (as by a swoon, or by visions). But t~e conditions 
for such deception are obviously lacking and this therefore renders 
such suppositions useless. We are thus caught in a hopeless bind. 
The third major criticism of the legend or myth theory (as well 
as the fourth) even challenges the supposition that any parallels at 
all can be drawn between the New Testament proclamation of Jesus' 
resurrection and the resurrection claimed for the vegetation gods of 
other ancient relisions~ The main difference between Christi~~ity 
and the myths of the vegetation gods centers in the fact that Jesus 
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11"1" ~o to, b t these gods and heros were not. 00 was a ~~s or~ca_ person, u The 
person of Jesus is historically accessible, whereas those of the 
mythical characters such as Dumuzi, TaID3uz, Osiris and the others 
live only in the tales spread about them. For instance, many claimed 
to have seen the res~rrected Jesus, but not so with these ~ythica1 
f o 167 ~gures. 
Therefore we perceive that there are no historical grounds upon 
which we can compare the two types of resurrection stories. I~either 
are there any historical grounds upon which to compare even the lives 
of Jesus and of these other gods and heros. Here we find no close 
t o 168 con."lec ~ons. In fact, in none of these mythical characters do we 
find belief in a historical resurrection from the dead as is presented 
in the New Testament concerning Jesus. This is an important point 
because it means that, far from having so many resurrection tales 
Ci.fter which the disciples could have "patterned" Jesus' resurrection 
as some of these theorists would have us believe, there were no 
previous stories of a historical person among these vegetation gods 
beUng raised. Jesus' story is therefore tnique. 
The fourth major criticism against the legend or myth theory is 
that there is considerable doubt about just how much the teaching of 
resurrection is found in this ancient mythology at all. Therefore 
the question yet remains as to the extent that the New Testament was 
166 
167 
168 
This point is admitted by both Pfleiderer (The Early Christian 
Concention of Christ,.o-p.cit., pp. 157-158) and by Eu1tmann 
( "New Testament and 7Eytho1ogy" in Kerygma and !t.yth, Ope ci t.., p. 34). 
Orr, 
Orr, 
on.cit., 
o ~ on.c~"., 
p. 236; Pfleiderer, Ibid., p. 102. 
p. 246; l~cNaugher, on. cit., p. 157. 
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"inspired" by the resurrection myths of other religio:J.s. For instance, 
Orr feels that these ancient myths are too vague and fluctuating to 
determine the amount of their influence. Their lack of historical 
reality adds to this confusion. 169 
In addition, the assumed diffusion of ideas of the resurrection 
of gods into Judais~ ~~d Christianity has anything but been proven. 
Even the critic Kirsopp Lake bel::':-ved that the difficulty ... ith the 
legend theory was in ascertaining how much was·based upon real fact 
d h h 't 1 . 170 an ow muc was nue 0 overzea. ous guess~ng. Pannenberg agrees 
that this diffusion has not been proven. In first-century Palestine 
there are almost no traces whatsoever of any influence fro~ these 
ancient cults of resurrected gods. 17l 
It was this last point that once baffled Oxford scholar C.S. Lewis 
when he was an atheist. After coming to accept the dependence of 
the New Testament upon ancient mythology, he was nonplussed by the 
so few ti~es that any reference was made to any death and rebirth 
patterns similar to those ir. ancient mythologies. He also found 
that such eleme:J.ts were essentially absent from Jesus' teachings as 
well, which was hard to comprehend if the aforementioned influence 
172 
was so great. 
Orr also.believes that the legend theory is too arbitrary, as 
well. It desires to choose points of similarity while disregarding 
169 Orr, Ibid., p. 2;6. 
170 Ibid., D. 247, footnote number one. 
- -
171 Pannenberg, Jesus--God and !lan, Ope ci t., p. 91. 
172 Lewis, Miracles, on.cit., pp. 117-118, 120. 
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differences. feels that it is not hard to use the imagination 
in order to find isolated areas of agreement. 17 ; Pfleiderer agrees 
that the mistake is often made where points of difference are 
neglected in order to bring about a connection between the facts which 
are more similar. 174 An example here is appropriate. Pfleiderer 
himself seems to lay a certain e:nphasis on the myths which present 
the resurrection of a god on the third day.175 Eut he fails to 
stress as much the celebration of Adonis' acclaimed resurrection on 
the first day after the period of mourning176 or Attis' acclaimed 
resurrection on the fourth day.177 
But even after all of these doubts, the key matter co~cerns the 
problem of the extent to which a resurrection from the dead is really 
found in any of these myths. For instance, the key manuscripts in 
the Sumerian ~u~uzi-Inanna myth break off before the ending ~~d there-
fore contain n~ account of a resurrection at all. In fact, a recent 
discovery of one fragment reveals that Inanna allows D~uzi to be 
t~~en to the underuorld rather than rescuing him fro~ this realm of 
the dead. 178 In the 3ablylonian myth of T?m~uz-Ishtar there is also 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
Orr, o~.cit.~ pp. 249-250. 
Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Concention of Christ, on.cit., 
pp. 155-154, 159. 
Ibid., pp. 155-155; cf. p. 103. 
Ibid., p. 94. 
Ibid., p. 103; cf. p. 155; Orr, on.cit., p. 252. 
Hooke, on.cit., pp. 21-22; Yama.uchi, on.cit., J.~arch 15, 1974, 
p. 4. 
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no RPecific mention of a resurrection. Rather, Tammuz is only 
inferentially (not explicitly) thought to have been raised,179 
+' t"' 180 some even ques 'J~on m.s. In addition, it has been shown that 
there is no sign of ~~ resurrection in the early aCCCQ~ts of Adonis. 
The texts which refer to such an event date from no e~rlier th&~ 
the second cent~~ A.D. and thus after the time of Christ's resurrection. lSl 
Lik~ffise, the god Attis is not presented as being resurrected until 
after the middle of the second century A.D. 182 One early critic who 
preferred the legend or myth theory, P. Jensen, cited the Gilgam~sh 
myths as providing a packground for Jesus' resurrection, when these 
183 
myths say nothing at all about such an occurrence. 
For these reasons, it is doubted just how much the idea of 
resurrection c~~ be found in such ancient religion. The references 
that we do fi.1'1d are fewer than expected, somewhat ambiguous, and not 
enough to account for the prominence that this belief supposedly 
181.. 
reached. . Therefore Yamauchi asserts that the only goo. forYilucl-l 
we ~2ve bo~h clear and early evidence (before Cr~ist's life) of a 
resurrection is the Egyptian Osiris. However, this god provides no 
179 
130 
181 
182 
183 
184 
Hooke, Ibid., p' 40; Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Conception 
~,.... '-"'-'t °9 Ol vnI'J..Sv, op.c~ ., p. " • 
:anauchi, op.cit., I·larch 15, 1974, p. 4: Orr, op.cit., p. 250 
Yamauchi, Ibid., p. 5. See also J.N.D.' Anderson, Christianity 
and ComparatI;e Religion (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 
1974 ), p. 39. 
Yamauchi, Ibid. ; _l\nderson, Ibid. , p. 38. 
Orr; .... op,CJ..v.: pp. 242-243, 25l. 
See, fpr instance, Ibid. , p. 257 
166 
inspiration for the Christian concept of resurrection, especially 
since Osiris is always pictured as a mummy. ~e did not stay on 
earth 8.fter nis return to life, but rather descended to rule the 
underworld. This is a far cry from Jesus'.appearances to his 
followers in this ~orld. We must. look elsewhere to find any 
inspiration for the narratives of Jesus' resurrection as depicted in 
185 the New Testament. 
Therefore we perceive that there is actually much less of a 
basis for the ancient belief in the resurrection of gods than was 
originally thought. A few questionable references to such occurrences 
do not provide the needed proof. There is especially little basis 
for the theory that these beliefs in othe:- cultures were just "floating 
around" and that tney are the foundation and background for the 
C· . t· t hO 186 nr~s ~an eac ~ngs. 
Thus we see here a converging negative result when the legendary 
or mythical theory of Jesus' resurrection is examined. First, the 
earliest narratives concerning this occurrence are too close to the 
events themselves to allow any ti~s legends to 1.... ___ J:' ___ ,: _. .1..:.c::..vo: ..!..u~ ..... c;u 0.\1 
all. This is especially true of Paul's list of appearances in I Cor. 
15:;-8. There was no gradual build-up of legends here. Secon~ the 
direct and indirect testi~cny from eyewitnesses is a very strong 
objection to this vie". That these witnesses were not lying is 
185 
186 
Yamauchi, on.cit., ll!l:arch 15,1974, p. 5.; Cf. ~ooke, on.cit., p. 68. 
Orr, on.cit., pp. 247, 256-257. Cf. also Pannenberg, Jesus--God 
and Man, on. cit., p. 91. For some of the general disbelief·in 
the Judaeo-Christian concept of resurrection, note the Hebrew 
and Greek responses to the idea in ~'::k. 12: 18; Acts 17: 31- 32; 
26:8. 
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agreed by all, fo~ men do not suffer tremendous diSCOffifort and 
even death for what is known to be a lie. It·is also agree~ by 
all that they at least actually believed that they had really ~ 
something. The.refore it is i::npossi ble to assume that they reported 
a legend or ancient myth as having actually occurred, for they would 
both know that they were lying when they narrated literal appearances 
of Jesus and they could not have actually believed that they had 
really seen hi::l. Some event had to have occurred which convinced 
the~ that Jesus ~as risen, otherwise there would have bee~ the need 
to invent the narratives. This is why this theory is usually coupled 
with another. A legend does not provide such realistic impetus. 
But the other key t~eories (swoon and Visionary) were also io~~d to 
be inadequate. 
Third, there are some pri=.ary differences between the nonhisto~ical 
resurrection of ve:etation gods and ~he resurrection of a historical 
person. The paral181$ bet~een the two types of beliefs have very 
little in COffimon. ?ourth, a comparison of the New Testament narratives 
1\-i th the stories of these vegetation gods reyeals further t:':a t the 
supposedly simila~ characteristics are usually missing. In addition, 
the~e is rep-l do~bt as to the p~esence of real resurrection stories 
in ancient mytholOQr and the extent to which they appear. ~here is 
certainly no actual basis to believe that these myths were siTIply 
"floating around" in Jesus' ti::le. For these and other reasons, this 
theory must be rejected as being inadequate to explain Jesus' 
t · 187 resurrec lone As Orr asserts, it simply lacks any historical 
187 
ot!'ler reasons could also be given against the legendary or 
mythical theory. For instance, we are left without any adequate 
explanation for the be6innings of the church or for the belief 
in the e~pty tomb if this theory ~ere correct. This ~riter has 
for~ulated a list of 33 total reasons (revolving arounu points 
such as those enumerated i~ the four ~ajor criticis~s above) for 
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foundation and relies too much on highly questionable com?arisons. 
We can-~ot dismiss facts just by pointing to artificial mythical 
.. 188 
orl.gl.ns. 
Eultmann's mOQification of this theory also fails for s~ilar 
reasons. First, his reliance on gnostic influences upon the 
resurrection of Jesus must be rejected for almost the same reasons 
as those raised above for rejecting the influences from other ancient 
mythologies. The comparisons are not as close as might be expected 
with regards to the resurrection and these myths surely could not 
have given rise to the belief in this event, as already explained. 
Bultmann must have realized this himself, howeve~~ because he does 
not try to make gnostic sources account for the basic foundation of 
the New Testa~ent resurrection nar.ratives. Rather, we have noted 
above that he utilizes these myths to explain ueriuhery Dortions of 
the resurrection such as Jesus' exaltation over all cosmic powers. 
This does not explain the core proclamation of a rise~ Jesus at all 
anQ thus cannot be the basis of these claims in the earliest church. 
Second, Bultma~~~ls scientific world view is outdated. ~e can 
no longer rule out miracles a priori because of a belief in a 
mechanistic, closed universe that rejects the miraculous from the 
outset (as pointed out in chapter three above). Yet, this is what 
Eultmann dces, as we have already seen. 189 Physicist Werner 
188 
189 
rejecting this theory. 
/ . 6 Orr; ou.cit., pp. 2~5-2~ , 253. 
Eul tmann, "Ne;-; Testa.m.ent and. !i!ythologyll in Kerygma and l.:yth, 
ou.cit., pp. 4-5 for instance. 
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Schaaffs,190 and philosopher Gordon Clark19l both agree in this 
cri ticism. I~iracles cannot be excluded in this way because of the 
modern scientific world in which we live today. Such an approach 
is not valid. 
Third, theologian John Macquarrie also criticizes Bult~ann for 
his arbitrary diszissal of the resurrection without any investigation 
whatsoever,19 2 due to his lack of studying the historical evidence. 
As with Eurne, just such an investigation may have revealed the 
resurrection to be a probable event. Kacquarrie also notes the 
defective scientific view involved. 193 
These second and third criticisms are very substantial ones 
indeed. They aTe some of the strongest arguments against Eultmann, 
who is seen as using an o~tdated and ineffective view of science, 
as well as ne;lecting any historical investigation at The 
resurrection of Jesus can no longer be rejected for these reasons. 
In order to ascertain if this event has actually occurred, it must 
be investigated. It cannot be ruled out a priori as done by Eultmann, 
In addition, Eultmann's view still fallsprey especially to the 
first and second major criticisms listed above. The eaY"liest 
190 
, Q1 
-" -
192 
193 
Schaaffs often directs his attack specifically at Bultmann for 
using an outdated scientific world view, a criticis~ ~hich 
nullifies 3ultmann's rejection of the miraculous. It is not 
possible to handle miracles in such a way, as if they -uere 
strictly impossible from the start. See Schaaffs, op.cit., 
pp. 13, 15, 24-25, 31, 60, 64. 
Clark also realizes that Bultmann's defective scientific under-
standing cannot be used to rule out miracles today. See Clark, 
"Eul tmann' s Three-Storied Universe" in Gae-oelein, OPe ci t. , 
pp. 218- 219. 
Eul tmal"..n, "Hew Testament and Mythology" in Kerygma and l~yth, 
op.cit., p. 38 for example. 
Macquarrie, OPe cit., pp. 185-186. 
170 
narratives are too close to the events to refer to them si~ply as 
myths. Also, the eyewitness testimony rules out this theory. As 
mentioned above, to refer to the resurrection as a myth does not 
explain why the original disciples came to relate their experiences 
with the risen Jesus~ Even Bultmann admits that they r~ally believed 
that Jesus rose from the dead. 194 But something had to cause this 
belief. :b::yths in other religions or the deve3:opment of later legends 
cannot account for the begin..'"ling of thi"s belief because this is no 
basis from which to project the original resurrection appearances, 
which would otherwise be pure lies. The disciples would not have 
actually believed that they had seen Jesus, no matter how prominent 
other such stories may have been (and we have seen that they were 
not that com~on). They could not therefore have believed that Jesus 
had actually appeared to them nersonally unless they had been other-
wise deceived. This is probably why Bultmannsug~ests visions as 
19-the answerc ' But, as we have seen, this and other such theories 
of deception are also quite inadequate. But legends or myths are 
especially inept at providing the needed impetus. Therefore Eultmann 
also fails in his attempt to explain away the literal resurrection 
of Jesus. 
~s pointed out by :Brown, this legend or myth theory is rejected 
theologial:S "'0""--- 196 I. u.a.~. Eornkap,m points out that there is a 
decisive lack of comnon ground between this theory and the Kew Testament 
194 
195 
196 
Bul tmann, "Xew Testament and 2.1ythology" in Kerygma and I;~yth, 
on.cit., p. 42. 
Ibid. 
Brown, "The Resurrection and Eiblical Criticism", on.cit., p. 233. 
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narratives. 197 Pannenberg likewise asserts that such 1eGencs cannot 
account for Jesus' resurrection. 198 
197 Bor~~amm, on.cit., p. 185. 
198 Pannenberg, Jesus--God and Man, on.cit.~ pp. 90-91. 
Chapter VII. Possibility Number Two: That the Resurrection TIid 
Occur, But That it Cannot be Demonstrated 
A. Spren Kierkegaard: An Introduction 
The second major possibility to ce dealt with is that the 
resurrection of Jesus did occur, but that this occu~rence canr.ot be 
demonstrated. 1;7e will first examine the views of a very significant 
scholar who held this opinion. This theologian and philosopher~ 
Spren Kierkegaard (1813-1855), is probably the best-known representative 
of this viewpoint. 
Although Kierkegaard was not the first scholar to formulate a 
hypothesis such as this, he popularized this view in a way ,'[hich has 
influenced twentieth century theology immensely. He has been chosen 
here as the primarJ representative of this view because of the affect 
which his work has exerted on many contemporary theologians. This 
influence is especially apparent, for instance, in this scho~ar's 
treat~ent of ~iracles. Eeginning with Karl Earth's E~ist1e to the 
p. . 1918,1 . th 1 . 1 h 1 f th ht" f 11 d _omans~n, var~ous eo og~ca sc 00 s 0 ~ oug nave 0 owe 
Kierkegaard in postulating that the miraculous cannot be demonstrated 
to have occurred in any way_ This is especially true of the 
resurrection. The occurrence event is often affirmed in various 
1 For the relation between Earth and the nineteenth century liberal 
theology which his thought was to replace, see the brief summation 
in Chapter Six, footnote number one. Earth's neo-orthodox theology 
as a whole was indebted to Kierkegaard for much of its framework 
and foundation, alid for many of its key facets. See, for instance, 
Bernard Ramm, A Randbook of Contemnorar Theolo (Grand Rapids: 
William. E. Eerd1Ilan's Publishing Company, 1966 , pp. 89-92. 
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ways, with the understanding that there is no way that it can be 
2 
verified or proven. In fact, it is probable that even ~ost of the 
theologians since Barth who reject any belief i~ a real resurrection 
of Jesus still manifest the influence of Kierkegaard in their belief 
that this event was not meant to be proven anyway. Such miracles 
are simply not open to objective verification.' We will deal with 
the reasoning behind such assertions ·below. 
It is mainly for these reasons that.Xierkegaard has been chosen 
here as the representative of this viewpoint. This Denish scholar 
has exercised mu.ch influe:l~c on twe~tieth century theology. His 
view of miracles was especially influential. As will be sho~ in 
the next chapter, a very large portion of contemporary theology has 
followed Kierkegaard in holding that miracles cannot be de~onstrated, 
whether these occurrences are accepted as really happening or not. 
He is thus an excellent example of one who believes that miracles 
such as the resurrection did occur but that any attempts at 
demonstrating their validity are fruitless and misleading. 
Before we proceed to en examination of Kierkegaard's views 
concerning miracles, it will be advantageous to look briefly at some 
of the intellectual background fo= his polemic. Perhaps more than 
with most other well-known thia~ers, muoh of this scholar's thought 
is derived from personal experiences, such as his observation of the 
2 
3 
See Daniel ~ller, on.cit., pp. 80-84; cf. Ramm, Ibid., pp. 14-16, 
19-80, 89-92. In the next chapter we will discuss some of these 
theologians ~ho were influenced by Kierkegaard in their acceptance 
of the resurrection with the stipulation that it cannot be demonstrated. 
See, for example, Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ a.nd :.rytholo (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958 , pp. 61-62, 11-12, 80, 84. 
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conditions in his native land of Denmark. 
Kierkegaar~ experienced a difficult boyhood. Apparently because 
of family problems and also because of a physical deformity (his 
back was crooked and he limped), he endured acute periods of melancholy 
which 3eemed to be continually present in his life. 4 By his own 
admission he suffe~ed greatly from this daily depression, which was 
complicated by the conviction that he had been singled out in order 
to suffer for others. These emotions cau~ed him a great amount of 
consternation and kept him from the real joy in life which oight 
otherwise have been a~tainable.5 
It was at least partially due to this intense melancholy and 
conviction that he must suffer for others that Kierkegaard encountered 
two other experiences which had a tremendous affect upon his life. 
First, he felt obliged to break off his engagement to his lover, 
Regina Olson. Although both loved each other very ::uch: Kj.erkegaard 
felt that somehow the break was God's guidance and will for his life. 
Eut because he still loved her, he struggled much with his feelings. 
Ris writings reveal this battle which he waged with himself. His 
action seemed to be attributable to the melancholy. from which he 
still suffered. 3ut nonetheless, this broken engagement led to an 
immense amount on writing on his part. Ris t;~e was now spent in 
4 
5 
Nartin J. Reinecken, '~pren Kierkegaard", in A Handbook of Christian 
Theolo.Q:'ians, edited by Martin C. Marty and Dean G. Peerman 
(Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 125-126. 
S~ren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for 1::y Work as an Author, 
edi ted by Eenjamin nelson, translated by Walter Lowrie (I;ew York: 
~arper and Ro~, ~~blishers, 1962) pp. 76-80. Cf. also ~einecken, 
lbid., p. 125. 
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publishing his views on vari~us subjects, especially theolo~ and 
philosophy.Eis rate of production over the coming years has rarely 
been e~ualled, especially in the diversity of the subjects ~hich 
6 
were covered. 
Second, Kierkegaard attacked a weekly news sheet n~ed the Corsair. 
This publication openly denounced many public figures, embarrassing 
them in the process. Kierkegaard had hoped to eypose this literary 
tirade with the help of other prominent men of Copenhagen who also 
disliked the methods of this paper. Eut he received no help and 
thus suffered all of the brunt of the return attack upon himself. 
And the Corsair was quite vicious in its presentations of this 
Danish thinker, deriding him because of his physical deformity. For 
instance, it made light of the unequal lenght of his two legs. This 
procedure continued in the paper for approximately one year and seon 
he was looked upon 7.ith much derision by the public. But Kierkegaard 
accepted this treat~ent as part of the suffering which was ordained 
for him. It caused him to become even more withdrawn fron society 
and resolved to continue the work he had begun.1 . 
One convictio~ that Kierkegaard continued to act upon ~as his 
polemic against the presence of Hegelian-influenced theoloo,y in 
Denmark. The Hegelian version of Christianity encouraged people to 
reason clearly, as if this was all there was involved in becoming a 
Christian. The popular belief in Denmark was that being a good Danish 
6 
1 
Kierkegaard, Ibid., see Appendix A, written by the tr~~slator, 
pp. 162-163; Heinecken, Ibid., pp. 126-121. 
Kierkegaard, Ibid., see A~pendix ~ written by the translator, 
pp. 163-165; cf. Kierkega~rd's own assessment, pp. 94-95. Cf. also 
Heinecken, Ibid., p. 128. 
176 
8 
citizen and being a Christian were almost synonymous. Kierkegaard 
attacked these ,resu?positions, pointing out that Christianity is 
much more than a life of easy living. Rather, it is a total 
transformation of the individual, based upon the personal recognition 
of one's being a sinner. It involves a commitment to God through 
faith in the death of Christ to pay fer one's sins. The result is 
the imitation of Christ. 9 In fact, the chief 'theme of all of his 
Wl'i tings ".as to speak to those living in "Christendom" to inform 
them about ho~ they could become t~~c New Testament Christians. lO 
This brief background ~ill make the proceeding prese~tation of 
Kierkegaard's ar6~ents more comprehensible. After endeavo=ing to 
understand the reasoning behind his treatment of ~iracles, a critique 
of these views will then be presented in order to ascertain their 
ability to support Kierkegaard' s arguments.' It should be mentioned 
before passing, however, that the two ~ain texts which will be used 
here are Kierkegaard's Concludin~ Unscientific Postscrint1l and his 
Philosonhical Fragments. 12 This is for a few very important reasonsw 
8 
a 
Kierkegaard's polemic against the IlChristianJ.ty" of his day is 
especially strong in his work Attack U'Oon "Christ'endom", translated 
by Walter Lowrie (Princetont Princeton University Press, 1972). 
For hi's evaluation of Danish C~ristianity such as spoken of here, 
compare pp. 132-133i 139, 145, 149, 164-165 for 'instance, or see 
the essay "";'iha t Christ's Judgment is About Official Christiani tyll, 
Ibid., p,. 117-124. For a brief discussion of Kierkegaard's 
attack against the influence of Hegelianism upon Danish Christianity 
as mentioned above: see also Eeinecken, Ibid., pp. 127-128, 134-135. 
/For Kierkegaard's own evaluation of what a real Christian is, including 
10 
11 
12 
these points just mentioned, see Ibid., p,. 23, 149, 210, 21;, 221, 
268, 280, 287, 290 for exam,le. 5einecken agrees with this summary, 
Ibid., pp. 131, 134. 
neinecken, Ibid., p. 127. 
This work is translated by David Swenson (Princeton: Pri::2ceton 
University Press, 1974). 
This work is also translated by David Swenson (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1974). 
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The Danish scholar himself relates to us that the former vol~e 
is both the turning point of his work as an author and the transition 
between nis aesthetic works and his religious ones. l ; In addition, 
quite a large portion of this work concerns one of the main topics 
14-
which is to be discussed here and other related thoughts. On the 
other hand, the primary problem treated by the latter work concerns 
whether or not the Christian faith can be based.on historical events15 
and this is the key question to be dealt with in this chapter. After 
t~us perceiving these introductory facts, it is now possible to 
proceed to our presentation of Kierkegaard's views. 
B. Spren Kierkegaard's Argument and a Critique 
As a theologian and philosopher, Kierkegaard's writin6s were not 
overly popular beyond Scandinavia and Germany until the twentieth 
16 
century. As pointed out above, he often reacted against both the 
"official Christianity" of his day, which was very defective in terms 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Kierkegaard, The Point of View for :r~y Work as an Author, on. ci t., 
pp. 13-14, 53, 97. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint, on.cit., pp. 86-
97, 115-343 for example. 
Ibid., p. 323. For instance, see Philosophical Fragments, on.cit., 
pp. 93-110< For the importance of these two texts as the writiugs 
of Kierkegaard which most influenced contemporary theology and 
philosophy, see Eeinecken's "Spren Kierkegaard", in :darty and 
Peerman, on.cit., pp. 131-132. 
Runes, on.cit., p. 160. 
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of the New Testa~e~t definition, and against the philosophy of 
Eegelianism. 17 30th trends were leading people away fro~ real 
Christianity. It was at least partially as a result of his bold 
stand taken against these ideas that he was not very popul~r in 
his own time. Eowever, his works were revived in this ce~tury by 
both secular and reliSious existentialis~, by such scholars as 
18 Martin ~eidegger Rnd Je~n-Pa~l Sartre. Today or~e 
cannot even deal adequately with existentialism without noting 
the in~luence of Kierkegaard and the i~petus which he gave to 
the begin~ings of this ~hiloso~hy.19 
. Kierkegaard for=ulated and defended the well-known philosophical 
state::ent t!1at IITruth is Subjectivity".20 Therefore, while several 
forms of philosophy teach that the way to knowledge is to seek 
objective truth in one form or another, this is viewed as being 
i~possible. We can only achieve the truth by subjectivity. 
1 1 h 1 h " b" t" "t 2l fact, a 1 eterna trut. and va ues are based upon t.1S Sll Jec 1V1 y. 
:Do objective approaches have a..'1Y validity at all? For I:ierkega.ara., 
ob jecti ve reflection can yield objective truth, sucb as mat21er::a tics 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
In addition to the references listed above, see Ja~es Collins, 
'?ai th ani !-'.ei'lection in !<ierkegaard" in A Kierkeg-aarc. Cri tiaue, 
edi tee. by rtoi7arc. A. Johnson and l';iels Thulstrup ( Chicag-o: Henry 
~egnery Company, 1962), pp. 141-142, 147-148. Cf. Lev Shestov, 
Athens and Jerllsale~, translated by Bernard Martin (No city: 
Ohio University Press, 1966), p. 242. 
:Daniel Fu11e::', on.cit., pp. 80-81, 84; Heinecken, "S¢'ren 
Kierkegaard"~ in ~arty and Peerma!l, on.cit., pp. 127, 142. Cf. 
~unes, on.cit., p. 124. 
See, for example, Wesley Barnes, The Philso-ohy and Literature of 
Existentialis:J., on. ci t., pp. 48, 56- 57, 100-102; ?.a.m:n, 1:. Eandbook 
of Conte~Do:rar? Tbeology, on.cit., pp. 46-47. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint, on.cit., title 
of Part Two, Cha~ter II, p. 169. 
Ibiri., p. 173. 
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and history. In other words, objective facts can be true, especially 
. '-' t . . t'l... t'- b d" l' 2 2 ~ . ht 1n an o~Jec 1ve sense as W1!l !!e a ove 1SC1P lnes. . ·Ie :llg. 
phrase it this ':i2.y: c ra tior.al, objective approach to reality can 
yield ~ facts, but it cannot lead to eternal truth, which is a 
An example which is introduced here by this Danish.thinker will 
serve to illustrate this point. A patient from an insane asylum 
succeeded in escaping from the institution. He knew that he would 
have to express hi~self sanely when he arrived in a nearby city, lest 
someone perceive the truth of the matter and send hi= back. As he 
walked along he picked up a ball and p~t it into the pocket of his 
coat. This continually bounced against his body with every step 
that he took. Inspired by this, the patient began repeatin: to 
hi:::self each ti:r"e it happened, ":Bang, the earth is round ". i7hen he 
....., , 
reac .. ec. the city he attempted to convince one of his friends that 
he was sane by speaking objectively. So he again repea:te:i, 113ang, 
the earth is roun~". Eut, alas, instead of being able to convince 
the doctor that he ~as sane, he only impressed upon him thst he was 
still sick and ir: need of medical assistance. 23 
The point that Kierkegaard thus expresses is the questionableness 
of objective truths. The state::!lent which the patient .from t:i1e asylum 
~ade was ~uite true and espe~ially objectively true (that the earth 
is round). 3ut it was of little consequence. Therefore ~e are to 
see that, while such objective statements c~~ indeed be true, they 
do not lead us to et~rnal truth. In this respect they fail, because 
"Truth is Subjectivity". 
22 
23 
Ibid., pp. 173-174. 
Ibid., p. 17 L• 
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?or Kierkesaard, this subjective factor finds its culmination 
in the idea termed "passion". The highE'st of the passions of human 
b · .... .. . ~ 'th 24 su Jec ... ~v~'ty ~s !a~ .• This concept is a central one in the thou;ht 
of this scholar. It opposed that portion of ~estern philosophy which 
reached its apex in Eesel, a tradition which stresseCl the i:J.portance 
f "'h b . f . 1 d 25 o reason as ~.e as~s or Know e gee 
This understanding of faith (as the highest of the passions) as 
the basis of knowlecge is an import~~t factor when we are speaking 
of Kierkegaard's approach to God. Since subjectivity is the way to 
truth and faith is the highest expression of subjectivity, it follows 
that ~e can only co~e to know the truth about God by this subjective, 
inward faith. It is an inner p::-ocess, a faith-experience, 'oy '"hic!1 
t k . t '0' 26 we cooe 0 no~ aoou _~~. 
Since God can only be known by subjectivity such as is expressed 
in faith, it is tr!erefore plain that we cannot gain such kr..olo'ledge by 
any for:ns of objecti vi ty, such as by reason. In fact, when ""e try 
to approach God by reason we find that ~e is inaccessible. It is 
plainly i~possible to discover truth about ~oa Objectively.27 
~he s~e is true of the Ch::-istian faith as a whole, because 
Christianity also opposes all objectivity. Kierkegaard even goes 
an far as to " ... " . "..... +. . t' .. .... 28 say ';;,'28. ~ obJectl."ve ", ... rJ..s _J..anJ.. y ~s paganJ..s ~J.c. 
24 
25 
27 
28 
Ibid., pp. 11::" 177-178. 
I"cid., "0. 17S and 3.a:n~, A ~andbook of Conte:n'Oorary Theolory, 
on.cit., p. 97. 
Y.ie::-ke;aard~ Ibid.~ pp. 117-118, 178-179. 
Ibid., p. 178 and Y.ier:<egaard' s Philosonhical Frag':!J.ents, 
0'0. ci t., pp. 55-57. 
Kierkegaard, Conc1udinF.:' Unscientific Postscri'Ot, Ibid., ?p. 42, 116. 
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The culmination of these thoughts is in Kierkegaard's convictions 
that since God is a Subject, He can therefore only be knoun 
subjectively. Thus we cannot attempt any proofs for His existence, 
nor can we conjure up any argumen~s concerning God by the use of 
reason. It is little wonder that Kierkegaard does not try to 
d .. t H" "t 29 emonsvra e ~s ex~s ence. 
This brings us to the crux of this presentation. It has been 
shown that Kierkegaard rejected verification and proof for the 
existence of God and for the, Christian faith as a whole. Such an 
objective approach is clearly improper. Christian truth is achieved 
by subjectivity. 
For these same reasons, Kierkegaard also rejected any attempts 
to base the truth of the Christian faith on historical knowledge. 30 
In this he followed his predecessor, Gotthold E. Lessing (1729-1781), 
who postulated that "accidental truths of history can never become 
the proof of necessary truths of reason. ,,;1 By this Lessing explains 
his conviction and belief that one cannot support Christian doctrines 
by referring to historical events such as the resurrection. In other 
words, while Lessing asserts that he has no historical groa~ds on 
which to deny the resurrection of Jesus, this is no reason to believe 
29 
;0 
;1 
Ibid., p. 178 and Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fra~ ents, on.cit., 
ppo 49, 55; cf. Robert L. Perk.ins, S ren Kierkegaard Richmond; 
John Knox Press, 1969), p. 17. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Ibid., pp. 86-97. 
See also James 3rown, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth 
(New York: Collier Books, 1961), pp. 51-60. 
Gotthold E. Lessing, Lessing's Theologi~~: Wr~t~n~s, ed~~ed by 
Henry Chadwick (London: A. 3.nd C..Black ~"to.., 1.9,6), p. ". 
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other doctrines of the Christian faith as a result. One aay, indeed, 
affirm the other doctrinal beliefs of Christianity (as Lessing claims 
that he does), but this must be on another basis other th~~ t~~t 
of the historicity of certain events. To argue from such events 
would be to reason from accidental historical facts to the necessary 
tr~ths of one's faith, and this is not al:owable. 32 
L2ssiilg adds that this division between historical facts and 
religious faith "is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, 
however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap.,,33 
Thus we perceive that the gap between these two categories is what 
comprises the barrier over which Lessing cannot find a way. There 
is no means he can discover which will allow one to proceed from an 
argument in the first category to a belief in the second category. 
It is doubtful, ho~ever, if Lessing actually believed in a 
historical resurrection like he appears to affirm (as noted above). 
For instance, when writing in another essay about eighteenth century 
rationalist Hermann ?eimarus' rejection of the resurrection, he admits 
that even if the objections which were raised were valid oues, 
Christianity would still exist because the acceptance of Christian 
doctrines depends u,on faith and not upon historical events. 54 Even 
Kierkegaard realized that Lessing's affirmations about events such 
32 
33 
~., pp. 53-55. 
Ibid., p. 55. 
Ibid., this essay.about Reim~rus appears on pp. 9-29. 
Daniel Fuller, on.cit., p. 32. 
Cf. 
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as the resurrectio~ were actually only concessions made by him to 
highlight the point he was making. 35 
In addition, Lessing relates that historical truths cannot be 
proven anyway. Thus, even if it is held that events have occurred, 
it canrLot be uroven that they did. In a similar way, just because 
the resurrection is believed to have actually occurred, it ca~~ot 
be nrcven to h~7e been historical, but only accepte~ by faith. 56 
We can therefore better perceive how Lessing could see~ingly accept 
an event even when it could not be demonstrated to have happened and 
when it could not be the basis for other beliefs. 
Lessing's formulation, whereby history is divorced fro= faith, 
has exercised much influence since his tioe. For example, Tmmanuel 
Kant borrowed from hi~ in making a similar distinction between the 
truths of God and historical fact. Separating these two categories 
is "a mighty chasm, the overleaping of which ••• leads at once to 
anthropomorphism.,,37 Thus we find once again that religious truths 
of faith ca~not b~ supported by history. And, as with Lessing, 
neither can events of history such as the resurrection be proven. 
In fact, ttis event cannot be demonstrated to have occurred literally 
because as such it is an offense to reason. 38 
55 
38 
Kierkegaard, Concluding unscientific Postscript, on.cit., p. 88. 
Cf. Fuller, ~., pp. 34:35. 
Lessing, on.cit., p. 53; cf. p. 54. See Fuller, Ibi~., p. 34. 
Immanuel Kant, Reli~ion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated 
by Theodore ~. Greene and Hoyt E. Hudson (New Ycrk: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1960), pp. 58-59, note. Cf. Fuller, Ibidaj p. 57. 
Kant, Ibid., p. 119, note. Cf. Fuller, Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
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Kierkegaard also followed Lessing in this belief that cccurrences 
in history could ~ot support religious truths of faith. Kierkegaard 
expressly states that "there can in all eternity be no direct 
transition from the historical to the eternal ••• ,,39" This is the "case 
both for the eyewitnesses to the facts and for those who are removed 
by generations. ~T.~ether the believer was a contemporary of Jesus or 
not, he is not able to base faith on reason or ~istory.40 
This stance by Kierkegaard is actually the key to this discussion. 
Since truth is subjective, then objective approaches such as the 
historicity of certain events cannot lead one to a decisi.ve faith or 
to eternal happiness. 41 To be sure, this scholar believes that Jesus 
was a historical person in that he entered the time sequence of this 
world as a man. It ~as also in history that Jesus lived, died and 
rose again. 42 But even though these events actually occurred, they 
comprise the supre~e paradox of the Christian faith because the 
doctrine of the incarnation is seemingly inexplicable and difficult 
to grasp logically. Such events are contradictory because they 
assert that God has become man, contrary to all reason. Even though 
this incarnation really did take place in history, one cannot 
historically (or otherwise) demonstrate such events in Jesus' life 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Kierkegaa.rd j Concluding Unscientific Fostscrint,on.cit., p. 89; 
cf. p. 47. 
See Ibid., pp~ 38, 89, 190 and Kierkegaard's Philoso~~ical Fragments, 
on.cit., pp. 108-109 for instance. See footnote number 46 below. 
Kierkegaard, Conc1 uding Unscientific Postscrint, Ibid., p. 33, 42, 
45. On Kierkegaard's belief that history is an objective approach, 
compare Ibid., p. 173 for instance, in addition to the discussion 
a.bove. 
Ibid., pp. 188~ 194. See also Eeinecken, IIS~ren Kierkegaard", in 
Marty and Peerman, op.cit., p. 131; cf. p. 138 and :Erc";';""!!., o"Dscit., 
p. 59. 
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like the resurrection because it is impossible tc demonstrate a 
contradiction (even one that really occurred). Historical proofs 
cannot make such eyents any less of a contradiction or paradox. 4; 
Therefore, Kierkegaard postulated that these events cannot be 
the basis of faith, as mentioned above. But, in addition~ they are 
to be believed even though it is not possible to demonstrate that 
they have occurred. Thus it is not only impossible to base one's 
fai th on objective, historical events (since fai t'h is subjectivity), 
but it is also impcssible to prove these events. The various facets 
of Jesus' incarnation are an enigma to history ~~d the objective 
/'4 discipline of history is too suspect and inexact to yield such proof.~ 
For this reason! Kierkegaard discouraged arguing anc debating about 
the truths of faitho45 
The direct result of this emphasis upon theology is the very 
important concept termed the~. Kierkegaard, inspired here by 
Lessing, makes much use of this idea. 46 For Kierkegaard, God carJlot 
·be determined to exist by "proofs", as mentioned earl:i.ero !:-ei ther 
can His existence be demonstrated by pointing to events i~ history 
4; 
44 
45 
46 
Kierkegaa!'d.~ Ibid.! pp" 199-190; cfo p~ 30. Cf. Ramm, A Eandbook 
of Contemnorary Theology, on.cit., pp. 7, 94-95 •. 
Kierkegaard, ~., pp. 42-43.and Kierkegaard's Philosonhical 
Fragments, on.cit., p. 108. Cf. Brown, op.cit., p. 59. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint, ~., pp. 46-47. 
See Brown, on.cit., pp. 57-59; Perkins, on.cit., p. 17; Ramm, ! 
Handbook of Contemporary Theology~ on.cit., p. 79 and Schaeffer, 
The God ';Tho is There, on. ci t., p. 21. Kierkegaard does no·t accept 
this idea exactly as it appears in Lessing, however. For Lessing 
the leap is made by persons who are removed from the historical 
events by time (perhaps by hundreds of years), but who still wish 
to exercise faith. The leap from history to faith would not be 
needed if we had all been contemporaries of the event in question. 
But for Kierkegaard, the leap from historical events in the life 
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such as the incarnation, as we have just seen. As long as we hold 
to such objective methods of verification, we will never understand 
God's existence. It is only when we let go of such proofs ~~d 
accept God by faith that we will realize that God does indeed exist. 47 
This ~ct of abandoning all of our proofs and all of our attempts to 
reach God by reason, however brief a moment it may' be, is termed a 
48 lean. This leap takes place when we let go ?f all of these objective 
attempts to prove God by our reason and accept Him by faith. 
So it is very clear that, for Kierkegaard, the resurrect,ion of 
Jesus provides no basis for faith. Although this event is believed to 
be true, it cannot be demonstrated to be such. It must si~ply be 
accepted by faith apart from any historical logic. Once again we 
are required to reject this proof and perceive God without such a 
crutch. Thus, ~e are to take the leap to God's existence by faith, 
without any reliance upon historical fact. Lessing's ditch is 
bridged by faith, as one leaps from the facts of Jesus' life to 
faith in him apart from any verification. 
So far, Kierkegaard's position concerning subjectivity has been 
investigated. ~o repeat briefly, this concept is viewei as being the 
proper way to finding the truth. A very clear statement to this effect 
, 40 
is "Subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality .. " '" This inward 
47 
48 
49 
of Jesus tc faith in these events must be made by all believers 
because there is no benefit in being a contemporary (see 
Kierkegaard, Ibid., p. 89; cf. ~rown, Ibid., pp. 58-59). 
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, on.cit., p. 53. 
Ibid. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscrint, o~.cit., p. 306. 
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quality of transforlnation reaches its ap~x in passion. In fact, 
passion itself is strictly a subjective factor which cannot be 
objective at all. 50 
This obviously leaves very little room for objectivity. Indeed, 
Christianity is opposed to all that is objective. If we rely on an 
objective faith we are said to be reverting to paganism. 51 There is 
actually even a lind t placed on reason, dicta.ting its boundaries. 
This is because Kierkegaard believes that reason can only advance 
to a certain point, beyond which it is not operative. For instance, 
it cannot proye God. :Sut even when reason is taken to its limit in 
relation to God, Be is still no closer than before. 52 
We should also mention the ~ersonal quality of this faith. One 
believes in God even though t~is exercise of faith is not based upon 
any logical or other objective grounds. Neither does this faith 
attempt to prove i~s own validity. Rather, the decision to act in 
fai th involves the le2.1' and one's subsequent embracing of subjective 
inwardness, which ultimately leads to a no!t.rational passion. 53 
It now remains for us to atte~pt to ascertain the accuracy of 
these views. ~e concluded above (in chapter four) that in theological 
investigations, reason is temporally first while faith is more 
important, especially as an end result. But here we have seen that 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Ibid., pp. 51, 111, 177. 
Ibid., pp. 42, 116. 
Kierkegaard, ?hiloso~hical Fragments, op.cit., pp. 53, 55, 57. 
Ibid., pp. 53-55 and Kierkegaard's Concludin~ Unscientific 
?ostscrint, o~.cit., pp. 118, 209 for instance. 
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Kierkegaard gives no essential place to reason at all, while beginning 
and en~ing the theological process with faith. This leads to three 
major criticisms of Kierkegaard's approach, all of which are directed 
at the very heart of his polemic. One criticism concerns his 
exclusive use of faith and the other two revolve around his resultant 
denial of any essential place being give to objective, reasonable 
approaches to Christianity. 
The first major criticism concerns this scholar'S inte~nal 
consistency, as it questions the very point of whether Kie:::-kegaard 
was successful in his O'7n attempt to leave the objective ap~roach to 
Christianity out of ~is view of faith. 54 It was concluded earlier 
(in chapter four) that :::-eason. by definition,55 was the grou.~ds for 
all convictions and decisions. Any defense of a belief is also 
reason. Even the ability to think coherently is ~eason. This 
definition clearly shons, in full opposition to Kierkegaard's 
teaching, that ~ational thought (as oppose~ to subjective thought) 
is the very basis of our knowledge. In other words, Kierkegaard 
himself could not aven provide such a polemic in defense of faith 
without relyin; on reason. This is because reason must be the basis 
55 
To be sure, Kierkegaard did not assert that there were no 
objective truths. He did allow for such. However"objective 
approaches s~?ly cannot lead to eternal truth and neither can 
the objective be the basis for faith. See Heinecken's "Spren 
Kierkegaard" , in ?:arty and Peer:nan, op. cij;., pp. 139-l4l. 
We also found scholarly support of this definition as well, so 
as not to attempt to settle such philosophical issues simply by 
referring to definitions. 
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of his conviction that faith is primary. Reason must likewise 
have compelled his uecision to act through such a faith-comwitment. 
Kierkegaard even m~~es use of logic and reason in his polemic 
in favor of the way of faith,5 6 even though such an objective process 
also finds its basis in the rational. Thus there could not even be 
a defense of the pri~acy of faith apart from so~e sort of rational 
process. Even though Kierkegaard does see som~ value in the objective, 
as noted above, he does not believe that it occupies a place of 
importance in reaching God. Neither does he accept reason as being 
temporally primary. The objection here is not that he gives no 
place at all to the objective, but that he does not realize that he 
is making use of such reasonable approaches in his own approach to 
God. Therefore, even in his system, reason must be temporally first 
in order ,for Kierkegaard to assert the importance of faith. 
This can be demonstrated more clearly when we remember how 
Kierkegaard postulated that truth is. found in subjectivity ar.d that 
objectivity was not the way to God. =e could assert this, for 
instance, either by reasonable persuasion and rational ar~ent or 
by intuitive convictior. and knowledge. But now it is plain to see 
that reason, and not passion, is the origin of each. All processes 
of reasonable persuasion and rational argument obviously involve 
reason. But we have also seen that even the basis of such intuitive 
conviction or knowledge is reason. Should he try to demonstrate 
that this is not the case, this persuasion also becomes rational. 
One can.~ot show how subjectivity is central without utilizing reason. 
56 For Kierkegaard's use of logic and reason in his polemic, see 
Reinecken's IISpren Kierkegaard" in Marty and Peerman, on.cit., 
p. 132; cf. pp. 127-128. 
190 
Indeed, it ~ould even be impossible for Kierkegaard to think 
in the sense th~t he was accustooed to atall, except by reason. lie 
would be required to thin.1{ through his position apart fron the 
formulating of any convictions 9 without the formulating of any 
conclusions or without ·making any decisions in order to theorize 
apart from a ratio~al process. It is therefore obvious that 
Kierkegaard did begin the process with reason, as he was not able 
to simply start with faith. 
It is the~efore somewhat ironical that the very element which 
Kierkegaard sought to separate from faith (namely, objectivity) was 
the basis upon which faith was built. His very arguments aGainst 
this conclusion proved raason to be an essential element, since the 
very polemic ,'ras r~tional. Thus, however subjective or irrational 
the entire system may be, this subjectivity has been formulated upon 
a rational process, albeit a disguise~ one. Otherwise sucn ~ 
theoretical construction would not have been possible. 
It is because of these factors that subjectivity, passion and 
faith cannot be held to be temporally first. This position belongs 
to reason, even though faith is more important, especially in the end. 
The second major criticism of Kierkegaard's system is that he 
does away with all logical grounds which might support his thesis. 
Even though it has been shown that Kierkegaard himself relies on an 
objective foundation in spite of his protests to the cO'.1".:rary, he 
still insists that there be no objective verification of faith. It 
is, of course, this scholar's express intention to do ~way ~ith these 
gTow""lds, but in so doing there is no objective criteria on i.hich his 
claims may be based. in other words, Kierkegaard is in error by 
first denying a place to any objective basis for faith even when he 
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unknowingly utilizes such a reasonable basis himself (criticism 
number oIeabove). Eut second, he continues to insist that faith 
cannot be verifieo. a.t all. Therefore, even though it is his 
intention not to base faith on any o"i:>jective found2.tion, it i"s 
because of this that one cannot ascertain if the subse~uent message 
should be accep'~ed or not. Since such faith is a personal, subjective 
experience, ther'e is no reason someone else should likewise be 
co~pelled to accept it. 
Or further, how would it be possible for one to know whether 
the Christian fait!l Y[as the right religion? One" could likewise 
urge faith in another system of belief. If no reasonable persuasion 
exists, how co~ld Kierkegaard differentiate ~~d choose between these 
options? 
As stat.ed earlier, since this faith which Kierkegaard proposes 
is so subjective, it is even hard to differentiate between it and 
human emotions such as elation, love o~ even heartburn. I~ other 
words, Kierkegaard's subjectiveness is not capable of answering 
these ~uestions and those raised above because it cannot de~onstrate 
its own validity or tell if its own foundaticns are solid. In the 
end there is no real way to ascertain if such a faith has been 
exercised in the proper way. 
Even if Kierkegaard prefers a subjective faith, this does not 
answer the ~uestion of how he might be sure that this faith is valid 
even for himself, let alone for others. Just because this scholar 
is n"ot interested. in any objective demonstration of the Christian 
faith, it is nevertheless very important to be able to know if the 
fai ~;h-commi tment which he is expounding is valid or not. After all, 
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faith is not si~~ly a cerebral exercise devoid of consequences if 
it just happened to be false. !~uch is at risk for those W!lO plac~ 
high value (indeed, eternal value) in their faith if it is fou-~d 
to be illegitimate. 
Kierkegaard speaks much of eternal truth, but it is hard to 
distinguish between real beliefs and false ones if there is no 
fac~ual criteria. It is therefore essential to know if his system 
is probable. It beco~es more obvious here that an objective, logical 
faith would thus be in a much better position to ascertain its 
trustworthiness than an irrational, subjective one 0 
For these reasons, for faith to be intelligible it must have 
some sort of objective groundwork. If the objective is rejected, as 
Kierkegaard does, then we must also abandon all hope of arr.iv.ing at 
testable data about our beliefs. It is true that Kierkegaard was 
opposed to all such testing and demonstration, but without some 
criteria such as this, it would be almost impossible to know if 
such a faith was spurious or not. Therefore we see that Kierkegaard's 
system of positing a faith which culminates in passion and inwardness 
is simply too subjective. There must be some reasonable basis upon 
which to build this faith. 
There is also the problem that Kierkegaard claims that his 
method of faith is the only way that a Christian can find eternal 
happiness. But we s~bmit that to abandon a rational basis for faith 
and to disregard intellectual demonstration can lead to eternal 
happiness only if one simply ignores any faith-related questions 
that might arise, such as these which have been raised here. One 
would have to wear earmuffs and blinders of irrationality in order 
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to fo~sake all needs and desires to rationalize just so t~at one 
might achieve a te.:rporary and fleeting "eternal happiness ll "."I'hich 
lasts only until the next doubt arises. And the ~uestions raised 
here would still remain unanswered--one would never know if one's 
faith-commitI!le~t was valid or even if it was warranted in the first 
place. 
These first two criticisms alone are. enough to provide an 
ade~uate criti~ue of Kierkegaard's view of the Christian faith. 
Eut it is now possible to apply these two to his system with regards 
to his rejection of proofs ~~d histori~al demonstrations as the 
basis of his nay to God. 
The third major criticism of Kierkegaard is that his rejection 
of any objective approach to the Chr~stian faith, including historical 
verification, is no longer warranted in view of the preceding t~o 
criticisms. It has been shown that reason must remain temporally 
primary. Subjective factors such as faith and passion are unquestionably 
important, but these are to be based on reason. There must also be 
some objective grounds for faith. There are some definite icplications 
in these conclusions. 
It was stated earlier that the resurrection of jesus was held 
by Kierkegaard as not being a valid basis upon which to rest the 
theological truths of faith. The reason for this was that the 
subjective was thought to be the true basis fo~ belief. Such objective 
events were believed to be of a differen~ category and are thus 
rejected. 57 
57 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscier.tific Postscrint, on.c~~., p. 89. 
See also Brown, on.cit., pp. 38-39 and Daniel Fuller, on.cit., 
pp. 34- 35. 
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But all of these convictions must cha~ge when it is held 
1) that reason is temporally first and 2} that faith should be 
objectively verified, both of which were concluded above. ~or 
instance, since reaso~ is held to be temporally primary (criticism 
number one here and chapter four above), one can no longer hold 
that the subjective stands alone and apart from this objective basis 
and neither can one negate the effectiveness of objective historical 
events as a result. In other words, with the former.basis for 
religious truths dissolved (namely, subjective fa.ith), the form~r 
reason for rejecting historical events must also disappear. This 
is because it can no longer be maintained that historical verification 
is opp~sed to an exculusively subjective faith, because it nas been 
found that this faith is already based on an objective element, 
namely reason. And since this is the case, it must be realized that 
this reason can be historical reason, logic, or another means of 
reasonable verification. At any rate, one could not be opposed to 
such reasonable historical demonstrations ~hen the objective element 
of reaSO!l is alread:r inherent in the concept of faith, thereby 
requiring some such objective approach. In fact, the way is opened 
for faith to be verified by any reasonable app~oach (or even several 
at once). 
It was also postulated above that faith must have some objective 
criteria on ~hich to base its claims so that it can be verified 
(criticism number two here and chapter four above). The use of 
historical research provides an excellent means by which such 
verification can be Therefore, we perceive once again 
tha t Kierkegaard I s thesis of subjectivity cannot stand. ·,T.nen this 
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scholar's emphasis on the exclusiveness of subjectivity fails, so 
does his pol~~ic a;ci~st such proofs as are shown to be probacle. 
It has been shoion that faith must be confirmed as being the proper 
approach to God. Thus we can no longer rule out the confirmation 
which is provided by verification, such as that from past events 
which are found to be probable. Such objectivedemenstration is 
in fact demanded by the very nature of the two conclusions which we 
have reached here, as faith must be shown to be val~d. 
For these reasouS, an exact inverse of Kierkegaard's rela~ion­
ships has therefore occurred. Wnereas it was formerly not possible 
to accept historical events as pointing to eternal truths (according 
to this scholar), ..... e now understand that this is no longer true. 
£istorical verification (and other such objecti~e demonstrations) 
now becomes a help rather than a hindrance, as it serves to validate 
and strengthen faith. In this way both the subjective fait~ and the 
objective demonstration are perceived to compliment eaoh other. 
These three criticisms against Kierkegaard must therefore be 
accepted as being valid, as they apply to all stages of his polemic. 
It was found that 2:is starting point was not subjective faith but 
reason (criticism number one). Thus Kierkegaard is internally 
inconsistent frem the outset by postulating faith as the initial 
starting point, but not realizing that he failed in this task himself. 
Since the main body of his work is predominantly subjective, this 
leads to another problem, namely that there is no way to ascertain 
if his system is valid or not (criticism number two). Wit~ no 
objective criteria ~ith which to test these views, one cannot know 
if subjectivity is the best approach to God. From these first two 
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criticisms a third was deduced, that subjectivity is not solely 
the right approach to God, sin.ce we must start with reason and mu.st 
utilize so::ne objectiv-e criteria to verify faith. Thus it was found 
that one possible approach would be to use history to investi'gate 
the Christian faith (ana the resurrection in particular) to see if 
it offers a solid basis for faith. 
Suffice it to say that the way has thus be~n opened fo~ ,the 
historical examination of events such as the resurrection. If this 
occurrence is fo~~d to be historical, it could be used as a more 
rational basis for Christian faith. 
Although Eierkegaard's exclusively subjective basis for his 
system fails, his eophasis on a fai th-co!ll!lli tment for sal'iration still 
remains valid. This is especially so if historical (or ot~er) evidence 
is found to verify such belief. This is because Kierkegaard is 
correct in establishinG this as the central component of Cr~istianity. 
The same conclusion was also reached in chapter four above, where 
it was fo~d that even though reason was temporally first, faith was 
the ::nost ~mporta.::t and essential element. Therefore we shoul'd still 
accept this conclusion as authoritative, especially with an objective 
foundation. Rierkegaard's concept of the faith that leads to 
salvation and an authentic Christian life involves an individual:s 
realizing that he is a sinner in need of repentance (a complete 
change of his life). This repentance is achieved by a complete 
surrender to God in fait~, trusting the death of Jesus Christ on the 
cross to pay for all personal sins. The result is a total commitment 
of the individual to God for a life of obedience, based upon the 
death of the Son of God. This total transformation of the person, 
if genuine, lea~s to the joy of the Christian life. This is real 
faith. 58 
This definition of faith set forth by Kierkegaard, as presented 
here, is ~uite a well-stated view. It also accurately portrys the 
New Testament teachings on this subject. We agree with this scholar 
that the summary just presented is the most important part of the 
reason-faith relationship and as such it is essential for the 
Christian belief in salvation. These teachings must therefore remain 
in our concept of Christianity: But we also believe that there 
are reasonable·evidences which help to validate these teachings. 
58 For this definition of faith by Kierkegaard, see his Attack U"Oon 
"Christena.oml~, on.cit., pp. 149, 210, 215, 221, 280, 287, for 
in.stance. See especially Heinecken, "Spren Kierkegap..rd" in 
!i~arty and Peerr:J.a.n, 0"0. ci t., pp. 151, 135, 154, 158. for the same 
sU!lUllary. 
Chapter VIII. Possibility Number Two: Other Similar Vie~s 
11. Kar 1 Barth 
We dealt above with some of the immense influence that Spren 
Kierkegaard's thought has had upon contemporary theology. His ideas 
were not very popular in his own day and did not become overly 
popular even in theological circles until the twentiet=:-~'?-r:-b~ry= 
At this time his views were revived by Karl Barth in particular 
and by those who follOwed him (usually referred to as Barthians or 
neo-orthodox theologians).l Especially influential was Kierkegaard's 
emphasis on the subjective approach to God which was discussed in 
the last chapter. 1:~ost of the neo-orthodox theologians agreed with 
him that God could not be approached by any rational means such as 
by proofs, historical demonstrations or other means of verification. 
2 !,:any also e..cce:pted tb.e belief that faith entailed an irrational "leap". 
It is in the works of Barth which one can probably see the 
strongest influence of Kierkegaard on this last point. 3arth also 
believed that God must be approached by faith and not cy objective 
means. In fact, his methodology revolves around the analogy of 
faith. This concept was perhaps developed most consistently 
1 
2 
See the introduction to Kierkegaard in chapter seven for ~any 
of these details. Cf. also ::ieinecken, "Spren Kierkegaard", 
in Uarty and Peerman, Ibid., p. 136. 
Ramm, A Handbook of Contemnorary Theology, on.cit., pp. 74-76~ 
79 .. 80, 89-92. 
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in Earth's work Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum,3 where this 
theologian concluded that Anselm's ontological arg~ent for the 
existence of God was not a philosophical proof formulated to induce 
f . th f A 1m d d h' t . d t . l' 4 a~ , or nse nee e no suc ~pe us ~n or er 0 oe ~eve. 
It is argued that Anselm admitted that the existence of ~od was 
known by faith and not by such demonstrations of Ris existence. 
This is true, Barth asserts, because it is impossible to learn of 
God by any kind of proof. We believe in Rim not because He is 
known to exist by various procedures of verification, but because 
He has revealed Himself to us, especially by faith. 5 
For this reason, Barth rejects the analogy of being, which 
attempts to argue to the existence of God by various demonstrations. 
This is an abortive attempt to gain knowledge of God apart from 
faith. Since faith is not primary in such a system, it must be 
replaced by tha ~~~logy of faith. 6 
Thus, for Barth (as for Kierkegaard), faith is primary. The 
proper approach to God is the acceptance of faith without trJing to 
verify this belief by proofs.? 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides uaerens Intellectum, translated by 
Ian W. Robertson Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960). 
Ibid., pp. 39-40, 101, 151. 
Ibid., pp. 18-20, 80, 86 9 128: 152. 
See Hans U:::-s von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, translated 
by John Drury (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 148 
and Herbert Hartwell, The Theolo~ of Karl Barth (London: Gerald 
Duckworth and Company, Ltd., 1964)~ pp. 49, 56, 184. 
Barth, Anselm, ou.cit., pp. 18-20, 128, 39-40; cf. von Balthasar, 
Ibid.~ p. 125. 
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When one endeavors to examine Barth's view of .' I.e resurrection 
of Jesus, it is important to keep in mind his method, centering in 
the analogy of faith. ~ecause of t~is methodology, Barth (again 
like Kierkegaard) therefore does not believe that it is possible 
either to demonstrate this event or to use it as the reason why we 
should believe in God. This is because God can only be approached 
by faith and not by demonstrations such as those from historical 
events. 
It is especially in the early period of Barth's thou6ht that 
the dialectical emphasis in neo-orthodox theology8 played a.n 
important role. The approach taken to the resurrection is a good 
example of how this dialectic might be applied to theology. ~arth 
was, for instance, able to say "Yes" to Jesus' resurrection being 
an actual event and llNo" to its being a. historical fact like other 
occurrences which can be historically verified. This sounds 
contradic~o~y, but it is affirmed nonetheless: 
8 
9 
In the Resurrection the new world 'of the Roly Spirit, touches 
the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent 
touches a circle, that is, without touching it ••• The 
Resurrection is therefore an occurrence in history ••• But ••• 
the Resurrection is not an event in history at all.9 
Among other facets, neo-orthodox theology (also termed dialectical 
theology) affi~s that there is 2 vast gulf between God and man. 
As a result, there exists a tension between the things of God and 
the things of man. An answer of both "Yes" and "No" is therefore 
given by these theologians to certain questions pertaining to this 
relationship. A possible example of such a seemingly contradictory 
position is that the Bible is both the Word of God and the word 
of man. Thus one might answer both "Yes': and "No" to the question 
of whether the zible is the work of human writers. See R~,A 
Handbook of Contemnorary Theology, on.cit., pp. 35-36. -
Barth, The Enistle to the Romans, on.cit., p. 30. 
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We have here an illustration which presents ~uite a seeming 
contradiction in terms. In the example chosen by the autho~, one 
must hold either that the tangent touches the circle or that it 
does not touch. 3ut 3arth affirms both. This example serves to 
illustrate a point in his theology, because in a similar maa~er he 
also affirms that the resurrection both is and is not an historical 
event. To the question of whether the resurrection is an actual 
event of'history, we therefore receive both a "Yes" and a "No" 
answer. 
Eut how is this possible? Barth holds to the essential evil 
character of the world, which is tainted by sin. As such the world 
is opposed to God and Eis purposes. If Christ was really to enter 
the actual history of the world, then he would likewise participate 
'th' '1 10 :Ln . J. S evJ. • For Barth "if the Resurrection be brought ,;i thin 
the context of' history, it must share in its obscurity and error and 
t ' 1 . , '1' ,,11 essen:La ques~:Lonao eness. 
The only possible conclusion is that the resurrection occurred 
on ttthe frontier of all visible human history. ,,12 It is a historical 
occurrence, but not in the normal sense of the word "histo:::-yll. In 
fact, it may be considered in some ways to be a nonhistorical 
occurrence. 13 
Earth continued a similar type of reasoning in other early works 
as well. In 1920 he taught that the resurrection of Jesus was tlnot in 
10 See the penetrating analysis by Daniel Fuller, op.cit., pp. 82-84. 
11 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, op.cit., p. 204. 
12 Ibid., p. 203. 
13 ~., cf. pp. 50, 195, 20;. 
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time. 14 It is not one temporal thing among others. 1t An i::!J.portant 
distinction is made as follows: 
The resurrection ~f Christ ••• is not a historical event ••• 
though it is the only real happening in is not a real 
happening of history (Italics and ~ording are Earth's).15 
Again we see the distinction between an event occurring and its 
being a part of history. The resurrection can really have occurred 
and yet not happen like other events for this scholar. Barth even 
~oes as far as to say that we should not ask whether it is ~istorical 
or not, for this event is a good example of the nonhistorical and 
the impossible. lo ~ven though it is an actual event, it ca~ot be 
proven or demonstrated to have occurred. 17 
In 1924 3arth published his work The Resurrection of the Dead. 18 
Eerein is contained essentially the same view of the resurrection as 
was present in his earlier works. 19 This event is again presented 
as occurring on history's frontier (or boundary) in such a ~~~er 
that it can only be u.nderstood as God's revelation and not proven 
or demonstrated by history. 20 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
An additioual opinion is further given and clarified in this 
Karl :Barth, The :."ord of God and the Word of ?:an, translated by 
Dou~1as Eorton (New York: Earper and 3rothers, 1957), p. 89. 
The essays in this book are dated 1916-1923. 
Ibid., p. 90. 
Ibid., p. 91-
Ibid., p. 92; cf. p. 120. 
Karl :Barth, The 3.esurrection of the Dead, translated. 0;)" Z. J. Stenning 
(New York: Fle!:lirL6 E. Revell Co:::par.y, 1933). 
Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 89-90. 
Earth, The Resurrection of the Dead, on.cit., pp. 134, 138, 139. 
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work. Eart~ boldly asserts that alternate critical theorieS concern-
ing the ~es~rrection ~ight even be true, for it ~akes no real 
difference if t~e to~b was closed or open that fi~st ~es~~ection 
~crning. ~e accept Jesus' ~esurrection by faith and not because of 
any historical evic.ence. ~hus this "occurrence cannot be invGsti;ated 
or tested. 21 It cannot be proven to have occurred. Therefore, if 
there we~e news reporters present at the tomb of Christ on that 
fi~st morning, they ~ould not have been able to verify this event. 
This last interpretation has been confirmed by A~erican theologian 
Carl ?E. Henry, .ho ~uestioned Barth on this very subject uhen he 
visited America S03e years ago. When ~enry asked if our news 
correspondents caul:! have reported the ~esurrection had. the:,:" been 
there to investigate it, Earth responded by saying tha.t it ,",-as a 
private event for the disciples alone. As the meetin~ broke up, one 
of the reporte~s re~arked to Henry that the other writers h~d clearly 
understood ~arth's answer. They knew that Barth was denyinG that 
they coule have v.-itnessed or investigated this event. 22 
Thus ~e perceive the view of the early Barth on the res~rrection 
of jesus. While this event is surely believed to have occ~red, it 
is not an event of real history that can be investigated and 
demonstrated like other historical facts. Rather, it is not an 
event of history, but rather an occ~rrence of superhistory.23 
21 
22 
23 
Icid.~ pp. 135-138. 
Carl F.2. Henry, editor, Jesus of Nazareth: Saviour an~ Lord 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 1966), 
p. 11. 
Karl Barth, Theolor,v and C~urch: Shorter ~ritin~s 1920-10 28, 
translated by Louise Pettibone Smith New York: Harper and Row, 
?ublishe~s, 1962), p. 62~ 
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Therefore the resurrection also happened in a different kind of 
24 history than has other events. 
Did Barth's position change substantially after his new emphasis 
on the analogy of faith in his work on Anselm?25 According to Daniel 
Fuller, he did give more attention to the question of historicity, 
but he continued to reject the resurrection as an event which can be 
°fO d ° 26 ver~ ~e ~n any way_ One does readily notice this change, however, 
as it appears that more credence is given to the historical character 
of this oocurrence. The objectivity of the resurrection is even 
stressed more, especially the fact that the disciples actually did 
see Jesus. 27 But 3arth made it plain that he still did not hold that 
the facts of the historical Jesus should be stressed. 28 
In spit~ of this new emphasis, however, it is still obvious that 
Barth relegates the resurrection of Jesus to something other than the 
history in which other events happen. Sacred events like the resurrection 
cannot be subjected to an already existing view of history. Rather, 
God's revelation through such. occurrences, dem'ands a particular type 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
See ].lontgomery, were is History Going?, 0-0. ci t., pp. 111-112; 
cf. p. 115 and Charles C. Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A 
Continuing Quest, o-o.cit., p. 157, footnote number 3 for instance. 
We will return later to, Earth's conception of the resurrection 
as having occurred in a history different from that of other events. 
Concerning Barth's earlier primary interest in dialectics and his 
later primary interest in the analogy of faith, see von Ealthasar, 
o-o.cit., pp. 78-80, 90, 92-93. 
Daniel fuller, 0-0. cit., pp. 147-148. 
This greater eophasis on the reality of Jesus' resurrec~~on is 
especially perceptible in Barth's Church DOgmatics, o-o.cit., vol. 
IV, part 1, pp. 502, 309, 318, 336-337, 351-352, for instance. 
See also Barth's Do~atics in Outline, translated by G.T. Tho~pson 
(New York: Farper and Row, Publishers, 1959), pp. 122-123. 
Cf. Hartwell, oo.cit., pp. 122-123. 
Karl Barth, Eow I Changed My Mind (Ricrunond: John Knox Press, 1966), 
see p. 69 for an example of his attitude. 
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of .history, a somewhat nonobjective, nondemonstrable variety. For 
Barth, there is such a definition of history which differs from the 
modern understanding of this word, and it is in this "metahistory" 
that Jesus is held to have risen from the dead. This event is judged 
to be nonhistorical by those who try to force the contempoarary 
meaning of history upon it. 29 
In Earth's chief 'work, Church Dogrga.tics, we can plainly perceive 
the continuation of this stance. The resurrection is said to have 
occ'l;:.rred in a peculia.r kind of history.30 As "we pass fro:::l the 
story of the passion to the story of Easter we are led into a 
historical sphere of a different kind.,,3l This is because the 
"death of Jesus can certainly be thought of as history in -;;ne ~cde;;'~ 
sense, but not the resurrection ••• the history of the resurrection 
. t h· t . 'h· 1132 ~s no ~s ory ~n ~.~s sense ••• 
Barth does give some vague indication as to the nature of the 
history in which he believes that the resurrection occurrei. He 
relates several £acts which serve in helping one to understand this 
peculia.r mode of ascertaining certain incidents of the past. First, 
since this event is part of God's revelation (and thus an act of God), 
it is different from other occurrences from the very outset. 53 But 
this is not the only reason we are given as to why the resurreotion 
is perceived to occupy a different kind of history. We are told, 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Ka.rl Barth, The Faith of the Church, edited by Jean-Louis Leuba, 
translated by Gabriel Vahanian (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 
1958), pp. 96-99. 
Barth, Church Do~atics, op.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 335. 
l£i£., p. 3340 
~., p. 536. 
Ibid., pp. 500-301. 
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second, th?t this event is ,erha~s more properly viewed es oeing a 
"saga" or a "legend". As such it is termed "prehistoryll because it 
t b d. . "h' t . 11 . th d ~ " " 34 canno e un erstooe ~s or~ca y ~n e mo ern sense o~ ~~e wore. 
~ere Barth identifies his concept mo~e closely. There are elso 
othe~ differences between this prehistory and the modern concept of 
histor:v. ~or instance, third (as we have remarked a.bove), the res-
urrection not only cannot be proven to have occu~red, but such a 
proof should not even be attempted. 55 It is thus unlike other events 
which can be verified by historical research. Fourth, 3arth boldly 
announces that it ~akes no difference if Jesus' tom~ was o~en or 
closed on the first resurrection morning, for Ia±th can follow from 
it nevertheless. In this way he asserts that the historical character 
of this ev~nt provides no foundation for faith. 36 
~arth's unde~standing of the resurre~tion therefore appears to 
be q"t;.i te an eJ,usiv~ concept to grasp. ~;ot only the ini ti2.1 revelatory 
character of this Event, but even the event itself is pre~istory or 
llietahisto~y. It cannot b~ verified like other incidents and is 
construed in such a way that faith in it can remain· even ~it~out 
v~rious elements of the nar~atives. In spite of these characteristics 
which ten~ to point away f~J~ the historicity of this event and in 
spite of the in~istence upon ~ ~ifferent kind of history, 37 Earth 
still states that we cann0t therefore say that Jesus did not rise, 
or t!1a t he did so only in a spiri tual sense. 1!le must understand that 
35 
37 
Ibid., p. 336; cf. Barth's The Faith of the Church, op.cit., p. 99. 
Ibid., especially p. 335; see also pp. 300, 341. 
Cf. 3art!1's ~ork The Resurrection of t!1e Dead, on.cit., p. 135 
wit!". Ibid., p. 335. 
Indeed, in The Faith of the Church, Earth notes that h~ is utilizing 
a different definitio~ of history ~!1en !1e af!irns t!1at events 
such as t!1e resurrection occurred (on.cit., pp. 98-~9). 
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this scholar still believed that Jesus rose fro~ the dead in time 
and space in an objective way. Jesus had a body and he could be 
seen, heard and perceived to actually have risen from the dead. 3S 
While this conception of the resurrection appears quite contradictory,39 
it is another example of Earth's use of dialectic. He answers both 
"Yes ll and "Noll to the question of whether Je$us rose from the dead 
in actual human history. 
We have seen that, whether we speak of the early or of the late 
Barth, we are dealing with a view of the resurrection that is 
essentially the same. Although a new stress is placed on the actual 
occurrence of this event in the later stages of this scholar's work, 
the belief that the resurrection is not history in the same sense 
as other events, and therefore not provable, still persists. It is 
noteworthy that Kierkegaard also acce~ted this occurrence as an 
I -
eni~a for history, a paradox that cannot be understood or de~onstrated 
by historical research. It can only be embraced by faith and not 
b ~h . . 11 ~ 40 y " e ~n"te ec". 
Earth's view of the resurrection has been discussed in ~epth, 
with the emphasis being laid primarily upon his understanding of 
this event as a type of prehistory which is not the old liberal 
view of myth, but neither is it one of com~lete historical Objectivity.4l 
3S 
39 
40 
41 
Earth, Church DOgmatiCS, o~.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 336-337, 
351- 352. 
More will be said about this criticism later. 
See especially Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
o~.oit., pp. l8S-l90 and the discussion above on Kierkegaard. 
Cf. Brown, o~.cito, p. 59. 
Cf. Barth's The ~ord of God and the Word of Man, on.cit., p. 90. 
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It has been our endeavor to be fair in this presentativn, striving 
to deal adequately with both sides of this emnhasis. It now remains 
- . 
for us to evaluate this approach. 
Four major criticisms of Karl Earth's view of the resurrection 
will now be offered. The first, and one of the most comprehensive 
criticisms, involves the belief that the resurrection occupies a 
sort of parahistory which includes some aspects of objective history, 
while other facets of history are abandoned. Berein lies a main 
problem of Barth's interpretation. 
An event must either be some k~nd of a myth which never literal~y 
occurred in actual human history, or it must have occurred in this 
same history. But Earth a~serts that the resurrection is neither 
myth nor actual history in the modern sense. Rather, this event 
. t f ~ t· 1·· hO t 42_ occurs :l.n some' sor 0 re\.O.emp :l.ve or re :l.g:l.OUS :l.S ory. however, 
history simply knows nothing of such an "inbetween" ground., .. hether 
it is termed prehistory, saga, legend, or referred to as the bound.ary 
or frontier of history.45 As Wand so perceptively points out: 
42 
44 
History is concerned only with stich events as happen within 
the space-time continuum. Events, real or imagined, which 
occur in an eternal or spiritual sphere are not the proper 
subject of history. The reason is that history has no tools 
by which it can deal with such events.44 
Earth, Church DOgmatics, OF.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 500-301, 
334, 536. 
Barth uses these descrintive words to refex to his concent of 
redemptive or spiritual-history~ See Ibid., p. 536 and The 
Resurrection of the Dead, on.c~t., pp. 134, 139. 
W'and, un. cit., p. 23. 
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In other words, history can only be concerned with events which 
occur in space and time in such a way that they can be investigated 
by the tools of ~istorical research. Since there are no means ~hereby 
events which occur in a spiritual "inbetween" sphere can be so 
investigated, they are not actually within the scope of history. As 
Wand asserts, religious events which are perceived to have happened 
only in such an elusive realm cannot be properly regarded as history, 
whether the~e were real events or not. Ristorical facts must there-
fore be open to verification and research. 
Admittedly, the resurrection.' (if it is fmmd to have occurred) 
would have a different origin from other events because as such it 
would enter history as a direct act of God. The fact that Jesus' 
res~rrection was not produced by any natural means, such as by 
historical causation, should not be belittled. Barth is correct 
in asserting that it is possible for an event to have its cause in 
Divine action and still be a part of history. Thus the resurrection 
would be unique in the sense that this event would have to ~ave 
originated with God. 
Eut there is an immense difference between saying that this 
occurrence would be a~ique because of its being a direct result of 
God's revelation and saying that as such it cannot be investigated. 
This is where Barth's polemic fails quite noticeably. The point here 
is that once this occurrence enters the realm of history (even though 
the actual entering is uniqu~), it must be open to historical 
investigation. To forego such verification means that it does not 
become normal history at all. Thus, to remove such an event from 
investigation, as this scholar does, is not valid. One ~ould have 
to also remove ". ~ ... fro~ the scope of history as well in order to 
isolate it from such historical procedures. 
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Therefore, one cannot assert that certain events actually 
occurred and then add that we cannot speak historically abo~t the~ 
or investigate the~. Either the resurrection really happened in 
verifiable historJ" or it did not happen in nor~al history ~t all. 
But let us not e~ploy fancy theological verbiage to affi~ its 
occurrence in a.n unverifiable, unc)bservable, contradictory :realm of 
thought! 
Pannenberg agrees in this cri tic,ism of Earth I s view. ;e 
expressly states: 
If we would forgo the concept of a historical event here, 
then it is no longer possible at all to affirm that the 
resurrection of Jesus or that the appearances of t~e 
resurrected Jesus really happened at a definite time in 
our world. There is no justification for affirmin~ Jesus' 
resurrection as an event that really happened, if it is not 
to be affirmed as a historical event as such. 71het:her or 
not a particular event happened two thousand years ago is 
not made certain by faith but only by historical research, 
to the extent that certainty can be attained at ,all about 
~uestions of this kind •••• The only method of achieving at 
least approxi~ate certainty with regard to the eve~ts of a 
~ast tise is historical research.45 
As pointed o~t here, it is i~possi~le for a theologian like 
Berth to say that an event occurred but not in the same objective 
history as other events occur. As Pannenberg adeptly points out, 
it is incorrect to claim to be speaking of Jesus' resurrectioL as 
a historical event if, as such, it can only be known by faith and 
not by historical research. If one asserts that somethin; is not 
even able to be investigated, neither can one say that the event 
still happened at a certain time in this t ~rld. We thus see that 
it is impossible for Barth to affirm that the resurrectior:. really 
occurred while still having the understanding that this occu:rrence 
is not in objecti7e, verifiable history. Such an event is not really 
Pannenberg, Je~us--God and ~an, on.cit., p. 99. 
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histor~ because no such conce~t of history exists. Therefore it is 
also i~~ossible merely to claim that this event still ha?pened 
just like other incider.ts in the past. 
As a historian, :,:ontgo:nery also objects to Barth's use of ~re-
history. The following illustration is introduced to demonstrate 
the folly of such a concept: 
I wonder ~hat you would say--what Barth would say--if I 
claimed that in my-backyard there is a large green elephant 
eating a raspberry ice crean cone, but that there is no way 
o~~ empirical investigation to deter:line that he is there. 
Konetheless, I maintain, as a matter of fact, that it is 
there in every objective and factual sense. Now I have a 
feelinz that you would either regard this as a clai~ that 
the elephant is there and is subject to empirical Llvestigation, 
or contend that it isn't there by the very fact that there 
is no way of determining the fact. I ~onder if this dOesn't 
point U? the proble~. To claim objectivity, but to remove 
an~ possibility of determining it, is by definition to 
destroy objectivity.46 
Kontsomery:s criticism is well justified. A historical event 
must either be open to investigation or not claim to be history at 
~ , 1 c:.._ for the very re~son that it cannot be investigated. ",',-e destroy 
the concept of historical objectivity ~hen we endeavor to rule that 
this objectivity itself cannot be tested. Any claim to a historical 
"middle gro'.lnd" of prehistory re:noved from such processes of 
verification is about as accurate and acceptable as the claim concern-
in~ the existence of ... ' Lone 47 grea-~ elephant • !;lontgo;:nery t':1.us a£rees 
'!lith others t::'at the idea of parahistory is foreign both to history 
"t If' d t ... ,. ""°b1° 1 "48 ~ se ::. an even 0 LoDe ~~ ::.ca recorc.s. 
Other theologi~r.s have also noted Barth's tendency to ~ely on 
the concept of ?reh~story and the subsequent weaknesses i~ his appro~ch 
46 
'+7 
48 
Kontgomery, ~istory and Christianity, on.cit., pp. 87-:8. 
Ibid., cf. also pp. 106-107. 
~i!ontgo:::Jery, -7::ere is !:istor;v Going?, op.cit., pp. 111-112; cf. p.l15. 
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to the resurrection which have resulted. They realize both that 
, 
historians recognize no such realm of history and that the very 
assertion that such a realm exists with both historical and non-
historical characteristics is itself contradictory.49 
The second major criticism of Barth is quite similar to one 
of the main objections to Kierkegaard and will therefore not be 
labored overly much here. Even though Barth claims that the 
resurrection literally occurred, we have seen how he denies any 
possibility of verifying this event. In fact, such a procedure 
should not even be attempted.~O Thus, in spite of his e3p~atic 
assertions that the resurrection occurred, his view also falls 
prey to the criticism that there is no way for one to ascertain if 
the Christian faith is valid or not. We have already seen that 
faith cannot stand alone and be its own criteria and proof for belief. 
These subjective, personal quaiities provide no reason why someone 
else should believe this particular system or accept Christi~~ity 
over alternative views. Faith simply is not a panacea for all 
theological problems, because there is no reason to accept this faith 
if there are no grounds upon which its claims may be based. In spite 
50 
In addition to those listed above, see, for instance, ~enry, on.cit., 
pp. 11-12 and Eenry's own comments in the debate on the resurrection 
(he was a participant) recorded in the appendix of Montgomery's 
History and Christianity:, on.cit., pp. 85, 96, 105. The 
contradictory aspect of Earth:s concept was also confir=ed by Clark 
Pinnock in personal correspondence with this writer, dated July 
19, 1971. See also Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 82-84; cf. pp. 69, 
71. Charles Anderson, in The Historical Jesus: A Continuin~ Quest, 
op.cit., pp. 157-158, footnote number three and Ramm, in! 
Handbook of Contemnorary Theology, op.cit., p. 90, also note Barth's 
position. 
For example, see especially Barth's Church DOgmatics~ on.cit., 
vole IV, part 1, p. 335. 
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of Barth's defense of faith as the only way (as opposed to any 
historical research or other rational approach), it still remains 
that this faith cannot verify itself or demonstrate its own validity. 
This can only mean that one cannot know if the grounds for belief 
are solid or not. There is no logical reason to accept such a faith. 
In other words, to say that Jesus really rose from the dead but 
that this event can only be accepted by faith (without verification) 
is to leave one's entire faith open to question. Barth is of course 
not inte::-ested in verifying the groundsfor Christianity. But without 
such objective criteria one can never know if one's faith is 
completely in vain or not. 
Montgomery also realized the strenght of such a criticism. 
Appropriating a fa.ct by faith cannot make this belief factual. Simply 
by starting wi th faith we are not assured o,f .arriving at a truthful, 
viable solution because the adinonition to "have faith" cannot 
guarantee that one's beliefs are any more correct. Therefore, if 
faith does not have its starting point in objective, verifiable events, 
there is no way that one may ascertain if Christianity is the 
preferable faith-system in which to place one's trust. 5l 
Therefore we perceive that which was stated earlier. Faith 
cannot create truth, no matter how intense it might be in the 
individual. Thus, faith cannot make itself valid by its intensity 
or by the fervency with which it is exercised. Because of this, it 
is important for the individual to know if his faith is valid, and 
objective criteria are best suited for this purpcseo 
The last two criticisms of Barth are internal critiques. The 
51 Eontgomery, History ana. Christianity, OPe ci t., pp. 99-101, 106-107. 
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third major criticism concerns Barth's understanding of God's 
revelation in hUEan events. It has been 5hown how this scholar 
contends that God reveals Himself in certain revelatory acts which 
occur in man's prehistory and not as an actual part of verifiable 
history. 52 But if revelation is not given objectively in historical 
facts which are open to historical research, then Jesus' death can.~ot 
be revelatory because even Barth believes that the crucifixion is 
history in th~ mcie:m sense of the word. 53 But Barth also hclds that 
the crucifixion is part of God's revelation, since Jesus died a 
substitutionary death to pay for the sins of those who surrender 
their life to God in faith. 54 Here we find an internal inconsiste~cy. 
If one holds that the death of Jesus is part of God's revelation to 
~an (as Barth is correct in doing), then one must abando~ the 
previously held idea that God never acts meaningfully in this kind 
of history. And if we reject. this, it also means that the resurrection 
could likewise be objective, verifiable histo~y and still'be a 
revelatory event as well. 55 
The fourth major criticism of Barth's treatment of the resurrection 
is th2t this theologian holds that the New Testament itself does not 
make any attempt to demonstrate or prove that the resurrection did 
occur. ~e holds, rather, that the earliest Christians were only 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Ramm, A Handbook of Contemnorary Theolo~, ou.cit., p. 90. 
Barth, Church Docmatics, o'O.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 336; cf. 
'0 73/' CJ .J "T. 
Ibid., 'Op. 248-254 for instance. See Ramm, A Handbook of 
ccntemuorary TheolOgy, o'O.cit., pp. 16, 108. 
See Henry, Jesus of Nazareth: Saviour and Lord, o'O.cit., p. 10 
wher2 this criticism is also developed. 
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interested in acce)ting this event by faith. Thus Paul, for example, 
was not trying to present a proof of this occurrence by citing the 
witnesses in I Corinthians, chapter 15. 56 
It has already been noted above that this portion makes it 
quite plain that although Paul is speaking of the faith of the first 
century Christians, he is also explaining how this faith has its 
basis in objective, historical fact. The text clea.rly sho,;s that 
Paul does intend to cite proof here, especially in verse six, where 
we are informed that most of the witnesses were still alive and could 
thus provide testimony concerning these events. This testimony 
would, in turn, provide historical eyewitness corroboration for Paul's 
claims. 
Even Eultmann disagrees with Earth here, also noting that Paul 
does mean to use the list of the appearances of Jesus as proof for 
the resurrection. 57 Eultma.nn notes that there were two current proofs 
for this event, both of which are found in I Cor. 15. There nas-
the appeal to eyewitness testimony, as we have perceived here 
(especially 15:5-8) and the appeal to the fulfillment of Old Testament 
-8 
prophecy (15:3-4).' 3ultmann's testimony is valuable at this 
point ~ainly because it is apparent that Barth is desiring to use 
the Sc~ipture to reinforce his polemic,59 whereas Bultmann actually 
57 
58 
59 
This tendency to believe that the New Testament never intends 
to demonstrate that the resurrection really did happen is evident 
in both the early and in the late Barth. See his earlier work 
The Resurrectio~ of the Dead, c~_cit., pp. 131-138 and his later 
opus Church Do~atics, o~.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 335. 
Eul tmann, "New Testament and 1~ythology" 
o~.cit., p. 39. 
in KerYgma and :;:yth, 
Eul tmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. I, p. 82. 
See~arth's Cnurch Dogmatics, vol.: IV, 'part I, pp. 334-336. 
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objects to Paul's using such a proof in spite of believing that 
.. .... t'.. 60 ne Qoes JUS~ ~1S. This desire of course does not in itself mean 
that Earth is neces£~rily wrong. Eut it does appear that 3ult~ann 
is more accurate in ascertaining Paul's obvious motives here. 
~eginald Fuller is somewhat close to Barth in his vie-:-: on this 
question. He holds that Paul's primary intention was to id.entify 
his preaching of the resurrection with that of the earliest 
eyewitnesses. 3ut he also believes that Paul intended to relate 
the eyewitness accounts in ord.er to prove that Jesus actually 
appeared to his followers. He likewise agrees in citing I Cor. 
as the main pointer to the fact that Paul is establishin; evidence 
to b d ~ ~ --h 61 e use as prool lor ~. ese appearances. 
But there are other portior.s of the New Testament '.-:hich also 
establish the fact that other authors besides Paul endeavo~ed both 
to prove the resurrection and to use this event as the basis for the 
establis~ing of other beliefs, contrary to Barth's ~iew. It has 
been sho~n above ho~ the gospels in particular sought to ~e~o~strate 
the reality of Jesus' resurrection by stressing that he appeared to 
his disciples in bodily form. Although the new body had tL~dergone 
so~e changes, it is reported that Jesus allowed his follo~ers to 
exa~ine and investigate this new body. We are evr~ told that Jesus 
was touched and. "held", thus demonstrating that he was a.live. This 
emphasis is especially evident in passages like Luke 24:36_43,62 
where ample evide~ce of this attempt to prove that Jesus had risen 
60 
61 
62 
3ul t::la:~m, "~Tew Testament and Mythology" in KerYg!:la and Myth, 
op.cit., p. 39. 
?e~ir.a1d ?uller, o~.cit., p. 29. 
?esides this portion and I Cor. 15:4-8, see such pass2.!es as 
Matt. 28:8-9; JL. 20:17 (in the Greek); 20:19-31; Acts 10:39-41. 
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is readily avai1ab1e. 63 We are even told in Acts 1:3 that Jesus 
"presented himself a.1i ve after his passion by many proofs ••• " (p.sV). 
In fact, the Greek word used here for "proof!! (tekmeriois) literally 
°to t ° f 64 t means a pos~ ~ve or cer a~n proo. Thus we see hat it was the 
intention of several New Testament authors to prove that Jesus had 
risen. 
In addition, it should be mentioned that the resurrection is 
also used in the Kew Testament as a proof for other Christian 
doctrines. For instance, Acts 17:30-31 shows that the earliest 
church believed that God verified Jesus' earthly teachings by raising 
him from the dead. 65 Acts 2:36 and Rom~~s 1:4, are other examples 
which point to Jesus' being accepted as the Lord, Messiah and the 
Son of God, 'based upon the resurrection.' 66 
Thus we see that neither can Barth rely on Scripture for support 
of his thesis. The claim that the New Testament does not seek to 
prove or demonstrate that the resurrection actually occurred is 
simply not supported by the facts. 
64 
65 
66 
Bultmann also bel~eves that the gospels and Paul endeavor to 
prove that Jesus had appeared to the apostles. He likewise 
recognizes tha.t I Cor. 15:3-8 and Luke 24:39-43 are good examples 
of this tendency. See "The New Testament and ~thology" in 
Kery,c;;ma and :',:yth, 0"0. ci t., p~ 39. 
See W.E. Vine, An Ex"Oository Dictionary of New Testament Words, 
(Four volumes in one; Old Tappan: Fleming~. Revell CC~P~~Y7 1966), 
volume III, pp. 220-221. See also Robertson, o"O.cit., vol. III, p. 6. 
This is admitted by both Bul tmann, "New Testament and Ifythology" 
in KerY.Q;!Ila and Eyth, av. ci t., p. 39 and by Marxsen 7 0"0. ci t., p. 169. 
Marxsen notes that the preaching of repentance and belief in 
the Lordship of Jesus are both based on the proof that Jesus 
rose from the dead, according to these verses. 
See Eultmann, Theolosy of the New Testament, on.cit., vol. I, p. 27. 
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For the reasons we have given above, it becomes evident that 
Barth's thesis fails. These four criticisms of his view on the 
resurrection point o~t the key weaknesses to which this view is 
,~ 
::lost vul~erable. The:~,r also reveal the inadeq,uacies of this approach.!: ( 
3. Other Related Views 
As Kierkegaard ;reatly influenced the views of Barth, so did 
Barth greatly influence the views of the :nany theologians ,;no follov;-ed 
him. This is eSPecially true on the question of the resurrection 
of Jesus. :,:any pro;:r;.inent neo-orthodox theologians in particular 
accepted these vie~s. 
~or instance, S~iss theologian E~il Brunner apparently affir~s 
belief in the resurrection of Jesus as having actually occurred. 68 
3ut like Barth, he concludes that this occurrence is not part of 
the realrr. of norr:al, verifiable history. ~e relates that the 
resurrec:ion is ~ot an event which ~an be reported as is possible 
60 ~ith other eve~ts. / I~ addition we also learn that this occurrence 
t b t '" "h 0 ro ... h . "h 0 t 0 f' 0 th 70 0 ro 1 can~o e ;le ~as~s .. or vo,e Vo r::. s ~an _a~ 0 • 3rur..ner ~s care.;. u 
to stress his vie~ that the Christian's belief in Jesus l resurrection 
is not based up:m any records contained in t!':.e New Testament, 
67 
69 
70 
These four cr~t;~c2S::lS will be briefly sum::J.arized at the conclusion 
of the next ssction. 
Emil :Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and 3ece~ntion, 
volu!!le II of Josmatics, translated by Olive O,'iyon T!lree volumes; 
'O"h°l d 1 00 m' _. tOt p 19-2) 7," :::ee 1 
_0.2 a e p!l~a: .L'n.e \,es :ll.ns er _ress, J p • .100. ..., a so 
E:-unner's work The !,:ediator, translated by Olive 7lyon 
( P"h • 1 "l - '" 0 Inh ,.. t' ......, 15 3 __ ~ a_elpll~a: Le ~es m~nsver .• ress, p. • 
Srunner, p. 573. 
Brunner, Jo=:-r::atics, on.cit., vol. II, p. 369; cf. p. 153. 
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including the testimony concerning the appearances. We cannot 
resort to historical or other means of verification of this event. 
Faith comes apart from any demonstrations or proofs that Jesus is 
1 • 0 . 1 .... this h f' ..... " 71 a lve. ne slmp y acce~~s ~y _al~n. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer likevrlse relegates the resurrection to a 
realm other than normal histor'J. He asserts: 
The historicity of Jesus Cr~ist thus comes under the two-
fold aspect of history and faith. Both aspects are closely 
associated. The Jeus of history humbled himself; the Jesus 
who cannot be grasped by history is the subject of faith in 
the resurrection.72 
We are therefore to understand that Jesus' resurrection is not an 
event which can be understood ~~storically. It cannot be verified 
or prov~~, but only accepted in faith. Bonhoeffer thus believed that 
the resurrection really occurred, but that it r~d to be received by 
faith, apart from any historical research. 73 
Rein...1.o1c. Niebur..r rejected the resurrection of Jesus as an event 
in his early years at Yale when he vras still under the influence of 
liberal theology and it appears that he never c~2nged his mind. The 
physical resurrection of Jesus had to be ab~~doned as an actual 
74 
occurence. !~everthe2-ess, he treated it as pazoahistory. Speaki.."'1g" 
of the death and resurrection narratives concerni~~ Jesus, he concludes: 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
The ~t.r.~y of this triur:rph over death is thus shrouded in a 
mystery which places it in a different order -·of history 
tmu"'1 the storJ of the crucifixion.75 
Ibid., pp. 366-372; cf. Daniel Fuller, op.cit., pp. 155-156. 
Dietrich Bon.~oeffer, C~~ist the Center, translated by John Bowden 
(New York: Harper and-!{ow, Publlshers, 1966), p. 76. 
Ibid., pp. 74-77. 
Ronald J. Stone, Reinhold Niebu.~: Prophet to Politicians 
(Nashville; Abingdon Press, 1972), pp. 22-23, 82. 
Reinhold ;Jieblli1r, Faith and History (Ne·, ..... York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1949), p. 147. 
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Once again we find the belief the resurrection did not nappen 
in history in the same way that the crucifixion did. It therefore 
cannot be jemonstrated to have occurred. 
Earth's influence extended even further than the neo-orthodox 
theologians on tr.e question of the resurrection. GUnther Bornkamm 
sounds surprisingly like Earth in his belief that the resurrection 
is not open to historical verification. It can neither be proven or 
observed like other eve~ts. Yet it is said to have occurred. As 
such it can be understood prope:l.'ly only by fai tho 76 
Reginald Fuller speaks of the resurrection as a methahistorical 
and eschatological event. Something occurred as revelation from 
God. However, this event cannot be verified or otherwise proven 
bec~u~e it 58 comprehended only by faith, having taken place on the 
boundary between this world's history and the methahistory of the 
eschatological age that is coming. 77 
Hans Grass also follows a line of thought somewhat si~ilar to 
Earth!s. For Grass, the historical method provides no basis for 
investigating the resurrection. This occurrence cannot be approached 
by such methods of reason. But he differs from Barth in postulating 
that Jesus' appearances were spiritual and not physical at all. 78 
Jllrgen Moltmann believes that the resurrection occurred, but 
that it caIL~ot be historically demonstrated to have happened in the 
76 
77 
78 
Bornkamm, ou.cit., pp. 180, 183-184. 
Reginald Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 2;, 48, 81. 
See Daniel Fuller's treatment of Grass' position for additional 
criticisms of it (on.cit., pp. 150-156). 
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past. The theologian's object should not be to examine such past 
events, but to look to the future for the si£nificance of them. 
A~~ays, if we we=e to examine the resurrection by modern historical 
standards, it would be found to be historically impossible and 
. 1 79 mean1.ng esse 
1;:01 tmann' s answer is to look for a new for!Ilula tion of the concept 
of history. The resurrection is an eschatological event and a's 
such it can be grasped historically at all only when it is -viewed 
t . t ft· . f' 80 as 0 1. S U ure S1.gnl. l.cance. Thus, while 1.:01 t!ll.ann seeningly 
rejects the view of prehistory,81 he still holds that the resurrection 
should be relegated to a different, eschatolof~cally-oriented 
concept of history. Ee is quite specific in his belief that the 
resurrection was not observable and that this event cannot be verified 
t .... 82 a presen ... . Thus he also t~~es flight to a different sort of 
history in which past events such as ..... .. ne resurrection car~ot be 
historically proven to have occurred apart fro~,future vin~ication.83 
Tie have already presented a critique of these theological 
atti tudes while discussing Karl Barth's position. Almost the e::>:act 
sane criticis~also ap~ly to the others (at least to the neo-orthodox 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Jurgen l[oltman.."l, Theology of Hone, translated by Ja::J.es 7:. Leitch 
(New York: Harper a.nd Ro''''' Publishers, 1967), pp. 165-202. See 
especially pp. 155, 172, 174, 177, 188-189, 197. Cf. Nelson ~. 
Chamberlain, "Jurgen :lol tmann; Apostle of Christian Hope?", 
Christia.nity Today, June 21, 1974, pp. 7, 8. 
l~ol tmann, Ibid., see especially pp. 178-182, 190, 202. 
Ibid.., p. 176. 
Jurgen 7Iol tmann, Reli ion. Revolution and the Future , translated 
by ~. Douglas ~eeks New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969), 
especially pp. 50-51. 
Ir.oltmann 9 !'h<::oloN of E:o"Oe, o"O.cit., pp. 177-182, 190, 197. Cf. 
Robert J. 31aikie, "Secular Christianity" and God ~ho Acts (Grand 
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theologians w·hic!l "e have discussed.). Perhaps the :::lain c:::-i ticism 
involves placinb the resurrection in prehistory or parahistory. 
~ile d.etails as to .. hat realm this is may differ somewhat (we 
have studied 3arth's view in depth above), sociologist of religion 
Peter L. Berger's criticisms still apply. first, this categor:· 
has no me~~ing for a scholar who desires to empirically investigate 
the data. One who supports such a.view of parahistory has already 
chosen to leave tne e~pirical realm of investigation. This concept 
is ~eaningless in this context. Second, this method is resigned 
to the few who feel that they have already attained the proper 
outlook v.-i th reg.::. ... ·c:. to theology. 84 
"tJi th a fe-:; variations, the following SU!IlI!lary of cri ticis~s 
applies at least to Earth and scholars like ~runner and 30~oeffer. 
They are also wore-or-less applicable to the others coveret here, 
at least in part. ?irst~ history knows of no such concept as 
prehistory. :t is not possible to measure or investigate s~ch a 
real:n. In ao.1i tio!l, the inclusion of both historical ani non.."I}istorical 
characteristics renders such a category contradictory. Real history 
can be investigated and examinet to determine if it is v~lid or not. 
One car~ot make the claim that an event is real history ~~ then 
not subject it to investigation. Even if a metahistorical event 
~ere possible, it must either be verifiable or not claim to be real 
84 
Rap~~8: ~7illia::l 3~ Eerdman' s :Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 129-
134. See the next chapter on Pannenberg for a criti~ue of a 
posi tion some1'.-ba t similar to lllol tmann' s, one which also Ci yes 
the future the place of priority. Many of the criticis~s offered 
in the next chapter also apply to ;.:01 tmann. 
Berger, on.cit., pp. 39-40. 
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history at all. Therefore this concept must be rejected. Second, 
the stress on one's affirming the resuxrection by faith anQ the 
refusal t:· demonstrate this event by any other method means that 
this view is not objective enough to provide sufficient reason for 
one to know if the Christian faith is valid. An intense belief 
cannot make this faith any more valid. With no such methocs of 
investigation we cannot know if such faith is simply in vain. 
Third, neo-orthodox theology contends that God!s revelation 
does not primarily occur in actual history in the modern sense of 
t h d 85 ~_e wor • Yet Barth, for instance, bases the xevelation in the 
death of Christ on what he admits to be an actual historical fact, 
while re!~~i~e to do this in the case of the resurrection. He is 
therefore internally inconsistent in holding that the resurrection 
cannot liker.ise be based on actual historical fact. Fourth, at 
least 5arth contends that the New Testament does not attempt to 
prove the resurrection. The others at least agree that his event 
cannot be demonstrated. Eut Earth's contention is not based on 
the available evidence. Contrary assertions in the New Testament 
invalidate these claims and thus cannot be used to support this 
thesis. 
For these reaso~s, it is our ccnclusion here that such an 
approach to the resurrection is ~~tenable. One cannot remove this 
event and, subsequently, the entire Christian faith, fro~ the realm 
85 Ramm, A Handbook of Contemuorary Theology, ou.cit.,?p. 90, 
108. 
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of investigation. ~here are simply too many difficulties for one 
to hold to such a position. But as with Kierkegaard's view, so 
Barth's emphasis on faith and its importance can remain. We have 
mentionen above how that Barth conceived of the death of Christ as 
being a substitutionary death to pay for t~e sins of those ~ho 
surrender their life to God in faith. 86 This view of faith must 
be retained. As it was concluded earlier in chapter four, faith 
must remain the ~ost important element in a theological system. 
This is even shown to be more true if there is an objective basis 
on which to rest this faith. 
86 Earth, Church ]o~atics, on.cit., vol. IV, part 1, P9. 248-254 
for example. 
Chapter IX. Possibility Number Three: That the Resurrection 
Did Occur and That It Can Be Demonstrated 
A. Yiolfhart Pannenberg: An Introduction 
The third major possibility to be dealt with in this ~ork is 
that Jesus' res~r~ection really did occur and that this occurrence 
can be demonstrated. l We will begin by examining the position of 
a very important scholar in contemporary theology today w~o holds 
this view. This theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg (born 192~), is 
without much doubt the best-known representative of this viewpoint 
today. 
Pannenberg has received much acclaim in recent years because 
of his defense of the historicity of the resurrection. In fact, he 
has been viewed by many as "the theologian of the resurrection".2 
It is this event which forms the basis for his polemic and which sets 
th t .ro .' , 'h 1 . 1 ' 3 e sage ... or n:::.s 't •. eo_ogl.ca sys'tem. Now it is by no mea.ns lL.'"lique 
either to defend the historicity of the resurrection or to ~se it as 
the basis for one's theological system. 4 But Pannenberg is probably 
1 
2 
3 
4 
When it is asserted that this eve~t can be demonstrated, reference 
is being made to probabilities. These scholars hold that this 
event can be demonstrated to Ci. high' probability by a reasonablG 
approach'to the Christian faith which includes a historical 
exaffiination of the known facts. 
See ed.itor Richard John NeuhaLlsl introductory essay "?!olfhar"t 
Pannenberg: Profile of a Theo1ogia.n" in Pannenberg's Theology and 
the Kingdo::n of God, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), 
pp. 9-50. See especially pp. 10-11 for this statement. 
Pannenberg, Revelation As ~is~~, on.cit., pp. 142-144 for instance. 
See this proclivity in such scnolars as Daniel Fuller, on.cit.~ 
p. 144; 1'.l:ontgo::lery, liistory a~d Christianity, on. cit., pp. 72-80 r 
McNaugher, on.cit.~ pp. 144-185 and Smith, on.cit., pp. 187-228. 
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the theologian who is best known for these tendencies. The~efore he 
becomes the logical choice as the primary scholar to be Qealt with 
here. 
Wolfhart Pannenberg is often connected with a new school of 
theology in Germany which is usually referred to as the "theology of 
hope." This generally optimistic understanding of theology was 
~elcomed in the United states in the late 1960's oy'some of the 
leading newspapers and magazines. These .publications seemed to be 
more than willing to report the demise of the pessimistic and short-
lived reign of the "death of God theology" and greet instead its 
more hopeful and reassuring IIsuccessor ll • 5 
The motif of hope in many ways presented quite a novel approach 
to theology, being one of the first theological schools of thought 
that was not a development of the earlier dialectic theoloG,JT of Karl 
Barth and those wno followed him. Among others, those usually 
connected with the theology of hope are German theologians Pannenberg, 
Jurgen ::,~ol tmann, Johann Metz and sometimes Karl Rahner. 6 E:owever, 
it is actually difficult to be overly suggestive when speaking of 
those who favo~ this approach, and it is l'2~lly only possible to 
speak ra.ther generally of any group of "hope theologians. 1I7 
5 
6 
7 
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenbe~g's Theology and the Kil1gdcm of God, 
op.cit., p. 9. 
Ibid., pp. 10, 17. 
For instance, li. Douglas 1Ieeks deals primarily with :101 tmann in 
his l'9"ork Ori .. ins of the Theolo· of Hope (Philadelphia: Fortress 
P=ess, 1974. See p. 2 for his conviction that others like 
?annenbe~g and I.:etz ca.nnot be connected 'completely wi th ~.:ol tmann. 
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While Pannenberg was earning his doctorate at the University of 
Heidelberg in the early 1950's, a group of graduate students began 
meeting and exchanging ideas on the nature of Divir.e revelation. 
Apparently in opposition to Pannenberg's own wishes, this ;roup began 
to be referred to as the "Pannenberg circle". The combined .. ork of 
four of the "members "--Par .... '1enberg, Rolf Rendtorff, Trutz Rendtorff 
and Ulrich Wilkens--produced the volume Offenbarung als Ges~ichte8 
in 1961. It represented years of study and discussion together. 9 
Although this work was not the first one of Pannenberg's to be 
translated into English, it was still significant in that it helped 
to bring this German scholar to the attention of other theologians. 
Perhaps Pannenberg's most significant work to date, Jesus--God and 
~, was translated into English in 1968. It was his first major 
~ork to appear in an English translation. This ChristolooY has been 
recognized by some theologians as one of the most signifioant to 
. 10 
appear ~n many yea~s. 
It soon bec~e evident that Pannenberg's thesis was opposed to 
many aspects of 3arth's and Eultmann's theolo~J. For instanCe, 
Pannenberg was opposed to the subjectivism exercised by both of these 
theologians. 11 He also objected to Barth's concept of revelation, 
8 
9 
10 
11 
This work was edited by Pannenberg and published in English under 
the title Revelation as History, translated by David Gr~'1skou 
(New York: The I.:acmillan Company, 1968). 
See editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God, 
on.cit., p. 16 and Daniel Fuller, on.cit.; p. 118. 
Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 11. 
ng.; p. 15. 
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especially with regard to Barth's view that certain events such as 
the resurrection happened in a nondemonstrable, nonverifiable t~~e 
of history. Pannenberg believed that such events both can ~~d should 
12 be historically investigated, in opposition to Barth. This, of 
com ~, also means that Par.nenberg likewise objected to Bul tmann ' s 
even more complete divorce of history from faith. 13 
With this introductory background, it is now advantageous to 
turn to Pannenberg's argument concerning the resurrection of Jesus. 
Both a presentation of these views and a critique of them will be 
given. It should be remarked that the following is not a p~esentation 
or discussion of the entire theology of hope, but only of ~annenberg's 
views on these suqjects. 
B. Wolfhart P~~~enberg's Argw~ent ~~d a Critique 
To put Pap.nenberg in proper perspective, it should be mentioned 
that the theology of hope stresses esc~2tological theology and the 
coming Kingdom of God in particular. The coming of the Kingdom !'l2S 
political and et:r.ical repercussions, as will as theological ones. p.~so 
stressed is the death and resurrection of Jesus as historical events 
14 
wp.ich set the stage fo~' thi-.s eschatology, as will be perceived below. 
12 
13 
14 
Ibid., p. 30 See the treatment of Barth above, :ncluding Pannenoerg's 
view. See also P~T1I1enberg's Jesus--God and }Jan, op.cit., p. 99; 
cf. his Revelation as History, op.cit., pp. 9-10. More mIl be 
said later concerning his views of the resurrection as a demonstranle 
event. 
Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 37 and Da..Tlie1 Fuller, op.cit., p. 173. 
See Meeks, OPe cit., p. ~O. 
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One of ?ar~enberg's chief aims is to restore to contemporary 
1-
theology the concept of a functionally imminent Kingdom of God. ' 
110st of contemporary theology is perceived to have failed in its 
approach to the Kingdom in that the eschatological centrality of 
this concept has been lost. But for Pannenberg, the teaching about 
16 the Kingdom must be the central message in Christian theology. 
The future Kingdom. of God holds a special interest ·for Pannenberg 
,6 th regard to God's existence. God is identified with the coming 
Kingdom in such a way that, in a certain sense, God does not exist 
as yet. It is only with the arrival of the future Kingdon that the 
existence of God isshown to be a definite reality.17 
But this by no means signifies that God is not now present in 
this age or that Ee ~as not present in the past. The idea that God's 
existence is fully =evealed in the future therefore does not disqualify 
Rim from present existence. From Sis future existence God dominates 
b . t'h t - ~h t 18 otn •. e pas ana. ,, __ e presen • 
At first this concept of the existence of God appears contradictory. 
But actually the "secret" is in understanding Pannenberg's ideas 
abo~t the retroactive power of history and the ability of the future to 
reach backwards i~to the past. God exists at present (and in antiquity) 
in the sense that Eis future is reaching back into the past. lie ~~us 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Brian O. McDermott, S.J., "Pa.nnenberg's Resurrection Christclogy: 
A Critique", Theological Studies, Voluoe 35, number 4, December, 
1974, pp. "11-721. See also Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom 
of God, on.cit., p. 55. 
Pannenberg, Ibid.., pp. 51- 53, 75. 
Ibid., pp. 56, 62, 111-112. 
Ibid. , pp. 62-63, 71. 
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exists at present as the par~ial arrival of the future. 19 
According to Pannenberg's concept of theology, it is God who 
will usher the Kingdom into human society. God thus works ill the 
future as well as in the present. This Kingdom is not sj~or~ous 
with the church, and neither will it arrive by man!s power. He 
is quite emphatic that it will become part of history by the future 
actions of God Himself, even though there are present ramifications 
20 
of the Kingdom as well. 
Eut it is not only the existence of God which reaches into the 
present from the future. In fact, all occurrences eventuate from 
the future. 21 ~s Neuhaus explains, we therefore cannot only refer 
to the future of an event simply as something which will happen, but 
rather as something which reaches back into the present and ~hich is 
now in existence. Although one can perceive the final state of some-
22 thing only in t~e future, the affects are present. 
For instance, the authority of God was retroactively present in 
?~ 
the teachings of Jesus.-~ This is shown to be the case especially by 
Jesus' resurrection from the dead. 24 In a similar way the Kingdom 
ha3 also reachei back into this present time, although it has not 
arrived in its ful1ness. 25 It is through such a stress on t~e 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
. 25 
Ibid., pp. 68, 70-71. 
Ibid., pp. 76-77, 82. 
Ibid., p. 70. 
Editor Ne~~aus in Pa~~enberg, Ibid., p. 42. 
Pa~~enberg, Ibid., pp. 133-135, 142-143; see McDermott, on.cit., p.714. 
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., p. 127; see ~cDermott, 
Ibid., p. 711; 715-717 • 
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 25; cf. p. 42. 
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fundamental importance and priority given to the future that Pannenberg 
26 can speak of the end time having participated in the life of Jesus. 
In Revelatio~ as History Pannenberg wrote two key essays. In 
one, entitled "Dog;natic Thesis on the Doctrine of Revelation", he 
postulated seven theses which are crucial to the understanding of 
his thought. This essay sets forth much of the foundation of 
?annenberg's theological system and expands on the points raised 
above. These theses are especially instrumental in pointing out 
the extremel~r i:::portant pla.ce that the resurrection of Jesus plays. 
Seeing ~nis event in the context of Pannenberg's theological enter-
prise will allow for a much better understanding of this scholar and 
will also make the ensuing critique more accurate and meaningful. 
Por these reasons the seven theses are presented below, with a short 
discussion of each included. 3elated key thoughts of Pa~~enberg;s on 
Christologj~ and eschatology will also be presented ~n appropriate 
places. 
Pannenberg's first thesis is that God's Self-~evelatio~ is not 
,.... . . 27 direct, but indirect, being effected by God's u1stcr1cal ac~s. After 
a brief survey of some of the prominent views on Divine revelation, 
Pannenberg asserts that God did not reveal Himself to man by the 
announcement of Ris name to the Isr~elites, or by the inspiration of the 
Scriptures, or by the giving of the law on ~ount Sinai or by any 
other direct means. 28 To the contrary, God revealed liimself indirectly 
through historical acts in both the Old and New Testament. lie made 
26 
27 
28 
See Pannenberb , Revelation as liistory, o~.cit., ~_ 139 for instance 
and Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., pp. 54, 63. Cf. 
Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 41. 
Pannenberg, Revelation as Eistory, Ibid., pp. 125-151. 
Ibid., pp. 3-13. 
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Himself known by means of a revelation which is grounded in history. 29 
The chief purpose of Pannenberg's essay is to explore this indirect 
revelation and to ascertain its value as God's chosen method of 
revealing Himself. 50 
An interestir.g aspect of this belief in the indirect self-
manifestation of God in human history is that Pannenberg conceives 
of this revelation as permeating all of human history. God therefore 
does not simply reveal Himself in some small segments of history 
exclusive of other areas. Rather, the indirect revelation of God 
occurs in all 'of man's history. For this reason, Pannenberg relates 
that there can be no such thing as "Supernatural events" or "miracles". 
Since God works in history as a whole, this me~~s that we cannot 
speak of Supernatural history versus natural history. No such 
dichotomy exists. ~e are thus to perceive that God reveals Himself 
in all of human history, and since He works in all of history we 
are not to.think of separate miracles or Supernatural events apart 
f=~~ t~e whole of historical revelation. 51 Pannenberg realizes that 
this is not a new conCeption of as s;milar vie~s were 
expressed in German idealism. 52 
29 
50 
31 
32 
Ibid., pp. 125-127; cf. Daniel Fuller, on.cit., p. 182 and 
Blaikie, o~.cit., pp. 156, 162. 
See Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 19. 
Ibid., p? 7, 16; cf. Blaikie, o~.cit., pp. 156-158, 162. 
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 16, 19. For instance, Schleiermacher's 
view is that all events, even the most mundane ones, are miracles. 
It is not simply the strange or unexplained event alone which is 
Supernatural. See the discussion of Schleiermacher's view of 
miracles above. See also Schleier~acher's work On Reli~on: 
S~eeches to its Cultured Desuisers~ on.cit., pp. 88-89, 113-114, 
explanation number 16 for instance. 
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The key to .' . . .. neS1S one is t~us that God does net reveal 
Himself directly. A~y understanding of the concept of revelation 
that asserts otherwise is therefore not correct. God only allows 
3imself to be known indirectly, and that is through His acts in 
the whole of human history. 
Pannenberg's second thesis is that God's revelation is not known 
totally at the beginning, but rather at the conclusion of revelatory 
history.33 Since God only reveals gimsel! indirectly, Pa~~enberg 
believes that it is therefore correct to link this revela~ion with 
the end of history. 34 Thus the early events in the history of Israel 
whereby they learned of Yahweh were not the final or the most 
important of God's acts. The most important revelation will occur 
only at the end of history.35 
Some of the logic of this position has been presented above. It 
has bee~ stated that Pannenberg conceived of tha end of history in 
such a way that the future can have a retroactive affect upon both 
the past and the present. As such, all occurrences eventuaie from 
the future. According to this understanding, God. Cali. be r:lore-or-less 
identified with the coming Kingdom and still have existed so as to 
have dominated the past and the present. In a similar way, the 
resurrection is the sign that God's activity was also retroactively 
present in the life of Jesus. 36 
33 
34 
35 
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 131-135. 
The logic of this assertion will be challenged below. 
Pannenberg, Revelation as Hist"ory, on.cit., pp. 132-154. 
Ibid., p. 127; see also Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom 
or-God, on.cit., pp. 62-63, 68, 70-71. 
Pannenberg thus accepts the priority of the future. 3ven at 
present the future is ~ore important~ This is seen, for i~stancef 
by this scholar's belief that all events reach into the past and the 
present from the future. 37 Since these postulates are believed to 
be valid, one can therefore perceive how Pannenberg further held that 
the final txuth and result of an event is determined by the future 
of that event and not only by its present appearances. 3S 
The natural outworking of this concept is that in the resurrection 
of Jesus the future already participated in the past. Through this 
event one can gai~ a previe~ of the futuTe~ Through this event the 
God of the coming Y-ingdom retroactively acted in the life of Jesus. 
It is an event such as this that illustrates the second thesis 
concerning how God's indirect revelation will be accomplished primarily 
at the end of revelatory history rather than at the begin.~ing.39 
Another pointer to this second thesis is Pannenberg's belief that it 
is only with the arl'ival of the end of history that God will prove 
5imself to be a definite reality. Again revelation is perceived to 
be complete at the end of revelatory history.40 
The third t~esis which is presented by Pannenoerg is that God's 
historical revelatioL is not restricted to special or private situations, 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., pp. 54, 63,70. 
Ne~~aus in Pan.~enberg, ~., p. 42. 
Pan.~enberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., pp. 141-143. 
~cDermott, on.cit., pp. 713-714. 
See 
Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 134 and Pannenberg's Theology and the 
Kin~dom of G~on.cit., p. 62. 
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but ~ f 11 t In tho 1 t· . . 1 41 .s open or a men 0 see. :lS sense, reve a :lon :lS un:lversa • 
Thus one is not to understand revelation as something secret or 
mysterious. It is n.ot an entity which is known only to those who 
have been initiated into the life of faith. In fact, an individual 
need not even have faith first in order to see God's revelation. 
This is because one's faith is inspired by seeing the revelatory 
events. In other words, faith need not precede the perception of 
42 
revelatory events, but arises after the recognition of the~. 
As to the nature of the revelatory events in question, P~~enberg 
asserts that God has acted throughout the history of Israel all the 
way to Jesus' resurrection. These events co~unicate meaning to those 
who perceive and appropriate them. They are comprehended by reason 
and are open to the examination of all.4; 
By postulating that God's revelation is open for all to see and 
examine, ?annenberg is further giving e~~lanation to this belief that 
Christianity is a rational faith. One is not required to make a leap 
of faith so that one might be able to believe in God. Such irrationality 
has no place in the Christian faith. One believes because the facts 
44 
are found to be reliable and trustworthy. 
Pannenberg realizes that there is a subjective factor involved 
when one speaks of a historical verification of one's faith and that 
one therefore cannot reach absolute results when studying history. 
y~t history is the proper method to use in exan:ining the claims of 
41 Pannenberg, ~evelation as History, ~., pp. 135-139. 
Ibid., pp. 135-137. 
Ibid., p. 137. 
Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
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Christian revelation, as it is capable of leading one to highly 
4-
probable conclusions. ' Therefore, historical examination of events 
such as the ~esurrection is needed to ascertain whether the reports 
46 
are t~ue or not. One thing which Pannenberg insists upon in this 
research is that the investigator must be open to the results of the 
research and not have made up his mind in advance as to what did or 
did not happen. 47 
Pannenberg's fourth thesis is that God~s universal revelation of 
Bis deity is not yet known in Israel's history. Rather, it was first 
revealed in Jesus' fate in that the end of history is already 
anticipated in this event. 48 In the ancient history of the Jews, 
Pan.~enberg is convicted that God did not show Eimself to be the God 
of all mankind. l!.9 Rather, Be was seen as the God of Israel.' But in 
the New Testament, God was shown to be the God of all of mankind by 
Ris act of ~aising Jesus from the dead. Through this ~ct all men 
can look to the God of Israel as the only true Goa. Through the 
life and teachings of Jesus, the offer of the Kingdom is extended 
- - ~ 50 to a.LJ.. peop:;.e. 
It is obvious that the resurrection holas a place of great 
importance in Pannenberg's theological enterprise. Indeed t this 
scholar's works reflect the Pauline conviction that if Christ had 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Cf. Pannenberg's Jesus--God and Man, o~.cit., p. 99 with editor 
Neuhaus in.?annenberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God, on.cit., 
pp. 20, 38, 46. 
See Neuhaus, Ibid., pp. 20-21 and Daniel Fuller, ~~., pp. 180-
181 for some of Pannenberg's techniques in investigating evidence. 
Fuller, rbi~., p. 180. 
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, on.cit., pp. 139-145. 
Ibid., pp. 139-141. 
~., pp. 141-143 •. On the universal aspect of the offer of the 
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not risen, all faith would be in vain. 5l It is therefore important 
for one to know if this occurrence is a historical fact which can 
be demonstrated. Pannenberg advocates examining the sources to see 
if any alternate explanations could account for the rise of the 
resurrection faith. 52 He entertains such hypotheses as the subjective 
vision theory,53 the legend or myth theOry,54 and Berth's view of 
the resurrection happening in prehistory.55 After a careful look 
at such theories, Pannenberg concludes that the resurrection of 
Jesus from the dead is the only adequate explanation for the 
subsequent faith of the disciples~ ThOSe ;;-ho seek to deny the 
reality of this event ~ust be prepared to provide a more adequate 
explanation. Pannenberg believes that the inevitable conclusion is 
that th~ resurrection can be verified as having occurred in human 
history. 56 
52 
53" 
55 
56 
Kingdom, see ?ar~~enberg's Theolo&r and the Kin~dom of God, on.cit., 
pp. 73, 76, 851 88 for example. 
Editor Neuhaus in Pa~~enberg's Theology and the Kingdom of God, 
Ibid., p. 41; cf. p. 10. For the apostle Paul's stance, see 
I Cor. 15:13-19. 
Pannenberg, Revelation as History,. on.cit., p. 13(; cf. Daniel 
Fuller, on.cit., pp. 181-182. 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and 1lan, on. ci t., pp. 95-97. 
Ibid., pp. 90-91. 
See Ibid., p. 99 and Pannenberg's Basic Questions in Theology, 
on.cit., vol. I, pp. 15-16. Cf. editor Neuha~s in Pannenberg's 
Theology and the Kingdom of God, op.cit., p. 30 and Blaikie, 
on.cit., pp. 156, 206. 
Par~enberg, Ibid., pp. 145-148. 
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The fifth thesis which ?annenberg presents is that the deity 
of God is not revealed in the Christ event as an independent or 
isolated fact, but only as the event is part of Israel's history.57 
The Christ event cannot be separated from Israel's history because 
the God of Christ is also the God of the Old Testament. Jesus: 
mission and fate must therefore be understood from within the 
framework and context of Israel's history.58 As such the resurrection 
remains the revelation of God whereby the end times have retroactively 
taken part in Jesus' fate. 59 
Pannenberg's sixth thesis is that the universality of God's 
eschatological participation in Jesus' fate fOll."'ld its actual .. 
expression in the Gen~ile Christian church's non-Jewish understanding 
of revelation. 60 The coming of the gospel to the Gentiles ~as a 
natural and necessary consequence of the eschatological significance 
of Christ. But Pannenberg asserts that there were differences 
between the Gentile and the Jewish conceptions of revelation. The 
influence of gnosticism is~id to have brought some non-Jewish 
elements into the Gentile undzrstanding of God's revelation. For 
instance, gnosticis~ taught that revelation was direct and that it 
was imparted by means of secret initiation and knowledge, thus 
61 
meaning that it was not available to the.scrutiny of all men. It 
has already been pointed out how Pa~enberg conceived of Jewish 
57 Pannenberg, Ibid. , pp. 145-148. 
58 Ibid. , p. 145. 
59 Ibid.~ p. 1l;.t:. • 1"""'_ 
60 Ibid., 149-152. pp. 
61 Ibid., 149-150. pp. 
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revelation as beins both indirect (by means of God's historical 
acts) and ogen for all to perceive. 
?annenberg believes that ev~n though these im90rtant ~ifferences 
existe~ between the Jewish and Gentile ideas of revelation, the 
Christian conception of God's acting in Jesus in a final and ~iversal 
manner still made its way extensively into the Gentile-gnostic 
concept of revelation. But one should not attempt to rule out portions 
of the Rew Test~ent r.hich reveal a gnostically inclined view of 
revelation, for these portions still served to make Go~ u-~derstandable 
to both Gentiles and to Jews. In other words, even though Pannenberg 
believes that s.nosticisc influenced portions of the New Testament 
teaching on the revelation of God in a wsy opposed to the Jewish 
concept, it must be realized that this still helped in causing the 
Gentiles to know that God was the God of the Gentiles as well as of 
the Jews. God's actions in Jesus' fate therefore were shc~n to be 
universal in scope in that the Gentiles responded to this revelation 
62 an~ accepted it as having been extended to them as well. 
The seventh thesis presented by Pannenberg asserts that the 
i~;arting of God's ~ord is related to revelation by its foretelling, 
forthtelling and report. 63 Even though Par~enberg understands that 
any reference to the Eiblical word of God as the direct revelation 
of God is influenced by gnosticism,64 there is still a threefold 
relationship between these two concepts. First, the indirect 
revelation through historical acts confirms the promises which God 
62 Ibid., 150-151. pp. 
63 Ibid., pp. 152-155. 
64 Ibid. , 10-12. see pp. 
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had given befc~ehand. Here the word sets the stage for the 
revelatory actions by foretelling the promises of God which are 
then fulfilled in the revelatory future. Second, the words of 
God confirm nis acts in history in the sense that they follow the 
revelation as forthtelling. In this sense, the actions of God 
establish the words that follow, such as with the Law or other 
commandments which were given to the people after they had seen God 
act. Third, emergi~s in the New Testament one finds that the kerygma 
acts as a repo~t of ~hat historical acts God has already performed. 
There can be no universal significance of God's revelation apart 
from some proclamation of these events. Thus this third relationship 
between word and revelation points to a spoken proclamation regarding 
.. d" 1 t" 65 ~ne precee ~nG reve a ~on. 
None of these relationships between revelation and word give 
any revelatory nature to the word. The word of God, either spoken 
or written, is therefore conceived by Pannenberg as supplementing 
the actual revelation without being the revelation itself. The 
word may precede the indirect revelation in the form of a pro~ise as 
to what God will do in the future (foretelling), or the word may 
follow the revelation, having been established by the acts of God 
(forthtelling). Yet again, the word may be a proclamation of the 
revelation (report). Thus the word may serve to explicate or proclaim 
revelation, or else the word may itself be expanded, verified or 
established by the revelation. At any rate, the word is therefore 
related to the revelation without being the revelation itself. 66 
65 
66 
Ibid., pp. 153-155. 
Ibid. 
241 
From Pannenberg's presentation of these seven theses one c~~ 
perceive how the past revelatory acts of God (both in Israel's 
history and in the life of Jesus) and the future revelation of God 
are believed to be intricately interwoven. This scholar has indeed 
developed a theological system which seeks to explain the 3iblical 
concept of God's indirect Self-revelation through Ris actions in 
history. However, Pannenberg fails noticeably in at least four 
key areas of his ~ork, which will be investigated here. 
The first major criticism of Pannenberg concerns his concept of 
God. This criticism is ~irected against the aforementioned understand-
ing of God as reaching from a future existence into the past. 
Pannenberg believes that this view of God is confirmed by the Scriptures 
and especially by the preaching of Jesus. In the view of this scholar, 
Jesus conceived of God's claim to this world exclusively in 
futuristic terms. God is said to be in a process of coming to exist 
a4d so in a certain sense does not exist at present. 67 
In order to make the assertion that the !{ew Testament also 
expounds this futuristic view of the existence of God, it appears 
that Pannenberg has to ride roughshod over the Scriptural evidence 
to the contrary. It is agreed that the main emphasis in Jesus' 
teaching is on the co~ing Kingdom of God a~d the resulting present 
faith-obedience to God. 68 But this is far from sufficient proof to 
require God's pri~ary existence as issuing into the present from the 
future. In fact, Jesus seems to indicate the origin of God's 
67 
68 
Pannenberg, TheoloGY and the Kingdom of God, on.cit., p? 56, 68. 
See Ibid., nne 50, 53, 73, 81, 133. 
- --
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existence as beL~g different than Pannenberg asserts. 69 
For instance, when Jesus refers to the eschatological judgment 
of the futuxe, he likens it to the past judgment that God meted 
out both in the days of Lot and in the days of Noah (Luke 17:26-30, 
32; cf. ?,{att. 24:37-39). Vi"hen on another occasion Jesus was asked 
for a sign, he did not point fo~vard to any events in the future: 
but bacbvards to the prophet Jonah, who was to be a sign of his 
resurrection form the dead (Matt. 22:39; cf. ?,fatt. 16:4, Luke 11:29-
30). P2so, when questioned about divorce, Jesus infcrmed the 
questioner that God has acted out of the past in making provision 
for rnarriage. Jesus refers his listeners to the mighty act of the 
creation of God for their answer concerning the seriousness of 
divorce (Mk. 10:6-8; Matt. 19:4-6). 
Therefore it is obvious that Parillenberg is not correct in his 
statement that Jesus spoke exclusively of God in terms of Ris future 
To the contrary, several portions of the gospels indicate 
rather that Jesus also looked into the past for the unveiling of C~d's 
power. Jesus thus does not speak of God exclusively in futuristic 
terms, unless one has already ass~~ed in advance that God works from 
the future into the past. 
NowP~~enberg c~~ admittedly explain these verses in w~ich Jesus 
refers to God's power as also being demonstrated in the past. These 
were not supposed to be verses which he could not explai..Tl. They 
siruply sho'.'! that Jesus looked to the past as well as to the future 
in order to reveal the work~gs of Ged. T~Ere are admittedly many 
69 
70 
In the use of the New' Testarlent Scriptures which are to follow, the 
issue is not to defend these words cu~d argue if they were actually 
spoken by Jesus or not. Rather, we are primarily concerned at this 
point With what the Scriptures teach about the nature and existence 
of C~d, not about who said which words. 
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op.cit., p. 56. 
verses which do indeed refer to future acts of God, but the:::-e are 
also ones dealing with His past actions. However, the significant 
point here is that Pannenberg can inte:::-pret the past actions of God 
accordin~ to his system onl~ by utilizing the prior presupposition 
that God is already in the future, working into the re~ote past. 
His view that Goe reveals Himself only from the future is an unsupported 
assertion, and it is shown to be so~mply by the fact t~at it must 
be assumed to be true before it can be accepted, as will be shown 
in the third criticism of ?a~~enberg below. He cannot point to these 
verses as ones which support his ideas, for ·they do not. Ee can 
only interpret them according to already existing assumptions. 
Eut from whence does the ac~ual idea that God exists primarily 
in the future arise? One might stress verses on the other end of 
the spectrum and build a case around the thesis that God e:-:ists 
primarily in the East and is revealed particularly through Zis 
crea tion. Fro:l this past existence Be would then reveal ::linself in 
t~e present and in the future. Verses pertainin~ to th~ future 
Kingdom of God would then be applied to the final and conplete 
revelation of God. As clever as such systems can be made to sound, 
they appear to be based more upon philosophical speculation than 
upon theological revelation • 
. The point here is therefore not that Pannenberg cannot deal with 
these preceding verses, but rather that he must assume the primary 
importance of the future in order to do so. Both his thesis and the 
contrived one that perceives God to have acted mainly from the past 
through the creation-event thus have the same problem. There is a 
lack of proof. Both views have inadequate reasoning to justify such 
a view of revelation. For instance, there is no suppo:::-t in the New 
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Testament accounts of Jesus' teachings to justify the position that 
God does not yet exist, in whatever sense this may be taken. Neither 
d J t h t - t ,.. d ° ° f ° ° tot 71 oes esus eac_ na ~o ~s ~n a process 0 com~ng ~n 0 ex~s ence. 
It is plain that in other si~ilar ways as well, Pa~~enberg's overall 
conception of God a?pears to be based more upon philosophical 
speculation than upon revelation. There is a decided lack of evidence 
for his view. 
The second major criticism of Pannenberg concerns his hypothesis 
that God reveals Himself indirectly only through His actions in human 
history. Por this scholar, God did not reveal Himself through any 
direct means, such as by the inspiration of the Scriptures, but only 
indirectly through " 72 the events of hum~~ history. 
1-:any theologians are of the persuasion that God acts in history 
and that this is one means of revelation. 73 But fewer are convinced 
that this is the only means of God's reve1atio"n. Certainly anothe:t' 
shortcoming of Pa~~enberg's is in not recognizing the self-~itness 
of the Scriptures as being another revelation of God, especially in 
° h O h Id t ,- b ° f1 d - t"" 74 port~ons w ~c. Call no nave een ~n uence oy gnos ~c~s~. 
71 
72 
73 
For Pannenberg's connection of these ideas ~ith Jesus' teachings, 
see Ibid., p. 56. Eut he strangely gives no references for these 
assertions. 
For Pannenbe::rg's assertions against the "direct" views of inspiration, 
see Revelation as Histo::ry, op.cit., pp.-9-13, 152. ?or his own 
view see pp. 125ff. 
For example, see Ladd, o~.cit., pp. 17, 144; cf. Daniel Fuller, 
on.cit.~ pp. 186, 230, Z37; cf. p. 234. At this point, Pannenbers's 
contention of revelation in history is correct. 
There is no attempt here to employ any kind of circular reasoning 
concernins the inspir~tion of Scripture by first asking what the 
self-witness of the Scriptures is and then assuming that this is 
true. This would not be a correct procedure. It is not our 
purpose here to even discuss whether this self-witness to inspiration 
is valid. Rather, the concern "is that Pa~~enberg does not accept 
the New Testament's claim to revelation in the Scriptures because 
2 /,1:: "TJ 
Pannenberg contends that the New Testament witness to the direct 
revelation of God in the Scriptures reflects the early influence of 
gnosticism, as already shown above. This direct Scriptural revelation 
is held to be contrary to the Jewish understanding of Godls indirect 
revelation in history. To be sure, he does allow a close connection 
between the written words and this revelation. 15 Eut it appears that 
Pannenberg ignores the Old Testament witness to God's revelation in 
Scripture and through the prophets. This attestation would of course 
be removed from the influence of first century gnosticism. 
A very clear reference to God's speaking through the Old Testament 
prophets is found in Kumbers 12:6, 8. Here we are specifically told 
that God used this means to make Himself known to the. Jewish nation. 
This is both an early and quite clear reference to the Jewish belief 
that God did reveal Himself to the Jews through the prophets. state-
ments such as this one in ~umbers could be multiplied considerably.1 6 
In fact, hundreds of times in the Old Testa:nent ·~he phrase "thus 
said the Lord" serves to introduce a revelation of God for t~e peoplew 77 
The Jews were even responsible for distinguishing between the 
prophet who spoke the words of the Lord and one who did not. The 
sign that the prophet was relaying a revelation from God ~as that the 
prophecy would occur in history. Thus, the true propbet ~as one who 
15 
16 
77 
of what he feels is the influence of gnosticism (see Revelation 
as Ristory, o~~cit., pp. 10-12, 152). It is this claim which 
must be examined, especially as regards the clearly non-gnostic 
portions of Scripture. This examination is very i~portant, since 
Pan.~enberg is interested in developing an understanding of what 
the Jewish conception of revelation consisted. This will be our 
endeavor here as well. 
Ibid., pp. 152-155. 
cr. for example Rum. 22:38; 23:12, 16, 26: Jer. 1:6-9, 26:2; 
Ezek. 3: 10-ll-
One such instance is Jer. 15:19-21. 
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correctly receiveQ revelation directly from the Lord and then 
proclaimed it to the people with his word being confirmed DY history 
(see Deuteronomy 18:20-22). The Old Testament therefore not only 
te~ches that Go~'s indirect revelation is manifested in history, in 
this instance by the fulfill~ent of prophecy, but also that God's 
direct revelation is given to the 'Dro'Ohets, through whom God makes 
Himself known. 78 
Eowever, the Old Testament witnesses report that God not only 
revealed ~L~self t~rough the preaching of the prophets, but also 
through the written Scriptures. There is even a relations~ip between 
the revelation given to the prophets to speak and the r~cording of 
this revelation in ~ritten words, as the prophets wer~ quite often 
required to record t~e words of their proPhecies. 79 For instance, 
80 1:oses was co~anded not only to spe~~ the words of God, but also 
to write the words .. hich had beer. revealed to him. 81 ~his ~eans that 
God's revelation also comes thro1.,;.gh the '.n:'itten words of the Scriptures. 82 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
See G. Ernest ~::::'i;ht' s exegesis of !jThe :Book of Numbersll in 
The Inter~reter's Bible, edited by George Arthur Euttrick, o'D.cii., 
vol. II, pp. 450-451. 
A ge~eral reference to the written words of the prophets occurs in 
Zech. 7:12. The "cras here would probably be the written ones 1 
since the reference is to prophets of former ti~es whose writings 
were in existence. 
~\Coses is referred to as a prophet in Deut. 34: 10. 
See Ex. 17:24; 24:4; 34:27-28; Deut. 31:9, 24-26. 
As with the other Old Testament ver'ses listed in this section, it 
is not our purpose here to debate who is the author of these words. 
It is rather our concern to ascertain what the Jewish view of 
revelation YlaS, especially as spoken and written D;:"- chosen men 
of ~od. Thes~ ve:ses are therefore very valuable in reflecting 
this belief. 
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other prophets besides !Joses are also commanded to write the 
revelation which was communicated to them by God. This is found to 
be the case with Isaiah (Is. 8:1; 30:8), Jeremiah (Jer. 36:2) and 
Habbakuk (Rab. 2:2). It is recorded that David also both spoke and 
wrote God's revelations to him. 83 
It is ~ow plain from this preceding brief survey that Parwenberg!s 
limitation of revelation to God's acts in human history is only 
presenting a part of the whole. In spite of this scholar's claim 
that his view faithfully represents that of ancient Judaism, it has 
been shown here that this is not the case. 84 The Jewish concept of 
revelation also includes at least the revelation given to prophets 
to speak the worn of God and the revelation which is written in the 
form of the S~;J"'iptures. It is true that the Jews believed that God 
revealed Himself indirectly throu~~ historical acts. But it is also 
true that the Jews belicvzd that God revealed Himself directly through 
the prophets and through the written word in the Scriptures. A proper 
view of Jewish revelation must include all of these factors and not 
just the first, as ?annenberg does. 
83 
84 
Cf. 1~. 12:36; Matt. 22:43-46; Luke 20:42 with II Sam. 23:2. One 
cannot object to the use of the l\"ew Testament verses her-e, because 
the Old Testanent verse also confirms that the Lord spoke through 
David. ~oth express the direct revelation of God to him. 
Rolf Rendtorff, in his essay, liThe Concept of Revelation in Ancient 
Israel" (in Pannenberg's Revelation as History, o~.cit., pp. 46-47), 
also recognizes a close relationship between word and r-evelation. 
However, like ?annenberg, he insists that the wo~d is not really 
revelation. His view likewise falls prey to the same criticisms 
raised here. For instance, in order for a prophet to foretell an 
act of God in history, he must have receivtnl su(;h wurd from the 
Lord. This is the whole point of Deut. 18:20-22. This word is 
God's revealinb the future through the prophet before the event 
in history occurs. Pannenberg especially misses this point in 
his expositio~ of the similarities between word and revelation 
(Ibid.~ 152-155). Without such revelation through the prophet 
there would be no foretelling of the event. 
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It is Pannenberg's opinion that only gnosticism teaches such 
direct revelation,8 5yet it has been shown that even in the earlier 
Old Testament writings this view is found. To claim the influence 
of gnosticism here is ther-efore clearly impossible. Rolf Rendtorff 
also asserts that God never revealed Himself in the prophetic word,86 
yet it has also been shown that several Old Testament passa~es teach 
the contrary view. Especially note~ort~here is Rum. 12:6: 
If there is a prophet among you, I the LORD make myself known 
to him. in a vision, I speak with him in a dream UIum. 12: 6, 
RSV, italics added). 
As if to say that this Self-revelation of God was not direct e~ough 
in soree insta.nces, !:.un. 12: 8 adds concerning 1:oses that: 
With him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in dark 
speech; and he beholds the form of the Lord (Num. 12:8, RSV). 
There can be no question about the intention of these t~o verses. 
God made Ei~self k~o .. n to the prophets, but ne revealed Einself even 
more directly to :;:oses. The Lord's "making Himself known" :iZlust 
necessarily involve Self-revelatio~. Other verses po~nted out above 
also assert these beliefs. ]y making known Ris present a~onitions 
for holy living by exhorting the Jews to keep the Law and by revealing 
the future by Ris prophets, it was believed that God was revealing 
Eimself directly to the people. This was done by God's c~osen 
messengers thro'llgh both the spoken and the written word. 87 
85 
86 
87 
Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 12; cf. p. 152. 
Rendtorff in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 46. 
!'':any scholars also believe that the :Biblical witness provides 
written revelation of God. For this view see, for instance, 
Norweigan theologian Sigmund Mowinckel's work The Old Testament 
as Word of God, translated by Reidar E. Ejornard (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1959), pp. 10-12, 23-26. See also Charles C. 
Anderson, The Vistorical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, o~.cit., 
pp. 9-51 and Bernard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences, op.cit., 
pp. 224- 249. 
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Pannenberg's view of revelation therefore fails in its attempt 
to present the only revelation of God as being indir~ct by =eans of 
God's acts in h~an history. This is just a part of the Je~ish 
concept, which also includes direct revelation through the oral 
proclamation an~ throu~~ the written wore, 
The third major criticism of Pannenberg is one which recurs 
throughout much of his work and is especially obvious in his 
presentation of his seven theses~ Pannenbergfs Yiew of revelation 
in its relation to the future contains several inadeouatelv su~~orted 
.. ... --
statements. 3is theological system does include many intri~~ing and 
alluring points, some of which are certainly valid. SS Eut the overall 
framework for this system, especially concerning God's revelation 
of Himself from the future, sometimes appears to be composed of 
assumptions ~hich lack proper evidence. This has been perceived to 
so:ne extent in the first objection above. Thus IiIcDer'!l1ott notes' 
hs~e that Pan~enber~ is sometimes ~ilty of inserting reality into 
a future ~hich has obviously not yet arrived, and that he has done 
""0 
so without the ~roper clarification and evidence. o/ 
Instances of this lack of evidence are readily availacle, and 
clearly affect the framework of Pannenberg's theological system. 
Pannenberg admits that his work rests upon two presuppositions, these 
being the reality of the future;s power and. the single future which 
qo -
exists for every event.' These two presuppositions are ~uite apparent 
88 
89 
90 
To be sure, there are some strong, carefully reasoned points in 
Pannenberg's ~ork. The strongest part of his theolo~- ~ill be 
discussed later. 
!.:cDermott, on. cit. , p. 714. 
Pannenberg, Theolo.y' and the Kin.;-dom of God, on. ci t. , -0 p. , ..... 
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in his seven theses, but strangely without supportive evidence in 
many cases. 
For instance, the second thesis calls for a relationship between 
revelation ana the end of all history. This relationship is said to 
be the result of t~e indirect nature of this aforementioned revelation. 
In fact, the cOr'_"lection of revelatio~l with history's end'is said to 
be the direct result of the indirectness of revelation. 9l 3ut even 
if or.e were to [;rant the indirect nature of God's reve'lation in 
h " t 92 h d .l-h" 1 t" .I- b k ""1 t _~s ory, ow oes ~ ~s cause reve a ~on ~o e nown pr~~ar~ y a 
the end of history? Pan.."lenberg never succeeds in de:nonstrating how 
indirect revelation auto:natically means that this revelation must be 
connected with the end of history. God could quite conceivably be 
acting indirectly in history fro~ out of the nresent. In other words, 
Pannenberg has not shown why futurity must follow from indirect 
revelation. One must assume that his view of God is the definitive 
one to even begin to arrive at this conclusion, and we have already 
seen that this vie~ is quite arbitrary and problematical as well. 
Anot~er example of Par~enberg's arbitrary theology occurs in the 
fourth thesis, wnere Jesus' fate is also connected with the end of 
3ecause of this formulation, Pannenberg asserts that there 
"ill be no further Self-revelation of God after the resurrection of 
Jesus. 93 
91 
92 
93 
?annenber;, Revelation as History, on.cit., p. 131. 
. .l..s we have already noted, many would perhaps be more willing to 
~rant that one of God's methods of revelation is His acting in 
history, in-addition to other modes of revelation. See Ladd, 
on.cit., pp. 17, 144; Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. Is6, 237. 
Pannenberg, ~8velation as History, on.cit., pp. 142, l43w 
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But this thesis also lacks conclusive evide~ce. Indeed, it 
raises several problems of its own. For instance, if revelation is 
~ediated in ~ of history as Pannenberg claims, why should the 
indirect Self-revelation of God then end with the fate of Christ? 
Why should revelation not extend beyond this point? One could still 
hold that the supreme Se1£-reve1ation of God occurred in the Christ 
event, but that this revelation still progresses beyond this point. 
Is not Par~enberg's abrupt halt at the fate of Jesus a rather arbitrary 
termination of revelation? Indeed~ it does appear to be si~ply a 
disired stopping point. But there is obviously a need for a logical 
reason to suP?ort such an abrupt halt. Pannenberg entertains this 
same objection at the end of his introductory essay, stati~b that he 
hopes this problem will be answered 1ater. 94 But he never ~uite 
seems to come back to it with an appropriate answer. 
Even if Panrlenberg were successful in showing why revelation 
should end here, would it not then demand an adjustment in his 
previous concept of this revelation? It would appear that the previous 
notion that God's indirect Self-disclosure occurs in all of history--in 
everything that happens9'--must be revised. How can one assert that 
everything which occu.rs is revelation and then later arbitrarily drop 
this notion after the Christ event becomes past history? Logically, 
according to Pannenberg's system, revelation should continue past 
point. 
A closely related problem with this fourth thesis is that if God's 
revelation occurs in all events of human history, why sincle out one 
Ibid., pp. 17-19. 
95 Ibid., p. 16; cf. p. 7. 
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strand, namely Jewish history, in which to concentrate a~ost all 
attention? To do so favors the Biblical witness, to be surG, but 
what is the rationale behind such an assertion if one beGi.:~s with 
Pannenberg's presuppositions? As Daniel Fuller aptly points out, 
Pa~~enberg must deal ~ith the proble~ of how God reveals ~i~self in 
all of history and yet all of the most i~portant revelatio~ occurs 
especially to a select group of Jews and Christians. 96 
Also, since God is said to act in all of history, how can one 
ascertain when Ee acts ill ~ special way in just ~ event like the 
fate of Jesus? SO:::J.e may look at an event and see.God working, others 
~ay look at the sa~e event and not notice this at all. 97 Perhaps these 
points indicate that Fannenberg's view of revelation occurring in 
all of ~istory needs a~justment. 
It is tierefore possible to perceive areas of Pannenbe~b's 
theologi~al SystE2 ~hich contain several inadequately supported 
assertions. These problems seem especially related to his view of 
the future and ~oy; it affects the present; ?annenberg's statements 
are not self-authenticating. 98 Yet he often fafls to provide 
reascnable facts to back his claims. As a result, his theology 
remains quite proclematical in that the logical demonstration in 
key areas is often lacking. 
The fourth major criticism of Pannenberg concerns both his view 
of the nature of the resurrection appearances of Jesus and his 
treat~ent of the naturalistic alternative views~ During a discussion 
96 4 6 Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 18 -18 • 
97 
98 
See ~laikie, on.cit., p. 159. 
S~e editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Theolosy and the Kin.:;dom of Goel, 
on.cit., p. 42. 
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of the historicity of this event, to which we will return briefly 
below, Pannenberg introduces his conception of the appearances of 
Jesus to the disciplss and to Paul. For this scholar, t~e resurrection 
appearances involve1 several elements. Those who sar. the resurrected 
Jesus saw a spiritual body, not a natural, earthly one. This 
appearance was acc02panied by an audition and, at least in the case 
of Paul, a phenomenon of light. These were appearances fro~ heaven 
and were recognized by all as the risen Lord. 99 
However, ?annenberg asserts that these appearances of Jesus were 
not very palpable one~. The nature of these occurrences were more 
similar to "objective visions", or visions which were not produced 
by the subjective consciousness of those perceiving the phenomena. 
In other words, the appearances of the resurrected Jesus ~ere 
-
realities outside of the apostles in spite of a lack of cor~oreal 
qualitie3. l00 Pannenberg specifically opposes the subjective vision 
. 101 
theory, which ~akes the resurrection a concept in the ~inds of the 
disciples wi~h no objective reality. ~is contentions against this 
view were presented above; The resurrection was rather an objective 
reality showing the disciples that Jesus was alive. 
t 1 h o t . ~ t 102 an ac ua ~s or~cal even • 
sue;';. it was 
In spite of ?annenberg's more than adequate defense of the 
historicity of the resurrection, his stance against more objective 
appearances of ~esus is u.~warranted, ?annenberg appears to feel that 
99 
100 
101 
102 
Pannenberg, 2'esus--God and I:!an, 0'0. cit., pp. 92-93. 
Ibid., pp. 93-95. 
Ibid., pp. 95-97. 
Ibid., pp. 98-99, 105. 
it is essential to choose between Paul and the gospels when discussing 
the nature of the resurrection body. Since he conceives of all the 
appearances being of a similar nature, Jesus must have alw~ys appeared 
as he did to Paul. 103 
It has been shown above that both the gospels and Paul maintain 
that Jesus' resurrected body was both similar to and diffel'ent from 
his natural body: The emphasis in the gospels on the disciples' 
ability to touch Jesus' body and to otherwise verify his appearances 
to them has also bee~ discussed above. This evidence in the gospels 
'~l th f t - t d- d h - 104 W~L ere ore no De s u ~e .ere aga~n. But the gospels also 
reveal the convic~iun that Jesus' body was somehow changed, having 
1 " - 105 new qua ~t~es an~ powers~ 
Paul's testimony is likewise that the res"..!rrection body is a 
"spiri t1.1al bodylt different from one t s physical body.106 Nevertheless, 
it is the resurrection of a spiritual body and not simply the 
resuscitation of a spirit. ~his is recognized by most theologians 
103 
104 
105 
106 
Ibid., p. 92. 
The key passages teaching the objective nature of Jesus' 
appearances include sucn portions as Matt. 28:9; Luke 24:36-43; 
John 20:17 (in the Greek); 20:20, 26-29; Acts 1:3. 
~or instance, the gospels assert that Jesus was already gone 
fr~m the grave before the stone was rolled away, implying that he 
evacuated by means other than the dco=way (l(:att. 28:2-6). It is 
also reported that Jesus left the graveclothes behind, undisturbed, 
showing that he passed through them rather than havinG to unravel 
them (John 20:6-9; cf. Luke 24:12). He was also able to appea= 
and disappear at will, even into locked rooms (Luke 2~:30-3l, 36; 
John 20:19; 26). See Ladd, on.cit., pp. 84-96, 126. 
See especially I Cor. 15:42-50. 
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tod.ay.107 As ':iilliam H. Johnson correctly contends, theological 
justice must be done to both wOJ:'ds in the Pauline phrase "spiritual 
body". Neither v.-ord must be over-stressed at the expense of the 
other. Thus, Jesus did not risE? as. a spirit or in a physical body, 
. . lOa but as a sp~r~tual body. 
Yet, it is not recognized as often that Paul also gives some 
evidence for objective appearances of Jesus. Although he possessed a 
new body, the Jesus who appeared to the disciples and Paul was the 
same Jesus who had died on the cross and was afterw~rds buried. 109 
Another indicator of the objectivity of Jesus' appearances was that 
he appeared to nany on different occasions (see I Cor. 15:5-8). It 
is especially Jesus' appearance to the 500 people at once (verse six) 
which helps us to determine how objective these experiences were for 
the diSCiples. It is this appearance in particular which points to 
an objective manifesta.tion. Paul's conception of Jesus' resurrection 
body v:as such that it could be seen by a group this size. It won.lei 
therefore appear to require more than just a my.stifying libht and 
107 
108 
109 
For instance, see Pan..'"lenberg, Jesus--God and 1.:1an, on.cit., p. 92; 
Ladd, ou.cit., pp. 111, 114-118; Brown, The Virginal Concention 
and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, ou.cit., pp. 85-89 and Brown's 
"The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism",ou.cit., p. 2;6; 
Reginald Fuller, ouocit., p. 179. See footnote number 113 below 
for others who also recognize this. 
William 3:allock Johnson, "The Keystone of the Arch::, Theology 
Today, edited. by Joh..'"l ~. :.racX~y, ~' .. :..!!lbe!" 1; A:?!'il~ 1949-January 
1950, p. 20. 
See I Cor. 15:3~4. For the reality of the empty tomb, see Pannenberg, 
Jesus--God and llian, ~~.cit., pp. 100-104; Reginald Fuller, on.cit., 
pp. 69-70, 179; Brown~ The Virginal Cc~cention and 30dily 
Resurrection of Jesus, on.cit., p. 122, footnote n~ber 204 and. 
p. 126; see also ErOW'!l'S article "The Resurrection and :Biblical 
Criticism", on.cit., p. 235. For the view that Paul also implied 
the empty to=b in I Cor. 15:4, see Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 
48-49, 69; Ramsey, on.cit., p. 44. In addition, see Robert M. 
Grant, A Historical Introduction to the New Testament, ou.cit., 
p. 369 and Clark H. Pinnock, "On the Third Day"in Henry, on.cit., "0.15 
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auditory phenomen~n, along with an objective vision. 110 
Ladd also disaGrees with ?an-~enberg's conception of "objective 
visions", which pattern all of Jesus' appearances after the one to 
Paul. The evidence shows that the gospels were written under the 
influence and control of various eyewitnesses of these events. There 
must be an underlying factual traditio!'l behind these reports as well. 
3esides, once it is granted that Jesu.s actually rose from. t:le dead, 
there is no reason ~hy he could not have appeared various ~ays to 
" "d""" 1 III var~ous ~n ~v~aua s. 
To reinforce this last statement, one must remember that, in 
the books of L~~e-Acts, the author Luke does not seem to be aware of 
any contradiction in recording both the more objective appearances to 
112 the disciples and tb.e more ,"'spiritual" conversion appearance to Paul. 
Sin:.il'arly, many theologians also feel that the witness of the gospels 
is essentially cO:.1pati "ole wi th that of Paul, in spite of tl:e different 
stresses in each. ~he conclusion often is therefore that Jesus 
appeared in an objective ~ay that could be verified, but in a new 
" "t 1 b" 113 S"::l:lr:l ua_ oay. 
- ~ 
110 
111 
112 
113 
It is so~ewhat surprising that Pannenberg does not p~~ce even 
stress than !le does on the objectivity of Jesus I appearances. 
Cf. Ladd, on.cit., p. 105; see also p. 138 and Brown, The Virginal 
Concention a!ld Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, ,Qp.cit., p. 91. 
Ladd, Ibid., pp. 126, 136-139. 
Luke records t~e rr;ore objective appearances to the disciples 
(see Luke 24:;6-43; Acts I:;; 10:40-41) right along with the three 
pas3ages fihich narrate Paul's conversion (Acts 9:1-9; 22:6-11; 
26:12-18). 
See La.dd, ot).cit., pp. 126, 137-138; Brown, "The Resu::rection and. 
Eiblical Criticism": ou.cit.: p. 236; cf. Grant, Miracles and 
Natural La.w, ou.cit., pp. 229-230; see also Charles C. Anderson, 
The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, on.cit., pp. 163-166; 
J.!~.D. Imc.erson, on.cit., p. 99; McNaugher, on.cit., pp. 164-165; 
Smith, o"::l.cit., pp. 194-195. 
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For the reasons just outlined here, it is therefore with good evidence 
that this fourth major criticism of Pannenberg remains vali~. Eye-
witness testimony witnessed to these objective appearances through 
such men as Luke (cf. Luke 1:1-4 with Luke 24:36-45; Acts 1:3). 
Such eyewitness testicony which has already been shown to exist 
behind the gospel traditions therefore reflects valid witness to 
the objectiveness of Jesus' appearances to the disciples. Even Paul 
refers to the original disci~lesi testimony of the resurrection 
ap~earances (I Cor~ 15:11-15). The tes~imony o~ the gospels is 
thus compatible ~ith Paul. 
The second part of this fourth criticism concerns Pannenberg's 
treatment of the naturalistic theories which have been proposed against 
the resurrection. Apart fro~ his criticism of the subjective vision 
theory, his overall treatment of the vt~ar alternative theories is 
not entirely complete. Be is still successful in refuting the other 
hypotheses, but he fails to disprove them as sufficiently as is 
possible. This is an i~portant point, for since all of Christianity 
rests upon the validity of the resurrection, as was determine~ earlier, 
then refutations of rival views must be as comnlete as uossible in 
order to more clearly ascertain if this event actually occurred. 
It is especially important to the validity of this third solution to 
the resurrection (that this event can be demonstrated) that there are 
no probable solutions other than Jesus' resurrection from the dead. 
This therefore yuints to the need for as thorough an investigation 
and refutation of the major naturalistic theories as is possibleo 
In addition, it is true that the more thorough such a refutation 
of the alternate vie~s is, the more convincing the resulting 
probability of the resurrection of Jesus is made. 
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Wolfhart Pannenberg has built a theological system ~~ich contains 
many intriguing a~d interesting ideas~ Bowever, his work has been 
shown to fall prey to four major criticisms. First, his view of God 
as being fully revealed ollly in the future is an arbitrary one which 
lacks the proper evidence. The Scriptures, including Jesus, do not 
unanimously refer to God this way at all. Second, Pannenberg's view 
of God's indirect Self-revelation as occurring only in historical 
acts is only a part of the Biblical presentation of revelation. It 
was found that God also revealed Himself directly through the 
prophets and through the written word of God. 
Third, the overall theological system of this scholar lacked 
conclusive evidence in several places. This is especially true with 
regard to Pannenberg's seven theses. There was a decided lack of 
evidence needed to demonstrate such' items as the futurity of revelation 
and the end o~ all Self-revelation of God occurring in the Christ-
event. Fourth, it was shown that Pan.'1.enberg's concept of the nature 
of the resurrection appearances WuS not object~ve enough and did not 
allow properly for the evidence for more objective m~'1.ifestations of 
Jesus. In addition, his refutation of the naturalistic theories 
against . 114 the resurrection was ~ot as cGmplete as ~t should have been. 
114 There are other substantial criticisms of Pannenberg's thought 
which have not been mentioned here. For instance, Heu.h.a.us has 
pointed o~t that Pannenberg's concept of the Kingdom of God as 
a possibility to be worked for in human society is perilously 
close to so~e of the ideas of the social gospel move~e~t of the 
nineteenth century. The view that the Kingdom of G·od coule. 
become established in the social order through the effort of men 
failed. See Neuhaus in Pannenberg's Theology and the Kingdom 
of God, o~.cit., pp. ,1-33. Cf. Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 77, 79, 
80, 84. 
It is easily perceived that the resurrection of Jesus is one 
of the central concepts in ?annenberg's theological syste3. The 
examination of the resurrection is also the strongest aspect of his 
theolo5J. Eis treat~ent of this event h~s been dealt wit~ above, 
but a few comrr.ents are in order here. Pannenberg logicall~~ investi:;ates 
the resurrection with regard to its historicity. Rival theories 
which seek to explain this event naturalistically are ente~tained 
and dispelled, even though such procedures are not asco~plete as 
they should have been.115 Anyone who disputes the claim t~at Jesus 
rose from the dea~ is welcome--in fact, required--to arrive at an 
116 
alternative theo:::-;? >;"hich is adequate enough to account for the facts. 
It is Pannenberg's conviction that when one conducts such an 
investigation of the facts, one arrives at the probability that the 
resurrection di~, indeed, occur in actual ~uman history. 
examinatio~ of t~e facts reveals the probable conclusion t~at Jesus 
did rise from the dead after the crucifixion. ~he resurrection is 
.... d .,' t' t 1'" . 1 t 117 " .... us eJ:;:!ons-:;:rB. c;ec. 0 uE: an ac ua n~s'tor~ca even. In tl:is 
1 . .,., . ., h . . .. ~&'. It t f' 116 cone us~on rannenoe:::-g ~s 't.orougn ana. Q~l~~CU 0 re u'te. His 
own refutation of alternate views is valid and does indeed show that 
the resurrection is the most probable solution. Therefore, this 
conclusion a"O"Oears to be q,'.1i te valj,d. 
115 
116 
117 
118 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and ?.ian, 0"0. ci t., pp. 88-106. 
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, o~.cit., p. 147. 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and ilian, 
on p. 105. 
.... 
0'0. c~ "., see this conclusion 
Even those who do not accept Par_~enberg's view of the resurrection 
find his defense of this event to be quite sophisticated. 
See for instance, Reginald Fuller, on.cit., pp. 22-23. 
Chapter X. Possibility Number Three: Other Similar Views 
Other scholars besides PaIL~enberg also hold that Jesus rose 
literally from the dead and that this can be demonstrated to be the 
~ost probable conclusion in this issue. l This is surely not to 
affirm that these scholars followed Pannenberg in these conclusions, 
for most have not derived their ins~iration from him, nor do they 
consider the~selves part of the "theology of hope" school of thought. 
Therefore one finds that the tec~~iques vary here, but the final 
result is similar. 
One such theologian who believes that Jesus' literal resurrection 
fro~ the ~ead can be demonstrated to be the most probable conclusion 
is Daniel Fuller. In his work Easter Faith and History, Fuller 
surveys most of the major theological approaches to the question of 
the relationship between faith and history. As the title of this 
work suggests, this question is surveyed particularly by examining 
the various views of the resurrection. 
Beginning ~ith Enlightenment rationalism and continuinG through 
present contemporary theology, this scholar investigates ~ost of the 
major theologians and their views of the historical and rational 
content of faith. After viewing the attempts of the major theological 
schools of thought down to the present, Fuller turns his attention to 
attempts to accept the resurrection as fact from three different 
1 The word "demonstrated", once again, is not used here in the sense 
of absolute proof, but rather as it is related to probabilities. 
Thus, this section deals with the conviction that the factual 
evidence is such that the resurrection of Jesus is "the ~ost 
probable conclusion. 
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standpoints. Atte~~ts to hold belief in this event anart from 
historical reasoning, by ~artial historical reasoning and totally by 
historical reasoning are then investigated. Fuller's concl~sion is 
that none of these views are entirely acceptable, as each falls prey 
2 to various criticis~s which he presents. It should be noted that 
Fuller does agree with the principle of historical verification of 
the resurrection, as will be shown below. But he objects here to 
these methods by .. hich such attempts are made. 
Fuller's solution is to exami~e the first century approach to 
the resurrection of Jesus which is taken by Luke in the Ne~ Testament 
wo~k Luke-Acts. 3 After reviewing seve~al key hypotheses concerning 
the theme of Luke-Acts,4 Fuller sets forth ~hat he believes is the 
maj o~ t-"eme of these two books. 5 
The L~~an prologue (Luke 1:1-4) sets forth some key information 
concerning the intentions of the author. Eere L~~e claims that he 
~eceived the information in this work from the original eyewitnesses 
(Luke 1:2). ~~ller points out that while Luke was thus not himself 
an eyewitness of Jesus' ministry, he received the info~ation from 
, 
those who did originally participate in the events.o However, L~~e 
did sha~e first hand in the fulfillment of the resurrection event, 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Daniel Fuller~ 0"0. oi t •.. The examination of these various schools 
of thought and the subsequent evaluation of these three positions 
with regard to history is fo~~d on pp. 27-187. 
Preliminary questions such as the authorship and date for Luke-Acts 
are discussed by Fulle~, Ibid., pp. 190-199. 
Ibid. , pp. 199-208. 
Ibid., pp. 208-229. 
Ibid., pp. 188-190. 
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namely, the mission of the Christian church to the Gentiles. Luke 
therefore experie!"!.ced the result of the resurrection fai tl1 firsthand. 7 
Fuller finds that an i~port~~t emphasis in Luke-Acts is Luke's 
writing so that his readers8 could know the certainty of W~&t had 
transpired in the life of Christ and especially in his res~rrection. 
In fact, Luke's purpose in writing to these early believers was to 
inform them that they could be sure of what had been reported to 
them pertaining to the Christ event. This certainty which was 
available to each reader applied in particul&r to the surety that 
Jesus was raised from the dead (see L~ke 1:4).9 
Upon what "as such certainty based? Fuller explains t~at for 
Luke, the early Christian mission to the Gentiles was the fulfillmeni 
of the resurrection of Jesus. Wit:hout the appearances to the 
disciples end the others and later to Paul, there could h~ve been 
no such Gentile mission. In other words, the existence and continuance 
of the effort to evangelize the Gentiles depended upon the Einistry 
of Paul &nd upon the authority and action of the other apostles. 
B·ut Paul's invo1ve:nent in such a 'Work cannot be explained by anything 
other than the appearance of the risen Jesus to hi~, as recorded in 
Acts. Paul, the enemy and persecutor of the chu.rch in earlier years, 
7 
8 
9 
Ibid., pp. 190-191, 220. 
Luke-Acts is addressed to Theophilus in particular (L~~e 1:;; Acts 
1:1), but there may have been other indirect recipients &S well. 
Daniel Fuller, o~.cit., pp. 189-190, 223 for instance. 
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would have no othe~ impetus for such behavior. Likewise, the 
disciples were not very accustomed to the idea of taking the gospel 
to the Ge!ltiles (at least in the form of a !!linistry) until they 
received just s~cn a commission from the risen Lord who appeared 
to t~em after his death. Only such an appearance could account for 
their realizing that the offer of the Kingdom of God had also been 
extended to the Gentiles. 10 
In a sense, Luke taught that there were therefore tV[O key points 
in the present ~hich pointed backwards to the resurrection. First, 
?aul's conversion could be explained no other way than his having 
seen the risen Jes~s. Ko other conclusion is sufficient to account 
for this cbange in the life of a non-believing enemy of the early 
11 chu~ch. Second, the outreach of the early Jews to the Gentiles, 
spearheaded by thQ ~isciples, pointed to a directive beyond the 
exclusivis:::l of ,"judaism. Apart from the directives issued. 'by the risen 
- 12 .'.' . h . . 1 f th J' .. . . Jesus, ~nere 15 no o~.er prooao e reason or _e eWlsn mlssl0n 
to the Gentiles, since the Jews considered themselves as the sole 
heirs of God's blessings. 13 Therefore, these two events poi~t 
14 une~uivocally to ~he historical resurrection of Jesus. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Ibid., pp. 223-225, 229, 235. 
Ibid., see especially pp. 217, 219, 226. 
Commands s~ch as those recorded in Luke 24:47-48 and Acts 1:8. 
Daniel Fuller, o~.cit., see, for example; pp. 223, 226-229, 
246-247. 
Ibid., p. 220. 
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For these reasons, Luke stood at a critical point in that he was 
both able to receive knowledge of the Christ event of the past via the 
eyewitnesses and also to participate in the present and future fulfill-
ment of this event. From his vantage point ne realized that the 
resurrection was the only logical explanation for occurrences such as 
the conversion of Paul and the Jewish' outreach to the Gentiles with 
the gospel. Thus he encouraged Theophi1us and his other readers to 
reason from these two events in the present to the resurrection of 
Jesus in the past, realizing that the present reality coul~ only be 
explained by the factualness of the past event. 15 
After presenting Luke's position here, Fuller is careful to 
point out that the resurrection is the solution to these t~o present 
events only if the objections against the resurrection have been 
16 
a4swered. Earlier he entertained various alternate theories a~inst 
the historical and verifiable nature of this event. 17 At this point, 
after a presentation of Luke's attempts ~o show 'that the resurrection 
was verifiab1e,lSFuller turns to the question of Pa~l',s co~version. 
Alternate theories to explain this event are also investigated and 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Ibid., see especially pp. 190, 223, 235. 
Ibid., pp. 242~ 245. 
For instance, see Fuller's discussion and refutation 0: ~aulus: 
swoon theory (Ibid., pp. 38-39), Lessing's and Kierkegaard's 
attempts to remove this event from all verification (Ibid., pp~ 35, 
255-256) and Earth's modification of this approach (Ibid., pp. 83-
84, 88-90, 155-156). Luke's proofs for the resurrection also 
serve as a refutation of Strauss' vision theory (Ibid., cf. 45-49 
with pp. 231-232). ----
l£i£ .• pp. 231-232. 
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refuted. 19 
Fuller's final investigation deals ,,,i th Luke IS arsu::.el1"ts for the 
historicity of the resurrection. For Luke, history is viewed as 
having two sections, an "upper" and a "lower". In the first or 10wel' 
section, all historical events are "natural" ones, 3.S the;r originate 
from other historical events. But Supernatural events fro~ the 
second, or hisher section, do enter the first. These eve~ts could 
never be the results of occurrences in the first section, but do 
enter the first from the second "layer". Here they do not c.isturb 
other events, but also follow the patterns of history in t~E first 
section after they enter. Thus, for L~~e, the resurrection car. have 
a Supernatural origin anc. still be a historical event, k ... "loi7!'l by 
.. t . 1 . 20 n~s or~ca reason~n6. 
Luke's approach is found to be quite satisfying, according to 
?nller. Ee agrees with 1~~e that the resurrection of Jesus can be 
verified. Given the possibility of believin; in this event apart 
from historical reasoning or in holding that it is base~ ~pon 
evidences that can be historically verified, Fuller opts for the 
latter. The resurrection can be shown t.- oe a. historical e-.rent, 
both by the investigation of the original eyewitness testi~or.y 
concerning the appearances and oy viewing the fulfillment of this 
event in history in the conversion of Paul and in the Gentile mission. 
. f' h' t' +'t... b' . . 1 l' 21 Be11e_ in t ~s even ~s ~nus ase~ upon emp~r1ca c a1ms. 
19 Ibid., pp. 247-250. 
20 Ibid., pp. 252-261. See especially pp. 252-253. 
21 Ibid., especially pp. 255-259. See also pp. 220~ 231-252. 
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Fuller's app~oach to the resurrection sometimes appears to reach 
overly easy conclusions. This is most evident in his refutation of 
alternate views both with regard to Jesus' resurrection and in the 
t P ul Full - - t 1 h"'"h' 22 d appear~~ce 0 a. . er aesJ.res 0 exp_ore suc _ l.. eorJ.es a:.~ 
d.oes refute the major alternatives: as shown above. But the various 
refutations often appear irresolute and are generally, as ,dth 
Pannenberg, not as thorough ~~d strong as should be expected. As 
noted above, it is imperative that the alternative views are refuted 
as completely as possible in order to reveal if there is a probable 
~aturalistic answer to the resurrection faith, which is rightly 
viewed as the central tenet of Christianity. It follows that the 
more thoroughly these alternative ~?otheses are refuted, the more 
probable the resurrection becomes. 
It is also possible that Fuller depends too much on the C~ntile 
mssion as demonstrating the resurrectio~, almost as if tills (;cnclusion 
could st~~d apart from any other investigation of the facts and 
alternate theories. It must be stressed once again that the Gentile 
mission can be a pointer to the resurrection o~ly if other oo.jections 
to this event are completely answered. Fuller does recognize this, 
but seems to neglect the conclusion that if a valid alternate theory 
~o the resurrection is found, a valid alternate ~heory would also 
have to be applied to the Ger..tile mission. We once again perceive 
the need to refute alternative theories as completel:r as possible. 
22 Ibid., pp. 242,245. 
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In spite of these criticisms, however, it is most difficult to 
annul Fuller's co~te~tion that the resurrection can be demonstrated. 
He does provide enough evidence to establish this eve~as probableQ 
In so doing he avoids the pitfalls of Pannenberg's theological system 
and still succeeds in showing hew the literal resurrection of Jesus 
can be verified as a historical event. 
Another theologian who likewise concludes that Jesus' resurrection 
is the best explanation for the facts is New Testament scholar George 
E. Ladd. 23 This scholar realizes that the modern concept of historical 
methodology argues for a reality in which God does not act irr human 
I 
history. Ever since the Enlightenment, the prevailing vie~ has been 
that historic&l events must have origins which are grounded in history. 
Therefore, miracles ~ith Superna~ura~ ori,gins are ruled out from the 
• t 24 OUvse • 
In opposition to this view, Ladd proposes the use of the inductive 
method of historical inquiry, ~hich allows for the conclusion which 
best fits the facts. Eistorical events which claim Super~atural 
intervention must be investigated to perceive if they are the best 
explanations for what is known to have occurred. Possible alternative 
theories must also be examined to see if these hypotheses are able 
to better account fer the factual evidence. 25 
23 
24 
25 
See Ladd's book, I Believe in the Resur=ection of Jesus, ou.cit. 
Ibid., pp. 12-13; cf. p. 23. 
Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
the resurrection, 
Concerning the need specifically to examine 
see pp. 27-28 f 132-133. 
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In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, Ladd points out that 
even if this occurrence were est~blished as an actual event, it must 
still be counted as "nonhistorical" with regards to its origin. Since 
such an event would require a Supernatural origin, it could not be 
said to be historical in the sense that other events ares ~hose starting 
point is history itself. 26 Therefore, when judged by modern historical 
methodology, the resurrection is not a historical event. It is 
unlike other events in its unique entrance into history. 27 
However, looking at the resurrection only from ·the standpoint 
of its origin yields only a portion of the overall picture. For La~d, 
historical inquiry ca~~ot Drove the resurrection, but it can establish 
it as the most probable explanation for what occurred. In fact, it 
is asserted that this event is the only explanation of the facts which 
adequately explains ~hat is known to have happened. 28 
m"1.._ 
.J."U,C: belief "that this zvent c~n be de!!!onstr~te(l to be the only 
possible solution which accounts for all of the facts is based upon 
the idea that there must be an adeauate expla.nation for any event 
" "h"' 29 occurrlng In ls~ory~ To this end~ Ladd enumerates the core 
historical facts surrounding the resurrection which are knovm to be 
credible. 30 Later he investigates the major alternative theories 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Ibid., pp. 21, 25. 
Ibid., pp. 25, 132. 
Ibid., cf. p. 27 with pp. 13, 27, 139-141. 
above. 
Ibid., p. 20. 
See footnote number one 
Ibid., pp. 13, 91-940 Ladd does not simply enumerate facts just 
because they are recorded in the New Testament. Rathar, he lists 
those which are known to be historically plausible. 
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which seek to account for these facts by naturalistic me~~s. Each 
is examined. and. critiqued. Ladd concludes that each theo:::-y fails 
to explain these :::-esurrection facts. 31 
It should briefly be noted however, that one of the sawe problems 
which appears in Pannenberg and Daniel Fuller is also appa:::-e~t in 
Ladd with regard to the naturalistic theories of the resurrectiono 
Although Ladd. provides a good critique of the subjective and objective 
vision theories and generally does a better overall job here than 
Fuller, his treatment of the other theories is not developeQ thoroughly 
enough. In fact, the other theories are said to need very little 
refutation. 52 This lack of a more complete refutation is very 
i~portant in that it must be ascertained as thoroughly as possible 
if the resurrection actually happened--if this Supernatural event is 
more probable than other explanations. The resurrection can be shown 
to be ~ore probable when other alternate theories are morG thoroughly 
sho~n to be less so. 
As pointe:: out a-!)ove, the explanation which best accou...."1ts for the 
historical facts is the one which is given the status of p:::-obability. 
3ere Ladd arrives at the conclusion that jesus' resurrection from 
the dead is the most probable explanation. It gives the 20st adequate 
explanation to the available facts. The only reason to xeject this 
conclusion is that one has a closed mind to the occurrence of the 
Supernatural. 53 
31 
32 
33 
Ibid., see pp. 133-139, where ladd discusses five majo:::- alternative 
theories concerr-ing ths resurrection. 
Ibid., see especially p. 136. 
Ibid., pp. 139-141. 
270 
ThUS, ~hile the resurrection differs from other occurre~ces in 
that it has a different origin into the historical processes, it is 
nevertheless an event in history. It therefore achieves the status 
of entering the historical process by means of a u0nhistorical, 
Supernatural orioin but still beco~ing a historical event. 54 
Ladd offers a logical approach to the resurrection which seeks 
to examine the most probable conclusion to this issue. Eo~ever, he 
comes perilously close to making some of the same ~istakes as did 
Karl Earth. 
It has been stated that Ladd explains the resurrection as being 
nonhistorical in that it enters history Supernaturally. 3ecause of 
this origin, this event is not historical in the same sense as other 
events. Therefore, if evaluate~ in terms of the modern co~cept of 
history, the resurrection is not a historical fact. 55 
But Ladd :::Loves even closer to Ea.rth's position at other points. 
?cr instance, he concludes that even though the resurrection can be 
shown to be the best historical explanation for what occurred, it is 
still primarily perceptible to the "eye of faith". Thus, a historian 
looking at this event can only ascertain that something wonderful 
happened. The conclusion that Jesus was riss:, ;,.:elil£.L":..s a tenet of 
faith. In fact, it is Ladd's :;pinion that even having actually seen 
the risen Jesus would still not prove the facticity of this event. 56 
34 Ibid. , p-p. 25, 58. 
55 
"lli· , pp. 21, 25, 132. 
36 Ibid., pp. 101-102, 139-140. 
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The appearances thus speak of the need for faith to approac~ t' 3 
event. 37 
Admittedly, LaQd:s position does differ from Barth's in other 
major facets. Unlike Earth, Ladd opts for investigo.ting the historical 
° d '" to to 38 ev~ ence lor ne resurrec ~on. There is therefore an interaction 
between history and faith, as faith is logical and not si~ply a leap 
in the dark. 39 Also unlike Earth, Ladd admits that his faith would 
be seriously affected if an alternate theory were found to be 
plausible. Thus he takes considerable effort to refute the leading 
alternate theories against the resurrection. 40 
Probably the biggest difference with Barth is Ladd's contention 
that the resurrection can be ~~~ons~r~~ed to be the most ~roba~l~ 
explanation for the facts. The only logical conclusion is tr-at Jesus 
actually rose fro~ the dead in history. Other naturalistic theories 
are found to be unacceptable. ~ere one finds that faith is reinforced 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Ibid •• u. 140. It must be noted here that the objection against 
_0-
Ladd is not due to his position that the,resurrection is primarily 
knO\'tn by fa:' tr:., 'Oer see It has already been pointed out above 
(Chapter four) that faith is more important than reasor., and so 
it is nith the res~rrection. But to remove the resurrec~ion to 
any type 0: metahistory is to begin to re~ove it fro~ certain 
types of reaso~able verification. This is to be guarded against. 
The problem is therefore in Ladd's tendencies to begin to remove 
the resurrection away frc~ the grasp of history (see Ibid., pp. 
101-102, 139-140). 
Ibid., un. 26-27, 29, 132-133. 
-- --
Ibid., '0'0. 12, 27, 140. It will be recalled that Barth opposed 
all such-historical investigation of the resurrection and other 
modes of interaction between history and faith. As an example, 
see Barth's Church DOgmatics, o'O.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 335, 341. 
Ladd, Ibid., p~. 27, 132-142. As mentioned above, Barth asserts 
that it makes no siGnificant difference if the tomb .. as opened or 
closed. In fact, sometimes a naturalistic theory is preferable to 
one's trying to treat the resurrection as actual, fully objective 
history. See Earth's The Resurrection of the Dead, on.cit., P? 
135-138 and The ~ord of God and the Word of ~an, ou.cit., p. 90. 
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by studying the evidences. 4l Earth opposed all such historical 
reasoning as an assistance to faith. 42 
In spite of the differences between these two theoloGians (especially 
Ladd's emphasis on the ability to demonstrate that the resurrection 
is the most probable conclusion), Ladd is still guilty of retreating 
to the concept of metahistory when confronted. by modern historiography. 
In so doing, history is split into two divisions--the secular and the 
d " 4, l.Vl.ne. As mentioned with regards to :Barth, history knoi'rs of no 
such differentiation and no such concept of prehistory. ~ontgomery 
points out that by making the resurrection 'a part of this questionable 
realm of history and by asserting that it can be known primarily by 
faith, Ladd makes this event only perceptible in any meaningful way 
to the believer. Thus the non-Christian is not able to benefit from 
the evidence in favor of this event. 44 
Ladd's concern with pointing out that the resurrection would 
require a Divine origin has b'een noted above. :But one can recognize 
that the origin of this event is Superriat~ral and still not resort to 
the concept of metahistory. Daniel Fuller45 and C.S. Lewis,46 for 
41 
42 
44 
45 
46 
Ladd, ~., pp. 13, 27, 139-141. It is because of Ladd's emphasis 
on the ability of the resurrection to be demonstrated as the. only 
adequate solution and because of the efforts to refute other alternate, 
theories that he is included in this section and not with Earth in 
the former section. Laddls entire emphasis on the ability of faith 
to be investigated and reinforced by positive findings was the 
deciding factor here. 
See the discussion of Earth above. 
op.cit., vol. IV, part 1, p. 335. 
Compare his Church DOgmatics, 
This is Blaikiels criticism of Ladd's position, op.cit., pp. 128-129,134 
Montgomery, Where is History Going?, on.cit., pp. 114-116. However, 
Montgomery does not seem to be aware of Ladd's belief that investigation 
of the resurrection is still possible even if it can primarily 
be known only by ~aith. 
Daniel Fuller, on.cit., pp. 252-261 in particular. 
Lewis, Miracles, op.cit., see especially pp. 56-63. 
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instance, have both done creditable jobs in showing how an event can 
have a Supernatural origin and still be normally co~~ected ~ith history 
once it enters t~e historical process. Thus, the matter of Divine 
causation should ~ot automatically determine that the event must be 
metahistorical and that it must be known only by the processes of 
faith. Once it enters history, this event could partake of the 
historical pattern without impeding other natural events. Therefore, 
in spite of the origin of a Supernatural miracle, it would oecome a 
historically verifiable event upon entering history. 
To agree i':i th 3arth (and others) in holding that a Supernatural 
event remains netahistorical even after it enters the historical 
process is, once acain, to divide history into the two component 
parts of the secular and the divine. Eut, as has been pointed out 
in the critique of 3arth in chapter ei~ht, this formulation is faulty. 
The criticisms directe~ against Earth will not be repeated here, as 
it has been s~fficiently shown that such a concept is not valid. 
To be sure, Laid accepts critical examinations of the Christian 
faith. He believes that the inductive histo:dc'al annroach 'which 
, --
accepts the event ".7hich best fits the evidence will demonstrate that 
4-
the resurrection actually did occur~ { Here he differs fro~ 3arth. 
:5ut 
47 
48 
, 48 
where Lade. does adopt Barth's m~tahistorical concept,· it must 
Ladd, oo.cit., pp. 12-13, 27, 139-141. 
It is actually difficult to ascertain how much Ladd does agree 
with Barth here. See ine.ications of a partial acceptance of Earth's 
understanding of the resurrection in Ladd, Ibid., pp. 21, 25, 
101-102, 140. See also Montgomery, Where is History Going?, on.cit., 
p. 115. 
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be agreed that he errs iL committing some of the same mistakes as 
Barth. If the Supernatural is found to occur it must happen in 
historically verifiable history and not in metahistory. This is 
lJ.'-" 
recognized by Pannenberg, Daniel Fuller, Lewis, and others •. / 
Ladd does not retreat completely into the realm of metahistory 
as does Barth. Ris emphasis on being able to demonstrate the 
resurrection is therefore, like the attempts of Pannenberg and 
Fuller, a positive aspect of his theology. All three theologians 
have succeeded in investigating the facts before arriving at a final 
solution and all three scholars have found the resurrection to be 
the most probable explanation of what occurred. These findiLgs are 
further"strenghtened by the failure of any naturalistic theories 
to adequately account for what happened. 
However, it is not only certain theologians who are convinced of 
this conclusion. Paul Kaier is an ancient historian who also oelieves 
that the resurrection is the most prob~~le answer for what occurred. 50 
Although Mai~r is not the only historian to reach such conclusions,51 
49 
50 
51 
By histcrically ve~ifiable we are referring to the approach to 
history which accepts the event which best supports the known 
facts. To this Ladd, Panrienberg, Daniel Fuller and C.S. Lewis 
all agree. In chapters two and three of this work this same 
conclusion of ascertaining historical events was also found to 
be the correct procedure~ But we are also speaking here of the 
need to realize that God's raising Jesus from the dead is there-
fore a theological and historical explanation of a historical 
event. Thus we must not resort to any type of metahistory to 
explain the resurrection. With this Ladd see::ns to disaGree 
(Ibid~; pp. 101-102, 139-140). 
l1aier's chief work 'on the resurrection is his book First Easter, 
on. cit. See also "The Empty Tomb as !listory" in Christianity 
Today, on.cit. 
We have discussed above the position of theologian/historian Jo~ 
Warwick i.:ontgomery and ancient historian Ed.win Yamauchi, both of 
whom also believe that the resurrection can be demonstrated to 
have occurred. 
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llis approach is probably the most thorough from the stand~oint of 
hi t . 1 ... ". 52 s or~ca s~ua~es. 
For Uaier, the discipline of history is very valuable in helping 
to ascertai..'1. what occurred on the first Easter morning. While many 
ancient historical events are based upon only one source, ~~d twu 
sources often render an event !!infalliblel!, there are several ~~cient 
sources which point to the event of the resurrection of Jesus. 53 
Even outside of the New Testament sources, there is import~~t extra-
biblical evidence especially for the empty tomb, and thus also for 
the resurrection. 54 
Iviaier points to such early historians as Tacitus and Josephus, who 
either infer or specifically mention the belief in the resurrection on 
the part of the disciples and the early church. Tacitus' reference 
to f'irst century Christia."'1.ity in Rome a.."'ld to the l:superstitiontr v;hich 
broke out in ·Ju.d~a a.fteY' the death of Jesus55 is perceived to imply 
56 the Christi2..n teaching of the resurrection of Jesus. Niaier also 
deals with the problem of a possible interpo2.ation in Josephus' more 
. f· f ... th ... . ,,- 57 spec~ ~c re erence ,,0 __ e resurrec ,,::..on o! Jesus ~~d finds that there 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
IfLontgomery, for inst~~ce, more often como::..nes hi.story and theology, 
being quite adept in both disciplines. 
l':iaier, First Easter, op.cit., p. 114. 
Ibid., and ~·.~aier's HThe Empty Tomb as History!!, op.cit., pp.4, 
~ 
See Tacitus, ~~~uals, 15.44. 
lJaier, nThe Empty Tomb as HistoryH, op.'cit., D. 4.J. N. D .. Anderson 
concurs in this position, cp.cit., p. 19. 
See Josephus, lmtiquities, 13.3. 
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is very good reason to believe that Josephus did compqse this state-
ment concerning Christ minus a few of the more "Christianized tl 
phrases. Thus W~ see that. in all probability~ Josephus reported 
the early Christian belief in the resurrection and thereby acknowledged 
that the to~b was empty.58 
The evidence presented by Josephus and implied by Tacitus,is 
further corroborated by a few other sources. In the first century 
it was reported tnat the Jews spread the story that the disciples 
stole the body of Jesus in order to proclaim his resurrection from 
the dead. It is related that this story was still being voiced in 
58 1.Iaier, First Easter, 0'0. ci t., p. 114= Other scholars also agree 
that Josephus did write this portion of Jesus (or at least one 
very similar tc it), except for several nChristian" words. This 
pos~tion is held for at least three major reasons. First, there 
is no textual evidence against this section in spite of various 
readings in other places. Second, there is very good ~anuscript 
evidence for these statements about Jesus and it is therefore 
difficult to ignore it. Third, this portion is written in Josephus' 
o~ sty~e of writing. It is thus a warranted conclusion that 
there are several good reasons for accepting at least that Josephus 
did write of Jesus, mentioning several facets or his career. It 
is also a justified conclusion to say that, in all probability, 
Josephus at least recorded the belief in the resurrection without 
actually acknowledging that he accepted such a fact. ?or these 
three rea.sons a.nd the concluding facts given here~ see, in ad.dition 
to };:aier, J.E.D. Anderson, o'O.cit., p. 20. See especially F.F. 
Bruce's two works; Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman's Publishing Company, 
1974), pp. 32-41, especially pp. 36-41 and The New Testament 
Documents: Are They Reliable? (Fifth Revised Edition; Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdr!J.an's Publishing Company, 1967}, pp. 102-112. 
Bruce, the 1J:anchester scholar of Biblical cri ticisrn, ha.s done 
much work o~ Josephus' reference to Jesus aud comes to a conclusion 
quite similar to ~aier's. 
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the second half of the first century.59 In formulating this totally 
inadequate vie~, the Jews not only did not succeed in offering a 
substantial objection to the resurrection, but in so doing they also 
admitted the empty tomb. 
T~is Scriptural report is confirmed by second century scholar 
Justin :,Iartyr, who reports in his Dialogue with Try-oho (about 150 A.:i).) 
, 
tha t the Jews sent specially taught men across the Medi terrar..ectiL Sea 
in order to counter the Christian claims of the resurrection. The 
explanation spread abroad by the Jews, once again, was that the 
disciples stole thei:::- dead J~aster' s body. The Jews therefore continued 
to admit the empty to~b.60 
59 
60 
See 7':a tt. 28: 11-15 for this report. It has already been shown 
above that t~e theory of the stolen body (or other such fraud 
on the part of the disciples) fails miserably in its attempt to 
explain the res~rrection of Jesus (see chapter 7, footnote numbers 
163, 154 and the discussion corresponding to these re~arks). 
Eriefly, this t~eory i~ores at least five key objections. First, 
men do not die ~illingly for what they know to be si~ply a false-
hood. Sec~r..d, the treme::1.dous psychological tra...'1sformation of the 
disciples fro~ backward fishermen to bold preachers can~ot be 
explained by any fraudulent action, or else there would not have 
been this change. Third and closely related, none of the disciples 
ever recant<:c eve!':. at the threat of losing his life, ',7h:"ch i'iould 
be the nor::;).al thing to do rather than die for a lie. =:this ..... as 
totally opposed to their actions before the resurrec~ion, such as 
in fleeing ..... hen Jesus was taken captive and by Peter's subsequent 
denials. ?o~rth, the quality of the ethical teachings promulgated 
by the disciples precludes such actions. Fifth, it is admitted by 
all that the disciples at least believed that Jesus h~d rise~ frore 
the dead. They would of course not believed that this event had 
actually occurred if they were the ones who had perpetrated the 
fraud. For these reasons (see also footnote numbe~ 61 and 62 
below), no reputable scholar holds this view today. Tnere is little 
doubt that this is one of the '.veakest theories ever formulated 
against the rssurrection, yet it was the one chosen by the early 
Jewish leaders. 
Maier, o~.cit., ?p. 116-117_ 
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As pointed out by 1~aier, the book of Acts gives further evidence 
that the tomb was ewpty on the first Easter morning. As the disciples 
and early Christians first began to proclaim the resurrection of 
Jesus fro~ the dead, the Jewish authorities objected streIT~ously. 
Eut in several confrontations with the disciples, the Jewish ~lders 
never did what mig-ht have been most expected--they never led the 
disciples to the tomb for an investigation. Discovering the body 
of Jesus would of course have destroyed Christianity, as the Jewish 
leaders desired to do anyway. The obvious reason that they did not 
try to locate the body is because they knew that the to~b ~~s empty. 
Haier asserts that even the impartial historian must admit this 
".~ 
historical evidence for the empty to~b. O~ This implicit a~~ission 
further pointed to the empty tomb mentioned by Josephus, ::a tthew, 
Justin ?:artyr and also i::np1ied by Tacitus. 
:r.:aier also utilizes circu:!lstantia1 evidence of two kinds. First, 
Christianity could not have had its beginnings at Jerusale2, as it 
did, if Jesus: grave was still occupied just outside the gates of 
the city. This is the last place that the church could have begun 
if Jesus' body was still in the tomb. Sere an investigatio~ of the 
61 Ibid., pp. 114-115. In addition to the point made here by ].~aier, 
it should also be noted that the behavior of the Jewish leaders 
in Acts also constitutes another objection to the stolen body 
(fraud) theory. If the Jewish rulers really believed that the 
disciples stole the body, they would not simply have co:m.:::anded 
the disciples not to preach about Jesus (such as Acts 4:18, 21; 
5:28, 40), but they would have forced them to ad:::lit a.nd re0ant 
of their actions. 
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grave would have revealed the body and Christianity ~ould have been 
destroyed before it realy began. The birth of the church in 
Jersusalem can only be explained by the fact that Jesus' to~b was 
indeed empty.62 
Second, the spread of Christianity around the Mediterr~ean 
region all the way to Ro~e itself by slightly after the first half 
of the first century is simply an astonishing feat to have been 
accomplished in so short a period of time. Approximately thirty 
years after the death of Jesus this amazing eypansicn had taken place. 
It is ~aier's view t~at such expansion of any teaching or philosophy 
is unparalleled in ancient times. Could the preaching of and belief 
in the resurrection have provided the impetus for such growth, as 
the New Testament attests?63 
Another piece of evidence has only apossibleconneci;ion directly 
with Jesus' resurrection. A valuable archaeological discovery revealed 
a marble slab fo ...... nc. in :Nazareth which contained. a warning froI;4 
Caesar to all who ~ere caught robbing graves in Palestine. Other 
such Ro~an edicts against grave robbing prescribed a fine as-ainst 
the offender, whereas this edict condemns the offender to capital 
punishment. l',:ost scholars believed that the inscription was the 
command of emperor Tiberius or emperor Claudius. Why was the punishment 
62 
63 
l1aier, "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 4. 
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to be so great in Palestine? Could this cc~and bave been pro~pted 
by the Je~ish report of Jesus' stolen body or by the preaching of 
th .. ?64 • e resurrec't~on. 
Theological evidence is also cited by Maier in his effort to 
deal historically riith the resurrection. This historian points to 
at least three other factors which lead to the final conclusion. 
First, the aforementioned change in the disciples caused the~ to 
believe that Jesus had risen fro~ the dead. Such a radical difference 
must be based upon sOwe real experience and points to an actual 
encounter with the risen Lord, just as the New Testament claims, 
Second, the very existence of the Church points to so~e event >ohich 
is worthy of such an enterprise. The New Testa~ent claims tr.is 
event was the resurrection. Third, there must have been a reason 
for the early church to have changed the day of meeting fro~ Saturday, 
the Jewish Sabbath, to Sunday, the Lord's day. Again, the New 
~esta!!lent claims that the resurrection caused this change in order 
to commemorate the day on which Jesus h~d rizen. 65 
The last type of evidence employed by Maier is of bot~ a 
historical and. theological nature. l1aier entertains the objections 
raised. by eight different naturalistic theories which are aimed 
at disprovinrr the resurrection of Jesus. Each is then investigated 
and refuted by the available historical data. He finds that all of 
64 Maier, First Easter, on.cit., pp. 119-120. 
65 Ibid., pp. 115, 121-122; "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., p. 5. 
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these naturalistic theories fail to provide a valid historical answer 
to what happened on ~he first Easter day. They must be rejected 
strictly on the basis of historical in~uiry, as well as by theological 
. 66 
I'eason~ng. 
As for the question of discrepancies in the resurrection accounts, 
~aier admits that they do exist, as in the rest of the gospels. 
However, he holds that it is illogical to conclude that this event 
did not occur because of these variations. Other historical reports 
also contain similar discrepancies and there is no question about 
the events they report. For instance, the reports of th~ zxeat fire 
of 30me offer even greater conflicts than do the resurrection accounts. 
Some reports clai~ that the entire city was affected by the burning 
flames while others claim that only three sectors of the city were 
destroyed. There ~re also differences of opinion as to ho .. the fire 
started. In spite of these ~roblems, the great fire of Rome is 
unquestionably a historical fact. In a similar way the resurrection 
of Jesus is also a historical fact. The various sources simply point 
to the different traditions, all of which provide evidence that Jesus 
actually rose from ~he dead. 67 
Maier concludes that the will not to believe has kept wany from 
1 . ft' 68 accepting the historica evidence on the quest~on 0 the resurrec ~on. 
The empty tomb is fo~d definitely to be a datum of history according 
66 
67 
68 
I;Iaier, First Easter, Ibid., pp. 105-113, 122; cf. also pp. 77-80 
and "The Empty Tomb as History", ~., p. 5. 
Kaier, First Easter, Ibid., pp. 94, 96. 
Ibid., p. 105 and "The Empty Tomb as History", on.cit., pn 5. 
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to the laws of histo~ical research. 69 This conclusioll is even 
strenghtened -by the "hostile evidence" which has been presented here. 
The stro~gest type of historical evidence is facts which are stated 
about an eve~t by a source which is hostile to that event. ~Jlen such 
a source claims that an event is factual when it is not advantageous 
to de so, this fact is in all probability a genuine one. The empty 
tomb is attested. directly or ind.irectly by Josephus, Tacitus and by 
the witness of l':atthew, Luke (Acts) and Justin l:artyr as to Jewish 
practice with regards to the resurrection. Such Jewish and ~oman 
evidence is hostile 8vidence, for it was not advantageo~s to either 
the Jews or to the Romans to acknowled~e the empty tomb. Other 
histo~ical and. tneological evidence, circ~stantial and otherwise, 
h~s also pointed. ~o this fact. Therefore it can be asserted that 
the empty tomb is historical fact. JO 
From the empty tomb Haier then argues to the probability of 
the resurrection. ~~i~~nce such as that presented above (especially 
the threefold theological proof and the refutation of the naturalistic 
theories) points to the resurrection of Jesus. The historic~l 
evidence is not as strong as that for the empty tomb, but t~e evidence 
on the periphery of this event points to the probability that the 
event itself is historical. 71 
69 
70 
71 
!'1aier, First Easter, Ibid., this conclusion is stated. 0:'1 p. 120. 
I'.iaier, "The Empty Tomb as History", 0-0. cit. , pp. 5-6. 
Ibid., pp. 4- 5 and First 3a.ste:r; 0"0. ci t., pp. 120-122. 
283 
I'·ia.ier has added a very valuable dimension to the study of the 
resurrection of Jesu3 in that he has pur~~ed tIlls subject from the 
standpoint of history. He thus approaches this question from the 
standpoint of the historian looking at theology. In his works, then, 
Uaier certainly does not look at t:r..is question as one for theolog,f 
only. Yet he arrives at the conclusion that tho empty tomb and 
resurrection are historical events according to all probability. 
Admittedly, r~s treatment of the naturalistic theories and 
refutation of them could have been developed more. It has already 
been shO"lm above how important a complete refutatil')n of al terna ti ve 
theories is in order to more fully determine how probable +.he 
resurrection is in actUality. Maier cioes a fairly creditable job 
in t~..is respect, but s~ill does not treat these naturalistic ~vpotheses 
as thoroughly as is possible. 
Perhaps some '.rill object that his treatment of the theological 
question did not deal with theology enough. Yet this letter criticism 
does not rightfully apply since his whole purpose is to approach 
this event as a h:i.Sl;O:r::La1'l 8.!ld not as a theologian. Thus he cannot 
be judged for this second point. 
Therefore, his overall effort has been a ver,f successful one. 
He has logically and historically shown that naturalistic theories 
do not solve the historical needs Oll the one hand a.T1d that valid 
,. + • 1 . t . th • . , . t . h ." " d 72 T"~s mSuorlca pOln ers ~o e resurrec~lon ao eXlS on ~ e o~ner na.T}. . ~~ 
72 Maier, First Easter, Ibid., especially pp. 105-113, 120-122. 
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combination ~akes a strong case for the historicity of the ~esurrection.73 
After inve~tif,ating the claims of three scholars ~hc believe 
that the resurrection can be demonstrated, it must be concluded that the 
positions of Daniel Fuller, Ladd and Kaier are positive in their 
overall approaches and conclusions. We have found that these three 
also present so~e difficulties. However, a logical approach that 
is both historical ~d theological reveals that these positions are 
better supported. by thG evidence than the others v;hich~re discussed 
earlier. It yet re~ains for us to finally ascertain if t~is third 
possibility of de~o~strating the resurrection is th~ one t~at best 
fits the facts. 
73 ?or a very positiye review of Maier's work First Easter and one 
which recobnizes the excellent job done by ~aier in his historical 
d.e:nonstrati::r,~ of Jesils' resurrection, see Lawrence E. l.iartin, 
liThe B.isen Christ", The (:hristian Century, li:ay 16, 1973, p. 577. 
P~T 3 
An 3valuation-of the Solutions to the 
~uestion of the Resurrection of Jesus 
Chapter XI. An Evaluation of Possibility Number One 
Chapters five and six investigated the possibility t~at the 
resurrection of Jesus did not actually occur. In chapte= five it 
was shown that the ~ost influential position here was held by histo=ian 
and philosopher David Eume. His essay ItOf :.liracles" set t~;.e stage 
for other views which also rejected the resurrection as a~ event, 
usually because it was held that such events were iffipossible from 
the outset because they contra.dicted. the laws of nature. 
It was apparent especially in chapter six that Protestant 
liberalism followed 2ume in this position. In fact, Jo:hl1 S:en.an 
Randall, Jr. ex~lains that Protestant liberalism as a w~ole followed 
Eume in this line of reaso~ing. Hume's influence extende~ not only 
to t:he nineteenth century liberals, but also on to this prese~t day 
7.':"l.ere r:en of this theological persuasion have often continued to 
other scholars also note t:hat Hume's essay beca~e t~e ~efinitive 
stance for liberalism with regards to all miracles. S:nith agrees with 
on d 11· "'b· . . 2 
.;I.an a ::l.n" .::l.S asser"t:Lcn. :Jontgomery likewise affir4ls th.e fact 
'that ooth nint:tE:8ilth a:::.d t;;zr.tieth century theology deri vee.. its 
belief in the impossibility of oiracles from Eume. 3 
2 
3 
Randall, on.cit., pp. 293, 553-554. 
Smith, ou.cit., un. 142-143. 
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theolo.~, 0-;:'. cit., pp. 28, 
37-38. 
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It is interesting t~at tnese liberal t~eologians t~e~selves 
also acknowledged that their views were based upon t~e stance taken 
by ~ume. For instance, in nineteenth century liberalism, David strauss 
was explicitly willing to acknowledge this dependence. For this 
scholar, Rume's essay had forever settled the question of the miraculous. 
4 Supernatural, nature-contradicting miracles simply do not occur. 
Ot~er liberals also followed the position taken by Strauss in 
that they also favored Eume's position against miracles. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, like Eume, asserted that miracles are foun~ ~~ere 
there is little knowledge of the laws of nature. ~iracles actually 
oppose nature and the idea of the miraculous must be abandoned. 5 
Heinrich Paulus likewise followed Eume in believing that ~i~acles 
are usually said to ha-ve occurred where there is a deficiGnt knowledge 
of nature. Scripture is mistaken in claiming that miracles did 
occur and when the 7.orkings of nature are revealed, this mistake 
becomes even clearer. 6 Bruno Baur also affirmed that no events like 
~iracles occur ~~ic~ break the laws of nature. 7 For Ernst ?enan, 
Jesus believed that miracles were common,not because they actually 
~ere, but because he was unfamiliar with the uniformity of nature's 
4 
6 
7 
Strauss, The rew Life of Jesus, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 199-201. 
Schleiermac~er, The Christian Faith. op.cit., see especially vol. I, 
pp. 179, ISl, 183. Cf. also vol. I, pp. 71, 178-184; vol. II, 
pp. 448-449 and Schleiermacher's On Religion: Sneeches to its 
Cultured Desnisers, on.cit., pp. 88-89, 113-114 note n~ber 16. 
Schweitzer, op.cit., pp. 51-53. 
Ibid., p. 154. 
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8 laws. 
Later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, liberal 
theologians were still following Hume and his reasons for rejecting 
~iracles. Otto Pfleiderer held a notion that was very co~o~, especially 
since Eume--that the events of nature follow an unchanging regularity 
and order. 9 Adolf vo~ Harnack added his voice to the grOF.inC ~ist of 
scholars who accepted, along with E:'.!Ile, the belief that ancient 
peoples believed the miraculous because they did not ~~derst2nd the 
laws of nature. They did not realize that events which interrupt 
nature never occur. Thus, miracles cannot be believed. lO 
In the twentieth century, as mentioned above, liberal theologians 
continued to accept Zume's position on miracles as the definitive one~ 
Rudolf ~ultmann accepts the view that the modern conceptions of 
nature and science do not allow for miracles. Eecau3~ of the natural 
laws, the universe is closed to Supernatural workings. Thus ~iracles 
11 
are no longer acceptable in today's world. For Paul Tillich, no 
events such as miracles can break the laws of nature. 12 John A.T. 
Robinson holds th~t the Biblical ~irac1es are myths because natural 
processes cannot be interupted by God's interventi on. The ~:ei'i" Testament 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Renan, Life of Jesus, £p.cit., pp. 147-155. 
Pfleide:cer, Tn\~ Phi10sonhy and :Development of Re1ib'ion, 0"0. ci t. , 
vol. I, pp. 5- 6.. 
Harnack, -.'That is Christianity?, op.cit., pp. 25-31. 
Bu1 tmann, "l-;ew Testament and ~;!ythology" in Kerygma and IJyth, 0-0. ci t. , 
pp. 4-5. 
Tillich, Syste~atic Theology, on.cit., vol. I, pp. 115-117. 
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cosmology must therefore be abandoned. 13 
It is ~uite obvious from this foregoing survey that both nineteenth 
and twentieth century liberal theologians have follorred 3:u::le in 
rejecting all possibility for the miraculous. That Eume ivas the 
primary inspiration for this viewpoint is also plain. 
Yet it has beer.. shown above that Eume's thesis failed to provide 
an adequate prohibitive against the occ~rrence of mi=acles. Four 
maj or objections were raised against his view. Eriefly, it was fiz'st 
discovered that ~~e utilized a series of logical errors, especially 
circular reasoning and begging the question. ~his is especially 
noticeable in his defini tior.. of miracle a..."ld. in his assumption of the 
negative value of all experience of miracles, when just such an 
investigation of this experience might demonstrate the probability 
of a miracle. Second, Eume arbitrarily rejects miracles even where 
he recognizes a high credibility for the Supernatural event described. 
Third, Eume rejects miracles because of a faulty view of the uniformity 
of nature which he hi2self had rejected in other works. This 
incorrect view of nature is the center of his polemic and. must therefore 
be rejected. ?ourth, in spite of 5ume'sagreements with modern thought 
in several aspects of his work, he reverted to a pre-mode=n stance 
with respect to his view'of miracles. Although he rejected the then-
popular view of a closed universe and opted for the use of probabilities, 
he inconsistent1;>" rejected miracles froill. the ou.tset because the;:r were 
believed to be impossible. He also ignored any probabilities for 
13 Robinson, Eonest to God, on.cit., pp. 11-18, 64-68. 
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~iracles and th~s r~led them out in a way which is not consistent 
with the above modern concepts which he accepted. nere he is pre-
, _ . 14 
mocern anc ~n error. 
All ten of tne theologians just surveyed also agree in accepting 
the view that the u~iverse is closed to all occurrences of Supernatural 
miracles. These events are generally conceived of as being impossible 
because they oppose the workings of natu.=e. Ancient peoples who 
accepted such reports as true were often said to have done so because 
they did not U!lderstand nature proy erly.15 It is therefore more 
possible to verify the contention of Randall, ~ontgomery and Smith 
given above that all of liberalisffi as a whole followed Huoe in these 
conclusions. 16 J. Gresham Machen concurs with these scholars that 
liberalism did indeed agree in abandoning belief in the ~iraculous.17 
Eecause both nineteenth and twentieth century liberalism followed 
Eume's reasoning in its rejection of the miraculous, it is thus 
possible to ascertain that these theologians were, like ::"''"'':1l':l. -~-, also 
in error concer~ing these views. For these reasons it is not surprising 
to find that almost the same criticisrr.s of Hume which ~ere related in 
14 
15 
, I' 
.J,.t,; 
17 
::his s1m:D.ar~~ of tr..e criticisms of ~ume is necessarily a brief one 
and thus the l~gic for these four criticisms cannot be properly 
analyzed fro~ this presentation. For a com~lete analysis of the 
reasoning behind these statements, see chapter five. 
See thE: above refere!2(\I?B to these ten theologians for tl:ese beliefs 
(to varying ezte~ts) on the part of each of the~. In order to 
ascertain how siEilar the beliefs of these theologians are to Hume's 
stance against miracles, compare chapter five. 
See footnote n:umbers one through three above and the corresponding 
discussion. 
J. Greshan Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (Gran~ ~~pids: 
~il1ia~ B. Eerd2an's Publishing Co~pany, 1923), pp. 107-109. 
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c~a?ter five wit~ regard to the use of improper presuppositions and 
an incorrect methodology and concerning the use of a faulty view of 
the uniformity of nature also apply to these other scholars. As ~~e 
was found to be in error in these concepts, so also is liberal theology 
likewise in error here. !\~iracles cannot be ruled out by such anapproach. 
A second indic~tion that the method employed by theoloGical 
liberalis~ since E~ue's ti~e is in error coneens the naturalistic 
theories ~hic~ have been suggested in order to account for the 
resurrection of Jesus~ Such hypotheses were necessary in order to 
explain an event which had alr~ady been rejected ~ la ~Uhle. The 
lI:.ajor theories vihich have been formulated against the resur::'ection 
"" 18 have been discussed above and refuwed. An investigation of each 
de~onstrated that tLey could not properly account for what is known 
to have occurred. ~ach can be adequately refuted historically, 
logically and theologically.l9 
That none of the naturalistic theories ade~uately accounts for 
the resurrection of Jesus is indeed an extremely acute point against 
theological liberalis~'s stance on the resurrection. Our ~~deavor 
has been to find the historical conclusion which is most probable--
the one which best accounts for what is known to have occurred. Yet, 
none of even the "strongest" alternative theories is even persuasive, 
let alone being proba~le. A more ade~~ate solution is defi~itely 
18 
19 
The major th€0:ri.8::1 c::.,lve:.nced to explain the resurrec"t~o~-;. have been 
discussed earlier. It was found that formulations baseQ UTIon a 
swoon, subjective or .ob jecti ve visions (including the "tel~gra!Il 
theory" and ideas of the continuing spiritual presence of Jesus' 
personality in the 7Linds of the disciples), the influence 0f other 
ancient myths, the growt~ of legen1s or fraud (including the stolen 
body theory) all failed to account for the known facta. See 
especially chapter six above. 
See the conclusions a6ainst each of these theories, es?ecially in 
chapter six. Cf. for exa:nple, l!aier, ?irst Easter, on. cit., p.113 
and L2dd, ~it., pp. 139-141. 
292 
needed here. 
! third indication that the liberal theological positiou on the 
resurrection is incorrect is the fact that even those who formulated 
naturalistic theories against this event joined in the deci~ation of 
other "rival" theories. Thus it was shown earlier how strauss and 
Renan (among others) were both strongly opposed to Paulus' swoOu 
theory. In fact, it is usually believed that Strauss himself gave 
the final death-blow to the t~eory, which destroyed it for good. 
However, Strauss' vision theory was opposed strenuously by such 
scholars as Schleiermacher, Paulus and Kei~. Once again it was a 
liberal theologian, Keim, who is generally considered to be th~ one 
20 
whose logical ar£"'X!lents disposed of stra.uss' theory. 
While such opposition by thcse of a similar theologica.l stance 
surely does not auto~atically prove these theories to be wrong, the 
indications are each felt that the other naturalistic theories 
were in error. This points to a real dissatisfaction with such theories 
on the part of these scholars. None could convince ~ t~ose of 
21 his own theolo~ical nersuasion that his view was the most probable one. 
20 
21 
See the discussion of these facets in chapter six above. 
Admittedly, no one is able to convince everyone that his view is 
right. However, if there was a naturalistic theory ~hich was 
probable, one ;:ould t~.i!l_1c that those who otherwise objected to the 
facticity of the resurrection would be able to agree on that 
theory. However, the point being stressed here is not so much 
that the liberal scholars could not agree on anyone theory, but 
rather that the inherent weaknesses in each were pOinted out. 
In other words, these scholars provided adequate refutations of 
each of the theories and thus revealed that they were not capable 
of accounting for the facts. 
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There are thus three verJT import~it reasons for holding that 
the 8..:.iSWer to the resurrection v!hich is sug~ested by IIume and by all 
of theological liberalism fails to accou.."'1t adequately for what is 
known to have occurred. First, much of the criticism directed 
against Rume in chapter five also applies to liberalism's approach 
to this event. Thus the entire methodology and the yresuppositions 
which are used are invalid, as is the faulty view of the uniformity 
of nature. The resurrection fuid other miracles caru~ot peoperly be 
negated b:r these methods. Trois point alone is devastating to these 
positions. Second, the fact that no r~turalistic theory adequately 
accounts for what occurred is 8..:.! even stronger point against Eume 
~"'1d liberalism. 7hat no probability can be estaclished for ~~Y such 
alternative theory derrDnstrates tr~t none of these ~~~otheses can 
be accepted as the probable solution. Third, not even those wno 
reject the resurrectio~ agree that a.~y theory adequately accounts 
for the evidence. Rather, several scholars were content to destroy 
the 2rune~ts for theories w~ic~ opposed their O\~, clearly reveali~~ 
tbe irulerent weakrlesses of each. 
It is popular in contemporary theolog-,f to den;:r Jesus' literal 
resurrectio::1 a...~d at the saIne time to affirm that in some way he can 
still·DB said to be alive today. For instance, 3ultma.L!D contends 
that although Jesus did not actually rise from the dead,22 he still 
neets us through the words of preaching as the risen Lord. Thus~ while Jesus 
22 Bultman."'1, "lJev; Testament and :.IytholoGY" in Kerygma and J.t{th, 
op.cit., pp. 33, 42 for example. 
hi~self did not actually rise fro~ the dead as the New Testament affirms, 
we can still encounter the risen Lord tod?y by faith in the 'words 
which are preached. In fact it is only by this mode that the 
resurrection becomes present and it thereby becomes possible to meet 
the risen Jesus. 23 
~arxsen likewise accepts such a formulation. Althou~~ Jesus is 
,,}, 
dead, his :;~~er of f~it~ has not losi;: its validity~'" because Jesus 
lives today in the content of Christian preaching. Thus Jesus' 
activity continues beyond the grave~ ~e shows himself to be alive 
because men still continue to respond to him in faith.25 For 
Earxsen, Jes~s' res~Trection is thus not the raising of a dead man 
from the grave ~ but rather the cruci fi.ed and dead Jesus still 
26 influencing men to believe even today. 
The purpose behind such theological maneuvers is obvious. The 
desire is to be able to continue to teach that the Christian faith 
is still valid fo:: modern man even though many are still Llclined 
to reject the resurrection as an actual event in history. In this 
way trac.itional beliefs which in the lIew Test2.!!lent are a result of 
the resurrectio!;. can be confirmed i::-~ a way that· is more har:J.onious 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Ibid., pp. 41-43. R. Lofton Hudson reaches a similar conclusion 
concerninb Jesus' being alive in the preaching of the church. 
See R. Lofton Eudson, n",rna t One Easter Meant to 1.~e", Christian 
Century, April 18, 1913, pp. 450-452, especially p. 451. 
~~rxsen, o~.cit., p. 141. 
Ibid., pp. 11, 11J, 128, 141, ., 1.1, 
.1.."''''. 
Ibid., cf. pp. 128-129 with p. 141. 
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wi th modern thoilb"11t. 
Eowever, this position is quite o'bviously laden with several 
incredibilities. There are at least two valid reasons for rejecting 
such a theological stance. 
First, such an ~~derstanding of Jesus' resurrection, whereby 
he is said to be alive even though he did not literally rise from the 
dead, is contrary to the earliest Christian understanding of this 
event, The Jewish conception of resurrection involved the raising 
of the body. The first century Christians likewise believed in the 
resurrection of a sniritual body as clearly shown above, and Jesus 
was believed to have literally risen in this way. Therefore, to 
assert that this modern view is close to the New Testamer.t is ridiculous. 27 
For the earliest believers, Jesus was said to be alive at present, 
but because he had literally risen from ~he dead, not bec~use h~6 
influence had si~~ly continued beyond the grave in spite of being dead. 
As asserted by :':aier, the !!lodern concept that the Christian 
faith wonld still be valid even if Jesus had never risen bodily 
would be nothin~ but nonsense to Paul and other first century Christians. 28 
Brown agrees, adding that formulations such as llarxsen's are of 
little value if they do not do justice to the New Testa~ent stance, 
which allows only one interpretation of the resurrection-~a literal 
resuscitation. 29 Ladd states this well: 
27 
28 
29 
The Xew Testa::lent know.s nothing about the persistence of Jesus' 
personality apart from the resurrection of the body_ Neither 
Ksrxsen does sU6~est just this (0'0. ci t., pp. 144-145). 
l:aier, tiThe Smpty Tomb as History", 0"0. ci t., p. 5 and :.:aier' s 
First Easter, on.cit., p. 115. 
Brown, The Vir~nal Concention and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, 
on.cit., p. 75, footnote number 128. 
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does the New Testament know the 'resurrection of the spirit' 
to heaven ••• If his body is !!lol1lderinr:; in a Palestinian tomb, 
he cannot be the exalted Lord ••• 30 
Admittedly, the New Testament concept of Jesus' resurrection is 
not self-vindicating. But the point here is a crucial one. The 
testimony of Paul is that if Jesus did not rise literally in a spiritual 
body in such a way that he could appear to others, then he did not rise 
at all ( I -'£or. 15: 1-19). This is the choice T.'7hich is open to us. 
Either Jesus rose literally or he carillot be said to be alive in any 
other than in a spiritual sense. To take a IT~ddle ground which claims 
that Jesus is alive but that he did not rise from the dead is not 
open to us. The earliest Christians in particular would not recognize 
such a comprocising belief. If Jesus was dead~ Christian theology 
could not be true at all. If Jesus is dead, neither c~~ contemDOraIJ~ 
theolo~J hold to the other affirr.ations ~~d doctrines of the C~ristifu~ 
faith. They all starHl or fall together. 
Second, logic alone dictates that t~is conceTlt of the 
resurrection is invalid. As Ladd fi~y states, if Jesus did not 
. """1 f t' , 'h~' , • . ·'l d .31 !'lse Doal y ro~ ne tom~, vnen ne lS Stl~_ eaa. It is plain that 
if a person is dead he cannot still be alive lli~less one is 8peaking 
of spiritual immortality or of the continuation of one's personality 
as he is remembered by others or some such ~~derstanding. Apart from 
.just such a resu:rrection as the New TestaIT'.ent ?roclaims, Jesus ca..~ot be 
said to be any more ali ve tha..~ a..'"1yone else who h5.5 ever died. Apart 
from a literal resurrection, he could still be influencing people 
todaJ~ only in the S2nse of the continued af:ect of his life a..'1d 
teaci,1ings upon others. B~~t to say that Jesus is risen because of 
30 Ladd, op.cit., pp. 146-147. 
31 Ibid., pp. 152-153, footnote number five. 
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su.c~:, spiritual immortality cr influe:Qce is plainly illogical and 
l...'1accu.:'ate. It also D:..,·olves a gross i,::'sappropriation of words. 
The early Cr~istian belief in Jesus' resurrection could not 
have survived if Jesus' body was still rotting in the grave. 32 In 
fc.;,c ~: n.v part of the Chri s+ 'i<L'"l faith could. be consi dered true if 
Jesus had never risen fr0lli th~ dead. Ladd states this fact quite 
well: 
But if Jesus is dead. 33 his entire message is negated. If 
he is dead, he cannot come in his Kingdom •.•• Furthermore 
Jesus' te2.ching about the yresence of the Kingdom and its 
blessings is also a delusion, for the presence of the Kingdom-
blessip~s was but an anticipation of the eschatological 
Kingdom to be established by the heavenly Son of ~;ra.Tl •••. If 
Jesus is dead, his entire message about the Kingdom of God is 
o. delllsion, If .Jes'!.!s is dead, the heart of the New Testament 
Christology is' also a delusion. 34 
For these reasons, whereb~'" it is held 
that Jesus is alive even though he did not literally rise from the 
dead cannot be valid. Such an interyretation does not coincide with 
the Ne~ Testa~ent ~Tlderstanding of this event ~'1d so caTlllot be 
understood as such. The New Testarr:eilt presents a lIdo or die:! attitude 
as regards the literal resur:t.'ection of Jesus. Only if it occurred 
li terally can we hold Christia.'1 theoJ.ogy to be valid. Any otner 
understa.'1ding of this event is therefore not possible if one still 
desires to embrace Christian doctrine. 
32 
34 
35 
At t:i.s point in the abov-2 gt:.ote, Ladd supplies a footnote in 
y{r:.ich he states his view tl:'1..at those who believe that Jesus is 
still aliVe but '~ho insist that ~e did not rise bodily from the 
tomb are voicing all illogical ODl!llOn. Jesus either arose or 
he is dead (Ladd, op.cit., pp. 152-153, footnote number 5). 
Ibid., pp. 145-146. 
~".a~hen notes that ""~i.s interp::-etation was also prevalent in the 
older liberalism of t:1E:; niilcteentr. and early twentieth centuries 
(op.cit., pp.108-109). 
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In addition, this modern formulation is quite illogical. A dead 
~an who did not rise from the dead is no more alive tnan any other 
dead individual. Such a man could only influence people by the 
ins~iration of his ~ life and teachings. But such a person has 
not "risen" and is not alive any more than any other person. His 
present spiritual existence would therefore not be uni~ue. Only by 
a literal resurrection can an individual be proclaimed as being risen •. 
Thus we must cor.c~ude that David Eume and theological liberalism 
as a whole (both nineteenth and twentieth century) do not offer a 
valjd approach to the resurrection of Jesus. The methodologJr and 
/" 
presuppositions which are used have been shown to be in error, as 
is the incorrect conception of the uniformity of nature. ~ithout 
these faul~y premises the subse~uent conclusions which were postulated 
against the resurrection ~~st assuredly cannot be h~ld. ~lso, the 
naturalistic theories which were proposed as alternate suggestions 
to account for the belief in the resurrection were shown to be 
inadequate to account :or the known facts. These theories fall short 
historically, logically and theologically. In addition, liberal 
theologians themselves showed that the alternate theories uere not 
valid by demonstrating the inadequacies of each one. 
It was likewise determined that the popular modern understanding 
of Jesus as beinb "risen" and "alive" today in spite of his having never 
risen from the dead is also a totally inadequate conception. It must 
be rejectea, as shown above, in that it violates the earliest Christian 
understanding of this event and because it is quite illogical. 
It is therefore necessary that the answer given by Hume and by 
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contemporary liberal theology since his time be rejected as an 
inade~uate solution to the ~uestion of the resurrectio~. None of 
the naturalistic theories are even historically plausible, let alone 
probable, and must therefore be abandoned. This theory that the 
resurrection did n~t occur thus fails at the crucial point of not 
being able to for~ulete a probable alternate theory or othe=wise to 
properly rule out the resurrection. Any alternative theory such as 
these which have been examined and refuted here must therefore be 
rejected. 36 
The questions disc~ssed in this chapter are very i~portar.t ones. 
All of Christian theology relies on the validity of the resurrection 
and it is therefore imperative to understand if this event is an 
actual occurre~ce. To say that Jesus is riser. or alive, but that he 
did not literally rise from the dead just cO:lpou.."lds the dile::-zra. 
is inade~uate as an answer to the ~uestion of whether Jesus really 
rose. It is our desire to evaluate the other possibilities in order 
to ascertain if they can come any closer to a probable anSi·:er. 
Such theories ";;o1l1d of cO'J.rse be re jected regardless of whether 
a theologian, historian, philosopher or other such scholar 
formulated the hypotheses. The field of specialty ma~:es :::0 
difference here, as the alternative theory would still be forced 
to answer the sa~e objections as were raised above. 
Chapter XII. An Evaluation of Possibility Nucber TriO 
In chapte]Sseven and eight the possibility ~as investigated 
that the resurrection of Jesus actually occurred, but that it cannot 
be demonstrated as such. It was shown in chapter seven that the most 
influential position here was that of theologian and philosopher 
s~ren Kierkegaard. It also beca~e obvious, especially in chapter 
eight, that man;)" others have followed him in this belief. 
It has just been found that the conclusion that the resurrection 
did not occur fails in that it can neither provide a probable 
solution to the facts or otherwise properly negate this event. Thus 
an answer must be found elsewhere. 
Kierkegaard popularized the conclusion that the resurrection 
(and other miracles) actually happened, but that this event cannot 
be proven to have occurred. It can only be accepted by faith. It 
is solely by faith and not by any type of deoonstration wn~tsoever 
that we co~e to know God. 
This position 7.as further developed by Karl Barth, :7ho clearly 
accepted the resurrection as a historical event which actu~lly occurred. 
But like Kierkegaard, this event cannot be proven to have occurred 
at all. However, Barth followed earlier theologians like !:artin 
~,II'!.o." • !\.8;:;,LJ.er ::.n relegatin; the resurrection to other than totally objec~ive 
history. This event was believed to have occurred in a nonvzrifiable 
type of history which is removed fro~ objective tests such as 
historical investigation. 
Many theologians followed Barth in these views. Today it is 
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quite popular to conceive of the resurrecticr. a real event, but 
one which is not verifiable. 
The rationale behind such a theory is apparently to be able to 
affirm the resurrection as a real event for faith but at the same 
time to re~ove this event from the critical eye of modern historiography. 
Thus it appears that Barth's intention (and those who agree with him) 
is to remove the Christian faith from this realm of modern historical 
methodology and thus to keep Christianity from any possibility of 
being critically investigated. l Such methods of verification'are 
viewed as being opposed to the New Testament presentation of 
fai tho 2 
In spite of 3arth i s seeming desire to !lpreserve" Christianity 
from all such critical investigations, his formulation is still quite 
problematical. It has already been found in chapter three above that 
history is required to investigate all. possible facts surroll..""lding an 
event in order to find the !!lost probable conclusion.. It 7'8.S concluded 
tha~ neither science or history can rule out tnemiraculous a ~riori. 
Rather, all of the facts must be thoroughly investigated with the 
conclusion which best SUDuorts the facts being viewed as the probable 
- --
one. Therefore a miracle such as the resurrection might be found to 
1 
2 
See Elaikie, ou.cit., pp. 122-136 and Montgomery's History and 
Christianity, ou.cit., pp. 87-89. an~ Where is History Going?, 
op.cit., pp. 115-116. 
Barth makes this claim, for instance, in his Church DOgmatics, 
ou.cit., vol. IV, part 1, pp. 335-336. 
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be the probable conclusion and thus be viewed as an actual historical 
event. For this reasor., Earth need not feel that the facts of 
Christianity must be preserved from historical or other types of 
investigation. If these facts are found to be probable they will 
thereby defend themselves. Otherwise such an event would not merit 
the faith which the l~ew Testament asserts is dependent upon it. 
Barth is therefore in error in recom~ending such a proced~re as 
being essential. 
This last criticism of Earth's method is in addition to the other 
major problems which have been pointed out in chapters seven and eight 
with regards to both ?:ierkegaard' s and Barth' s position (an::: also 
concerning those scholars who follow them). Briefly, there ~ere 
three major criticisms directed against Kierkegaard. First, even 
Zierkegaard hi~self is not successful in buildinb a theological 
system that is not first built on some reasonable foun~ation. For 
instance, his polemic for fait~ and subjectivity is somewhat rational, 
as he ~akes use of both logic and reason. Even his convictions were 
shown to be rationally-based. In fact, his entire system could not 
be for~ulated apart from reason. Thus it is shown to be impossible 
to have faith apart from some sort of rational basis. Second, since 
faith is construed as being te~porally first and reason is civen no 
real place by this scholar, it is not possible to know if such faith 
is valid. Since there would be no objective criteria by which to 
exa~ine the Christi~~ faith, we cannot know if it is correct in its 
beliefs or not. Faith must therefore be testable ill orQer to 
deter~ine if it is valid. Otherwise one never ascertain whether he 
30; 
was right in this faith and whether his belief was trust~orthy and 
:actual, or if it was 5i~ply spurious.; 
From the :irst two criticisms of Kierkecaard it beco29s apparent 
that 1) reason is te~porally first and 2) faith needs an objective 
foun~ation so that it can be verified. A third criticism of Kierkegaard 
naturally follows from these first two. Since some reasonable 
verification is therefore needed upon which faith can be b~ilt, a 
historical exa~ination of the claims of Christianity is the most 
likely procedure. At any rate, such a reasonable method could not 
be opposed since just such an objective basis is needed. 4 
From this treatnent of Kierkegaard, some of the wea~:nesses of 
this proposec ap?roach to the resurrect~on can be more clc~rly seen. 
There is definitely a need for a more objective approach to this event. 
In addition to the one given above, four major criticis~s were 
also presented co~cerning Barth's modification of this method. 5 
Eriefly, the first criticism concerns Earth's development of the 
idea that Jesus' resurrection occurred in prehistory or parahisto!~~y. 
It involves a t~ofold critique. History knows 0: no such concept 
3 
4 
5 
?or the reasoninG for these first two criticis~s, see chapter four 
above. 
The logical steps for these three criticisms of Kierkegaard cannot 
be completely ascertained from this brief summary. See chapter 
seven for an indepth study of this critique. 
These four criticis~s of Earth were later altered in chapter eight 
so that they also applied to the scholars who followed hi~. 
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where events ca.n occur on the boundary or out2~~irts of history. This 
realm cannot be measured by historical methods and is th~s invalid. 
Additionally, Barth allows no verification for events in prehistory, 
but still insists that they are actually his~~:ical. 50wever, actual 
history can -be examinee. ana. inv13stigated. If the resurrection occurred 
in history it must be open to such investigation or it car~ot be 
referred to as objective history. Second, like Kierkegaard, ]arth's 
method allows no :leans whereby the Christia.n faith can be examined. 
Thus, once again, it cannot be determined if this faith is valid or 
not. To re~ove Cnristianity f=~= ~~J investigation is to make it so 
subjective that no one could actually ascertain its trustworthiness. 
One could not be sure whether his belief was factual. 
Third, Barth accepts the death of Jesus as an event which 
occurred in real history in the modern sense of the word, ~hile the 
resurrection is relecated to prehistory. Yet both events are 
believed to be revelatory. Earth is therp-fore illogical to Qeclare 
that God does n0t reveal Eimself in objective, verifiable events. 
Since !3:e did so at the cross, 3e could also do so with the ::-esu::-::-ectioll. 
Thus the resurrection could also logically be history in t~e modern 
verifiable, objective sense. The fourth criticism of Barth is that 
he has clearly been shown to be wrong in his belief that the New 
Testament does not ever try to deoonstrate the resurrection. To the 
contrary, such a procedure occurs several times. 6 Thus he cannot claim 
6 For example, see I Cor~nthians 15:4-8, especially verse 6; L~~e 
24:36-43; John 20:24-28; Acts 1:;; 10:40-41. Christian doctrines 
are also sai~ to be true because of the resurrection (see Acts 
17 =3~ ~,. ~~ma~s '·4) • v-./ .. , _ .. v_._ - • • 
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Scriptural backing for his method. 7 
For the reasom stated here, this second possible solution 
to the resurrectior. also fails to account properly for the facts 
which are kno~~ to be true. Admittedly, it is laden with fewer 
problems that the first ~ethod discussed in the last chapter. For 
instance, this solution is not required to offer any naturalistic 
alternative views concerning the resurrection. But the approach 
taken by Kierkegaard, Earth and others c~~not adequately deal with 
all of the criticisms raised here and must therefore be rejected as 
an incorrect treat~ent of Jesus' resurrection. 
As co~cluded in chapters seven and eight, Kierke;aard and 
Barth both agree that faith in Christ is the most important element 
of Christianity. Thz same was also found to be true in this study 
, 
in ~ha?ter four above, with faith as the more crucial elenent being 
built upon a reasonable look at the facts. Therefore, their 
conception of faith can remain valid even though the methodology by 
which they reach this conolusion is faulty'. This is because the 
same conclusion, namely the importance of faith, can also be reached 
objecti~ely.8 
For both Xierkegaard and Barth, the center of Christi~nity is 
salvation by faith and co~itment to Jesus as the Christ. Salvation 
7 
8 
As with Rierkegaard, the reasons for these four criticisns cannot 
be fully gleaned from this brief survey. See especially chapter 
eight for the rationale here. 
This was the result of the logical study of faith and re~son in 
chapter four. 
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is achieved ~nen an individual is convicte~ that he is a si~ner and 
ex~eriences a co~plete change in his life by repentance. ~~is 
spiri tua1 experie!lce consists of the individual trusting t;le death 
of Christ on thG cross as a subsitutionary death to pay for his 
sins and surrendering his life to God in faith as a result. loth 
of these theologians also stress the subsequent com~itment ~d the 
changed life which ~ill result from a genuine conversion. 9 
Because of the afore~entioned s~udy of the reason-faith relation-
ship, these cO!lc1usio!ls concerning the primary importance of faith 
must therefore be accepted as valid. They faithfully represent the 
~ew Testament position on this subject an~ will be found to be 
even more trustworthy if the resurrection is found to be an actual 
histcrica1 event because a firm, objective grounding will then 
have been give!l tc this concept of faith. 
9 For Kierkegaard is view, see especJ.a.!.i.;)r Attack Upon II Christendom" , 
on.cit q p]. 149, 210, 213, 280, 267; cf. Heinecken's "S¢ren 
Kie!'kegaard", in r'::arty and Pee!'man, q,p.cit., pp. l3! .. , 153, 134. 
For Earth's vieu, see in part:cu1ar his Church uOgmatics, on.cit., 
vol. IV, ~art 1, pp. 248-254. 
Chapter XIII. Evaluation of Possibility Number Three 
The third possible solution to the resurrection of Jesus was 
investigated in chapters nine and ten, a solution which ?ost~lated 
that the resurrection actually occurred and that it can be demonstrated 
to be a historical event. It was determined in chapter nine that 
Wolfhart Pannenberg is probably the best kno\vn representative of 
this viewpoint. Several other scholars likewise hold this view 
witho~t followine Par~enberg in these conclusions. In chapter ten 
the views of three other key scholars who also believe that the 
res~rrection can be demonstrated to have occurred in history were 
also enumerated. 
Generally speaking, each of these four scholars holds that history 
:r;.ust be investigatec3 ifl order to ascertain if the resurrection occurred. 
All agree that one Dust not be prejudiced concerning what is 
possible or inpossible in such an investigation. The onl:.~ TIay to 
ascertain if a Supernatural event such as the resurrection has 
act:.:a.lly occurred is to exar:line the facts and then decide ,.hich 
concl:.:sion best fits these facts. This conclusion is to be accepted 
as the nost ~robable one and is thus to be viewed as a historical 
fact, even if it is a miracleo 
After an exa=ination of the available evidence, each of these 
four scholars arrives at the conclusion that the resurrection is the 
event that best explains what happened. The method varies a little 
be:ween each of t:-~ese !:len, but the primary result is the same. The 
facts are best explainec by the resurrection and as this is the most 
;07 
308 
probable solution, it is regarded as histo=ical fact. l 
In spite of the logical approach taken by these scholars, 
SO:::le difficulties ,',ere detected in their work. This was especially 
true of ?annenbere's thesis. First, his concept of God was discovered 
to be quite arbitrary, lacking a sufficient amount of de~onstration. 
Contrary to Pannenberg's belief, Jesus does not speak exclusively 
of God's working from the future. To hold such a position one 
must already have ass~ed that God ~orks in this way in order to 
interpret all verses in light of this idea. This would be especially 
difficult ~ith the verses which W8re shown to teach the opposite vier.. 
Second, in spite of Pannenberg's conception of the indirect Self-
revelation of God, it was shown that the Jews also viewed revelation 
as occurring directly through beth the spoken word of the prophets 
an~ the written ~ord of Scripture. Thus it cannot be held that the 
indi=ect revelation of God in history was the only means of revelation 
accented by the Je~s. 
Third, it "lias found tb.at Pa:nnenberg's overall system lacks proof 
at several crucial points. It is especially in the formulation of 
his seven theses that there is a decided lack of evidence for his 
views. This proclivity is perhaps best evidenced by the co~~ection of 
both revelation and the fate of Jesus with the end of history. Several 
1 Ladd's conception of the resurrection occurring in history does 
differ somewhat from the others, and this has already been considered 
above. All four scholars agree that this event is the best 
explanation of the historical facts and thus they also agree in· 
accepting it as the most probable conclusion. 
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proble~s r.hich arise as a result of these for~ulations were pointed 
out above. !n fact, ?annenberg's theological fra~ework as a ~hole, 
althuugh interesti~G, sometimes lacks the de~onstration nee~ed to 
establish it beyon~ the realm of philosophical speculation. Fourth, 
Pannenberg's treatment of the =esurrection fails in two respects. 
First, he fir~ly accepts this occurrence as a historical event, but 
rejects any stronsly objective appearances of Jesus eve!l ',"in,m the 
evidence indicates otherwise. But it was shown that s1lch conclusions 
are unwarranted and that the witness of the ~ew Testa~ent is to the 
contrary. 1~?ertheless, this scholar does indeed believe that Jesus 
actually did rise fro~ the dead and appear to his disciples. 
The second part of th:s fourth criticis~ concerns ?a~~enberg's 
treatment of the naturalistic theories which have been co=posed in 
opposition to the resurrection. With the exception of s~bjective 
vision theory, his critique of these alternate theories is not as 
strong as it could have been. Yet it is imperative that these 
naturalistic vierrs be refut~d as conclusively ~s possible. c: • ..." ... J..nce u.r~e 
resurrection is the central elewent in the Christian fait~, it is 
essential to ascertain if this eve~t actually occurred. ~herefore, 
a co~plete refut~tion of the naturalistic hypotheses would allow 
a ~ore accu~ate d~cision on the probability of the resurrection. Also, 
the more thorough the refutation of these alternate vie~sis, the 
easier it is both to conclude that there are no views which are ~ore 
probable than Jesus' resurrection as a historical event and the more 
probable the resurre~tion is shown to be. 
It was likei';ise found that Daniel Fuller, Ladd and :':aier also 
fell prey to t~is last criticis~. Like Pannenberg, these tr~ee 
scholars were also successful in refuting the major alter~ative theories. 
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But also like Pannenberg, seldom was a c~mplete refutatio~ Given. 
Once again, a ::nore thorou::;h and entire negation of the rival views 
on the part of all fo~r scholars nould reveal even ~ore ~ositively 
if there were any probable solutions other thar the literal 
resurrection of Jes~s. The more complete this investigatio~ and 
refutati0u is, t~e easier it is the verify that the resurr~ction is 
the East probable answer and the !!lore probabacle this eve~t itself 
becomes. Since all four scholars endeavor to establish t::'2 probability 
0: 't!'::!.s event~ th8 c'-eject should of course be to do so as 2.ccu=a.tely 
and thoroughly as possib1e. 2 
In addition to this one com~on criticism made of all four of 
these scholars co~c6rning their inco::np1ete treatuents of the 
alternate theories, other more individual criticisms were pointed out 
above. 3ut ir. all cases, these critiques did not annul t~e Q€fense 
of the resurrection ~hich was presented by each of the four. In 
fact, it is qUitE ~ifficult to annul these approaches when it is 
realized that to successfully abrogate the::n, one would have to 
propose a more probable naturalistic solution to the resurrection. 3 
it ~as not only negative evidence (suc~ as that 
which was present:=d against the alternate theories) i7hic~ -:;as ascertained 
to favor the resurrection as an actual even in history. It was also 
sho~n that there were positive facts and pointers which also indicate 
2 
3 
The sign~l~cance of this criticism against all four of tnese 
scholars ~il1 be ~ore fully eyplained in the last cha]ter. 
See, for exa~ple, ?annenberg, Revelation as ~istory, o~.cit., p. 147 
and Eaier, Fi:::-st Easter, op.cit., p. 120. 
311 
that this is the ~ost probable explanation of the facts. Por 
example, Daniel ~ller points to the conversion of Paul and the 
existence of the 3entile mission. Maier presented historical 
evidence of various types to corroborate his position. 
It is for these reasons that the third possible approach to 
the resurrection, which proposes that this event actually occurred 
and that it can be demonstrated, presents itself as' the best solution 
to the question of Jesus' resurrection. As will no .. be shown, the 
conclusion whic!l 'best fits the facts is that the literal resurrection 
of Jesus from the dead can be demonstrated to have occurred as a 
historical event. fo:lv"i~g discussion in the last cnapter is 
not dependent upon the work of these four scholars discussed here, 
but still arrives at a oi~ilar conclusion. 
Chapter XIV. A Concluding Demonstration 
It has been ascertained that the lite~al resurre~tion of Jes~s 
fro~ the dead is the historical event which best accounts for the 
kilov;n facts sur::-o"J.!:dinC this occurrence. The objective i~;, tl:.is 
chapter is to present one final de~onstration by this ~riter that 
this event is the 20st probable. As explained earlier in this work, 
the ,"ore. "desonstr.s.tion" is used here not in the sense of "a-:::;solute 
proof", but rat!ler as a reference to probabilities. Thus, it is 
asse::-te0 that the; factual evidence is strong enough to 7I"arr:;.nt the 
conviction t~at t~e resurrection is the oost probable conclusion for 
l\~e. t occurrei~ 
A. The Historical Method 
!~odern !;,is-:;orio~raphy usually rules out the possibi1:'".;y of the 
miraculous a urio~i. AccordinG to this method, history is close~ to 
the Supernatural workings of God in events such as miracles. In spite 
of the popularity 0= this procedure, it ~ust be recc;nized that such 
a position is a historical presupposition. 
This modern co~cept of history emerGed fro~ the intellectual 
enyiro:rl.nent -oe::;inninc il1. the :Snlighten:nent and continued on to 
nineteenth century historical Positivism. ::iracles such as the 
resurrection ,;,,-e::-e ruled out frc:::l the outset, often because of a 
supposed conflict '.,:i th the concept of history~ The result .. as an 
1 1 . t"' t ... 1 a -oriori::-ejecticn of a 1 Supernatura ~nter'ven ~on ~n 0 n:Ls~ory. 
1 
One misht wender how historical this approach ::-ea11y is in 
See Montgomery, History and Christianity, on.cit., pp. 88-89 ~nd 
Where is Rist8r;v' Gsing'?, o-o.cit., pp. 115-116; :Slaikie, 0-'::. cit. , 
p. 135; ]aniel Fuller, on.cit., p. 188; Ladd, 0-0. cit. , pp. 12-13; 
Maier, "The Empty TOI!l.b·· as. Eistory", 0-0. ci t., p. 5. 
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actuality. In the case of a miracle-claim, the preyailing technique 
is to dis~iss t~e possibility of it even befor~ any investiGation 
of the facts. 
::fowever, such 'ITas found to be an incor':oect procedure i~ chapters 
t~o and three aboye. Science cannot rule out tne miraculo~s a uriori 
because the universe is no longer conceived of in terms of a closed 
system in which all events happen by means of a prescribed regularity. 
Science therefore cannot know beforehand that such ~iracles ca~~ot 
occur. There can thus be no rejection of miracles such as the 
resurrection si~ply by referring to a modern .. orld in which such 
Supernatura} ~vents do not occur~ 
In fact, modern science is quite limited as to what it can say 
about the resurrection. The scientific method is obviously concerned 
with ~easurable quantities. Concepts s~lch as peace, freedo= or love 
cannot, of course, be measurec in a test tube. Neither ca~ a Geiger 
counter be used to verify the existe~ce of julius Caesar. In other 
words, empirical science has no instruments or 'other means ~hereby past 
history can be investifated. In addition, history is nonrepeatable, 
which is also requi:oed in order for science to make a proper judgment. 
~herefore, all ~hat can be ascertained via empirical science is that 
the resurrection cannot be negated because of the scientific world 
view. Rather, an iillpartial historical investigation of the facts 
is needed to see if this event actually occurred. 
This is where the science of history e~erges as the ~ore proper 
~ethod to be used in this instance. As with scienoe, it was also 
shown that neither can history e~ploy the scientific world view to 
rule out miracles a '!:)riori. Y;e are thus faced once again "\-:i th the 
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need to historically investigate all of the facts to fini t~e Eost 
n:'cbable solution. Eodern historiography cannot negate the> resurrection 
as ~. historical event Iii thout such an examination. It is clearly 
i~possible (as sho~n in chapters troo and three) to properly dismiss 
such a miracle-claim beforehand. 
In this work, the historical method which is employed is therefore 
one which investisates the facts first before a decision is made as 
to ~hat can or did occur. The status of probability is given to the 
event which is the best explanation for the known facts. Such an 
inductive approach is actually more "scientific" in its end.eavor to 
base the final c~nclusion upon a thorough historical investigation 
of what is known to have occurred. 
E. The Historical Facts 
Throuehout this T.ork, many references have been =ade to the 
knonn historical facts and how the resurrection is the best explanation 
fo:, these events. ',',11 a t are these facts? What are the e-vents and 
circ1l!ristances T.hic~ are known to have happened in conju!1ction with 
the belief that Jesus rose from the dead? 
Sur:'ounding the .resurrection event are many facts which are 
usually recognized as being historical by most scholars who deal 
with this subject. It is known that Jesus actually died2 ~~d that 
he was buried. Also historical is the fact that, after the death 
of their Master, the disciples were extremely depressed and disillusioned. 
2 There are very few (if any) reputable theolosians today -.. ,ho doubt 
t~at Jesus actually died on the cross. 
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For them, Jesus' ~inistry had been ended prematurely by the ~oman 
cross. It is unani:::ously agreed that. they were thus qu.ite ciscouragec 
and downcast. Afterwards, as c~nfounding as it was, the tomb in 
which Jesus was laid was later found to be "empty. 3 
Very soon afterwards, history relates that the disciples had 
several experiences which they believed were appearances of the risen 
Jesus. After these experiences there was a drastic qhange in their 
disposition--a transformation which made them bold preachers even in 
the very city where Jesus was crucified and bu.ried: The result of 
this preaching was the birth of the Christian church, which began 
to meet on Sunday rat~er than on the Jewish Sabbath (Saturday). 
Lastly, it is an un~uestionable historical fact that one of the most 
avid persecutors of the Christian church, Saul of Tarsus, ~as converted 
to Christianity by what he. also believed was an appearance of the 
. J 4 rJ.sen esus. 
From this S1lm3ary, a minimum of ten historical facts can be 
gleaned which are held as being historical by the majority of 
theologians 010 -,-oa.ay. 1) Jesus actually c.ied on the cross ana. 2) was 
buried in a tonb. 3) The disciples were extremely disillusioned and 
disconcerted by the death of Jesus, being bereft of all hope. 4) The 
same tomb in which Jesus was buried was found empty just a few days 
later, probably with the graveclothes still inside. 5) The disciples 
3 
4 
Ladd adds here the historicity of ~he account of the graveclothes 
being found in the empty tomb (on.cit., p. 94), since the description 
of them bears the marks of eyewitness testimony. 
For similar lis~s, see Ladd, 12i£.s pp~ 13: 91-94, 132-133. 
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;rere the recipients of several eX:;leriences which they believed were 
resurrection appe~rances of Jesus. 6) Afterwards, the disciples 
experienced a complete transformation, being willing to die for 
their new faith. 7) The resultant-preaching often took place in 
JerllsalelJ:. 7 the e::act place where Jesus w?.s killed and buried. 8) This 
preaching led to the birth of the church, 9) featuring Sunday as the 
most important day of worship, instead of Saturday. 10) Later, Paul 
was converted to Christianity by means of an experience which he 
also believed was an appearance of the risen Jesus. 
These, then, are the historical facts which !!lust be d.eal t \vi th 
and explained. The gospels and New Testament as a whole ag=ee with 
all ten of these either explicitly or implicitly. Kone of them is 
denied in any of t~e writings of the New Testament. In addition, 
as we have seen at various points in this work, the majority of 
theologians accept these as historical facts as well. It is therefore 
evident that the e:i:planation which is given to the resurrection must 
also account for these events. The answer that is postulated in 
these early writin;s is that Jesus literally rose from the dead. 
Any alternate explanation must explain all of these facts adequately 
and still C?OSS t~e hardest hurdle by proposing a probable ~aturalistic 
theory for the appearances to the disciples. Thus, one ~ho would 
deny the resurrection must both ac.equately explain all of these facts 
and offer a nrobable alternate view to ~he appearances. ~ut as we 
have seen, no such probable alternative views exist, as even the more 
popular naturalistic theories fail to properly account for the facts ~h~~h 
occurred. 5 
5 We will return to a final evaluation of these alternate theories -
later. 
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The enumerating of these facts also makes it evident that 
there are ~ositive historical facts which support a belief in the 
resurrection as well. This event therefore does not only depend 
lJ!,on "hhat Ladd refers to as IIanti-criticism ll ,6 or the dis:::n.issal of 
all natu~alistic theories which have been formulated against the 
resurrection. In other words, it is not only the evidence from the 
elimination of all altErnate theories which makes the resurrection 
plausible, but there are actual "p,?sitive" facts which also demonstrate 
that this event is the most probable. 
There are at least seven strong facts which indicate that Jesus 
actually rose from the dead. The first and by far the strongest 
fact is the positive New Testament claim that the disciples ~id indeed 
see the risen Jesus. There is not only the eyewitness testi~ony of 
Paul to this fact, but the gospels are at least close tc ~~d inclu~e 
thE Eyewitness testi~ony of the ~isciples (see Luke 1:1-4 as an 
exa~ple), as discussed above. Paul also records the extre2ely 
important fact the.4: the original disciples were also preac;:ing _1... _ ....... c:.uu""w 
the appearances of the risen Jesus to them (I Cor. 15:11-15). 
The power of this New Testament testi!!lony is twofold.. First9 
no alternative theory is sufficient enough to explain these sppea~ances 
and the subsequent conviction of their reality. But it is not only 
the rejection of these theories that makes this claim so important. 
Second, the known facts surrounding ~his event tenQ to corroborate 
6 Ladd, o~.cit., pp. 27, 140-141, in reference to He1wut 7~ie1ickels 
name for this evidence. 
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it and make t~e claim highly credible. For i~stance, the disciples 
came to believe fir~ly in the resurrection despite their overwhelming 
disillusionment and disbelief. Thus, they came to believe in spite 
of themselves. Other facts are also left unexplained apart from 
the literal resurrection of Jesus. 
other events in addition to the actual appearances are also 
positive evidence for Jesus' resurrection. Second, the incredible 
change in t~e liyes of the disciples fro:n dejected !!len -::;!10 fleG. at 
t~e arrEst of Jesus to bold preachers. ~!10 asserted the te;:;..c2::'ngs of 
tta life, deat~ a~d resurrection of Jesus even in the face of their 
o~n death indicates unequivocally that these ~~n firmly believed that 
Jesus had risen. Such elation is usually not the action of 2en who 
have been deceive~ by any ki~d of falsehood, either. Such ~~doubting 
belief evE~ to the point of dying for their faith is not the mark of 
::len who hc:.d even t~1e faintest ::lisgivings about this event. The 
transformation of the disciples is best ~ccounted for by actual 
appearances of the risen Jesus. 
Third, the evidence of the empty tomb? while not in itself 
providing proof of t~e resurrection, is a positive point in favor 
of those who accept this event as historical. At the s~e tiLe it 
requires a probable explanation by those who reject this event.{ Even 
core in favor of the resurrection is the discovery of the CT2veclothes 
inside the tomb~ still unraveled wi t:-. -the body 5i~pl~r lllissing. 
7 As was shown earlier, even those who do not accept overly objective 
appearances of Jesus often accept the belief in t~e e~pty tomb. 
See Reginald Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 48-49, 69-70, 179-180 and 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God and J.::an, ou. ci t., pp. 100-104. 
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The attitude of the Jewish leaders in the book of Acts reveals 
a fourth set of historical circumstances strongly in favor of Jesus' 
literal resurrection. When the disciples were confronted by the 
Jewish elders o~ various occasions in the early chapters of this 
book (see especially Acts 4-5), these followers of Jesus ~ere not 
charged with spreading false tales about Jesus' resurrection. Neither 
did the Jews go to Jesus; to~b, reveal his body and so crush the 
central belief of Christianity.8 
Fifth, the very "birth of the Christian church d.epends 1.::.pon the 
message of Jesus i resurrection. This event forms the very center 
of Christianity and of the earliest Christian message. According 
to the earliest testi~ony, there would have been no church today 
9 apart from this event. 
~ sixth fact pointing to the resurrection is the com~e~orating 
of this event in the Ghri~JlJjs.n worship on Sunday instead of Sc:.. turday, 
the Jewish Sabbath. The first day of the week was referred to as 
"the Lord's day" because .Tesus was believed to have risen on a 
Sunday (see Rev. 1:10; cf. In. 20:19, 26). Early Jewish Cr:istians 
apparently still oathered at the local synagogue for ~orship on 
Saturday, but for tl'le Christia-"'l believer, Sunday was t!le day for such 
important practices as partaking of the Lord's supper (Acts 20:7) and 
8 
9 
ohen speakinG ;.i th an "agnostic" on the subject of Jesus' re!5urrection 
a fe~ years ago s this writer was told that the stance t~:en by 
the Jewish leaders in the boo~ of Acts was the strongest 
~emonstrati8n of the reality of this event. 
See Acts 1:21, 22; 2:24, 32; ;:15, 26; 4:10; 5:;0, etc. 
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the gathering of one's of~ering (I Cor. 16:2). Soon Sun~ay became 
the day of pre-er:rinence for the Chris~ians. But sc:.ethint; zust aCCOll.."lt 
for this day of war-ship since it was not the usual day. ':::he l~ew 
Testament witnesses that the change was due to Jesus' resurrectic~. 
A seventh historical fact which makes the resurrecti~~ even more 
probable is the conversion of Paul. This enemy of the Christian 
church was suddenly converted to the faith which ne had so avidly 
opposed. As Daniel Fuller shows, other naturalistic views -~:hich 
would account for this conversion are not convincing anQ 2USt be 
rejected. Paul c1<::.1.::(;:1 his turnabout was due to an appea:!.'allce of 
the risen Jesus and it is this view which still fits the fr;,cts . .. 10 ces "" 
These seven facts are therefore "positive" evidence for the 
resurrection of Jesus in add.i tien to the "negative" eviie::~cG supplied. 
• L' t t' ~.l.h It ... . . 11 oy a relU a 10n 01 ~e a erna",1ve v1e~s. The appearances of the 
risen Jesus to his followers, the complete chanse in the d.isciples, 
the empty to=b, the attitude of the Je~ish leaders in Acts, the 
existence of the cLu~ch, the Christian worship day of Sunday and. 
Faul1s conversion are strong facts in favor of the resurrection. 
Earlier other historical evidence was also given, such as Janiel 
Fuller's thesis about the existence of the Gentile missio~ being 
d.ependent on the resurrection12 and Paul Maier's 2resentation of 
10 
11 
12 
Daniel Fuller, ou.cit., pp. 242-250. 
"Positive" eyidence is a refer'ence to events which .?oi.:t directly 
to the res-.:rrection, ";7hile "negative" evidence is that ';:-hich is 
received fro~ refuting the naturalistic theories. Of co~rse, ~ 
are positive as far as the r0ality of the resurrection is concerned. 
Daniel Fuller, o~.cit., p~. :_9-261. 
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both specific and circumstantial nistorical evidence for this event. 13 
However, contemporary theology has provided additional evidence 
foy· the resurrection which reinfo::-ces ea~l1 of these other points of 
evidence. As eXylaineQ in chapter one, the application of form 
criticis~ to the sospel records was thought to be nelpful in ascertaining 
what the earliest cbu.rch believed. about Jesus. One of the J:;:lain 
expecta tions tf.SS to uncover how the miraculous element was due to 
later additions an~ was not actually a part of the life of Jesus. 
But such was not to be the case. 
Contrary to 7:n:::.t may have been expected if the origin of 
everything niraculous in the New Testament was the faith of the early 
church rather than being a real part of Jesus' life, scholars cannot 
react a form critical layer of tradition in whicn the resurrection 
belief is not present. In other words, form criticism has ceDonstrated 
tha t t!1.e resur=ection belief is in the earliest strata of Ci.lristian 
belief. As Carl ~raatc~ cAplains these ::-esults: 
13 
14 
The form-c::-i tical study of the earlie.st Christia:l traditions 
nas established beyond reasonable doubt .that faith in the 
risen Christ is the point of departure and the essential content 
of the kery~a. Without the Easter faith there ~o~ld have 
been no Christian church and the New Testament would not have 
been written. The belief that God raised Jesus from the dead 
on the third day is as old as the Christian faith and is now, 
as ever cefore, the a::-ticle by ~hich the church stands or 
falls •••• it may be refreshing to know that even the more scepticaJ 
historian: ag:ree that for primative Christianity .... the 
resurrection of Jesus from the dead was a real eVe~t in history, 
the very ioun~a~~on of faith, and net a ~ythical idea arising 
out of the creative imagination of believers.14 
2~aier, First :3aster, 0"0. ci t., pp. 114-122 and liThe 3m.pt3" Tomb as 
History", on.cit., pp. 4-6. 
Carl 3raaten, History and Her~eneu.tics, Volume II of New Directions 
in Theolo;~r Today, edited by William liordern (Seven vol~es; 
Philadel?hia: The Westminster Press, 1966) p. 78. 
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Other schola~s likewise concur with Braaten in this view. 
Reginald Fuller ag=ees that there was no time in which the ~esurrection 
was not tne center of Christian preaching. 15 Ramm asserts that the 
most important pu~?ose served by form criticism has been to show 
that the miracles, and the resurrection in particula~ have been 
embedded in Christian belief from the very _ . . 16 oegl.r...n~:n.g .. 7i"anc. notes 
the. t the further bad: tba t the texts are studied, the more clear it 
becomes that the risen Christ is the same as the Jesus of history.17 
Thus form criticism only served to strenghten the belief that the 
resurrection is the historical basis of the Christian faith. It 
likewise confirmei the fact that this event occupied this very important 
position in theology since the very begin.'1ingsof Christianity. 
!n en~erating these historical facts surrounding the resurrection, 
it becomes apparen~ that this event is the best explanation for what 
has occurred. Eowever, tnere is not only the evidence of these facts, 
but the~e is also the evidence from the refuted naturalistic theories. 
In ad.dition, it lias also found that t!1ere are at least seven major 
historical facts in favor of the resurrection besides those listed 
by such scholars as iYlaier and. Daniel Fuller. These consid.erations 
therefore show that the literal resurrection of Jesus is ~b.e most 
probable conclusion to this historical ,!uestion, especially "hen it is 
recognized tha~ no alter~ate theories or other facts ~ilit~te against 
this event. 
15 
16 
17 
Reginald Fuller, on.cit., p. 48. 
Rar:L"'!l, ?~ctest8.:nt Christian Evidences, o"J.cit., p. 194. 
Wand, on. cit., p. 122. 
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c. The Theological 1.1ethod 
It becomes especially apparent from the material presented in 
this chapter (as ~ell as in the rest of this work) that the pivotal 
point in this discussion is the experiences of the earliest followers 
of Jesus. All admit that these witnesses really believed that Jesus 
actually rose from the dead. lS But the focal point here concerns 
whethe~ these eX?eri~llCes were actually appearances of the risen Jesus~ 
Naturalistic theories of these experiences have been proposed 
ever since tl1e earliest proclamation of these beliefs. Of -:11e 
several alternative views which were refuted here, there Toere three 
major hypotheses. These were the swoon theory popularized by Heinrich 
Paulus, the subjecti-:€ vision theory formulated by David strauss 
and the legend or ::::l:lth theory taught by Otto pfleid.erer and. others. 19 
It has bee~ a very important emphasis in this work to provide a 
detailed and conplete refutation of each of·the naturalis~ic theories, 
especially these t~~ee major ones. Although it ~ay be tho~cht that 
the te!'ldency was to "overkill" each of the theories by pre~enting 
::::lore evid.ence than ~as necessary to dispose of them, it =ust be 
18 
19 
Even critical theology ~ccepts this belief on the part of the 
disciples. For instance, 5ee Bul t:nann, "New Testament a."ld hlythology" 
in Kery~a and Myth, ou.cit., p. 42. 
Other naturalistic theories refuted here in addition to th~se 
three include the objective vision theory (including t~e telegram 
theory), the hypothesis of the continuing spiritual presence of 
Jesus' personality in his disciples' minds, and the fraud theory 
(including the stolen body hypothesis). See especially chapter 
siT- for these refutations. 
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strenuously objected that such was the exact intention of this 
writer and for good re~son. The need for a complete refutation of the 
alternative theories is too often overlooked in the works of those 
who also opt for the belief that the resurrection can be de~onstrated. 
It is apparently not r~alized that the more thorough such a refutation 
is, the more nrobable the resurrectio~ becomes. 
The reason for t1:is assertion is acute. There are several very 
important facts V:'hich point to the factici ty of the resurrc.c·tion; the 
main one being the appearances to the disciples. A~ long as a key 
I 
alternate theory re~ains unrefuted (in whole or in part), these 
facts which point to the resurrection -:~.nnot be accorded the full 
impact which they warrant. 3ut the more the alternate theories are 
refuted, the :nore outstanding ihe facts favoring the disciples' 
claims become~ thus leaving the resurrection as still even more 
probabl~. Then it follows that the Dore completely such nat~ralistic 
theories are rejected, the higher the probab'ili ty for the resurrection 
beco:n.es as the facts which demonstrate the reality of this event are 
thereby shown to be valid. This is especially so when no other alternate 
theories are shown to be probable. Therefore we perceive t~e importance 
of complete refutations of these other views. 
In examininG tne approaches of Pannenberg, Daniel ~~ller, Ladd 
and }~aier, it was found that each was not complete in 'his :oefuta tion 
of alternate views (to varying degrees). This is true in t1'IO 
different respects. First, many of the main reasons for rejecting 
each of the major theories were not presented. In other ...-o:,c,s, seldom 
v;as a theory rejected as thoroughly or strongly as it might have been. 
Second~ eac~ of these scholars neglected completely (or almost so) 
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one or more of the: "t::'ree major theories. In Pannen"berb"s secti0Il 
dealing with a defense of the resurrection against the alternate 
theories in his Yoli.:~.ine Jesus--God and "':.an, the swoon theory is 
1 t · 20 neg ec ea. Fuller's treatise omits any specific refutation of 
strauss' vision tneory or of the legend or ~yth theory, alt~ough both 
are cited as alternate hypotheses. Also, the swoon theory is quickly 
passed over ,vi th very little disproof. 21 Ladd. also ignores the legend. 
or :a:.yt::' theory ir.. his treatment of the naturalis·tic theories~ 22 as 
d.oes !Eaier. 23 <i.l t::'ough it has been ascertained t~at these scholars 
were generally successful in their overall treatments of t~e resurrection, 
one cannot help but t~ink that since it was their desire to de~onstrate 
the probability of ~~e resurrection, a more complete re!ut~tion would 
have been desirable. 
Since a more adequate refutation of the alternate t~eo:ries makes 
the reE:~rrection more probable, the treat~~nt of the three Dajor 
theories and several lesser ones in this work has end.eavorec. to be 
complete. In fact, the desire was specifically to present ~ore evidence 
than ",ras necessary in order to dismiss each one. The New Testament 
states that Jesus rose from the dead and demonstrated this by appearing 
to his followers. Other facts also corroborate this event. Uith these 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Pannenberg, Jesus--God a...'>'ld Man, 0"0. ci t., pp. 88-106. 
Daniel Fuller, o~.cit., see pp. 38-39, 45-49, 67-68 for examples 
of this. 
Ladd, ou.cit., pp. 132-142. 
~aier, First ~aster, o"O.cit., pp. 105-113. 
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naturalistic theories thus shown to be ~uite inadequate to properly 
explain whet occurred, the facts for the resurrection are sbown to 
be hlghly probable. If one believes that it is still difficult to 
accept such a Supernatural event, it is even more difficult to 
formulete an alternative view which logically, historically and 
theologically accou.~ts for the known facts. The resurrection is 
the highly probeble historical fact ~hich best accounts fo= what 
occurred. 
D. Convinced by the Facts 
One interesti~~ point with regard to the facts of the resurrection 
is that, after an examination of the evidence, many scholars who had 
once rejected t~is ever.t ca~e to believe that it could be de~onstrated 
to have occu=red. They were convinced by the weight of ~ne facts t~~t 
this event was historical. This is not to say thet no one ,';"no had 
been taUGht that the resurrection occurred has ever rejected such 
inf0rmetion leter. ~ut this writer knows of no instance ~~e=e the 
resurrection was rejected after en examination of the facts, as was 
the case with these ~ho accepted the reelity of this event afte= just 
such an examinetion, against their former views. 
Frar.k I:!orison, a lawyer, is surely one of the best exa::::ples of 
a scholar who ~ec~me convinced against his earlier. convictions after 
studyin6 the evidence for the resurrection. As a young ma~, l:orison 
began a serious study of the life of Jesus, being much influenced by 
the works of G-er:r.en liberal scholarship. He did not accept the miracles 
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in Jp,sus' life a~d. was G.ete:,oined to remove what he felt ".7ere mythical 
outgrow-ths. 
Ten years afta:' his first studies he received the OP?o~t~~ity to 
study the life of Jes~s in depth. An examination of the last week of 
Jesus' life i~ particular brought him to a study of the resurrection. 
3:owever, in endeavoring to write a book exposil:g these !:lyths which he 
thought he would fi.nd, he was compelled by the factual evidence to 
Tori te 'lui te a differ'ent book in favor of the resurrection. This 
work, entitled \Tho ];loved the Stone?, became a defense of the 
resurrection again~t the theological views formerly held by l~orison 
himself. ~e explains that it was because of his investigation of the 
fa.cts that he reversed his former views a.nd that caused hi::: to realize 
not only ~hat the resurrection occurred, but that it could be 
, t'" d 24 c.eZlons ra"e • 
'!Ihe late Sim~)l: G~eenleaf, p8.:::-: Barvard professor of la.r; and one 
of the sreatest legal minds that America· has ever produced, ~as a 
religious skeptic. Challenged by hiB students to apply the techniques 
of his legal !:lasti:rpiece .A Treatise on the Law of EV'idence tv the 
resurrection of Jes~s, Greenleaf became a believer. ~e later wrote a 
book, the long title of which is An Examination 'of the Testi:::nony of 
the Four 3van5el;sts by the Rules of Evidence Administered in the 
Cou::::·ts of Justice. 25 In this work he defends the resurrec';;icn and 
24 
25 
See ;.:orison' s -book Who :,:ov~'; the stone?, 0"0. ci t., espscially the 
?ref~ce and pp. 9-12; cf. pp. 8o-l02 for instance. Tne first cha~ter 
appropriatel:,r tells of the original book that could !':oot be writte~ 
against the res-..::.rrection and life of Jesus because of the facts. 
r,,' - k - . d - , t'\ t:: ~ (G"'a. .:l ".:;> -; d .!.n~s wor wa.s reprl.n-r;e ~n J.;;v~ -_ nl,,;, _.ap ... s: Eaker 300k House). 
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explains how, when judged by the laws of legal evidence, this event 
can be demonstrated to have actually occurred. 26 
Another scholar ~ho was convinced by an examination of the 
evidence is ~edical doctor Viggo Olsen. Be described hiillself as an 
agnostic who did not believe in the Supernatural elements of Christianity. 
But more than this, he const~.tly ~uestioned the Christian :aith and 
attempted to disprove it. Through the process of trying tc expose 
these beliefs, he studied the resurrection and other evide~ces. 
Later he became convinced that God tUd exist e.nd tha.t there "~as 
more than a sufficient amount of de~onstration for the res~rrection. 
He realized that this event actually occurred and that as such it was 
the center of the Christian faith. It is noteworthy that Simon 
Greenleaf's book on the Christian evidences was a key influence on 
Olsen. 27 
Other scholars who have looked impartially at the facts have 
often likewise concluc..ed that the evidence for the resurrection 
establishes it as a historical event. For· instance, such i.as the 
cO!lclusion of lawyer Sir Biward Clarke, K.C., who also investigated 
the resurrection in terms of the evidential aspect. He renarked that 
this factual suP?ort was conclusive, as he had often secure~ a positive 
verdict in courts of law with less evidence. 28 McDo~ell lists numerous 
26 
27 
28 
See Josh !.:cDowell, Evidence that Demands A Verdict (San Bernadino: 
Published by Campus Crusade for Christ International, no date), 
especially pp. 199-200. See also the tape by McDowell distributed 
by this sa~e organization, entitled "Resurrection: Fact or Fallacy?" 
ViggoOlsen, The A~osti~ Who Dared to Search (Chicago: Keody 
Press, 1974). For Olsen's discussion of the resurrection, see 
pp. 36-37, 39, 46-47 of this booklet. 
Stott records a letter '.'1'ri tten by Clarke with the a.bove affirma tions~ 
See John R. ".7. stott j Basic Christianity (Chicago: Inter-Varsi ty 
Press, 1965), p~ 46. 
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other instances where other scholars came to similar conclusions 
after an impartial examination of the facts. 29 
~hen speakin~ of such examples, the New Testament instances of 
similar results should not be ignored. It is known, for instance, 
that Jesus' brother James was almost assuredly not a believe:r' before 
the resurrection (J~. 7:5; cf. !dk. 3:21, 31-34). Eut after an 
appearance fro~ Jes~s he became a Christi~~ and the leader of the 
Jerusalem church (I Cor. 15:7; cf. Gal. 2:1-10). The ex~ple of 
Paul changing fro~ a persecutor of the church (Acts 7:57-59; 9:1-2) 
to an ardent follower of Christ has already been mentioned above 
(see I Cor. 15: 8-9). Agair.. it was an appearance of the risen Je=,~s 
that caused this change of heart. It is the opinion of co~te~porary 
thecl~gical scholarship that ~cth of these men became Christians 
in spite of their former beliefs because of an appearance of the 
risen Lord. 30 
This brief pr2sentation has shown that many have accepted the 
resurrection as a historical eYent after a'careful investiga.tion-of 
'the data, even when formerly opposed to .this belief. Also extremely 
interesting is the stance taken by two "God-is-dead" or secillar 
theologians, Willia3 Hamilton and Jo~~ A.T. Robinson: In spite of 
the secular theological positions of these two men, they also 
recognize the strong evidence fer the resurrection. 
For ~amilton, the resurrection and empty tomb are hiShly 
pro-oa.ble. In fact, he believes that the resurrection may be affirmed 
29 
30 
MeDowell, op.cit., pp. 196-202. 
See Reginald Puller, on.cit., pp. 37, 177-178; Raymond 3rown, 
The Virginal Concention and Bodily ?esurrection of Jes~s, on~cit., 
p. 94, footnote number 160 and p. 95; Ladd, on.cit., pp. 104-106 
for a few examples of this belief. 
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31 
as a regular historical event. Robinson admits that the empty 
tomb is very dif:icu1t to dis~iss because of the good evidence for 
32 this event. 
T~is survey of several scholars was presented in orde~ to sho~ 
ho~ strong the evide~ce for the resurrection is for the o~e ~ho looks 
irr.partially at the facts. Seve~al scholars who were once op~osed to 
this belief ~ere convinced othernise after ~n investigation of the 
evidence, as were others who studied the data ir. favor of this event. 
The New Testament also records two exa::lp1es of men who were convinced 
by resurrection appearances of Jesus against their former views. 
Even two secular theo1oginas were able to grant a high credibility to 
the resurrection, as one accepted it as a historical event While 
t~e other ad!:litted that it Vlould be hard to reject the st=':;;lg' evidence 
in favor of it. 
Suc~ is the convincing evidence for the resurrection of Jesus 
Crxist. As church historian Wand re!:linds us about t~is event: 
.IUJ. the strictl~' historical evidence we· have is i!"J. fa~!or 
of it, and those schol~r? who reject it ouzht to recocnize 
that they do so on some other ground than that of scis~tific 
"';sto-v -'::3 
... ~... -II' • ./ 
:'~is serves <".s a good reminder about our earlier conclusion 
accept the ans~er to the ~uestion of the resurrection which best 
fits the facts. ~9nd notes that if naturalistic theories are unable 
to account for an event '.V!1ich clai:ls that a miracle has taken place, 
then a Supernatural alternative ~ust not be viewed as impossible. 
It is unscie~tific to oegin ~ith t!1e pres~pposition that ~iraculous 
31 
32 
33 
Willia:!! ?:e.::J.ilto~, The Wew Essence of C!1ristianity (New York: 
Association Press, 1961), p. 116, note. 
John A.T. ROJinson, Ex~lor2tio!l. Into God (Stanford: Stanford 
Universit3 Fress, 1967), p. 113. 
Wand, o~.cit., pp. 93-94. 
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events ca~~ot occur. Rather, a critical historian can only examine 
the facts involved in the situation before hi~ and decide on the 
basis of this evidence. If the probable event is a Supernat~ral one. 
then it must be accepted as such, as with the resurrection. ~odern 
science and history cannot refute this event, as we have seen. 34 
Therefore, in accordance with this historical princi~le, the 
literal resurrection of Jesus Christ fro~ the dead·must be accepted 
as an actual histo~ical eventaccor.ding to its high degree of plausibility. 
Once again, those who find it difficult to accept this conclusion 
will have an even wore difficult time endeavoring to formulate ~~ 
alternative theory "hieh is historically probable. It is not only 
possible to conpletely refute all of the naturalistic alternate 
theories which oppose a literal resurrection, as shown above, but 
there are several i=port~nt facts in favor of this event. The 
most i~,ortant of these facts is that, in all probability, Je91~S 
appeared e~pirically to his followers after his death on thc cross 
and no other thesis apart from the literal r~surrection is capable 
of properly explaining these appearances. The resurrection of Jesus 
is thereby hi~~ly probable. 
E. The Center of Christianity 
It must be concluded that the knowledge that Jesus' resurrection 
is a historical fact is one of ultimate importance to the Christian 
faith. As was sho~n in chapter eleven, one cannot hold that Jesus 
is dead and that he never rose from the tomb and still hold that 
34 Ibid., pp. 30, 51-52, 70-71, 101. 
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Jesus is alive today in any uni~ue sense. Neither can one hold that 
suc~ doctrines as Christolo~' and subsequent beliefs concerning 
salvation can have the same validity if the one around who~ such 
beliefs revolve is dead, not even being able to conquer death himself. 
If such were the case, there would thus be no reaso~ to sus?ect that 
Christians will receive such blessings either. As Paul asserts, 
apart fro~ the res~rrection there is no Christian faith at all 
(I Cor. 15:12-19). For this reason, the reality of the resurrec~ion 
is absolutely esse:::tial for Christian faith. 35 
There~ore, the conclusion which asserts that Jesus actually 
rose fro~ the dead is no meaningless assertion~ It is not a ~atter 
of simply affir~i!lG the resurrection. To the contrary, it is very 
i~portant to acce~t this eve~t as historical, for in so doing the 
re~ainder of the Christian faith is de~onstrated to be valid. 
This is also o;;hy it wa:- asser'Ced earlie:.'" tbat t::'e concept of 
faith as defined PH Kierke;a.,.rd a.nd 3a:::,th could :::,e::nain valid in 
spite of the critiques of these two theologians~ Each of these 
scholars agrees with the New Testament in recognizing that every 
individual man is a sinner In need of repentance, or a total change 
in one's life. A total surrender to God in faith, trustins Jesus' 
substitutionary death on the cross to forgive these sins, is needed 
for salvation. The result is a total change in one's life, a total 
com~itment based upon the death of Jesus. In these principles, 
35 Even secular theologian 7>'"illiam Hamilton opposes ihe contemporary 
view which gives e7.ist~ntial i~portance to the concept that Jesus 
is alive but denies that he literally rose from the de~d. ~amilton 
also asserts that wit~out the historical event of the resurrection, 
Christian faith loses all meaning (on.cit., p. 116, note). Here 
he perceiveS t~8 ~ase quite well. 
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Kierkegaard and 3arth both follow the New Testament defi~ition of 
salvation. Jes~s clai~ed to have come to this world chiefly to die 
a substitutionary death in order to procure such salvation for those 
who com=it their lives in faith to God through ~is Son (see ~ark 10: 
45; John 1:12-13; I Cor. l5:l-4)a 
Such teachinGs ~~o ~-- often ignored today as outmoded and due to 
ancient superstitions. But in light of our conclusions concerning 
Jesus' resurrection, such tendencies to dismiss the New Testament 
teaching on salvation are unwarranted. Since the resurrection is 
accepted as a Supernatural event~ as showr. here, then Jesus' ~inistry 
to ffiankind was for a reason. It ~ould be illogical to accept the 
Super~atural demonstration of Jesus' mission and then reject the 
message which is corroborated by it. As the resurrection evsnt cannot 
be denied, neither can the resurreqtion message of the subsequent 
availability of this salvation. 
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